Yoder

PEARSON, J.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

STATE EX REL. HOME AND LAND )

DEVELOPERS LLC, et al., ) CASE NO. 4:26CV0235

)

Plaintiffs, )

) JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON

v. )

)

MARTHA C. YODER, etc., ) MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

) AND ORDER

Defendant. ) [Resolving ECF No. 13]

Pending is Defendant Martha C. Yoder’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 13) pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), treated as a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The motion was filed on June 23, 2026. Defendant moves the Court for an

Order dismissing the Complaint (ECF No. | at PageID #: 5-7) in its entirety with prejudice,

assessing costs to Plaintiffs, and granting Defendant all other relief to which she is entitled. The

Court has been advised, having reviewed the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law.

For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

1.

On December 30, 2025, Plaintiffs Home and Land Developers LLC and JRD Holdings

filed a two-count Complaint (ECF No. | at PageID #: 5-7) against Defendant, in her individual

capacity, in the Trumbull County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas, being Case No. 2025 CV

03278. Plaintiffs were and remain private real estate developers, in and around Trumbull

County, owning undeveloped land having public infrastructure ready for development within the

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meaning of Ohio Admin, Code § 5703-25-11(C)(4). Defendant is the Trumbull County, Ohio

Auditor, whom appraises and assesses county real estate for taxation purposes within the

meaning of Ohio Rev. Code § 5713.01. The First Claim is for mandamus. Plaintiffs allege

Defendant has and does appraise(d) and assess(ed) their land via the “development method” for

valuing land, i.e., by estimating value as thought fully developed. According to Plaintiffs,

Defendant has not subtracted therefrom Plaintiffs’ development, administrative, and

entrepreneurial costs, which they claim is required by § 5703-25-11(C)(4). The Second Claim

asserts a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in a class-of-one equal protection claim. Plaintiffs allege

Defendant appraised and assessed only their land via the “development method.” According to

Plaintiffs, Defendant appraised and assessed land owned by others as “undeveloped,” resulting in

a value that is a fraction of that of Plaintiffs’ land. Plaintiffs claim Defendant’s dissimilar

treatment among similarly-situated developers resulted in a denial of their equal protection of the

laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

Defendant removed the case to this Court on January 29, 2026, on the basis of federal

question jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Notice of Removal (ECF No. | at

PageID #: 1,93). She filed an Answer (ECF No. 4) on February 5, 2026.

II.

A.

“The standard of review for entry of judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is

indistinguishable from the standard of review for dismissals based on failure to state a claim

under Rule 12(b)(6); the difference between the two rules is simply the timing of the motion to

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dismiss. For a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the moving party must request judgment in a

pre-answer motion or in the answer itself, whereas a motion for dismissal under Rule 12(c) may

be submitted after the answer has been filed.” Jackson v. Heh, No. 98-4420, 2000 WL 761807,

at *3 (6th Cir. June 2, 2000) (citing Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir.1980)

(holding that an untimely motion to dismiss may be treated as a motion for judgment on the

pleadings); Hunter v. Ohio Veterans Home, 272 F. Supp. 2d 692, 694 (N.D. Ohio 2003).

B.

The procedural standard for determining a judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(c) is indistinguishable from the standard of review for dismissals based on failure to state a

claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Daily Services, LLC v. Valentino, 756 F.3d 893, 898 (6th

Cir, 2014) (citing Ziegler v. IBP Hog Mkt., Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001)). “To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,

to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Igbal_, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “While legal conclusions

can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then

determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Jd. at 679. The factual

allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing authorities).

In other words, claims set forth in a complaint must be plausible, rather than conceivable.

Id. at 570. The factual allegations in the complaint “must contain something more... than...a

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statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 1216, p. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). Dismissal of the action is proper if Plaintiff “undoubtedly

can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle relief.” Progressive Northern

Ins. Co. v. City of Rocky River, No. 1:18CV0524, 2019 WL 5394206, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 16,

2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Ill.

Defendant complied with the pre-filing written exchange required by §] 14 of the Case

Management Plan (ECF No. 11 at PageID #: 61). See ECF No. 13 at PageID #: 76; ECF No. 13-

1. Plaintiffs’ counsel wrote in response to Defendant’s request to be dismissed: “Plaintiffs

won’t dismiss their two claims because the Board of Revision can no longer remedy their

mandamus claim for years 2023-2024. Hence, no ‘adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the

law’ for mandamus purposes.” Email Message dated June 5, 2026 from Attorney Michael D.

