Stavola

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JUWAN MITCHELL,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00042

v. (SAPORITO, J.)

J. STAVOLA, ,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Juwan Mitchell, a prisoner proceeding , brings Eighth

Amendment excessive force claims against four officers who allegedly

assaulted Mitchell at SCI-Benner Township. The defendants have moved

for summary judgment (Doc. 40). Because video of the incident plainly

contradicts many of Mitchell’s allegations, and the record does not

support an inference that the defendants acted “maliciously and

sadistically to cause harm,” they are entitled to summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

In the operative complaint (Doc. 16), Mitchell alleges that on June

18, 2024, defendants Capt. J. Stavola, CO1 McGary, CO1 Durst, and Lt.

Tyson “slammed” Mitchell into “solid objects,” including a door post, and

punched Mitchell several times. Mitchell was permitted to proceed on

Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against the four officers.1

After discovery closed, defendants moved for summary judgment.

(Doc. 40). Mitchell initially responded to the motion by objecting that “he2

has not seen the defendants[’] exhib[i]ts including video[,] photogra[p]hs

and statements.” (Doc. 47). Defendants filed a certificate confirming

service of the moving papers on Mitchell, and a separate declaration that

Mitchell was permitted to view video of the incident. (Docs. 49, 49-1).

These verifications were provided to Mitchell, and Mitchell was advised

that any further request for relief needed to more specifically explain the

alleged lack of access to exhibits. (Doc. 51). Ultimately, Mitchell filed an

“answer” to defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 53), making

no further claim of lack of access to exhibits. Therefore, the summary

1 Upon screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a

series of other claims against these defendants were dismissed.

(Docs. 17, 18).

2 In prior orders, we have referred to Mitchell using female

pronouns, based in part on another complaint in this district in which

Mitchell identified as transgender and used female pronouns. (Doc.

17 at 1, n.1 (citing , No. 3:25-cv-00216 (M.D. Pa., filed

Feb. 4, 2025)). However, Mitchell has used both male and female

pronouns in filings in this case. In this memorandum, we use gendered

pronouns only when quoting from Mitchell’s own filings or other

documents in the record.

judgment motion is ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome

of the case. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A

dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”

, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all

inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the

movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.”

, 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). The party seeking

summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence

of a genuine dispute of material fact. , 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant

must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that

“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to

the jury.” , 477 U.S. at 251-52.

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first

determine if the moving party has made a showing that it is

entitled to summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477 U.S.

at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the

burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a

genuine dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477

U.S. at 331. Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those

made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory

answers or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

III. MATERIAL FACTS

Mitchell’s response to the motion consists of a statement of material

facts supported by what Mitchell describes as a “declaration”3, (Docs.

3 Mitchell’s declaration includes a statement that Mitchell

“realiz[es] that any false statement[s] made to this court are punishable

under the law subject to Fine, Imprisonment and Punishment Under The

Law.” (Doc. 53-1). Whether this makes the declaration competent

53-1, 53-2), and a supplemental response with additional evidence (Doc.

57). These filings are not compliant with the local rules of this district,

but since filings must be “liberally construed,”

, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), we have considered all the evidence and

argument Mitchell has submitted.

The summary judgment record indicates as follows: On June 18,

2024, Mitchell was transferred from SCI-Benner Township to an outside

hospital, following an incident in which Mitchell placed “a foreign object

inside of [Mitchell’s] genitals.” When Mitchell returned from the hospital

at 9:23 p.m., Mitchell was placed in restraints including handcuffs, leg

irons, and a “Kuff bag.”4 (Docs. 44-11, 44-12).

evidence at the summary judgment stage is open to question.

, , 923 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir. 2019) (a statement that is “both

unsworn and not given under the penalty of perjury [is] insufficient to

create an issue of fact”); 28 U.S.C. § 1746. For purposes of the motion, we

will consider the allegations in the declaration as if properly sworn.

, 152 F.4th 549, 552 (3d Cir. 2025) (courts can consider

unsworn allegations as a reason to delay summary judgment or “issue

any other appropriate order”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(4)).

4 For context, we take judicial notice that a Kuff bag is a “straight

jacket for the hands” used in conjunction with handcuffs.

, No. 3:22-CV-1538, 2025 WL 1932743, at *2 n.3 (M.D. Pa. July 14,

2025) (citation omitted).

A. Cell Extraction

The following day, June 19, at 9:57 a.m., Mitchell was still in

restraints and was being held in a Psychiatric Observation Cell (“POC”).

