Jamerson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES A. JAMERSON,

Case No. 25 CV 06584

Plaintiff,

v. Honorable Sunil R. Harjani

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

James Jamerson worked as a special agent for the Postal Service’s Office of

Inspector General for over a decade. During that time, he became friends with the

postmaster of one of the local post offices. When a coworker accused the postmaster

of stealing shoes, the postmaster complained to Jamerson. Around the same time,

Jamerson heard from another special agent that the postmaster would be

investigated for theft. Jamerson maintains that he never told the postmaster about

the investigation. But his office became suspicious and questioned whether he shared

any confidential information with the postmaster. Jamerson was placed on leave and

eventually notified of his impending termination. OIG charged him with

unauthorized disclosure of investigation information, which he formally challenged,

but to no avail. OIG removed him from his position and upheld the decision on

internal appeal.

Proceeding pro se, Jamerson sued OIG, several of its officials, and the

postmaster general for alleged procedural errors leading up to his removal, which he

claims violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process and other procedural rights

under statute and agency policy. His constitutional claim is the only one substantial

enough to establish federal question jurisdiction. Still, his sole requests for equitable

and declaratory relief make the claim implausible when asserted against the

individual Defendants personally. When the claim is advanced against them in their

official capacities, which is equivalent to the claim against OIG, the Court finds that

the Complaint, liberally construed, sufficiently invokes the Administrative Procedure

Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. However, Jamerson’s request for review of

adverse agency action still cannot proceed. The Civil Service Reform Act is an

exclusive regime for federal employees like Jamerson to contest removal. Under

Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent, the Court finds that Congress

intended to channel Jamerson’s challenge to his removal through its scheme, even

though it provides him with no administrative and judicial review. The Court cannot

provide an alternative remedy, and the constitutional presentation of his claim does

not override the statutory directive. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.

Background

In May 2023, the Postal Service’s Office of Inspector General received an

anonymous tip that a manager in the Lombard, IL post office stole a pair of shoes.

[20] ¶ 10.1 Jamerson had a personal friendship with Postmaster Tenia Thompson of

the Lombard post office. See id. at 18. Before learning that OIG opened an

investigation into the reported theft, he learned directly from Thompson that she was

accused of stealing a pair of shoes. Id. ¶ 12. When Mike O’Connor, the special agent

assigned to investigate the theft, told him that official action was being taken,

Jamerson explained to O’Connor that he gave Thompson a pair of shoes as part of a

family discount program, which might account for the reported action. Id. ¶¶ 14–15.

Upon request, Jamerson submitted a written statement about his connection with

Thompson to another special agent, Daniel Cozzi. Id. ¶ 39; see also id. at 21.

Jamerson maintains that he never told Thompson about the theft

investigation, but OIG accused him of discussing the allegation with her after

speaking to O’Connor. Id. ¶¶ 13, 16–17. Jamerson was placed on leave for nearly a

year, which his supervisor decided to do only after Inspector General Tammy Hull

allegedly weighed in. Id. ¶¶ 22, 27. In August 2024, he received a notice of proposed

removal. Id. ¶ 18. Through counsel, Jamerson submitted a written response to the

charges that presented his side of the story, identified mitigating factors weighing

against removal, and provided a written statement by Thompson attesting to her

version of the events. Id. ¶¶ 17c, 19, 42; id. at 16–31. Jamerson also obtained a copy

of the statement from the employee who reported the theft and argued that it

supported his narrative. Id. at 51–56; see id. ¶ 31. Nevertheless, OIG removed

Jamerson from his position. Id. ¶ 20. He then unsuccessfully appealed his

termination through the agency’s internal process, during which Thompson and Cozzi

were interviewed.2

Jamerson claims that OIG committed procedural errors during his disciplinary

process and violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights by removing him. Along

with OIG, Jamerson sues Inspector General Hull; her special agents Cozzi, Ryan

Petry, and Matthew Modafferi; and the former and current Postmasters General,

1 For purposes of reviewing this motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true, as it must, all

factual allegations in the Complaint, which includes its attachments and referenced

documents. Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2024). All paragraph citations

refer to Jamerson’s typed allegations attached to his form complaint. See [20] at 4, 6–11.

