Davis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

DEXTER L DAVIS CASE NO. 3:24-CV-01746

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

THOMAS VILSACK MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D.

MCCLUSKY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 78] filed by Defendant, Brooke L. Rollins (“Secretary

Rollins”), Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”

or“Defendant”). Pro se Plaintiff, Dexter Davis (“Davis”), filed a response [Doc. No. 83].

No reply was filed.

For the following reasons, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

Davis, an African American farmer, has received farm loans through the Farm

Service Agency (“FSA”) since 1984 and has extensive experience filing grievances

against the USDA1. Davis filed this suit on December 13, 2024, against Rollins in her

official capacity as Secretary for the USDA.2 His complaint alleged that Defendant

discriminated against him based on race, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the

United States Constitution, the Equal Credit Opportunities Act (“ECOA”), the

1 As listed in Defendant’s Motion, Complaint #951113-20; Complaint #1151802; Complaint # 08-0815;

Complaint #12-5519; Complaint #2020-12- 00012196; and Complaint #2024-10-00015010.

2 The original defendant in the suit was Thomas Vilsack (“Vilsack”); however, Vilsack was terminated

and Rollins was substituted on May 14, 2026, to reflect the current Secretary of the USDA.

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and “Title IV” of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3

On March 21, 2025, Davis filed an amended complaint for damages and injunctive

relief, listing the USDA as a Defendant and adding the National Administrator of the

USDA Discrimination Financial Assistance Program (“DFAP”) as a Defendant.4

Because the amended complaint did not name Secretary Thomas Vilsack (now

Secretary Rollins), in his official capacity as Secretary of the USDA, Secretary Rollins

was incorrectly identified as a party. Accordingly, the Court will analyze the claims

as asserted against the USDA alone. The facts alleged in the amended complaint are

as follows.

The FSA Customer Profile indicates that Davis last filed an application with

the FSA on April 4, 2000.5 On June 14, 2000, David obtained a loan of $209,809.82,

of which $187,286 remains outstanding.6 Davis’s last payment on that loan was

January 1, 2025.7

Sometime in 2019, and to obtain further loans for the 2020 crop year,

Commercial Capital Bank instructed Davis to request a non-disturbance agreement

from the FSA due to “[Davis’s] position at the time of the requests.”8 A non-

disturbance agreement, as described in the notice of closure letter, is “a legal

3 [Doc. No. 1, p. 14]. The Court believes Plaintiff had a typographical error and construes the “Title IV”

allegation under Title VI.

4 [Doc. No. 41, p. 2, ¶ 6]. Because the USDA contends that DFAP is a “non-government contractor that

is not herein represented by undersigned counsel,” and because DFAP has not enrolled in this action,

the Court does not address any claims against DFAP.

5 [Doc. No. 78-2, p.1].

6 [Id.].

7 [Id.]; [Doc. No. 78-3].

8 [Doc. No. 41, ¶¶ 8–10].

document in which one party assumes all liability of another party in a specific case.”9

Davis requested FSA officials to sign the agreement, essentially releasing him of all

financial obligations to Defendant. The request was not agreed upon as “nothing

contained in the FSA loan regulations indicate any FSA official has the authority to

issue such a document to an FSA borrower.”10

On or about December 27, 2019, Davis filed a complaint with the Office of the

Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights (“OASCR”), arising out of claims that the FSA

racially discriminated against him in denying his request for “a hold harmless or non-

disturbance request to carry out his 2020 farm operation.”11 OASCR accepted the

complaint on May 4, 2020, and transmitted it for potential resolution.12 OASCR

formally addressed and disposed of Davis’s administrative complaints of

discrimination.13 Despite not obtaining a non-disturbance agreement, Commercial

Capital Bank approved Davis for a crop loan on January 7, 2020.14

On January 13, 2024, Davis submitted an application for relief under the

DFAP program.15 At the beginning of the document, it cautioned that “[i]t is critical

that you provide the list of required documents for your Application to be considered;

certain documents, if not provided, may disqualify you from participating in this

program.”16 In Step 4, Part A of the application, the application states: “You are

9 [Doc. No. 41-1, p. 5].

10 [Id. at ¶ 11].

11 [Doc. No. 41, ¶¶ 7,8]; [Doc. No. 78-7, p. 21].

12 [Doc. No. 41-1, p. 5].

13 [Doc. No. 78-6, pp. 1–5].

14 [Doc. No. 78-5].

15 [Doc. No. 78-7].