Rossi (ECF No. 13-2). After Defendant briefed the First Claim for mandamus, Plaintiffs filed a

Notice of Withdrawal of Complaint’s First Claim (ECF No. 14). While considering relevant

factors under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41, the First Claim is dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21

because Plaintiffs have now withdrawn it. See Wilkerson v. Brakebill, No.:

3:15-CV-435-TAV-CCS, 2017 WL 401212, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 30, 2017) (“Plaintiffs desire

to withdraw a single claim, rather than the entire action, so any prejudice to defendants is

substantially minimized.”) (citing Crozin v. Crown Appraisal Grp., Inc., Nos. 2:10-cv-581, 2:10-

cv-764, 2012 WL 139219, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 18, 2012)). In the alternative, the First Claim is

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dismissed because Plaintiffs make no effort to rebut Defendant’s request for dismissal of it. A

plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff fails to address it in response to a

motion for judgment on the pleadings. See CHKRS, LLC y. City of Dublin, 984 F.3d 483, 492

(6th Cir. 2021) (affirming district court’s decision granting judgment on the pleadings to

defendant on plaintiff's due-process claims because plaintiff had abandoned them by making no

arguments in response to defendant’s contentions about them).

IV.

A.

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a class-of-one equal protection claim upon

which relief can be granted. The Sixth Circuit has held:

The Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination by government which either

burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or intentionally treats one

differently than others similarly situated without any rational basis for the

difference.

TriHealth, Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, Hamilton County, Ohio, 430 F.3d 783, 788 (6th Cir.

2005) (citation omitted). The Complaint (ECF No. | at PageID #: 5-7) does not allege that a

fundamental right was burdened or that the alleged conduct targets a suspect class. The third

type of equal protection claim is a class-of-one claim. “In [Vill. of Willowbrook vy. Olech, 528

U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam)], the Court in the property context, laid out the basic

requirements for a valid class-of-one claim: a plaintiff must allege ‘that she has been

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis

for the difference in treatment.’” Franks v. Rubitschun, 312 Fed.Appx. 764, 766 (6th Cir. 2009).

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A “class of one” plaintiff may demonstrate that government action lacks a rational

basis either by negativing every conceivable basis which might support the

government action, or by showing that the challenged action was motivated by

animus or ill-will. . . . To prevail, they must demonstrate that the differential

treatment they were subjected to is so unrelated to the achievement of any

combination of legitimate purposes that the court can only conclude that the . . .

actions were irrational.

* * *

[G]overnmental action subject to equal protection scrutiny under the rational basis

test must be sustained if any conceivable basis rationally supports it.

Id. at 788, 790 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). In Bertovich v. Village of Valley View,

Ohio, 431 Fed.Appx. 455 (6th Cir. 2011), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court dismissal

of Bertovich’s Fourteenth Amendment claims against Valley View, based on the Village’s Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion. The Court of Appeals stated:

In dismissing this claim, the district court found that Bertovich had failed to

“allege any facts from which one might conclude he was treated differently from

others that are similarly situated.” A close examination of the factual allegations

confirms that Bertovich does not point to any individual who was treated

differently, and makes no allegation that any other individual had been able to

effect a criminal investigation by his or her request. In fact, Bertovich himself

acknowledges that there was an investigation, but asserts that such investigation

was only “cursory.” Bertovich has not pointed to any facts supporting his

contention that a similarly situated victim, without the alleged adversarial

relationship with municipal leadership, would enjoy a higher level of attention

from law enforcement.

Had we determined that Bertovich’s allegations satisfied the differential-treatment

pleading requirement, he would nonetheless have failed to state a claim. This is

because his allegations also fall short concerning Valley View’s lack of a rational

basis for the treatment. Although Bertovich makes allegations concerning an

“animus” held against him by the Village of Valley View, and Valley View’s

“desire . . . to protect Cooke from both civil and criminal liability,” his allegations

include no specific information.

Id. at 458.

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In Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2012), the Sixth Circuit

explained that “a plaintiff must overcome a ‘heavy burden’ to prevail based on the class-of-one

theory.” Jd. at 462 (citing TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, Hamilton Cty., Ohio, 430 F.3d 783,

791 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the plaintiff “had not carried its heavy burden of negativing

every conceivable basis for the Board’s decision”)).

JDC Management, LLC v. Reich, 644 F. Supp.2d 905 (W.D. Mich. 2009) discusses at

length the application of Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture., 553 U.S. 591 (2008), and

subsequent cases construing it, noting that courts throughout the country have begun extending

Engquist beyond the context of public employment to other circumstances requiring the exercise

of discretion.

[Engquist’s| rationale strongly suggests that the class-of-one theory is also

unavailable in other contexts where government officials must make subjective

discretionary decisions, e.g., in its role as a sovereign and regulator.

Id. at 910 (emphasis in original). In JDC Management, LLC, the district court quoted a

particularly apt passage from the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Jennings v. City of Stillwater, 383

F.3d 1199, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 2004):

In the wake of Olech, lower courts have struggled to define the contours of

class-of-one cases. All have recognized that, unless carefully circumscribed, the

concept of a class-of-one equal protection claim could effectively provide a

federal cause of action for review of almost every executive and administrative

decision[] made by state actors. It is always possible for persons aggrieved by

government action to allege, and almost always possible to produce evidence, that

they were treated differently than others, with regard to everything from zoning to

licensing to speeding to tax evaluation. It would become the task of federal courts

and juries, then, to inquire into the grounds for differential treatment and to decide

whether those grounds were sufficiently reasonable to satisfy equal protection

review. This would constitute the federal courts as general-purpose

second-guessers of the reasonableness of broad areas of state and local

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decision-making: a role that is both ill suited to the federal courts and offensive

to state and local autonomy in our federal system.