2 Jamerson attaches to his Complaint excerpts from interviews conducted as part of the “161

hearing,” which he describes in his response brief as OIG’s internal appeal process. [20] at

57–68; [43] at 10.

Doug Tulino and David Steiner. He alleges that Defendants failed to provide

adequate warnings about the effect of his statement before he submitted it to Cozzi,

to afford sufficient time to gather evidence for his defense, to interview him and

Thompson as a key witness, and to consider all the evidence fairly.

Legal Standard

The government moves to dismiss the Complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(1) tests the sufficiency of

the complaint on subject matter jurisdiction. Ctr. for Dermatology & Skin Cancer,

Ltd. v. Burwell, 770 F.3d 586, 588 (7th Cir. 2014). In contrast, Rule 12(b)(6) tests the

sufficiency of the complaint on the plausibility of its claims as determined by its

factual matter. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). For both types of motions,

the Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draws all

inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Ctr. for Dermatology & Skin Cancer, 770

F.3d at 588; Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673, 678 (7th Cir. 2024). The Court

also holds a pro se plaintiff to less stringent standards and liberally construes his

complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

Discussion

The Court begins with whether Jamerson’s due process claim survives

dismissal. Then, it addresses the remaining two claims about alleged procedural

errors.

I. Fifth Amendment Due Process Claim (Count I)

In his Complaint, Jamerson seeks a declaration that his removal violated his

Fifth Amendment rights, reinstatement of his OIG position with back pay and

benefits, expungement of his removal from employment records, and compensatory

damages. Initially, the government construed his Fifth Amendment claim against the

individual Defendants as a Bivens claim, which may allow a private individual to sue

federal employees for damages in limited circumstances. See Thomas v. Carmichael,

164 F.4th 1058, 1063 (7th Cir. 2026) (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of

Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). However, in his response brief,

Jamerson renounces his claim for damages and clarifies that he seeks only

declaratory and equitable relief. [43] at 1 (“Plaintiff does not seek . . . to obtain

damages against individual federal officials.”); id. at 12 (“Plaintiff can cure any

identified deficiencies by clarifying that he seeks only equitable and declaratory

relief[.]”). By doing so, Jamerson waives his right to seek damages under this claim.

See United States v. Grusd, 164 F.4th 635, 638 (7th Cir. 2026) (“Waiver occurs when

a party intentionally relinquishes a known right[.]” (citation omitted)). All that

remains are his requests for declaratory and equitable relief. Therefore, the Court

need not determine whether Jamerson presents an actionable Bivens claim.

A. Individual Defendants Sued in Individual and Official

Capacities

Analyzing Jamerson’s due process claim as one for only declaratory and

equitable relief, the Court considers first whether Jamerson sues the individual

Defendants in their personal or official capacities. Jamerson does not specify the

capacity in which he sues each Defendant in the Complaint or his brief, so it is unclear

which is asserted. To proceed, the Court considers the Complaint in its entirety and

looks to the conduct alleged. Orr v. Shicker, 147 F.4th 734, 739–40 (7th Cir. 2025).

A personal-capacity suit “focuses on the constitutional torts of an individual

official.” Orr, 147 F.4th at 739 (citation omitted). The plaintiff must show that the

individual defendant caused the deprivation of a federal right. Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Upon such a showing, the plaintiff may seek money

damages but cannot obtain declaratory and injunctive relief. Knowlton v. City of

Wauwatosa, 119 F.4th 507, 519 (7th Cir. 2024). In the Complaint, Jamerson does not

allege any facts that infer personal involvement by Tulino, Steiner, Petry, or

Modafferi. However, he alleges that Hull influenced his supervisor’s decision to place

him on administrative leave, which contributed to the deprivation of due process. [20]

¶¶ 23–24, 32. He also alleges that Cozzi violated agency policy by compelling him to

write a statement without adequate warnings that it may lead to disciplinary action.