16 [Id. at p. 2].

required to provide documentation in response to this request. If not provided, and

this information is unable to be verified, you may be disqualified from participating

in this program.”17 Defendant alleges that Davis failed to include required identifying

information and documentation such as his address, driver’s license, utility bill issued

in the past 60 days, showing name and current address, proof of Social Security

Number or Individual Taxpayer Identification Number, documents relating to his

deeds, and documentation supporting his claim that he was denied a loan/loans based

on discrimination despite instructions that he “must” provide such.18 Davis included

some information in certain steps, but did not provide supporting documentation.19

He also acknowledged that although some information was missing, the requested

details were “available and well-known to the agency.”20 This grievance was not

considered because of the insufficient information.

The parties briefed all relevant issues, and the matter is ripe.

II. Law and Analysis

Davis claims that he is entitled to relief pursuant to the following: 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000(d); Civil Rights Act Title VI; Fifth Amendment; the APA; and the ECOA.21 The

Court will first examine Davis’s APA claim and Title VI claim under Rule 12(b)(1).

Subsequently, the Court will analyze Davis’s constitutional claim under Rule

12(b)(6). Lastly, the Court will analyze Davis’s ECOA claims under Rule 56.

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

17 [Id. at p. 41].

18 [Id. at p. 5].

19 [Id.].

20 [Doc. No. 41, ¶¶ 63, 64].

21 [Doc. No. 41, p. 16].

When subject matter jurisdiction is challenged by a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the

burden of establishing the federal court’s jurisdiction falls on the party asserting the

jurisdiction—in this case, Davis. See Wittman v. Personhuballah, 578 U.S. 539, 545

(2016). Federal district courts have the unique power to make factual findings that

are decisive of subject matter jurisdiction. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413

(5th Cir. 1981). A district court has the power to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction—and thus for lack of standing—on any one of three separate bases: “(1)

the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced

in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s

resolution of disputed facts.” Williamson, 645 F.2d at 413. Ultimately, a motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted only if it appears

certain the plaintiff cannot provide any set of facts in support of their claims that

would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th

Cir. 2001) (citing Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143

F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)).

1. APA

Davis asserts an APA claim against Defendant and DFAP, claiming that § 706

of the APA was violated because the DFAP application denial was “unlawful and

arbitrary.”22 Davis requests money damages of not less than $5,000,000.23 In seeking

dismissal, Defendant argues that Davis is seeking money damages and that the

22 [Id. at p. 16].

23 [Id.].

United States has only waived its sovereign immunity under the APA for suits

seeking non-monetary relief.24 Davis is silent as to this assertion in his opposition.

Section 702 of the APA, however, provides in pertinent part:

A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or

adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the

meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review

thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking

relief other than money damages and stating a claim that

an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed

to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority

shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the

ground that it is against the United States or that the

United States is an indispensable party.

5 U.S.C. § 702.

Section 706(2)(A) of the APA, under which Davis claims relief, provides:

To the extent necessary to decision and when presented,

the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of

law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and

determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an

agency action. The reviewing court shall hold unlawful and

set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to

be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law.

Id. § 706(2)(A) (citation modified).

Thus, Section 702, in conjunction with 706 of the APA, contains a waiver of

sovereign immunity applicable to any claim “seeking relief other than money

damages.” 5 U.S.C. § 702; see Crowley Gov't Servs., Inc. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 38

F.4th 1099, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“Via the APA, the Congress has provided a limited

24 [Doc. No. 78-1, p. 11].

waiver of sovereign immunity for claims against the United States ‘seeking relief

other than money damages[.]’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702)).

Here, Davis seeks monetary damages to compensate for the harm he allegedly

suffered as a result of the Defendant’s denial of his DFAP application and requests

an award of $5,000,000.25 In King v. U.S. Dept. Of Veterans Affs., the Fifth Circuit

affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s APA claim because the

complaint exclusively sought money damages. 728 F.3d 410, 416 (5th Cir. 2013). This

is precisely what Davis seeks here, as he claims $5,000,000 in damages. Davis cannot

do so.

Thus, the Court finds that dismissal as to his APA claim for monetary damages

against Defendant under Rule 12(b)(1) is appropriate.

Defendant does not address Davis’s request for declaratory relief under the

APA in that Defendant’s actions were unlawful and arbitrary.26 Accordingly, because

Davis seeks nonmonetary relief, sovereign immunity does not bar that claim.

Therefore, Davis’s claim for declaratory relief under the APA remains pending.

