Opinion

1

FILED IN THE

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

2 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

Aug 04, 2026

3

SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK

4

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

6

7 VANESSA VELASCO ORTEGA, an

individual, NO. 2:22-CV-0195-TOR

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR

9 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

10 OKANOGAN COUNTY,

WASHINGTON, a municipal

11 corporation; OKANOGAN COUNTY

SHERIFF’S OFFICE; ISAIAH

12 HOLLOWAY, an individual and

employee of the OKANOGAN

13 COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,

Defendants.

14

15 BEFORE THE COURT are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

16 Against Defendant Okanogan County (ECF No. 158), Plaintiff’s Motion for

17 Summary Judgment Against Defendant Holloway (ECF No. 161), and Defendant

18 Okanogan County’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 166). These

19 matters were considered without oral argument. The Court has reviewed the

20 record and files herein and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below,

1 Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant Okanogan County is

2 GRANTED in part, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant

3 Holloway is DENIED, and Defendant Okanogan County’s Motion for Summary

4 Judgment is GRANTED in part.

5 BACKGROUND

6 This matter arises out an alleged quid pro quo relationship between Plaintiff

7 and Defendant Holloway. The Court’s August 8, 2024 Order provides a detailed

8 background of the case. ECF No. 113 at 2-4. To summarize, Defendant Holloway

9 was a deputy, and later a detective, with the Okanogan County Sheriff’s Office

10 (“OCSO”). Id. at 2. Defendant Holloway and Plaintiff had prolonged contact

11 based on Plaintiff’s involvement with criminal activity, including her active

12 addiction to drugs for most of the alleged relationship. Eventually the two began a

13 sexual relationship in 2019, that lasted until late 2020. Plaintiff alleges that two of

14 their sexual encounters occurred at Bud Clark field while Defendant Holloway had

15 been on duty. Id. at 3. Plaintiff also alleges that over the course of the relationship

16 Defendant Holloway provided Plaintiff tips with how to avoid law enforcement

17 while she was engaged in criminal activity. Id. at 2-3.

18 In 2020, Plaintiff’s brother reported to OCSO that Plaintiff and Defendant

19 Holloway had been engaging in an inappropriate relationship which resulted in

20 Defendant Holloway being disciplined. Id. at 4. However, Plaintiff maintains that

1 even after being disciplined, Defendant Holloway carried on the sexual nature of

2 their relationship through a Facebook profile. Id. Plaintiff alleges that during

3 these encounters, she was an active user of methamphetamine, thereby unable to

4 consent, and coerced through a promise of leniency related to criminal activity she

5 was allegedly involved in. Id.

6 Plaintiff file this action on September 2, 2022, bringing state and federal law

7 claims against Defendant Holloway and Okanogan County (the “County”). ECF

8 No. 1. Defendant Holloway moved for summary judgment in June 2024 arguing

9 that summary judgment was proper because he was not acting under the color of

10 state law when the acts were committed, and even if he were, he is shielded by

11 qualified immunity. ECF No. 70 at 3. The Court partially granted Holloway’s

12 motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for due

13 process on qualified immunity grounds but concluded issues of fact remained as to

14 whether Holloway was shielded by qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s Fourteenth

15 Amendment equal protection claim. ECF No. 113 at 33. Defendant Holloway

16 filed an interlocutory appeal of the Court’s decision, and Plaintiff cross-appealed.

17 ECF Nos. 115, 145. The case was stayed pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision.

18 ECF No. 143.

19 On August 28, 2025, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Court’s determination as

20 to the equal protection claim concluding “[t]here is ample evidence that Holloway

1 abused his authority to make unwanted advances and sexually coerce a woman

2 whom he knew to be a drug addict.” Velasco Ortega v. Holloway, No. 24-4930,

3 2025 WL 2477160, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2025). The Ninth Circuit dismissed

4 Plaintiff’s cross-appeal.

5 The stay in this action was lifted on September 5, 2025. ECF No. 152.

6 Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment as to Defendant Holloway and

7 Okanogan County. ECF Nos. 158, 161. Okanogan County also moves for

8 summary judgment. ECF No. 166. 1

9 SUMMARY JUDGMENT

10 The Court may grant summary judgment in favor of a moving party who

11

1 The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff has recently filed a motion to

12

continue the trial date, reopen discovery, and continue the Court’s consideration of

13

the parties’ summary judgment motions based on new evidence that has come to

14

light. ECF No. 214. Upon reviewing the motion and declarations in support, the

15

Court concludes that any newly discovered evidence is unlikely to alter the Court’s

16

summary judgment findings as stated herein even if Plaintiff’s request for a

17

continuance and a reopening of discovery is granted. Therefore, the Court declines

18

to continue consideration of the parties’ motions. Plaintiff’s motion to continue

19

20

will be addressed in a separate order.

1 demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the

2 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling

3 on a motion for summary judgment, the court must only consider admissible

4 evidence. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002).

