HAMEED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

JASMIN KAZEM HAMEED and

ESLAM SABRY MOHAMED,

Plaintiffs, 1:25-CV-660-DAB

v.

CHRISTOPHER M. HEFFRON, Field

Office Director, Charlotte Field Office,

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration

Services; JOSEPH B. EDLOW,

Director U.S. Citizenship and

Immigration Services; MARKWAYNE

MULLIN, Secretary of U.S.

Department of Homeland Security; and

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney

General of the United States, in their

official capacity,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

Plaintiffs Jasmin Kazem Hameed and Eslam Sabry Mohamed (“Mohamed”)

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against the Director of the United States

Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS” or “the agency”), the USCIS

Charlotte Field Office Director, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland

Security,1 and the Attorney General of the United States2 in their official capacities,

1 Markwayne Mullin became Secretary of Homeland Security on March 24, 2026,

and is substituted for defendant Kristi Noem under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)

2 Todd Blanche became Acting Attorney General of the United States on April 2,

2026, and is substituted for defendant Pamela Bondi under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

seeking judicial review of USCIS’s 2022 denial of Hameed’s Form I-130 petition

for Sam to be classified as her spouse under Section 201(b)(2)A)(i) of the

Immigration and Nationality Act. See Complaint, D.E. 1.

Currently pending before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary

judgment. See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, D.E. 16; Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment, D.E. 18. The Matters have been fully briefed, and

after a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, the Court finds that

USCIS is entitled to summary judgment in its favor for the reasons set forth below.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Eslam Sabry Mohamed entered the United States on April 20, 2015, as a

nonimmigrant visitor with authorization to remain in the United States until October

19, 2015. Certified Administrative Record, D.E. 12–15 at 747 (hereafter “CAR”). On

September 11, 2015, approximately a month before the end of his authorized stay,

Mohamed married United States citizen Michele Holland (“Holland”). Id. at 761.

On July 27, 2016, Holland submitted an alien relative petition (Form I-130) on

Mohamed’s behalf. Id. at 747–48. Mohamed and Holland were scheduled to be

interviewed by a USCIS officer on December 27, 2016, but failed to appear and

provided no explanation for such failure. Id. at 743–44. As a result, Holland’s

petition on Mohamed’s behalf was denied for abandonment. Id.

After USCIS determined the petition was abandoned, the USCIS Officer

referred the case to USCIS Fraud Detection and National Security (“FDNS”). Id. at

804. Thereafter, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Homeland Security

Investigation (“HSI"), a separate component of the Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”), interviewed Holland. Id. at 808–10. During this interview,

Holland stated that her employer was Mohamed’s brother, Khaled. Id. She stated

Khaled knew of her financial difficulties and told her that he may have a way to

assist with her financial issues. Id. Khaled and Mohamed proposed that she be paid

to marry Mohamed, with different financial sums paid to her at different stages of

the immigration process. Id. at 808–09. She provided details of the money Mohamed

provided, including how the payments were typically transmitted and when they

stopped. Id. at 809. Holland stated that Mohamed received his “green card” a few

months before the immigration interview scheduled in December 2016 and used that

as identification to open a joint bank account at Wells Fargo bank in Wytheville,

Virginia.3 Id. at 810. The account agreement from First Community Bank shows

3 Considering that Mohamed never received a green card, this may have been a

layperson’s description of a work permit. D.E. 12–15, at 330.

Holland’s address on West Main Street, Wytheville, Virginia as of January 6, 2016.

Id. at 520.

Mohamed, as well as various affidavits from Holland and others, state that

they resided together at the West Main St. address until February 2016, when

Holland relocated to Salem, Virginia. Id. at 56, 58, 59–74, 79, 186–95, 221–31, 522–

24. On December 5, 2016, Mohamed was charged with Trespassing Private Property

in violation of Virginia Code Section 18.2-119. Id. at 504. Mohamed states that this

incident was in response to marital infidelity by Holland. Id. at 186–195. On April

19, 2017, Mohamed was found guilty and prohibited from contacting Holland. Id. at

504. Mohamed and Holland divorced in September 2017. Id. at 42. The divorce

decree states that they had lived separate and apart since January 7, 2016, without

reconciliation. Id. at 42.