2. 42 U.S.C § 2000(d)

Davis makes a claim against the DFAP and Defendant, alleging that the

DFAP’s denial was motivated by discriminatory animus and retaliation for prior

protected activity. He claims this violates 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d), Title VI of the Civil

Rights Act.27

25 [Doc. No. 41, pp. 9, 16].

26 [Id. at p. 16].

27 [Doc. No. 41, ¶ 46].

Under Title VI, “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,

color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,

or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

Title VI does not apply to a discrimination claim arising from a program

directly conducted by a federal financial agency. See Brown v. U.S. Postal Inspection

Serv., No. H-14-1756, 2014 WL 7072021 at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2014); Williams v.

Glickman, 936 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C.1996) (holding that Title VI does not permit suits

involving directly administered federal programs); Soberal–Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d

36, 38 (2d Cir. 1983) (Title VI “was meant to cover only those situations where federal

funding is given to a non-federal entity which, in turn, provides financial assistance

to the ultimate beneficiary.”)

Davis has not demonstrated that the United States, through Defendant, has

consented to be sued under Title VI. So, to the extent Davis asserts a claim against

Defendant under Title VI, such claim is denied and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

Additionally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanction dismissal where

the plaintiff fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(6). A pleading states a claim for relief, inter alia, when it contains a “short and

plain statement” that shows “that the pleader is entitled to relief” they seek. Id.

8(a)(2).

To withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual

content for a court “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability;

it lies somewhere in between. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. Plausibility only requires

enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence to support the elements of the claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Although courts must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, the same

presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. A pleading

comprised of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action” does not satisfy Rule 8. Id. “[P]laintiffs must allege facts that support

the elements of the cause of action in order to make out a valid claim.” City of Clinton,

Ark. v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 632 F.3d 148 (5th Cir. 2010). “Courts must focus on the

substance of the relief sought and the allegations pleaded, not on the label used.”

Gearlds v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 709 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2013). Moreover, a court

is compelled to dismiss an otherwise well-pleaded claim if it is premised upon a

“meritless legal theory.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

When considering a motion to dismiss, courts are generally limited to the

complaint and its proper attachments. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333,

338 (5th Cir. 2008). Courts may, however, rely upon “documents incorporated into

the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice,”

including public records. Id.; Norris v. Hearst Tr., 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5th Cir.

2007). Furthermore, “documents that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are

considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and

are central to his claim.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–

99 (5th Cir. 2000).

It is unclear which constitutional claims Davis asserts against Defendant in

his amended complaint. On its face, the amended complaint appears to assert only a

Fifth Amendment claim against DFAP.28 However, in response to the Motion, Davis

argues that Defendant’s “absence of technical assistance, coupled with OASCR’s

dismissal of Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint, deprived [him] of procedural due

process.”29 To afford Davis the benefit of the doubt, the Court will analyze his

procedural due process claim against Defendant. Even so, the claim is dismissed for

failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for the reasons below.

The touchstone of a due process claim is the deprivation of a life, liberty, or

property interest. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (“Procedural due

process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of

‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”) According to the Supreme Court, “[t]o have a

property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need

or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must,

instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” The Bd. of Regents of State

Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).

28 [Id. at ¶ 45].

29 [Doc. No. 83, p. 4].

It remains unclear what specific due process protections Davis contends he was

entitled to receive. Davis appears to assert that his due process rights were violated

by the absence of technical assistance and the denial of his application, which, in his

view, deprived him of a protected property interest because he was afforded no

opportunity to appeal the denial. This argument is unavailing. First, Davis did not

suffer a deprivation of any protected property interest due to his denial, as he

ultimately obtained the loan he sought and thus sustained no harm or damage from

any alleged violation.

Second, as to denying the application with no alleged appeal, other courts have

held that there is no property interest in the right to a hearing. See, e.g., Richardson

v. Twp. of Brady, 218 F.3d 508, 517 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing United of Omaha Life Ins.

Co. v. Solomon, 960 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1992)) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument

that he had “a property interest in the procedures themselves, and that by failing

swiftly to execute its procedures the Township has deprived him of that property right

without due process”); see also Allen v. Mecham, No. 05-1007, 2006 WL 2714926, at

*3 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 2006) (“While it is certainly true that AOUSC cannot deprive the

Plaintiff of property without a ‘fair hearing,’ neither that hearing itself nor the right

to a hearing can constitute protected property. . . . [A] number of courts have

explicitly rejected Plaintiff's circular argument that procedures may constitute

property subject to due process protection.”) (collecting cases).