5 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the

6 absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

7 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to identify

8 specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v.

9 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla

10 of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be

11 evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252.

12 For purposes of summary judgment, a fact is “material” if it might affect the

13 outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at 248. Further, a dispute is

14 “genuine” only where the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find in

15 favor of the non-moving party. Id. The Court views the facts, and all rational

16 inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v.

17 Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). Summary judgment will thus be granted

18 “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of

19 an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the

20 burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

1 I. Okanogan County

2 Plaintiff brings claims against the County for violations under the

3 Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

4 asserts other state law claims of negligent supervision and retention, loss of

5 consortium, and civil conspiracy. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 164-205.

6 A. Washington Law Against Discrimination

7 Both Plaintiff and the County move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

8 WLAD public accommodation discrimination claim. ECF Nos. 158 at 5-6, 166 at

9 7-11.

10 The WLAD prohibits “any person or the person’s agent or employee [from

11 committing] an act which directly or indirectly results in any distinction,

12 restriction, or discrimination” based on a person’s membership in a protected class.

13 RCW 49.60.215. To establish a claim under RCW 49.60.215 in a place of public

14 accommodation, a plaintiff must show:

15 (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, (2) the defendant’s

establishment is a place of public accommodation, (3) the defendant

16 discriminated against the plaintiff when it did not treat the plaintiff in a

manner comparable to the treatment it provides to persons outside that

17 class, and (4) the plaintiff’s protected status was a substantial factor that

caused the discrimination.

18

19 Fell v. Spokane Transit Authority, 128 Wash.2d 618, 637 (1996).

20 Factors one through three are a mixed question of fact and law, and the fourth

1 factor is purely a question of fact. Id. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is a

2 member of a protected class based on her gender.

3 1. Public Accommodation

4 The County argues that Plaintiff’s WLAD claim as to the County fails

5 because she cannot establish Defendant Holloway’s conduct occurred at an

6 Okanogan County place of public accommodation. ECF No. 166 at 7. The Court

7 disagrees.

8 The Court previously concluded that Bud Clark Field is a public park, falling

9 under “any place of public . . . amusement.” ECF No. 113 at 28; RCW

10 49.60.040(2), (28); see also Fell, at 638 n.24 (noting public accommodations

11 include restaurants, parks and public resorts). RCW 49.60.215 “makes it unlawful

12 for ‘any person or the persons’ agent or employee to commit an act [of]

13 discrimination . . . in any place of public . . . accommodation.’” Floeting v. Group

14 Health Cooperative, 192 Wash. 2d 848, 857 (2019) (quoting RCW 49.60.215).

15 The Washington Supreme Court in Floeting highlighted the lower court’s

16 reasoning that “the legislature chose to fight discrimination in public

17 accommodations by making employers directly responsible for their agents’ and

18 employees’ conduct.” Id. at 856 (quoting Floeting v. Grp. Health Coop., 200

19 Wash. App. 758, 770 (2017)). Nothing in the provision’s plain language supports

20 the County’s interpretation that there is an extra requirement that the public

1 accommodation where the discrimination occurred must be owned by the agent or

2 employee’s employer for the employer to be liable under the WLAD. Rather,

3 RCW 49.60.215 imposes strict liability on employers for the discriminatory

4 conduct of their employees. Id. at 859.

5 The County’s argument relies heavily on the lower Floeting court’s

6 language, “by imposing direct liability on business proprietors for the action of

7 their employees/agents, the legislation serves its purpose. Direct liability makes

8 the proprietor liable for all acts of sexual harassment occurring on its premises—

9 including the first.” Floeting, 192 Wash. App. at 565. The County argues that the

10 same reasoning applies to public parks, therefore the County cannot be held liable

11 under WLAD because it does not own or operate Bud Field Park. ECF No. 166 at

12 10. This argument misses the mark. Floeting was addressing the scope of liability

13 of a proprietor of a place of public accommodation for an alleged sexual

14 harassment by an employee, not employer liability in general. Id. at 863 (“While

15 we have decided cases that involve sexual harassment in the workplace and

16 discrimination in places of public accommodation, we have not had occasion to

17 determine what legal standard is appropriate for imposing liability on a proprietor

18 of a place of public accommodation for alleged sexual harassment by a

19 nonsupervisory employee.”) (emphasis added). The court ultimately concluded

20 that “when the ‘person’ referenced in the statute is a business proprietor, that

1 ‘person’ is directly liable for its own unfair practices and the unfair practices of its

2 agents and employees.” Id.

3 A proprietor is but one type of “person” under the WLAD. RCW 49.60.040

4 defines “person” to include:

5 one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, organizations,

corporations, cooperatives, legal representatives, trustees and receivers,

6 or any group of persons; it includes any owner, lessee, proprietor,

manager, agent, or employee, whether one or more natural persons; and

7 further includes any political or civil subdivisions of the state and any

agency or instrumentality of the state or of any political or civil

8 subdivision thereof.