Id. ¶¶ 39–40. But, while he identifies individual actions, none of this involvement

“seek[s] to impose personal liability upon” them for these actions. See Kentucky, 473

U.S. at 165. Rather, he seeks reinstatement, which only OIG can provide, and a

declaration that his removal was unconstitutional, which also can be recovered only

from OIG. Jamerson no longer seeks damages, so he cannot state a plausible claim

against the individual Defendants in their personal capacities. Accordingly, the

personal-capacity claims are dismissed with prejudice, since amendment would be

futile.3 See Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786

F.3d 510, 519 (7th Cir. 2015).

In contrast, an official-capacity suit alleges that an individual official

participated in implementing official conduct by a government entity that is the real

party in interest. Orr, 147 F.4th at 739. Aside from the few allegations implicating

Hull and Cozzi, Jamerson attributes the alleged due process violations to OIG. He

asserts that “the Agency” failed to conduct necessary interviews during its

3 The government argues that because Cozzi has not been served, Jamerson did not intend

to include him as an individual Defendant. Jamerson has not responded to this argument.

Cozzi was not served and has not moved to dismiss, see [24], but the claims against him places

him in the same position as the other Defendants and can be evaluated in the same way. See

Rosser v. Chrysler Corp., 864 F.2d 1299, 1304 (7th Cir. 1988). Because the claims against him

are integrally related to the rest of the claims, the Court applies its analysis of the

government’s motion to dismiss to him, too.

investigation into his misconduct, disregarded exculpatory evidence, and ultimately

removed him. [20] ¶¶ 17a, 17d, 20; see also id. ¶¶ 38, 41, 43, 45. Indeed, the

declaratory and equitable relief he seeks is only recoverable from the individual

Defendants in their official capacity, since that equates to recovery from OIG.

Knowlton, 119 F.4th at 519. Considering the Complaint in its entirety and in light of

his revised requests for relief, the Court finds that Jamerson asserts official-capacity

claims against the individual Defendants. In this capacity, the Court dismisses the

claim against former Postmaster General Tulino, who is automatically substituted by

the current postmaster, David Steiner.4 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

B. Sovereign Immunity

Having determined that Jamerson brings official-capacity claims against the

individual Defendants, the Court analyzes those claims in the same way as his claim

against OIG. See Orr, 147 F.4th at 739 (“In an official-capacity suit, . . . the real party

in interest is the entity.”). The government argues that OIG cannot be liable because

it is entitled to sovereign immunity as part of the federal Government. Jamerson

contends that he may proceed on his constitutional claim under Title 28, United

States Code, Section 1331, which provides the Court with jurisdiction over “civil

actions arising under the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

The Postal Service enjoys sovereign immunity as an agency in the executive

branch. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Konan, 607 U.S. 391, 395 (2026); Morgan v. Fed. Bureau

of Prisons, 129 F.4th 1043, 1049 (7th Cir. 2025). To maintain a viable claim against

the United States in federal court, a plaintiff needs both “a statute that confers

subject matter jurisdiction on the district court” and “a federal law that waives the

sovereign immunity of the United States to the cause of action.” Clark v. United

States, 326 F.3d 911, 912 (7th Cir. 2003). The language of the statute waiving

sovereign immunity must make it “unmistakably clear” that Congress intended to

waive it. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), 146 S. Ct. 1909, 1918

(2026) (citation omitted). “Failure to satisfy either requirement mandates the

dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim.” Macklin v. United States, 300 F.3d 814, 819 (7th

Cir. 2002). Here, OIG is part of the Postal Service, so Jamerson needs statutory

grounds for both subject matter jurisdiction and waiver of immunity. Although he

identifies Section 1331 to satisfy the first requirement, he does not cite a statute that

waives sovereign immunity.