JDC Management, LLC, 644 F. Supp.2d at 924-25 (emphasis in original).

Defendant argues a class-of-one claim still requires someone else. Plaintiffs identify no

one in the Complaint (ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 5-7). To date, Plaintiffs still identify no

comparator taxpayer, no comparator parcel, no tax year, no valuation, and no appraisal facts from

which the Court could plausibly infer that another property was similarly situated in all material

respects. They likewise plead no facts showing purposeful discrimination or eliminating rational,

parcel-specific reasons for different appraisal treatment. At most, they allege a disagreement

over valuation methodology. At this time, however, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings regarding the Second Claim. Defendant can renew this argument at a

later stage of the proceedings.1

B.

Defendant argues Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is also barred by qualified immunity because

Plaintiffs have not pleaded a constitutional violation or a clearly established right. Once a

defendant raises qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must demonstrate

both that the official violated a constitutional or statutory right, and that the right was so clearly

established at the time of the alleged violation that every reasonable official would have

1 The Court recently granted the parties’ Joint Motion to Extend Fact Discovery

Deadline (ECF No. 16) until August 14, 2026. See Non-document Order dated July 27,

2026. Plaintiffs presumably have engaged in discovery to identify comparators, who are

similarly situated in all material respects, and intentional irrational treatment. The

dispositive motion cutoff date is September 15, 2026. See ECF No. 11 at PageID #: 61,

¶ 14.

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understood that what he was doing violated that right. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S 731, 741

(2011). If the plaintiff fails to carry this burden as to either element of the analysis, qualified

immunity applies and the official is immune. Cockrell v. City of Cincinnati, 468 Fed.Appx. 491,

494 (6th Cir. 2012). “Clearly established law” should not be defined “at a high level of

generality” and the clearly established law must be “particularized” to the facts of the case.

Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 742; Anderson vy. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). While generally a

court should look to binding precedent with sufficiently similar facts to the case in front of it,

“[s]ome violations of constitutional rights are so obvious that a ‘materially similar case’ is not

required for the right to be clearly established.” Hearring v. Sliwowski, 712 F.3d 275, 280 (6th

Cir. 2013) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004)); see also Taylor v. Riojas,

592 U.S. 7, 8-9 (2020) (per curiam) (holding that, in an outrageous case, a “general constitutional

rule” will serve as sufficient notice to an officer claiming qualified immunity) (quoting Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 US. 730, 741 (2002)).

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Supreme Court established a two-step

inquiry for determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity. /d. at 201. The

Court must consider (1) whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the injured

party, a constitutional right has been violated; and (2) whether that right was clearly established.

Id.; Mosier v. Evans, 90 F.4th 541, 546 (6th Cir. 2024). In Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223

(2009), the Supreme Court held that while the sequence set forth in Katz is often appropriate, it is

not mandatory, and courts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of the qualified

immunity analysis to address first. /d. at 236; Williams v. City of Grosse Pointe Park, 496 F.3d

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482, 485 (6th Cir. 2007) (if a plaintiff is “unable to establish sufficient facts to support a finding

of a constitutional violation by the defendant, the inquiry ceases, and the court must award

judgment to the defendant”).

Plaintiffs invoke equal protection at the highest level of generality and then quote the

Supreme Court of the United States to show that she violated a clearly established federal right:

“Taxing is required to be by a ‘uniform rule’—that is, by one and the same unvarying standard.

Taxing by a uniform rule requires uniformity not only in the rate of taxation, but also uniformity

in the mode of assessment upon the taxable valuation. Uniformity in taxing implies equality in

the burden of taxation, and this equality of burden cannot exist without uniformity in the mode of

assessment, as well as the rate of taxation.” Gilman v. City of Sheboygan, 67 U.S. 510, 517

(1862) (emphasis in original) (citing Exchange Bank of Columbus vs. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 15,

(1853).

The Court will not decide the issue of qualified immunity at this point. The Sixth Circuit

has held that “it is generally inappropriate for a district court to grant a 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity.” Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 433 (6th Cir.

2015). The reason for the Sixth Circuit's “general preference” to withhold a ruling on qualified

immunity until the summary judgment stage is that “[a]bsent any factual development beyond the

allegations in a complaint, a court cannot fairly tell whether a case is obvious or squarely

governed by precedent, which prevents us from determining whether the facts of this case

parallel a prior decision or not for purposes of determining whether a right is clearly established.”

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Guertin v. State, 912 F.3d 907, 917 (6th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

V.

Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings(ECF No. 13) is granted in part and

denied in part. The First Claim for mandamus is dismissed. The motion is denied as to the

Second Claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

August 4, 2026 /s/ Benita Y. Pearson

Date Benita Y. Pearson

United States District Judge

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