9 RCW 49.60.040.

10 And RCW 49.60.215 clearly states that discrimination is prohibited by “any person

11 or the persons’ agent or employee” in “any” place of public accommodation.

12 There is no ownership requirement. Furthermore, the Court already concluded,

13 and Defendant Holloway concedes, that Bud Park Field is a place of

14 accommodation for purposes of Plaintiff’s WLAD claim brought against him.

15 ECF No. 175 at 15. The County does not dispute that Defendant Holloway was its

16 agent or employee. It therefore follows by the plain language of the statute that the

17 County may be liable for Defendant Holloway’s conduct if he is found to have

18 violated the WLAD. To conclude otherwise renders the statute’s language

19 meaningless.

20 The Court concludes the second element of Plaintiff’s WLAD claim against

1 the County is met. Bud Clark Field is a place of public accommodation as defined

2 under RCW 49.60.40. The County’s ownership, or lack thereof, is irrelevant.

3 2. Defendant Holloway’s discrimination against Plaintiff

4 Plaintiff argues that the County, through Defendant Holloway’s conduct,

5 discriminated against Plaintiff in violation of WLAD as a matter of law. ECF No.

6 158 at 6-8.

7 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Holloway discriminated against Plaintiff through

8 sexual harassment. ECF Nos. 183 at 5. “Sexual harassment is a form of sex

9 discrimination, which we analyze like other forms of discrimination in places of

10 public accommodation.” Floeting, 192 Wash. 2d at 853. The discriminatory

11 conduct must be objectively discriminatory, that is, “it must be of a type, or to a

12 degree, that a reasonable person who is a member of the plaintiff’s class, under the

13 circumstances, would feel discriminated against.” Id. at 858 (quoting Floeting,

14 200 Wash. App. at 773-774). A single discriminatory act in a place of public

15 accommodation may violate WLAD. Id. at 853.

16 It is undisputed that Defendant Holloway was the County’s employee,

17 therefore the WLAD imposes strict liability on the County for sexual harassment

18 by Defendant Holloway. The question then is whether there is any genuine issue

19 of fact that Defendant Holloway discriminated against Plaintiff through sexual

20 harassment. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Holloway’s undisputed acts of sexual

1 misconduct with Plaintiff constitutes sexual discrimination as a matter of law.

2 ECF No. 158 at 6-8. Plaintiff points to the County’s investigation and reprimand

3 of Defendant Holloway for his illicit sexual relationship with Plaintiff (ECF No.

4 90-17), Defendant Holloway’s admittance that his conduct violated OCSO’s

5 policies (ECF No. 159 at ¶ 32), and undisputed facts demonstrating OCSO policy

6 violations. Id. at 6-8. Plaintiff argues this evidence of sexual misconduct warrants

7 summary judgment on her WLAD claim. ECF No. at 8 (citing W.H. v. Olympia

8 Sch. Dist., 193 Wash. 2d 779, 792 (2020)). The Court disagrees.

9 The W.H. court reasoned that sexual misconduct such as sexual harassment,

10 abuse and assault is what constituted sex discrimination under the WLAD. W.H.,

11 193 Wash. 2d at 792-93. Thus, whether Defendant Holloway’s sexual relationship

12 with Plaintiff was misconduct under OCSO’s policies does not conclusively

13 establish that Defendant Holloway sexually discriminated against Plaintiff for

14 summary judgment purposes. Furthermore, as the Court previously concluded,

15 there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Plaintiff consented to the relationship

16 with Defendant Holloway. ECF No. 113 at 14-15. Plaintiff argues that consent is

17 not a valid defense under WLAD, citing the lack of a consent defense in Floeting

18 and rejection of a consent defense in A.S. v. Provail, 36 Wash. App. 2d 34 (2025).

19 The Court again disagrees.

20 First, the Floeting court identified a non-exhaustive list of possible defenses

1 available to an employer under the WLAD including the argument that “the

2 discrimination did not happen at all, that it did not meet the objective or subjective

3 standards required by the statute and therefore was not an unfair practice, or that

4 the person who committed the discrimination was not its agent or employee.”

5 Floeting, 192 Wash. 2d at 861. The absence of consent as a listed defense is

6 therefore not dispositive of the issue. As for Provail, the court’s holding there

7 actually suggests consent can be an available defense. In that case, the defendant

8 was a charitable organization that provided supported living services to residents

9 with developmental disabilities. Provail, 36 Wash. App. 2d at 36. The plaintiff,

10 born with spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy and receiving the defendant’s

11 services, brought a sex discrimination claim under the WLAD claim against the

12 defendant alleging one of the defendant’s employees had sex with the plaintiff. Id.