Despite his lack of legal authority, Jamerson is a pro se litigant who is held to

less stringent standards and afforded a more liberal construction of his Complaint.

Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. A pro se plaintiff need not point to the appropriate statute

4 The Court need not reach the government’s qualified immunity defense since the personal-

capacity claims are dismissed and it does not apply to official-capacity claims. Sanville v.

McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2001).

or law to raise a claim, so long as he explains how the government violated the law

in a way that can support a lawsuit. Powell v. Village of Lansing, 2026 WL 1091742,

at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 22, 2026) (citing Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1134

(7th Cir. 1992)); see also Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding

that litigants need not plead legal theories if their factual allegations provide fair

notice to the defendants of the necessary elements of their claim). Often, when

plaintiffs seek judicial review of agency action for nonmonetary relief, they invoke

the Administrative Procedure Act. See Osterbur v. Ill. E.P.A., 2011 WL 4459104, at

*3 (C.D. Ill. Sep. 14, 2011). Section 702 of the APA provides a generally applicable

basis for reviewing agency action. Blagojevich v. Gates, 519 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir.

2008) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 702). Relevant here, it waives sovereign immunity “in cases

involving constitutional challenges.” Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 667 F.3d

765, 775 (7th Cir. 2011).

Jamerson describes his desire for review of the executive agency action

terminating him, which he asserts violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment.

By seeking only declaratory and equitable relief, his claim is substantively a Section

702 claim. Indeed, the government recognizes that this statute could be a basis for

his claim, even though they do not contend that it is. See [47] at 11. Given his pro se

status and the liberal construction owed to the Complaint, the Court presumes that

Jamerson asserts his claim under Section 702 and, thus, Defendants are not immune

from suit.

C. The Civil Service Reform Act

Having found that Defendants are not immune, the Court turns to the

government’s argument that the Postal Reorganization Act and Civil Service Reform

Act preclude Jamerson’s declaratory and equitable claims. The PRA provides that the

CSRA governs postal employees’ challenges to adverse employment actions, including

removal. 39 U.S.C.§ 1005(a)(1); 5 U.S.C. § 7512(1); Fuqua v. U.S. Postal Serv., 956

F.3d 961, 965–66 (7th Cir. 2020). The CSRA “comprehensively overhauled the civil

service system.” Lindahl v. Off. Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 773 (1985). It centralized

adjudication of disputes arising from adverse personnel actions taken against federal

employees “to balance the legitimate interests of various categories of federal

employees with the needs of sound and efficient administration.” United States v.

Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444–45 (1988). To accomplish that purpose, it prescribed

remedies for three main categories of civil service employees. Id. at 441 n.1. The

relevant category in this case is the excepted service, which the parties agree applies

to Jamerson’s former OIG position. See [20] ¶ 21; [47] at 9; see also 5 U.S.C.

§§ 2102(a)(1)(A), 2103(a); 39 U.S.C.§ 1001(b); Mouton-Miller v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,

985 F.3d 864, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“All positions in the Postal Service fall within the

excepted service.”). While the CSRA allows excepted-service employees who meet

enumerated preference requirements to appeal agency decisions to the Merit Systems

Protection Board and Federal Circuit, it provides no administrative or judicial review

for members of the excepted service who do not. See Fausto, 484 U.S. 446–47 (citing

5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1)(B), 7513(d), 7703); 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3). Jamerson does not allege

whether he meets the preference requirements, but he discloses that he cannot appeal

to the MSPB. [20] ¶ 21. Accordingly, the Court infers that he is a non-preference

member of the excepted service.