Thus, to the extent Davis asserts a Fifth Amendment claim against Defendant,

his claim is denied under Rule 12(b)(6).

C. Rule 56

Defendant filed an alternative motion for summary judgment. Under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters

outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must

be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d).

As an initial matter, the Court will consider and treat part of the motion to

dismiss as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, since matters outside the

pleadings have been presented to and not excluded by the court. See Washington v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1284 (5th Cir. 1990). “Rule 12(b) gives a district court

‘complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept any material beyond the

pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’” Isquith ex rel

Isquith v. Middle S. Utilities, Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 194 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988). “[W]henever

a motion to dismiss is converted into a motion for summary judgment, the non-

movant is entitled to the ‘procedural safeguards of Rule 56.’” Id. at 195.

A court will grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). If the movant meets their initial burden of

showing no genuine issue of material fact, “the burden shifts to the nonmoving party

to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine

issue for trial.” Distribuidora Mari Jose, S.A. de C.V. v. Transmaritime, Inc., 738 F.3d

703, 706 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation modified). A fact is “material” when proof of its

existence or nonexistence would affect the lawsuit’s outcome under applicable law in

the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In other words,

“the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise

properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 247–48. And a dispute

about a material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact

finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. “A party cannot defeat

summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only

a scintilla of evidence.” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th

Cir. 2007). Courts “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence”

and “must resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the

non-moving party.” Total E & P USA Inc. v. Kerr–McGee Oil and Gas Corp., 719 F.3d

424, 434 (5th Cir. 2013).

Finally—and importantly—there can be no genuine dispute as to a material

fact when a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof of trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).

Davis seemingly makes a claim against DFAP for denying his civil rights

complaint, in violation of the ECOA. As for Defendant, however, Davis asserts that

the FSA discriminated against him based on race in connection with his request for

a hold harmless or non-disturbance agreement. The Court will only examine the

claim against Defendant.

The ECOA provides that it is “unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against

any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction ... on the basis of

race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a).

The statute authorizes the recovery of actual damages from creditors, including the

federal government, see id. §§ 1691a(e)–(f), 1691e(a), and a court “may grant such

equitable and declaratory relief as is necessary to enforce [the ECOA],” as well as

“reasonable attorney’s fees” to applicants bringing a “successful action.” Id.

§ 1691e(c)–(d). Claims under the ECOA must be filed within five years of the “date of

the occurrence of the violation.” Id. § 1691e(f). “To state a claim for relief under the

ECOA, the plaintiff must plausibly show that he was discriminated against in

violation of the statute. More specifically, the complaint must plausibly allege that

(1) each plaintiff was an ‘applicant’; (2) the defendant was a ‘creditor’; and (3) the

defendant discriminated against the plaintiff with respect to any aspect of a credit

transaction on the basis of the plaintiff's membership in a protected class.” Alexander

v. AmeriPro Funding, Inc., 848 F.3d 698, 705–06 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing 15 U.S.C.

§§ 1691(a), 1691a(b), 1691a(e), 1691e(a)).

“[T]he ECOA does not prohibit discrimination with respect to mortgages

purchased on the secondary market; the Act only applies to originating lenders in the

primary market.” Id. at 706. If the plaintiff successfully demonstrates a prima facie

case, the defendant must “respond by producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

rationale for its decision.” Curley, 2007 WL 1343793, at *5. If the defendant satisfies

its burden, the plaintiff must “raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the

[defendant’s] proffered reason was merely a pretext for discrimination.” Id. (citing

Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 F.3d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 2001)).

As Defendant points out, and because Davis has failed to present any evidence

creating a dispute as to this fact, the FSA profile indicates that Davis’s last

application for an FSA loan was submitted in 2001.30 Thus, he cannot be considered

an applicant because no actual application was ever submitted. Nor does Davis

appear to dispute this in any of his filings. Instead, he submits a blank non-

disturbance agreement, which does nothing to refute the fact that no application was

ever submitted or properly completed.31 Moreover, although the amended complaint

is not entirely clear, it appears that, despite never having submitted an application

to the FSA, Davis filed a complaint with OASCR alleging discrimination for the

failure to provide a non-disturbance agreement.32 Even assuming that Davis has

established a prima facie case and submitted a proper application, Defendant has

met its burden of producing evidence demonstrating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for not agreeing to Davis’s request for a hold-harmless agreement. As

Defendant contends, and as the notice of closure letter shows, the non-disturbance

agreement was not agreed to because no “FSA official has the authority to issue such

a document to an FSA borrower or to a commercial entity on behalf of an FSA

borrower.”33 Davis has presented no evidence creating a genuine issue of fact to

dispute this reason. In fact, Davis merely asserts a conclusory opinion of law,

“discriminatory and retaliatory conduct.”34 Neither legal conclusions nor statements

30 [Doc. No. 78-2].