13 at 38. The defendant pointed to evidence suggesting the plaintiff had consented to

14 the sexual contact and argued the consent negated a claim of sexual discrimination

15 under the WLAD. Id. at 55. The court disagreed and concluded that WLAD

16 liability existed regardless of consent because the “sexual contact with [the

17 plaintiff] was defined as sexual abuse by law” due to her status as a vulnerable

18 adult. Id. at 57. She was therefore by law incapable of consenting. Id. The court

19 did not conclude that consent was never available as a defense to a WLAD claim.

20 Similarly, in Christensen v. Royal School District No. 160, 156 Wash. 2d 62,

1 67 (2005), a school district attempted to assert a consent defense where a thirteen

2 year old student willingly engaged in sexual activity with her adult teacher. Id. at

3 65-66. The court rejected this argument, concluding that the state legislature

4 rejected the idea that a minor can consent to sexual activity with an adult by

5 adopting statutes making it a felony for an adult to engage in sexual activity with a

6 minor, regardless of whether the minor “consented.” Id. at 67-68. Therefore, a

7 consent defense was not available to the district. Id. at 68. Based on this case law,

8 and the absence of any that state or suggest consent is never an available defense

9 under the WLAD, the Court is inclined to conclude that consent may be an

10 available defense depending on the case.

11 Here, Plaintiff has previously pointed to Washington State drug and alcohol

12 consent laws in arguing that she was incapable of giving consent to sexual activity

13 due to her drug addiction during the relationship. ECF No. 85 at 13. And as the

14 Court previously concluded, this combined with other evidence created an issue of

15 fact as to whether Plaintiff did consent or was even capable of giving consent

16 given her drug addiction during the relationship. ECF No. 113 at 14-15.

17 Therefore, whether Defendant Holloway discriminated against Plaintiff on the

18 basis of sex and whether Plaintiff’s sex was a substantial factor that caused the

19 discrimination must be left up to the jury.

20 //

1 B. Monell Claims

2 To prevail on a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a local government

3 entity, a plaintiff must prove that the entity violated his or her constitutional rights

4 by engaging in “action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature.”

5 Monell v. Dep’t. Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). In the Ninth Circuit, a

6 plaintiff may establish the existence of an “official municipal policy” under any of

7 the following theories: (1) action pursuant to an express policy or longstanding

8 practice or custom; (2) action by a final policymaker acting in his or her official

9 policymaking capacity; (3) ratification of an employee’s action by a final

10 policymaker; and (4) a failure to adequately train employees with deliberate

11 indifference to the consequences. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235-40 (9th

12 Cir. 1999); see also Ninth Circuit Model Civil Jury Instructions, Nos. 9.4-9.7.

13 Plaintiff argues the County is liable for Defendant Holloway’s violations of

14 Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under three separate Monell theories: the County’s

15 custom of turning a blind eye to its officers’ sexual misconduct with women

16 involved in drugs and crime; the County’s failure to train and supervise its

17 employees; and the County’s ratification of Defendant Holloway’s misconduct

18 with Plaintiff. ECF No. 158 at 16.

19 1. Custom of turning a blind eye

20 “[A]n act performed pursuant to a ‘custom’ that has not been formally

1 approved by an appropriate decisionmaker may fairly subject a municipality to

2 liability on the theory that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the

3 force of law.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (citation

4 omitted). A custom or policy may be inferred from evidence of a failure to

5 investigate, discharge or reprimand officers for repeated instances of

6 unconstitutional conduct. Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1233

7 (9th Cir. 2011). Whether a custom or policy exists is normally a jury question.

8 Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 920 (9th Cir. 1996).

9 Plaintiff argues that the County failed to record, respond, or investigate

10 allegations of sexual misconduct made against Defendant Holloway and other

11 deputies. ECF No. 158 at 17. Defendant argues that Plaintiff presents no evidence

12 that OSCO had knowledge of deputies committing repeated constitutional

13 violations and ignored them. ECF No. 166 at 13-14. The Court concludes Plaintiff

14 has presented sufficient evidence to support a Monell claim that Plaintiff’s alleged

15 constitutional deprivation was caused by OSCO’s policy or custom of turning a

16 blind eye to Defendant Holloway’s long-standing repeated sexual misconduct, and

17 other deputy misconduct, with women known to be involved with drugs and crime.

18 However, the issue must ultimately go to a trier of fact.

19 First, Defendant Holloway admitted to having a sexual relationship with

20 Christina St. Clair (“St. Clair”), a known informant and drug user, in 2017 and

1 2019. ECF No. 90-3 at 17-18. The County denies it had knowledge of the

2 relationship, however, in 2014 OSCO received a call from St. Clair’s uncle

3 complaining that Defendant Holloway was “found . . . with his pants off and was

4 pulling his pants back on” next to St. Clair. ECF No. 67-3. While Defendant

5 Holloway denied anything inappropriate happened and that he was only

6 performing off-duty work (ECF No. 94-7 at 10-11), St. Clair testified that the two

7 had been having sex just prior to the call. ECF No. 90-4 at 6-8. The investigating

8 officer, Chief Criminal Deputy Rodriguez (“Deputy Rodriguez”), admitted that he

9 did not review the call log or investigate further but rather concluded Defendant

10 Holloway had been there for work purposes. ECF No. 80-3 at 11-12. He further

11 conceded that it would have been handled differently had he known of the

12 allegation that Defendant Holloway’s pants had been off. Id. No documentation

13 regarding the incident was kept. Id. at 10-11.