Given his service status, Jamerson cannot appeal to the MSPB or Federal

Circuit. The government argues that he cannot bring his claim here, either. Although

he alleges a constitutional violation, the government asserts that the CSRA is an

exclusive scheme that precludes judicial review beyond what it prescribes. Certainly,

Congress can substitute federal courts’ statutory or equitable authority for an

alternative scheme of review. Axon Enter., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 598 U.S. 175,

185 (2023); Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327–28 (2015). In

two related instances, the Supreme Court expressed the CSRA’s preclusive effect on

claims brought outside the statutory scheme. In Fausto, the Supreme Court held that

a non-preference member of the excepted service, like Jamerson, could not challenge

his suspension in a federal district court. 484 U.S. at 440–41. The Supreme Court

explained that Congress designed CSRA as a comprehensive scheme to replace the

“haphazard” and “patchwork” system of administrative and judicial review of

personnel action that existed before its enactment. Id. at 444–45. This system

explicitly addressed which excepted-service members had limited or conditional

rights to administrative and judicial review. Id. at 446–47. By deciding that some

members had those rights, the Court reasoned, Congress expressed through its

silence that it deliberately denied those rights for the others. Id. Allowing those

excepted-service members without rights to pursue avenues of review outside of the

CSRA scheme would negate its system of preferences and would “seriously

undermine” the primacy of the MSPB and Federal Circuit for resolution of disputes

over adverse personnel action. Id. at 449–50.

Later, in Elgin v. Department of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012), the Supreme

Court extended the CSRA’s preclusive effect to constitutional claims. Id. at 5. There,

“covered” employees, who could seek review from the MSPB and Federal Circuit, sued

in federal district court, alleging that the statute governing their removals was

unconstitutional. Id. at 7. The Supreme Court again looked at the purpose of the

CSRA—to be an exclusive system for challenging employment actions—and the

CSRA’s provisions about the covered employees—which established the methods for

obtaining review in “painstaking detail.” Id. at 10–14. This purpose and structure

made it “fairly discernible” that the CSRA provided the only avenues for covered

employees to challenge adverse employment actions. Id. The exclusivity turned “not

. . . on the constitutional nature of an employee’s claim, but rather on the type of the

employee and the challenged employment action.” Id. at 15. Because the plaintiffs

were employees specifically addressed in the statute and based their constitutional

claims on removal, the CSRA barred their suit. Id. at 23.

Following this analytical framework, the exclusivity of the CSRA to Jamerson’s

due process claim depends not on its constitutional nature but on whether the CSRA

has addressed his type of employee and the challenged employment action. Fausto

supports the first factor. The Supreme Court detailed how Congress explicitly dealt

with the rights of non-preference members of the excepted service, both in how their

rights to review are determined and by how those rights are exercised. Id. at 446–47.

Importantly, it found that Congress’ silence communicated its intent to regulate non-

preference members’ review rights, rather than finding the silence left a gap that an

alternative judicial remedy could fill. Id. For the second factor, Fausto is instructive

again because it dealt with a plaintiff challenging his removal, which was covered by

Chapter 75 of the CSRA and thus barred. Id. A difference here is that Jamerson

frames his claim as a due process violation that caused his removal. See Elgin, 567

at 11 n.4 (noting that Fausto did not involve a constitutional claim). But an action for

reversal of removal framed as a constitutional violation was found precluded by the

CSRA in Paige v. Cisneros, 91 F.3d 40 (7th Cir. 1996). There, a non-preference

member of the excepted service sued for a violation of his Fifth Amendment due

process rights. Id. at 41–42. The district court remanded to the agency for further

review of his discharge, but the Seventh Circuit stated that the district court lacked

jurisdiction to do so. Id. at 42. The CSRA was the exclusive scheme for adverse

employment actions, even if that meant “[m]any personnel actions are unreviewable

in any court or administrative tribunal.” Id. at 42–43. Its withholding of review rights

for certain claims did not mean that courts could fashion a separate remedy. Id. Along

those lines, permitting Jamerson’s claim would lead impermissibly to an adjudication

of an employment action outside of the framework established by the CSRA.

