Opinion

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7 THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, et al., Case No. 25-cv-08910-LJC

8 Plaintiffs,

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY

9 v. MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

SHOULD NOT BE DENIED IN PART

10 PIPE-NET, INC.,

Re: Dkt. No. 22

Defendant.

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13 I. INTRODUCTION

14 Plaintiffs, the trustees of four union benefit trust funds, bring this action under the

15 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to enforce Defendant Pipe-Net,

16 Inc.’s contribution and reporting obligations. The Clerk entered Pipe-Net’s default after it failed

17 to appear and defend this case, and Plaintiffs now move for default judgment. For the reasons

18 discussed below, Plaintiffs are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why their Motion should not be

19 denied in part. Plaintiffs shall file a response no later than August 3, 2026.

20 The hearing previously set for July 14, 2026 is CONTINUED to October 6, 2026 at 10:30

21 AM in Courtroom G. Not all parties have appeared and consented to the jurisdiction of a

22 magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), so this Court anticipates issuing a report and

23 recommendation for resolution of this case by a district judge after Plaintiffs respond to this Order

24 to Show Cause.

25 II. BACKGROUND

26 Because a plaintiff’s factual allegations are generally taken as true in resolving liability on

27 a motion for default judgment, this summary presumes that the allegations of Plaintiffs’ Complaint

1 Plaintiffs are the trustees of the Laborers Health and Welfare Trust Fund for Northern

2 California, the Laborers Vacation-Holiday Trust Fund for Northern California, the Laborers

3 Pension Trust Fund for Northern California (in which capacity they are also responsible for the

4 Laborers Annuity Plan for Northern California), and the Laborers Training and Retraining Trust

5 Fund for Northern California. Compl. (ECF No. 1) ¶ 2. Pipe-Net is an employer that agreed to be

6 bound to a collective bargaining agreement with the Northern California District Council of

7 Laborers, which required Pipe-Net to submit contribution reports and make timely payments to

8 Plaintiffs’ trust funds, among other terms and requirements. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5. According to Plaintiffs’

9 Complaint, Pipe-Net had at the time of its filing “accrued at least $19,416.02 in delinquent fringe

10 benefit contributions; at least $6,984.85 in liquidated damages and interest on contributions paid

11 but paid late; and at least $6,272.92 in liquidated damages and interest on contributions reported

12 but not paid.” Id. ¶ 13.

13 Plaintiffs’ Complaint lists the following claims, which might more accurately be

14 considered remedies: (1) “Breach of Contract Statutory Damages Under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(g) &

15 1145” (two provisions of ERISA), Compl. ¶¶ 10–14; (2) “Actual Damages for Breach of

16 Contract,” id. ¶¶ 15–16; and (3) “Injunctive Relief,” id. ¶¶ 17–19 (capitalization altered from all-

17 caps headings for each claim). In their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs seek delinquent contributions,

18 interest, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and injunctive relief. Compl. at 6 (Prayer for

19 Relief).

20 The Clerk entered Pipe-Net’s default on March 23, 2026. ECF No. 19. Plaintiffs now

21 move for default judgment, ECF No. 22 (Mot.), seeking a total judgment of $58,071.53, interest

22 going forward at a contractual rate of 1.5 percent per month until paid, and an injunction requiring

23 Pipe-Net “to timely submit all required monthly contribution reports and contributions due and

24 owing by Defendant to Plaintiffs for so long as Defendant remains bound to contribute to the

25 Plaintiffs,” ECF No. 22-10 (Proposed Order and Judgment). Plaintiffs’ Motion is supported by a

26 declaration by Michelle Lauziere, Director of Employer Services of Plaintiffs’ administrative

27 office, ECF No. 22-1, and a declaration by Plaintiffs’ counsel Noah Stark, ECF No. 22-5.