On April 24, 2019, Mohamed married United States citizen Plaintiff Jasmin

Kazem Hameed. Id. at 557. Hameed filed an alien relative petition on Mohamed’s

behalf on November 18, 2020. Id. at 532. On August 16, 2021, USCIS issued a

Notice of Intent to Deny (“NOID”) Hameed’s petition, stating that there was

substantial and probative evidence that Mohamed’s earlier marriage to Holland was

fraudulent, so the petition was barred from approval under INA § 204(c). See 8

U.S.C. § 1154(c); CAR at 528–31. Holland filed an affidavit recanting her statements

to police and to HSI on October 4, 2021. CAR at 186–195. Plaintiffs also submitted

a comprehensive response to the NOID, including affidavits from Holland and third

parties, joint bank account records (which do not identify what financial institution

they come from), joint residential lease agreements, utility bills and automobile

records, medical records, court records, and texts messages between Mohamed and

Holland. Id. at 280–527.

After considering the response to the NOID, USCIS denied the alien relative

petition filed by Hameed on May 17, 2022. Id. at 129–134. USCIS found that the

evidence demonstrated Mohamed’s marriage to Holland was solely for immigration

purposes. Id. Thereafter, Hameed appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration

Appeals (BIA). On July 8, 2024, the BIA remanded the matter to USCIS for issuance

of a new decision. Id. at 126–28. The remand directed USCIS to reassess and clarify

the evidence on which it relied in rendering its decision, and consider any further

evidence submitted upon remand. Id. at 128. BIA also noted that USCIS relied upon

an alleged police report related to Mohamed’s trespassing conviction that was not in

the record. Id. Upon remand, USCIS issued a new NOID on February 24, 2025. Id.

at 9–14. After considering the plaintiffs’ response to the NOID, USCIS once again

denied the petition on June 11, 2025. Id. at 1–8. Plaintiffs challenge this denial here.4

Plaintiffs did not appeal the June 11, 2025, denial to BIA, but Defendants do not

raise any challenges based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies.5

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) confines judicial review of

agency decisions to the administrative record of proceedings before the pertinent

agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). Stated

differently, “when a party seeks review of agency action under the APA, the district

judge sits as an appellate tribunal.” Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d

1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001). In reviewing an agency decision, courts should “not

reweigh the evidence . . ., make credibility determinations, or substitute [their]

judgment for that of the agency.” Downey v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 685 F. App’x

184, 189 (4th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). The Court is only tasked with

determining whether the evidence in the administrative record supports the

conclusion. Id. at 190. As review is confined to the record, the entire case on review

is a question of law, rather than of fact. See Am. Bioscience, Inc., 269 F.3d at 1083;

Amin v. Mayorkas, 24 F.4th 383, 391 (5th Cir. 2022).

The APA instructs federal courts to set aside agency action that is “arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A). This standard of review is “narrow and highly deferential.” Ren v.

USCIS, 60 F.4th 89, 93 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotations omitted). Courts will

uphold an agency’s decision “so long as we find that the agency ‘acted within a zone

of reasonableness.’” Mestanek v. Jaddou, 93 F.4th 164, 170 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting

FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021)). “Even when an

4 Plaintiffs also submitted two affidavits, Plaintiff’s Response, D.E. 20, but the

Court’s review of this case is limited to the administrative record, which does not

include these affidavits. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973).

5 Because “[c]ertain unfavorable decisions on applications, petitions, and other types

of cases may be appealed” to the BIA, 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(ii) (emphasis added),

some courts have held that such an appeal is optional but not required. See, e.g.,

Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 498 (6th Cir. 2006). However, the Second

Circuit has ruled differently. See Howell v. INS, 72 F.3d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1995).

