Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SUSAN L. JOHNSON, )

)

) No. 23-CV-1903

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) District Judge J. Nicholas Ranjan

FREEDOMROADS, LLC, )

) Magistrate Judge Christopher B. Brown

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This employment-discrimination case was referred to Magistrate Judge

Christopher B. Brown for proceedings in accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and the Local Rules of Court applicable to Magistrate Judges.

Before the Court is a Report & Recommendation filed by Judge Brown,

recommending that Defendant FreedomRoads, LLC’s summary-judgment motion be

granted in part and denied in part. FreedomRoads filed four objections, to which

Plaintiff Susan Johnson responded. On de novo review, the Court overrules the

objections and adopts the R&R in full. Addressing each objection, in turn:

First, the Court finds there is sufficient evidence of pervasive discrimination

for the hostile-work environment claim to proceed. This includes: Mr. Fusco’s

unsolicited sexualized comment that he would perform mouth-to-mouth on Ms.

Johnson, and send a picture to her husband; comments by Mr. Rifendifer and Mr.

Hoover reflecting sexist attitudes about women that were made in front of Ms.

Johnson; testimony from coworkers corroborating the use of demeaning language

toward women, including Ms. Johnson; evidence reflecting a culture of tolerance for

such behavior, which included threats of violence directed at women, and calling

female employees “stupid” or “bitch”; and conduct by the FreedomRoads’s General

Manager that multiple employees reported as vulgar and sexually inappropriate,

particularly about women. ECF 46 at ¶¶ 76–88.

Some of these comments were directed at Ms. Johnson; others at women

around her. But as a whole, they reflect a pervasive and hostile-work environment

that adversely impacted Ms. Johnson, well beyond the off-hand remarks that usually

don’t survive summary judgment. See Brown-Baumbach v. B&B Auto., Inc., 437 F.

App’x 129, 133 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that frequent sex-related offensive comments

and behavior over months weren’t just “‘ordinary tribulations of the workplace’” even

while acknowledging that “not every sexual comment, action or joke creates a hostile

work environment” and “‘[t]he mere utterance of an epithet, joke, or inappropriate

taunt that may cause offense does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment

to implicate Title VII liability.’”) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.

775, 788 (1998) and Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 428 (3d Cir.2001)).

Second, there is sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination and pretext

on the disparate-treatment claim to proceed to a jury. FreedomRoads argues that

evidence of the April 2023 schedule change isn’t enough to support an inference of

intentional discrimination. ECF 49 at 4–6. That stops short of what Judge Brown

found. He found that there was enough evidence to establish disparate treatment

and pretext, including that: “FreedomRoads assigned her a substantially more

onerous schedule than her male colleagues. In less than a month after the schedule

change, when she did not meet the demands of a 67-hour, seven-days-a-week work

schedule, Johnson was terminated after working as a top performer for five years.”

ECF 48 at 26. FreedomRoads’s objection in this regard is more of a dispute over this

evidence, which is for the jury to resolve.

Third, FreedomRoads argues that it provided Ms. Johnson with religious

accommodation, so her Title VII religious-accommodation claim fails. ECF 49 at 6–

7. FreedomRoads points to a text message, where Ms. Johnson appears to

acknowledge that management told her she could “file paperwork thru HR to take

Sundays off for religious reasons.” Id. at 6. But as Judge Brown correctly found, the

record on this issue was as clear as mud. ECF 48 at 36–38. All the evidence reflects

is that Ms. Johnson asked for an accommodation, the one reasonable accommodation

on the table (a later start time on Sunday) was never reduced to writing, and

FreedomRoads’s regional manager couldn’t confirm it was even offered. ECF 46 at

¶¶ 26–28, 45–47; ECF 42-3 at 9:8–10:5; see ECF 48 at 37–38. At a minimum, there

are enough disputes on this issue for the jury to decide.

Fourth, the Court agrees with Judge Brown that the internal verbal

complaints and email to the CEO were protected activity, sufficient to support the

retaliation claim on the basis of sex discrimination. See ECF 48 at 39–41. Further,

emailing the CEO to complain about discrimination and then being fired nine days

later is suggestive timing to raise an inference of pretext.1 ECF 46 at ¶¶ 96, 99; Qin

v. Vertex, Inc., 100 F.4th 458, 476–77 (3d Cir. 2024) (“Temporal proximity between

the protected activity and the termination can be itself sufficient to establish a causal

link[,]” particularly if “within the three-month range to be unusually suggestive of

retaliatory motive.”) (cleaned up; quotations omitted); see ECF 48 at 41–43.

AND NOW, this 29th day of July, 2026, it is ORDERED that Defendant’s

objections are OVERRULED. The Report & Recommendation is ADOPTED as the

opinion of the Court.

BY THE COURT

/s/ J. Nicholas Ranjan

United States District Judge

1 FreedomRoads argues that the timeline here supports its arguments. It says that

the April schedule change was implemented April 1, 2023, and it wasn’t until after

Ms. Johnson refused to comply with the schedule (a few weeks later) that she emailed

the CEO. ECF 49 at 8–9. This argument though just repackages FreedomRoads’s

non-discriminatory reason—that Ms. Johnson was terminated for not complying with

the schedule. As noted above, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that this was

implausible and thus pretextual.