1 III. LEGAL STANDARD

2 A court may enter default judgment on a motion by a plaintiff after the clerk has entered a

3 defendant’s default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). After considering threshold issues of jurisdiction

4 and service of process, courts consider the following factors in exercising their discretion to grant

5 or deny default judgment:

6 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of

plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint,

7 (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a

dispute concerning material facts, (6) whether the default was due to

8 excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

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10 Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). Courts evaluating a motion for default

11 judgment take the factual allegations of a plaintiff’s complaint as true except as to damages, which

12 must be shown by evidence. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir.

13 1987).

14 IV. ANALYSIS

15 A. Jurisdiction

16 1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

17 Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the

18 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiffs here seek relief

19 under federal law, specifically ERISA. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 18–19; see ECF No. 22 (Mot.) at 11–12, 17.

20 The Court therefore has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, as well as under

21 ERISA’s specific grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).

22 2. Personal Jurisdiction

23 “Personal jurisdiction over a defendant may be acquired in one of two ways: by personal

24 service of that defendant [in the jurisdiction] or by means of a defendant’s ‘minimum contacts’

25 with the jurisdiction.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992).

26 Where a federal statute provides for nationwide service of process, the “minimum contacts” test

27 for personal jurisdiction looks to the defendant’s contacts with the United States as a whole.

1 ERISA statute so provides,” and therefore requires only sufficient contact between defendants and

2 the United States. Cripps, 980 F.2d at 1267 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)); see, e.g., Reg’l Loc.

3 Union Nos. 846 & 847 v. Jayco Steel Servs., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-02267-ST, 2015 WL 2123757, at

4 *4 (D. Or. Apr. 29, 2015); Vivien v. Worldcom, Inc., No. C 02-01329 WHA, 2002 WL 31640557,

5 at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2002).

6 Pipe-Net is a California corporation. Compl. ¶ 3. “Courts can exercise general personal

7 jurisdiction over a corporation in its state of incorporation.” Green Pet Shop Enters., LLC v.

8 Grand Innovations USA, LLC, No. 2:21-cv-06156-MCS-MAA, 2022 WL 2235474, at *1 (C.D.

9 Cal. Apr. 13, 2022) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924

10 (2011)). Pipe-Net therefore has sufficient ties with the United States to fall within this Court’s

11 personal jurisdiction, and would have sufficient contacts with California to establish personal

12 jurisdiction even if ERISA did not call for a nationwide test.

13 B. Service of Process

14 As another threshold issue, the Court must determine that service of process was proper.

15 Bank of the W. v. RMA Lumber Inc., No. C 07-06469 JSW, 2008 WL 2474650, at *2 (N.D. Cal.

16 June 17, 2008). Service must comply with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which

17 authorizes service either through several means specifically listed or in any manner allowed by

18 state law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), (h)(1)(A). Rule 4 allows service on a corporation “ by

19 delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent,

20 or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process and—if the

21 agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires—by also mailing a copy of each to

22 the defendant.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B).

23 After previous unsuccessful efforts to serve Pipe-Net through its CEO Albert Gonzales,

24 who Plaintiffs discovered was deceased, Plaintiffs sought to serve Pipe-Net’s corporate secretary

25 and registered agent for service of process, who is listed as Manuel Ray Rodriquez (with a Q) in

26 Pipe-Net’s corporate filings with the California Secretary of State. ECF No. 22-5 (Stark Decl.) ¶ 3

27 & Ex. A. Plaintiffs identified a Manuel Rodriguez (with a G) as a beneficiary of the late CEO

1 Gonzales and Pipe-Net, Plaintiffs concluded that Manuel Rodriguez and Manuel Ray Rodriquez

2 were the same person, and personally served that person at an address listed for Manuel Rodriguez

3 in filings related to the trust. See id.; ECF No. 14 (Proof of Service). The proof of service

4 completed by the process server indicates that “Manual Ray Rodriquez - Registered Agent for

5 Service of Process” for Pipe-Net was personally served at the address Plaintiffs found for “Manuel

6 Rodriguez.”

7 Based on the record available, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiffs’ inference was

8 correct and that the Manuel Rodriguez listed in the trust documents is the same person as the