14 Next, sometime between 2013 and 2018, Noah Stewart (“Deputy Steward”),

15 the former Chief Corrections Deputy for OCSO heard a rumor through staff

16 members that Defendant Holloway “let some woman off of a crime that lived in

17 northern part of Okanogan County because he was having a sexual relationship

18 with her.” ECF No. 112-7 at 7-8. The allegations were never investigated. ECF

19 No. 112-11 at 10. During the same time frame, another complaint was filed

20 against Defendant Holloway by a man complaining that Defendant Holloway had

1 been outside his house hugging his daughter. ECF No. 159 at ¶ 2(a). Defendant

2 Holloway claimed he was only getting information from her. ECF No. 112-4 at 8.

3 The father was never questioned and no further investigation occurred. Id. at 9.

4 The actual complaint and any related documentation has not been located despite

5 confirmation that they would have been in writing. Id. at 9-11.

6 Next, sometime after June 2020, Aaron Culp (“Undersheriff Culp”),

7 Undersheriff for the OCSO heard from the human resources director that there was

8 a report that Defendant Holloway had previously had a sexual relationship with

9 Morningstar St. Peter (“St. Peter”) who was a drug user and known criminal. ECF

10 Nos. 159 at ¶ 7(a); 112-8 at 19. Undersheriff Culp testified that no investigation

11 occurred and neither Ms. St. Peter nor the reporting individual were ever contacted

12 about the allegation. ECF Nos. 159 at ¶ 7(a); 112-8 at 19.

13 In 2015, OCSO was made aware of an allegation that another deputy,

14 Deputy Weigel, became involved with a known drug user and criminal, Stacy

15 Rodriguez (“Ms. Rodriguez”), after he arrested her for drug related charges. ECF

16 No. 159 at ¶ 4. Chief Deputy Brown (“Deputy Brown”), who investigated the

17 allegation, testified that Deputy Weigel had recommended Ms. Rodriguez for drug

18 court, “which is basically like diversion,” and a complaint later came in that

19 Deputy Weigel was seen picking up Ms. Rodriguez, and the two went to a wedding

20 together. ECF No. 112-4 at 20-21. Deputy Weigel later admitted to giving Ms.

1 Rodriguez a ride to a wedding but denied the two had a relationship. Id. Deputy

2 Brown testified that he believed Deputy Weigel’s behavior to be inappropriate and

3 a policy violation and claimed he reprimanded Deputy Weigel for it (ECF No. 112-

4 4 at 23), yet Deputy Weigel testified that he never received any sort of reprimand

5 or discussion from Deputy Brown that the behavior was inappropriate. ECF No.

6 112-6 at 11. Deputy Brown also acknowledged that the proper course of conduct

7 would have been to question Ms. Rodriguez about the allegation, but could not

8 recall if he ever did, and no records of the complaint or any investigation have

9 been located. ECF No. 112-4 at 24.

10 Plaintiff additionally points to the County’s failure to investigate Defendant

11 Holloway in response to the two complaints related to the alleged sexual

12 relationship between Defendant Holloway and another drug user and criminal

13 Maddesyn George (“Ms. George”) in 2018. ECF Nos. 158 at 18, 112-16, 112-17.

14 Defendant argues that one report was unsubstantiated hearsay and the other was

15 not submitted until after the Velasco Ortega investigation began. ECF No. 174 at

16 12. However, the investigating deputy, Deputy Weigel, admitted to never

17 questioning Defendant Holloway about the allegations or another individual

18 reported to have potential information. ECF No. 112-6 at 29, 31-32.

19 Finally, after OSCO received the complaint regarding Defendant Holloway’s

20 conduct with Plaintiff, no investigation occurred for two months even though

1 Defendant Holloway had messaged Chief Wright the day after the complaint was

2 filed confessing that he had fallen “into a world of porn addiction, sexting and now

3 an affair.” ECF Nos. 90-15, 112-10 at 12. Even after Defendant Holloway

4 admitted to having a sexual relationship with Plaintiff, neither his nor Plaintiff’s

5 phone was ever examined despite a report that Plaintiff’s phone had evidence that

6 Defendant Holloway had been messaging Plaintiff advice on how to get away with

7 crimes. ECF No. 112-10 at 13, 15-16.