Here, this Court need not reach that issue because even if administrative exhaustion

were required, the Defendants waived this argument by failing to raise it in their

Motion for Summary Judgment. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007)

(“[T]he usual practice under the Federal Rules is to regard exhaustion as an

affirmative defense.”).

agency explains its decision with ‘less than ideal clarity,’ a reviewing court will not

upset the decision on that account ‘if the agency’s path may reasonably be

discerned.’” Alaska Dep’t of Env’t Conservation v. E.P.A., 540 U.S. 461, 497 (2004)

(quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281,

286 (1974)).

DISCUSSION

In their cross-motions for summary judgment, the parties focus on one

primary dispute: whether the USCIS’s action was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Plaintiffs argue that the evidence

relied upon by USCIS is contradictory or unsupported by the administrative record,

and as a result the decision made by USCIS in reliance on that evidence was arbitrary

and capricious. In response, Defendants move for summary judgment arguing that

USCIS properly denied Plaintiffs’ Form I-130 petitions because it identified

“substantial and probative evidence” that Mohamed’s prior marriage to Michele

Holland was invalid. Defendants’ Memorandum, D.E. 19, at 4. After a brief

explanation of the Marriage Fraud Bar, the Court will address each of the parties’

arguments.

a. Legal Framework Governing I-130 Petitions and the “Marriage Fraud

Bar”

A United States citizen seeking lawful permanent resident status for a

noncitizen spouse must initiate the process by filing Form I-130, Petition for Alien

Relative, with USCIS. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1154(a)(I)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R.

§ 204.1(a)(1). The petitioner must furnish with that petition sufficient documentation

that establishes, inter alia, “the claimed relationship of the petitioner [citizen] to the

beneficiary [alien].” 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(f)(1). The petitioner bears the burden of

proving eligibility, including both the validity of the marriage and “the legal

termination of all previous marriages.” 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(2). However, if USCIS

determines that the non-citizen beneficiary has previously “attempted or conspired

to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws,” then it is

prohibited from approving the petition. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c)(2). This “marriage fraud

bar” requires that USCIS must identify “substantial and probative evidence” of

invalidity. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(1)(ii); Mestanek, 93 F.4th at 172; Matter of Singh,

27 I&N Dec. 598 (BIA 2019); Matter of Tawfik, 20 I&N Dec. 166, 167 (BIA 1990).

In making a determination on Form I-130 and the “marriage fraud bar,”

USCIS “may rely on any relevant evidence, including evidence having its origin in

prior [USCIS] proceedings involving the” alien. Tawfik, 20 I&N Dec. at 168.

“Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to constitute ‘substantial and

probative evidence.’” Singh, 27 I&N Dec. 598. Once USCIS identifies this evidence,

the burden shifts to the petitioner to rebut the finding. Matter of Kahy, 19 I&N Dec.

803, 806–07 (BIA 1988). If USCIS denies the petition, the petitioner may take an

administrative appeal of the decision to the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1204.1.

b. Parties Arguments

Plaintiffs’ first argument is that USCIS never found fraud in its February 1,

2017, decision to deny Holland’s Form I-130 petition on behalf of Mohamed. That

decision was made exclusively on abandonment grounds after Mohamed and

Holland did not appear for a scheduled interview. Plaintiffs appear to argue that

USCIS could not arrive at a new decision in the wake of later discovered facts.

Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, D.E. 17, at 10. Plaintiffs offer no case law to support this

proposition, and the Court is not aware of any. Indeed, USCIS “may rely on any

relevant evidence, including evidence having its origin in prior [USCIS] proceedings

involving the” alien.” Tawfik, 20 I&N Dec. at 168. This does not limit USCIS to the

evidence available to it at the time of prior decisions but instead allows USCIS to

consider the weight of all relevant evidence to a petition. USCIS’s reliance on later

evidence to find a likelihood of fraud is therefore not arbitrary and capricious on its

own.