9 Manuel Ray Rodriquez listed as Pipe-Net’s corporate secretary and registered agent. Plaintiffs

10 therefore properly served Pipe-Net’s “officer” pursuant to Rule 4(h)(1)(B).1

11 C. Eitel Factors

12 Most of the Eitel factors either weigh in favor of default judgment or are inapplicable

13 where, as here, a defendant has failed to appear. With no other avenue apparent to resolve this

14 case, Plaintiffs will be prejudiced if default judgment is not granted because they will be left

15 without a remedy. There is no indication that Pipe-Net’s default was due to excusable neglect—

16 Plaintiffs properly served Pipe-Net as discussed above, and also mailed Pipe-Net a copy of the

17 entry of its default, see ECF No. 21—nor is there any indication Pipe-Net would dispute any

18 material facts. Notwithstanding the strong public policy favoring decisions on the merits, such a

19 decision is not possible when Pipe-Net has failed to appear or defend and there is no indication

20 that it intends to do so.

21 The sum of money at stake is not so high as to weigh against granting default judgment to

22 the extent supported by evidence, an issue discussed separately below. “The remaining factors,

23 ‘the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim’ and ‘the sufficiency of the complaint,’ are intertwined

24 where, as here, the case has not advanced beyond the pleading stage.” Dist. Council 16 N. Cal.

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1 The Court need not reach the question of whether service was also proper on

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Rodriguez/Rodriquez as an “agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of

process.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(B). Plaintiffs have not specifically addressed that prong of

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the rule, nor its requirement that “if the agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so

1 Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Prod. Serv. & Lab., Inc., No. 20-cv-2063-JCS, 2022 WL 17371170,

2 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2022), recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17371142 (N.D. Cal. Oct.

3 25, 2022).

4 ERISA requires employers who are “obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer

5 plan under the terms of the plan or under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement” to

6 “make such contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of such plan or such

7 agreement.” 29 U.S.C. § 1145. When an employer fails to do so, a fiduciary may bring an action

8 to enforce those obligations. If the fiduciary prevails, “the court shall award the plan”:

9 (A) the unpaid contributions,

10 (B) interest on the unpaid contributions [as provided by the plan2],

11 (C) an amount equal to the greater of--

12 (i) interest on the unpaid contributions, or

13 (ii) liquidated damages provided for under the plan in an

amount not in excess of 20 percent (or such higher percentage

14 as may be permitted under Federal or State law) of the amount

determined by the court under subparagraph (A),

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(D) reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the action, to be paid by

16 the defendant, and

17 (E) such other legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.

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29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2).

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Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Pipe-Net breached its obligation to pay (or to pay

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timely) contributions owed under the terms of the multiemployer plans at issue. E.g., Compl.

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¶¶ 4–9, 11. The undersigned therefore concludes that Plaintiffs have pleaded a meritorious claim.

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D. Damages

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As noted above, while a plaintiff may rely on the allegations of its complaint to establish

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the merits of its claim for default judgment, the plaintiff must prove its damages with evidence.

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TeleVideo Sys., 826 F.2d at 917–18. The damages Plaintiffs have requested in this case fall in two

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2 “For purposes of this paragraph, interest on unpaid contributions shall be determined by using

1 broad categories: (1) unpaid contributions, interest, and liquidated damages; and (2) attorneys’

2 fees and costs of collection efforts.

3 1. Contributions, Interest, and Liquidated Damages

4 To support their request for damages (other than attorneys’ fees), Plaintiffs rely on the

5 declaration of Michelle Lauziere, Director of Employer Services for the Laborers Funds

6 Administrative Office of Northern California, Inc. ECF No. 22-1. Lauziere details the amounts

7 that Pipe-Net purportedly failed to pay, and attaches summary charts that she or her staff

8 apparently prepared on Plaintiffs’ behalf. See ECF Nos. 22-3, 22-4 (Lauzire Decl. Exs. B, C).