8 “Evidence of ‘identical incident[s]’ to that alleged by the plaintiff may

9 establish that a municipality was put on notice of its agents' unconstitutional

10 actions.” Velazquez, 793 F.3d 1010, 1027 (9th Cir. 2015). There is sufficient

11 evidence for a jury to determine that the County was put on notice of its deputies’

12 alleged unconstitutional conduct but repeatedly failed to investigate, document, or

13 reprimand. Defendant argues that for most of the reports, Plaintiff cannot

14 demonstrate that any sexual activity actually occurred or that there was a

15 constitutional violation. ECF No. 166 at 13. The Court disagrees. First, Plaintiff

16 has presented evidence that creates an issue of fact as to whether some of the

17 reported sexual misconduct actually occurred. And second, “[t]he court need not

18 conclude that each prior incident was itself a constitutional violation in order to

19 conclude that the [County] was on notice of the behavior that led to a violation of

20 [Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.” Paredes v. City of San José, 760 F. Supp. 3d

1 902, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2024).

2 As for causation, evidence of a department’s treatment of complaints or

3 failure to take any remedial steps in response can support a plaintiff’s theory that

4 the department’s complaint and disciplinary process contributed to police conduct

5 “complained of because the procedures made clear to [the] officer that . . . [he]

6 could get away with anything.” Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d 630, 646-47 (9th

7 Cir. 1991). Here, Plaintiff presents evidence of OSCO’s custom of repeatedly

8 failing to investigate or reprimand its deputies for instances of alleged sexual

9 misconduct. And the jury could find that the County’s custom was a driving force

10 behind Plaintiff’s alleged injury because its lack of oversight of OSCO deputies

11 allowed Defendant Holloway to engage with Plaintiff without fear of punishment.

12 Therefore, Plaintiff’s Monell claim under the custom theory will go to a jury.

13 2. Failure to train or supervise

14 The County may be liable on a failure to train or supervise theory when “in

15 light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or

16 different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the

17 violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers . . . can be said to have

18 been deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489

19 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). “Where a § 1983 plaintiff can establish that the facts

20 available to city policymakers put them on actual or constructive notice that the

1 particular omission is substantially certain to result in the violation of the

2 constitutional rights of their citizens, the dictates of Monell are satisfied.” City of

3 Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396 (1989).

4 Plaintiff presents evidence that OCSO had a pattern of failing to investigate

5 allegations made against its deputies and gave little to no discipline even where

6 OCSO concluded misconduct occurred. There is also ample evidence that OCSO

7 failed to document complaints, investigations, and reprimands, if any, that

8 occurred. Additionally, in 2019, the Loaned Executive Management Assistance

9 Program (“LEMAP”) conducted a review of OCSO’s policies and issued a report

10 with findings and recommendations (the “Report”). ECF No. 112-15. The Report

11 indicated that OCSO’s policy manual “is outdated and is largely ignored by OCSO

12 employees.” Id. at 5. The Report also reported deficient records management.

13

There is no uniform records management philosophy, policy, or plan in

place at OCSO. Records by the previous administration were destroyed

14

and many of those would have still had retention value. The office does

not have a records index and has not identified which records are

15

essential, permanent, or have a retention value. Many types of

investigation, personnel, CEO, and policy records have been destroyed

16

throughout the agency with no authority or documentation. Some

records, such as police reports, are commonly destroyed and logged

17

without the recommended information such as the Disposition

Authority Number (DAN) which designates the legal authority to

18

destroy the record. Nor is there documentation of how the record was

destroyed, when the record was destroyed, or who destroyed it.

19

20 Id. at 11.

1 The Report also noted that complaints were not all being documented, and the

2 OSCO’s own policy that all complaints against its members would be investigated

3 was “open to interpretation.” ECF No. 112-15 at 19. Further, OSCO retained

4 letters of reprimand for only one year while the requirement was six, “regardless of

5 whether or not the complaint was sustained or if discipline was imposed.” Id. at

6 23. Finally, the Report states that “OCSO has never conducted a review or

7 analysis of critical incidents (pursuits, use of force, bias based policing and internal

8 affairs investigations)[,]” and explained such reviews are “critically important”

9 because among other reasons, “an analytical review requires higher levels of the

10 organization to be aware of risky behavior by deputies which can be addressed.”

11 Id. at 8. The evidence related to OSCO’s response and handling of repeated

12 allegations of deputy misconduct and the LEMPA Report support a finding that

13 OSCO deputies were not adequately trained or supervised.

14 The Court concludes there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the

15 need for training and the lack of supervision of OSCO’s employees and deputies

16 was so obvious and a resulting constitutional violation so likely as to constitute

17 deliberate indifference. Similarly, there is sufficient evidence to support Plaintiff’s

18 claim that the failure to train/supervise was the “moving force” behind the alleged

19 constitutional violation and Plaintiff was a foreseeable victim. A jury could find

20 the OSCO’s failure to investigate, document or preserve repeated complaints and

1 allegations prevented Defendant from being identified as a risk and allowed him to

2 target Plaintiff with little to no fear of any consequences.