In a written report, Defendant McGary, who was assigned to observe

Mitchell, stated that Mitchell attempted to “manipulate the Kuff bag,”

and refused McGary’s orders to stop. McGary deployed O.C. spray into

the cell “in order to gain compliance with the orders given.” (Doc. 44-5).

Mitchell attests that McGary and other officers were “[antagonizing and]

messing with” Mitchell. (Doc. 53-2).

Defendants have produced video from the cell and surrounding

area, which shows Mitchell biting and tugging at a black strap on the

Kuff bag for about 15 seconds. McGary is seen talking into a handheld

device for approximately 5-10 seconds. (Doc. 44-2, 0:15-0:25). McGary

then approaches the cell and begins to deploy O.C. spray through an

opening in the cell door. (Doc. 44-1, 0:09-0:59). Approximately three

minutes later, four officers enter the cell, pin Mitchell against a wall, and

apply a spit hood over Mitchell’s head. ( ., 4:00-4:20).

Three officers, whom defendants identify as COs Durst, McGary,

and Knable, removed Mitchell from the cell and escorted Mitchell down

a hallway. Durst and Knable reported that during the escort, Mitchell

“attempted to pull away from the escorting officers” and “struck his

[right] shoulder” against a door frame in the hallway. (Docs. 44-6, 44-7).

In his declaration, Mitchell attests that officers were “tugging,” “pulling,”

and “jerking [Mitchell] around,” and ultimately, that they “slamme[d

Mitchell] into the door frame[,] smashing [Mitchell’s shoulder] into the

door frame very hard.”

An officer’s handheld camera footage captures Mitchell’s removal

and escort from the cell. The videotaping officer walks behind the

escorting officers, so the camera view is occasionally obscured. As the

officers enter the cell, Mitchell repeatedly yells: “I can’t see!” An officer

says: “Stop resisting”; Mitchell replies: “I’m not! I can’t see!” The officers

drag Mitchell out of the cell and walk Mitchell down the hallway, while

Mitchell yells as if in pain. Mitchell walks with an unsteady gait;

Mitchell’s legs are shackled and the officers appear to be pushing Mitchell

forward. After about 10 seconds of walking in this manner, the group

approaches a door frame. The group appears to walk faster as it reaches

the door frame, but the video does not clearly show why. Mitchell’s right

arm or shoulder collides with the door frame as they pass it. Mitchell

continues to yell and groan as if in pain. After the collision, two officers

are heard to yell “slow down,” and the group begins to walk more slowly.

(Doc. 44-3, 00:30-01:45).

B. RHU and Medical Care

Mitchell was taken to the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) for

immediate examination and decontamination by medical staff. (Doc. 44-

3, 03:05-05:25). During the examination, medical staff repeatedly

evaluated Mitchell’s shoulder in response to Mitchell’s complaints and

attended to a cut on Mitchell’s ankle. (Doc. 44-4). Video from a camera

within the RHU shows that the decontamination and medical

examination continued off and on for roughly 30 minutes, with officers

and Mitchell talking to each other during breaks. (Doc. 58). Officers

removed some of Mitchell’s restraints and permitted Mitchell to change

into new clothes. After Mitchell changed, the officers restored the

restraints and escorted Mitchell out of the room.5

5 Although Mitchell began this case by complaining of an assault in

Mitchell’s own cell, Mitchell now attests that “the major abuse & assault

happened” in the RHU after the officer “shut the [handheld] camera off.”

Mitchell attests that an unspecified officer “picked me up off my feet in

the air excessively slamming me to the ground.” The RHU video plainly

contradicts Mitchell’s account; therefore, this attestation is disregarded.

The following day, June 19, Mitchell was seen by medical staff for a

complaint of shoulder pain. Mitchell had an abrasion and “slight edema”

on the right shoulder. Mitchell was given one 30 milligram dose of Toradol

and prescribed Tylenol as needed. (Doc. 57 at 5-13). X-rays of

Mitchell’s right shoulder and clavicle, taken the following day, showed no

fracture or dislocation, no acute osseous abnormality, and

“unremarkable” soft tissue with no evidence of swelling. ( . at 14-

17).6

C. Grievances

The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) provides a

three-part procedure for inmate grievances: initial review by a Grievance

Officer, appeal to the Facility Manager, and final appeal to the Secretary’s

Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals (“SOIGA”). Under the DOC’s

, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (when a party’s version of

events is “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury

could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment”).