9 This Court has previously addressed such evidence in another case brought by the same

10 Plaintiffs and some of the same counsel, where Plaintiffs also relied on a declaration by Lauziere

11 attaching similar summary charts: “Permitting Plaintiffs to rely on their own say-so of what

12 [Defendant] owes would undermine the requirement to prove damages through evidence—

13 particularly where underlying evidence that has not been provided is apparently available.” Bd. of

14 Trs., Laborers Health & Welfare Fund for N. Cal. v. Garrison Demolition & Eng’g, Inc.

15 (Garrison I), No. 25-cv-02878-TLT (LJC), 2025 WL 2522378, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2025)

16 (Order to Show Cause). That Order also addressed why the Ninth Circuit cases that Plaintiffs cite

17 again here, ECF No. 22 at 18, do not “excuse trust funds from offering underlying evidence to

18 support their requests for damages when moving for default judgment,” Garrison I, 2025 WL

19 2522378, at *5.

20 Here, much like in Garrison, Lauziere states that her office considered “Defendant’s

21 contribution remittance reports and payments submitted to the Trust Funds to determine whether

22 all required contributions Defendant had self-reported to the Trust Funds were paid.” ECF No.

23 22-1, ¶ 20. Just as in that case, Plaintiffs are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why their request

24 for unpaid contributions, as well as interest and liquidated damages on unpaid and late-paid

25 contributions, should not be denied for failure to submit the contribution reports or other

26 underlying evidence on which Plaintiffs base such damages. Plaintiffs shall file a response either

27 attaching that underlying evidence or arguing why that evidence should not be required no later

1 2. Post-Judgment Interest

2 Plaintiffs seek an order and judgment providing that “[i]nterest on unpaid delinquent

3 contributions shall continue to accrue at the rate provided for under Defendant’s agreements with

4 the Plaintiffs of 1.5 percent per month until paid.” ECF No. 22-10, ¶ 3. Though contractual

5 interest rates generally control in an ERISA action through entry of judgment, post-judgment

6 interest is typically governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961, which provides for interest at “at a rate equal to

7 the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield . . . for the calendar week preceding[]

8 the date of judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a); see Dishman v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 269 F.3d

9 974, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (addressing a dispute over the point in time in an ERISA case at which a

10 higher prejudgment interest rate should have given way to the lower statutory post-judgment

11 interest rate under § 1961); Locals 302 & 612 v. Les Russell Const., LLC, No. C12-860-JPD, 2012

12 WL 4026866, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2012) (“The Court notes, however, that this Court’s

13 entry of judgment will bar further recovery of interest at the pre-judgment rate.”).

14 Plaintiffs are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why post-judgment interest should not be

15 set at the statutory rate. If they believe they are entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate set by

16 contract for delinquent contributions, they must identify legal authority to that effect.

17 3. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

18 ERISA authorizes recovery of “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs of the action” when a

19 fiduciary successfully sues an employer. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D). Plaintiffs seek attorneys’

20 fees totaling $12,070 and costs totaling $2,592.95. ECF No. 22-8 at 2; ECF No. 22-9 at 3.

21 Plaintiffs’ fees were incurred by two shareholder attorneys (Kristina Hillman and Sean

22 McDonald) at a rate of $350 per hour, two associate attorneys (Norey Navarro and Noah Stark) at

23 a rate of $300 per hour, and three paralegals or senior paralegals (Aaron Nathan, Teresa Alou, and

24 Muey Saeteun) at a rate of $150 per hour. ECF No. 22-5, ¶ 7. McDonald, Navarro, and Stark

25 billed the vast majority of the 40.45 hours for which Plaintiffs seek recovery, with each of the

26 other timekeepers billing no more than two hours. See id. The Court has reviewed the detailed

27 billing records submitted with Plaintiffs’ Motion and finds that all of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fees

1 case. ECF No. 22-8. The Court also finds Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing rates to be reasonable in

2 light of each professional’s experience and the prevailing rates in the local market. See ECF No.