3 Plaintiff argues that summary judgment should be granted in her favor,

4 however, questions of fact remain as to whether Plaintiff’s constitutional rights

5 were violated. In any event, the Court finds that it is appropriate for the jury to

6 decide if the County’s failure to train amounted to deliberate indifference and was

7 the moving force behind the alleged constitutional violation.

8 3. Ratification

9 Plaintiff argues that the County ratified Defendant Holloway’s misconduct

10 by appointing Defendant Holloway as a detective prior to investigating the sexual

11 misconduct allegations against him. ECF No. 158 at 20-21. Plaintiff argues that

12 Chief Wright and Sheriff Hawley, a policymaker for OCSO appointed Defendant

13 Holloway as detective above other candidates prior to investigating the pending

14 allegations involving Plaintiff and permitted him to keep the position once the

15 allegations were verified. ECF No. 158 at 20-21. The detective position came

16 with a three percent stipend for on-call availability and a clothing allowance for

17 duty-appropriate clothing. ECF No. 160-2 at 5-6.

18 Plaintiff may establish § 1983 liability by proving “that an official with final

19 policy-making authority ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action

20 and the basis for it.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992).

1 Liability under the ratification doctrine is distinct from other Monell liability

2 generally in that it “is based on a municipal policymaker’s decision that

3 occurs after the constitutional deprivation and endorses a subordinate’s conduct

4 causing the injury.” Tubar v. Clift, No. C05-1154-JCC, 2008 WL 5142932, at *5

5 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 5, 2008). An official has final policy-making authority where

6 “the official’s discretionary decision is [not] ‘constrained by policies not of that

7 official’s making’ and . . . [not] ‘subject to review by the municipality’s authorized

8 policymakers.’” Christie v. lopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1236-37 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting

9 City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)). “To show ratification, a

10 plaintiff must show that the ‘authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s

11 decision and the basis for it.’” Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2004)

12 (citation omitted); see also Haugen v. Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 2003)

13 (“[T]he plaintiff must show that the triggering decision was the product of a

14 ‘conscious, affirmative choice’ to ratify the conduct in question.”) (citation

15 omitted).

16 Here, the County does not dispute that Sheriff Hawley was “the ultimate

17 authority on all policy changes” (ECF No. 160-2 at 2), and Chief Criminal Deputy

18 Laura Wright (“Chief Wright”) and Sheriff Hawley had the final say in Defendant

19 Holloway’s appointment to detective. ECF Nos. 159 at ¶ 21, 174 at ¶ 21. Rather,

20 the County argues that an appointment to detective is not a promotion or privilege

1 but rather a lateral move in police organizations. ECF No. 166 at 17. The County

2 further argues that Defendant Holloway was given a written reprimand for his

3 conduct with Plaintiff and placed on probation through a deferred unpaid

4 suspension. ECF No. 172 at 15-16. Plaintiff replies that the alleged misconduct

5 did not prevent Defendant Holloway from returning to work or being appointed

6 detective, nor did he lose his job as detective after the misconduct was verified.

7 ECF No. 183 at 10-11.

8 Whether Defendant Holloway’s appointment as detective constituted a

9 promotion appears to be disputed as Defendant Holloway admitted in his Answer

10 to Plaintiff’s Complaint that he was promoted within the OSCO. ECF No. 12 at ¶

11 110. However, even if a jury could find the appointment was a promotion, it alone

12 is insufficient to demonstrate ratification “absent some facts from which it can be

13 inferred that the entity’s final policymaker actually had knowledge of and

14 approved of the purportedly unconstitutional conduct.” Bennet v. Cty of Shasta,

15 No. 2:15-CV-01764-MCE-CMK, 2017 WL 3394128, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8,

16 2017); see also Gavin v. City of Los Angeles, 2:05-CV-09001-FMC-SSx, 2007 WL

17 9706236, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2007) (“[T]he fact that individuals involved in

18 the allegedly unconstitutional acts received promotions is not sufficient evidence to

19 demonstrate that the individuals who promoted them ratified the unconstitutional

20 activity.”); Dizon v. City of S. San Francisco, No. 18-CV-03733-JST, 2018 WL

1 5023354, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2018) (“Failure to discipline alone is

2 insufficient to state a claim under a ratification theory . . . . Nor is it sufficient that

3 officers may have been promoted after the fact.”). In this case, the Court

4 concludes Plaintiff has not demonstrated sufficient evidence to support Monell

5 liability under the ratification doctrine.

6 Chief Wright investigated the allegations of sexual misconduct against

7 Defendant Holloway related to Plaintiff. ECF No. 112-10 at 7-8. Nearly two

8 months after the initial complaint came in, Chief Wright appointed Defendant

9 Holloway as a detective. ECF Nos. 90-6 at 4. Chief Wright testified that up until

10 that point, no investigation of Defendant Holloway had occurred and only after he

11 was appointed as detective did he confess his sexual relationship with Plaintiff.