6 Given this evidence (which was submitted by Mitchell), Mitchell’s

own attestations that “nothing was ever done” in response to Mitchell’s

requests for medical care, and that “after the beating no medical came,”

(Doc. 53-2), are disregarded. , 550 U.S. at 380.

grievance policy, an inmate must submit the initial grievance within 15

working days after the event in dispute. The initial grievance “must be

filed with the Facility Grievance Coordinator/designee at the facility

where the grievance event occurred.” (Doc. 44-8 (DC-ADM 804, §§

1(A)(8),(9))). On appeal to final review, the inmate must attach all

“required documentation,” including copies of the initial grievance,

appeal, and the corresponding denials. ., § 2(B)(1)(j).

At some point after the cell extraction, Mitchell was transferred to

SCI-Rockview, and defendants have identified two relevant grievances

Mitchell filed from that prison: Grievance #1103116, received August 16,

2024, and Grievance #1109706, received September 24, 2024. Grievance

#1103116, filed from SCI-Rockview, was rejected as untimely, improperly

formatted, and improperly addressing a matter that occurred at SCI-

Benner Township. Mitchell did not appeal it to final review. (Doc. 44-

9). Grievance #1109706 was rejected as untimely, and Mitchell’s

intermediate appeal was denied on the same grounds.7 Mitchell appealed

7 Although filed at SCI-Rockview, Grievance #1109706 was

“forwarded to the SCI Benner Township Security Office” (Doc. 44-10 at

5); apparently for that reason, it was not rejected as directed to the wrong

prison.

to final review, but the final appeal was rejected because Mitchell did not

provide a copy of the initial rejection notice. (Doc. 44-10).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants seek summary judgment for Mitchell’s failure to

exhaust administrative remedies, but they are not entitled to that on this

record. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), prisoners

complaining about the conditions of their confinement must exhaust

available administrative remedies before they may file suit in federal

court. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The PLRA requires proper exhaustion,

meaning plaintiffs must administratively grieve their claims in

accordance with the procedural rules of the prison in which they are

incarcerated. , 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir.

2020) (citing , 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). Therefore,

exhaustion within the DOC generally requires appeal to SOIGA, the

third and final step of the process. , 372 F.3d 218, 232

(3d Cir. 2004).

Defendants, the parties seeking summary judgment, have the

burden to prove the defense of failure to exhaust. ,

312 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, they point to two unexhausted

grievances as demonstrating Mitchell’s failure to exhaust. (Doc. 44,

¶¶ 38-52). However, the record does not show that those grievances were

the only relevant ones that Mitchell filed.8 , , , No.

13-CV-00465, 2021 WL 1807875, at *7 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2021) (“Although

[defendants] attached several [unexhausted] grievances as exhibits to

their motion for summary judgment, they did not point to a declaration

from a prison official or any other record evidence indicating they

performed an exhaustive search to identify all applicable grievances.”);

, No. 1:18-CV-00233-SPB-RAL, 2021 WL 2191282, at *5

(W.D. Pa. May 6, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL

2190818 (W.D. Pa. May 31, 2021). Therefore, summary judgment will not

be granted on these grounds.

B. Excessive Force

As previously noted (n.5, ), Mitchell’s claim of being beaten by

officers in the RHU is contradicted by the video. Therefore, the Court’s

review of Mitchell’s excessive force claims is limited to Mitchell’s cell

8 Defendants’ statement that “Plaintiff filed two grievances about

the June 19, 2024[,] events” is without citation to evidence. (Doc. 44

at 6, ¶ 42).

extraction and the collision with the door frame during the escort to the

RHU.

The Eighth Amendment bars cruel and unusual punishment,

including “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” on prisoners.

, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (quoting , 475

U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). “[T]he question whether the measure taken

inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately turns on

whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing

harm.” at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). For this

determination, courts consider “(1) the need for the application of force;

(2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was

used; (3) the extent of injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the

safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible

officials on the basis of the facts known to them; and (5) any efforts made

to temper the severity of a forceful response.” , 571 F.3d

318, 326 (3d Cir. 2009).

The first factor, the need for the application of force, favors the

defendants. The record shows that Mitchell had recently engaged in self-

injurious behavior, was trying to tamper with restraints, and refused

verbal orders to stop. Those facts justified the use of O.C. spray to obtain

compliance9, and in turn, required officers to escort Mitchell for

decontamination. That Mitchell found the officers’ remarks to be

“antagonizing” did not obviate the need for force. , ,

, No. 4:22-CV-01873, 2024 WL 1894346, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 30,

2024).

The second factor, the amount of force used relative to the need,

potentially supports Mitchell. A reasonable jury viewing the video could

conclude that the officers pushed Mitchell down the corridor faster than

Mitchell could safely walk, causing Mitchell to collide into the door frame.