Plaintiff’s second argument is that USCIS’s May 17, 2022, denial of Hameed’s

Form I-130 petition was based on evidence that was not available in the record and

that the June 11, 2025, denial relied on similar evidence that contradicted the 2022

evidence. Plaintiffs point to the BIA’s remand order which concluded that remand

was warranted for “further clarification of [USCIS]’s decision[,]” and that “[USCIS]

should reassess the case and clarify which statements [it] relies on and when and to

whom Ms. Holland’s statements were made to ensure that the petitioner is provided

proper notification and an opportunity to respond.” D.E. 12, at 128. Specifically, the

BIA was concerned that the 2022 denial referenced a police report that was not

included in the record and instructed that “sworn affidavits should be considered

along with other evidence of record.” Id. Plaintiffs assert that reliance on this missing

evidence was arbitrary and capricious.

But USCIS’s 2025 denial removes any reference to the missing police report

and instead relies on a separate investigative report from DHS Homeland Security

Investigations, which describes a different conversation with Holland on April 19,

2017. That conversation highlights admissions by Holland that she was paid $150

per month three or four times in cash, and that she received $80 as part of the last

payment in November 2016. Reliance on that evidence is reasonable, and USCIS

does not rely on any “missing and unreviewable” evidence in the 2025 denial.

Moreover, there is no requirement to discuss every piece of evidence that an agency

receives. See Fosso v. Sessions, 692 F. App’x 744, 754 (4th Cir. 2017). USCIS

“acknowledges the affidavits and photographs submitted in response to the NOID.”

D.E. 12, at 6. However, it need not address every piece of evidence individually,

especially where it does address the relevant rebuttal testimony in the affidavits. See

Mestanek, 93 F.4th at 174. As such, the Court does not find that USCIS was arbitrary

and capricious by relying on the investigative report in its 2025 holding.

Plaintiffs also assert various factual arguments, claiming that the

administrative record includes contradictory or speculative facts that render the

USCIS denial “internally inconsistent.” Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, D.E. 17, at 13.

Among these are allegations that dollar amounts of the pay Holland received vary

based on the source (Holland reportedly gave various numbers to investigators,

including $150 per week, $200 per week, and $200 per month, along with planned

but ultimately unpaid bulk payments of $2000 and $3000 upon Mohamed’s

obtaining a green card), allegations that Holland “never lived” with Mohamed but

witnessed him speaking to his (then ex-) wife in Egypt for hours (suggesting they

spent significant time together), allegations of domestic abuse, allegations that

Mohamed’s brother was involved in the scheme, and Mohamed’s response to

discovering Holland’s infidelity. It is not this Court’s mandate to weigh the truth or

falsity of various stories in the factual record. Instead, this Court is tasked with

determining whether the administrative agency acted within a “zone of

reasonableness.” Downey, 685 F. App’x at 189; Mestanek, 93 F.4th at 170. Despite

Plaintiffs’ protestations, USCIS’s analysis of the facts falls within a zone of

reasonableness. It is reasonable to conclude that, based on Holland’s various

statements to police and circumstantial evidence that the marriage was fraudulent

(including the fact that the parties did not live together long and could not establish

sufficient evidence of the commingling of finances) there was an agreement to enter

into a marriage for immigration purposes. Moreover, despite Holland’s declaration

withdrawing her allegations of marriage fraud, USCIS was still allowed to consider

the admission. Mestanek, 93 F.4th at 174. It is not irrational for USCIS to conclude

that Holland’s retraction was not credible considering the other evidence in the

record. Id.

Considering the high level of deference shown to administrative agencies

when revieing their decisions, as well as the significant circumstantial evidence and

witness testimony of marriage fraud, USCIS was not arbitrary and capricious in

determining that there was “substantial and probative” evidence of marriage fraud.

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (D.E. 18) and DENIES Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (D.E. 16). Accordingly, all claims asserted by the Plaintiffs are dismissed

without prejudice.

A Judgment dismissing this action will be entered contemporaneous with this

order.

This the 11th day of August, 2026.

/s/ David A. Bragdon

United States District Judge