12 ECF No. 112-10 at 12-14. Chief Wright also testified that she was only aware of

13 one previous allegation made against Defendant Holloway prior to her working at

14 OSCO but that no documentation was kept or located. Id. at 7, 10. Thus, whether

15 Chief Wright had actual knowledge of Defendant Holloway’s unconstitutional

16 conduct at the time of his appointment may be disputed, but assuming she did for

17 summary judgment purposes, the evidence does not support an inference that the

18 Defendant Holloway’s appointment to detective was a deliberate choice to endorse

19 his conduct or the basis for it. Although the evidence could support Plaintiff’s

20 argument of deliberate indifference. Similarly, the Court does not find the facts

1 surrounding Defendant Holloway retaining his position as detective after he

2 admitted to his sexual misconduct with Plaintiff or Sheriff Hawley’s decision to

3 permit Defendant Holloway to return to work in April 2020 demonstrate that either

4 Chief Wright or Sheriff Hawley had knowledge of and approved of Defendant

5 Holloway’s conduct and the basis for it. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Monell claim under

6 the ratification theory fails.

7 C. Negligent Supervision and Retention of Defendant Holloway

8 Under Washington law, employers have “a limited duty to control an

9 employee for the protection of third parties, even where the employee is acting

10 outside the scope of employment.” Niece v. Elmview Group Home, 131 Wash. 2d

11 39, 51 (1997). An employer may be liable for negligent supervision where: (1) an

12 employee acted outside the scope of his employment; (2) the employee presented a

13 risk of harm to others; (3) the employer knew, or should have known in the

14 exercise of reasonable care that the employee posed a risk to others; and (4) that

15 the employer’s failure to supervise was the proximate cause of injuries to other

16 employees.” Briggs v. Nova Servs., 135 Wash. App. 955, 966-67 (2006).

17 The parties agree that Defendant Holloway’s sexual relationship with

18 Plaintiff was not in the course and scope of his employment. ECF Nos. 158 at 11,

19 13 at ¶ 86. The first element is therefore met. Plaintiff has presented evidence

20 supporting the remaining elements of a negligent supervision claim, but whether

1 they have been met ultimately must go to the jury for similar reasons previously

2 discussed. First, while there is evidence of repeated reports of Defendant

3 Holloway pursuing and having sexual relationships with women whom he met

4 through the course of his duties, the facts surrounding most of those reports are

5 disputed, making summary judgment inappropriate. It is for the jury to decide

6 those facts and also determine whether Defendant Holloway posed as a risk of

7 harm to others. Similarly, there is evidence that OSCO had notice that Defendant

8 Holloway may have been engaging in sexual misconduct, but whether it knew or

9 should have known he was a risk of danger to others is also a jury question.

10 Finally, Plaintiff presents expert testimony that OSCO’s failure to supervise

11 Defendant Holloway was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s harm. ECF No. 158 at

12 14. This element necessarily rests on the previous two being met.

13 D. Loss of Consortium and Civil Conspiracy

14 The County moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s loss of consortium and civil

15 conspiracy claims. ECF No. 166 at 19-20. Plaintiff has not provided any response

16 to the County’s argument and appears to have abandoned the claims. As such, the

17 claims are dismissed for failure to carry the burden of creating a material fact for

18 the jury to consider. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256.

19 II. Defendant Holloway

20 Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on her WLAD and § 1983 equal

1 protection claims against Defendant Holloway. ECF No. 161.

2 A. Washington Law Against Discrimination

3 Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on her WLAD

4 claim against Defendant Holloway because of his admission of sexual misconduct

5 with Plaintiff at Bud Clark Field. ECF No. 161 at 9-13.

6 As the Court previously explained, Plaintiff is a member of a protected class

7 and Bud Clark Field is a place of public accommodation, however, issues of fact

8 exist as to the remaining elements. Summary judgment on this claim is therefore

9 inappropriate.

10 B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

11 To make a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) a person

12 acting under color of state law (2) committed an act that deprived the plaintiff of

13 some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

14 United States. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1988). The Court’s

15 previous summary judgment order concluded that whether Defendant Holloway

16 was acting under color of law and violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights should

17 be left to a jury. ECF No. 113 at 7-15. Plaintiff argues that the Court should

18 nevertheless grant summary judgment because the undisputed facts demonstrate a

19 constitutional violation and that Defendant Holloway was acting under color of

20 law. ECF No. 161 at 13-19. A review of the record a second time around leads the

Court to the same conclusion—Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim must go to a jury.

2|| ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

3 1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Okanogan

4 County (ECF No. 158) is GRANTED in part.

5 2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendant Holloway

6 (ECF No. 161) is DENIED.

7 3. Defendant Okanogan County’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.

8 166) is GRANTED in part.

9 4. Plaintiff's claims for civil conspiracy and loss of consortium as to

10 Defendant Okanogan County are DISMISSED.

11 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order and furnish

copies to counsel.

13 DATED August 4, 2026.

<> United States District Judge

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