3 22-5, ¶¶ 8–14; Villasenor v. Cmty. Child Care Council of Santa Clara Cty., Inc., No. 18-cv-06628-

4 BLF, 2021 WL 242924, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2021) (awarding fees at rates of $650 per hour

5 for law firm partners and $190 per hour for senior paralegals in an ERISA case).

6 Plaintiffs’ costs—for a filing fee, reproduction and service of documents, legal research,

7 and researching an address for service on Pipe-Net—mostly also appear to have been reasonably

8 incurred. ECF No. 22-9 at 3. The Court has identified only one claimed cost that may not be

9 valid: a $367.55 charge on November 26, 2025 for “Service of documents Case Management

10 Statement (ASAP Legal SF34062210 11/26/25) Pipe-Net, Inc, CA; US District Court.” ECF No.

11 22-9 at 3. No case management statement has ever been filed in this case, see ECF No. 15, and

12 the docket does not reflect service of any other documents on Pipe-Net on that date. Plaintiffs are

13 ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why recovery of that $367.55 charge should not be denied.

14 E. Injunctive Relief and Continuing Jurisdiction

15 Plaintiffs request injunctive relief requiring Pipe-Net to submit timely monthly

16 contribution reports and payments going forward. ECF No. 22 at 23; ECF No. 22-10 (Proposed

17 Order and Judgment) at 4, ¶ 4.

18 According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking

a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court

19 may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has

suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such

20 as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;

(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff

21 and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public

interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. The

22 decision to grant or deny permanent injunctive relief is an act of

equitable discretion by the district court, reviewable on appeal for

23 abuse of discretion.

24 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Plaintiffs have not addressed

25 those requirements in their Motion. See ECF No. 22 at 12.

26 Courts routinely grant injunctions in similar cases requiring defendants to comply with

27 their agreements to submit contribution reports, and the Court is inclined to recommend such an

1 Demolition & Eng’g, Inc. (Garrison II), No. 25-cv-02878-TLT (LJC), 2025 WL 3900808, at *9

2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025), recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3907735 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2025).

3 Pipe-Net’s “failure to provide reports leaves Plaintiffs unable to determine the full extent of any

4 unpaid contributions.” See id. “[S]uch uncertainty is not itself redressable through remedies at

5 law, and . . . both the balance of hardships to the parties and the public interest favor requiring

6 [Pipe-Net] to honor its contractual obligation to provide reports—at least to the extent that [Pipe-

7 Net] may be continuing to perform work for which contributions are owed.” See id. A permanent

8 injunction requiring Pipe-Net to provide the contribution reports is therefore warranted.

9 With respect to the actual contributions, however, Pipe-Net has not explained how an

10 injunction requiring payment serves to address an injury for which “remedies available law, such

11 as monetary damages, are inadequate.” See eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. The same was true in

12 Garrison, where this Court recommended denying such an injunction and a district judge adopted

13 that recommendation. Garrison II, 2025 WL 3900808, at *9. Plaintiffs are therefore ORDERED

14 TO SHOW CAUSE why their request for an injunction requiring future payments should not be

15 denied.3

16 The Court is inclined to recommend that the district court retain jurisdiction to enforce the

17 terms of any judgment in this action.

18 V. CONCLUSION

19 For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs are ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why their

20 Motion for Default Judgment should not be denied as to the following issues: (1) delinquent

21 contributions, interest, and liquidated damages, for which Plaintiffs have not submitted underlying

22 evidence; (2) post-judgment interest at a rate greater than provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1961; (3) a

23 $367.55 cost dated November 26, 2025; and (4) an injunction requiring future payment of

24 contributions.

25 Plaintiffs shall file a response addressing those issues no later than August 3, 2026. The

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3 The Court’s concern that the specific legal remedy of injunctive relief may not be available for

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that purpose should not be understood as questioning Pipe-Net’s contractual obligations to make

] hearing on Plaintiffs’ Motion is continued as stated above.

2 IT IS SO ORDERED.

3 Dated: July 13, 2026

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‘A J. CISNEROS

6 ited States Magistrate Judge

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