Defendants claim that Mitchell tried to “pull away” from them (Docs. 44-

6, 44-7) and “run themself into [the] door frame” (Doc. 45 at 13), but that

is not clear from the video (which we must interpret in the light most

9 , , , No. 3:22-CV-1538, 2025 WL 1932743,

at *14 (M.D. Pa. July 14, 2025) (“Courts have widely upheld the

reasonableness of using O.C. spray to gain compliance when a prisoner

ignores orders from correctional officers.”); , No. 2:16-

CV-0392, 2019 WL 8017850, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2019), report and

recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 881436 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2020),

aff’d, 837 F. App’x 860 (3d Cir. 2020); , No. 3:11-CV-1431,

2016 WL 3595790, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 5, 2016), aff’d, 704 F. App’x 194

(3d Cir. 2017)

favorable to Mitchell). Given that Mitchell was in the grasp of three

officers, and was restrained by a spit hood, handcuffs, a Kuff bag, and leg

shackles, it is unclear what threat Mitchell posed to anyone’s safety

during the walk to the RHU. In these circumstances, a jury could view

the force the officers used against Mitchell as disproportionate.

The third factor, the extent of the injury inflicted, supports the

defendants. Nothing in the record suggests that Mitchell sustained more

than temporary discomfort from the use of O.C. spray. As for the collision

with the door frame, medical records show that Mitchell reported

shoulder pain and sustained an abrasion and “slight” edema on the

shoulder; X-rays of the shoulder revealed no evidence of further injury.

Temporary pain and minor cuts, bruises, and swelling generally do not

support an inference of excessive force. , , , 534 F.

App’x 100, 103-05 (3d Cir. 2013) (plaintiff’s “pain, swelling, numbness,

[and] occasional bruising” were “indisputably . . . minor, temporary

injuries”); , No. 4:23-CV-00181, 2024 WL 115989, at *4

n.40 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 10, 2024) (listing cases).

Mitchell now attests that “for a long time I was in great pain, now

my shoulder still hurts from time to time & it is not right at times unable

to move it or move it right.” (Doc. 53-2). Mitchell presents no other

explanation or evidence of this claimed long-term injury. Given the

medical evidence documenting the nature of Mitchell’s injuries, this

vague and conclusory statement does not support a genuine dispute of

fact as to the injuries Mitchell suffered. , 885

F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[C]onclusory, self-serving affidavits are

insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment.”) (citation

omitted).

The fourth factor, the extent of Mitchell’s threat to staff and inmate

safety, could weigh in any party’s favor for the reasons discussed above.

While Mitchell’s recent history of self-injurious behavior and attempts to

tamper with restraints constituted a threat to safety, , , ,

2024 WL 1894346, at *4, any such risk was minimal during the time the

officers were escorting the still-restrained Mitchell out of the cell.

The fifth factor, the efforts made to temper the severity of the force,

supports defendants. Defendant McGary sought to avoid the use of force

entirely by issuing verbal orders, but Mitchell did not comply. In these

circumstances, courts have repeatedly endorsed the use of O.C. spray as

a reasonable means of force to obtain compliance. ,

No. 3:23-CV-591, 2024 WL 2059084, at *5 (M.D. Pa. May 8, 2024) (listing

examples). It was then necessary for the officers to escort Mitchell to be

decontaminated. The video shows that after Mitchell collided with the

door frame, multiple officers shouted to slow down, which the group did.

Regardless of the cause of the collision, the immediacy of this reaction

undermines any inference that the officers engineered the collision

“maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”

In situations calling for the use of force, officers must make “split-

second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and

rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary.’”

, 837 F.3d 343, 350 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting

, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)). From the video of this

incident, a reasonable jury could conclude that the officers should have

been more careful in escorting Mitchell to the RHU. However, any such

error or misjudgment “[falls] short of supporting a finding that prison

officials acted maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

, 206 F.3d 335, 346 (3d Cir. 2000) (abrogated on other grounds);

, , , No. 4:22-CV-00985, 2023 WL 7336452, at *3

(M.D. Pa. Nov. 7, 2023) (granting summary judgment against a plaintiff

who “accidentally bumped into . . . his cell door during [a] crowded and

slightly chaotic removal process”). While the record vividly attests to

Mitchell’s distress, it does not show that any defendant violated

Mitchell’s Eighth Amendment rights.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted to the defendants,

and we need not address their arguments regarding improper

amendment of the claims, personal involvement, qualified immunity, and

the availability of compensatory damages. An appropriate order follows.

Dated: July 24, 2026

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

United States District Judge