31 [Doc. No. 41-1, p. 2].

32 [Id. at p. 5].

33 [Doc. No. 78-6, p. 1].

34 [Doc. No. 83, p. 5].

made without personal knowledge are capable of being so presented. See FED. R. EVID.

602, 701, 702.

In any event, although Davis’s discrimination claim aligns more closely with a

disparate treatment theory than a disparate impact theory (because he ultimately

received the loan he sought), it, too, fails to state a claim. To establish a prima facie

case of disparate treatment under the ECOA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1)

he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he applied for and was qualified for a

loan; (3) despite his qualifications, plaintiff's loan application was denied; and (4) the

lender continued to approve loans for applicants with qualifications similar to those

of the plaintiff. Phoenix v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 16-75, 2016 WL 7379001, at

*2 (M.D. La. Dec. 20, 2016) (citing Dixon v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., No. 12-2150,

2013 WL 3776577, at *4 (E.D. La. July 17, 2013)). To make out a disparate treatment

claim under the ECOA, a plaintiff must articulate facts which, if taken as true, would

demonstrate that actions were taken against him as a result of race. Jones v. Caliber

Home Loans, Inc., No. 18-1023, 2019 WL 3366104, at *5 (M. D. La. July 25, 2019).

“There can be no liability without a finding that the protected trait (e.g., race)

motivated the challenged action.” Id.

Davis fails on elements two through four. Again, there is no dispute that Davis

failed to submit an application to Defendant. Even if he did, Davis cannot prove

element four. Much of Davis’s amended complaint includes general and conclusory

allegations that Defendant engaged in racial discrimination or disparate treatment.

Nevertheless, Davis appears to support his claims by relying on evidence of alleged

disparate treatment and discrimination from Defendant’s prior years.35 However, as

this Court has recognized in Davis’s prior lawsuits against Defendant, evidence of

past settlements neither creates a genuine dispute of material fact that Davis was

subjected to discrimination nor supports a finding of disparate treatment in this case.

See Davis v. Vilsack, No. 14-3320, 2015 WL 5012838 (W.D. La. Aug. 21, 2015).36 To

accept Davis’s arguments, the Court would have to presume that because Defendant

and/or the FSA settled claims of discrimination in the 1990s, it follows that Davis is

a victim of discrimination in 2019 and 2024. The Court cannot make that leap based

on events of almost thirty years ago. Next, Davis supports his contention by

presenting records of subordination agreements involving other individuals.37 First,

these agreements are not the same ones Davis sought; and second, he fails to

demonstrate that the other individuals share any similar qualifications, such as

existing liens. And to reiterate, Davis ultimately received the loan he originally

sought and therefore suffered no cognizable harm. Accordingly, Davis’s claims under

the ECOA against Defendant are dismissed.

To conclude, Davis’s APA and Title VI claims are dismissed, in part, pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(1). Davis’s Fifth Amendment claim is dismissed pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), and his ECOA claims are dismissed under Rule 56.

III. Conclusion

35 [Doc. No. 41, pp. 12–13].

36 Indeed, the mere fact that the FSA or USDA previously settled with Davis does not constitute

evidence that he was the victim of discrimination. Settlements may be reached for numerous reasons

and do not, standing alone, constitute an admission of fault, liability, or discriminatory conduct.

37 [Doc. No. 41-1, pp. 7–11].

For all these reasons,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant USDA’s

Motion to Dismiss or Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant’s Motion

as to Davis’s APA claims seeking monetary relief is GRANTED, and such claim is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. To the extent Davis seeks non-monetary

relief, that claim remains pending.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that

Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED as to Davis’s Title VI claim, and such claim is

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that

Defendant’s Motion as to Davis’s constitutional claim is GRANTED, and this claim

is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that

Defendant’s Motion as to Davis’s ECOA claims is GRANTED, and Davis’s claims are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 24th day of July 2026

unifen§ TATES DISTRIC D

Page 18 of 18