The Court notes that other circuits have divided over whether a district court

retains jurisdiction over a constitutional claim for equitable relief despite the CSRA.5

Indeed, the Seventh Circuit in Paige acknowledged the divergent approaches to

constitutional claims that only seek equitable relief. 91 F.3d at 44. While the Seventh

5 Compare Berrios v. Dep’t of Army, 884 F.2d 28, 30–31 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that the CSRA

precluded the plaintiff’s constitutional claims seeking reinstatement, back pay, damages, and

attorney’s fees), Dotson v. Griesa, 398 F.3d 156, 180 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[E]mployees covered by

the CSRA . . . may not sue in equity for reinstatement of employment, even when they present

constitutional challenges to their termination.”), Zummer v. Sallet, 37 F.4th 996, 1007–08

(5th Cir. 2022) (affirming dismissal of constitutional claim about adverse employment action

that was not reviewable by the MSPB), Lombardi v. Small Bus. Admin., 889 F.2d 959, 961–

62 (10th Cir. 1989) (concluding that the CSRA precludes judicial review of agency

employment decisions even if the employee’s complaint raises constitutional claims and

merely seeks injunctive relief), Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 901 F.2d 1571,

1576 (11th Cir. 1990) (not permitting additional remedies for alleged constitutional violations

beyond what the CSRA has provided), with Semper v. Gomez, 747 F.3d 229, 242 (3d Cir. 2014)

(holding that a federal employee with no meaningful judicial review may seek equitable and

declaratory relief for alleged constitutional violation in a “federal question” action under 28

U.S.C. § 1331), Strickland v. United States, 32 F.4th 311, 376–77 (4th Cir. 2022) (same), Am.

Fed. of Gov’t Emps. Loc. 1 v. Stone, 502 F.3d 1027, 1036–39 (9th Cir. 2007) (same), Spagnola

v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223, 229–30 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same).

Circuit has not weighed in, the “doctrinal path hewed by the Supreme Court and

[Seventh] [C]ircuit” cuts a broad path for the CSRA to preclude Jamerson’s claim.

Ass’n of Admin. L. Judges v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 402, 406 (7th Cir. 2015) (J., Ripple,

concurring). The Seventh Circuit’s logic in non-equitable cases also supports this

conclusion. In Paige, the appellate court addressed the same type of constitutional

claim that is presented here and found the claim barred. Id. at 42–43. And later, in

Richards v. Kiernan, 461 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2006), the Seventh Circuit held that the

CSRA “provides the exclusive remedy for an alleged constitutional violation . . .

arising out of federal employment.” Id. at 885. It reasoned that Congress provided

what it considered adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations, even

if incomplete and unavailing for some parties. Id. at 883–84. Although it decided this

in the context of a covered employee asserting a Bivens claim, the principle extends

to Congress’ “deliberate exclusion” of non-preference members of the excepted service

from administrative and judicial review. Fausto, 484 U.S. at 455. By determining that

judicial review was available to certain federal employees and not others, Congress

intended to provide adequate constitutional remedies for some and not others, such

as Jamerson. The CSRA’s exclusivity appeared again in Colvin, where the Seventh

Circuit found that the CSRA barred a group of administrative law judges who were

challenging an agency-imposed quota because the quota fell under the statutory

definition of “personnel practices,” for which there were statutory remedies. 777 F.3d

at 403–04. Even though the statutory remedies for personnel practices were

unavailable for the type of practice at issue, the CSRA still foreclosed the plaintiffs’

federal suit.6 Id. In the same way, what matters for Jamerson is that the CSRA

occupies the field for claims about adverse employment actions, not whether it allows

him a statutory route to relief.

Although Jamerson presents his claim as a constitutional one, it is a challenge

to agency action that seeks to undo his removal. It is not truly an “independent

constitutional claim” that lands outside the CSRA’s reach or can be adjudicated as a

collateral matter. Paige, 91 F.3d at 43–44. Rather, Jamerson proceeds in the same

6 In Colvin, the Seventh Circuit considered covered employment actions under special

circumstances. The APA provides that an agency cannot assign duties “inconsistent with

[their] duties and responsibilities as administrative law judges.” 777 F.3d at 403 (citing 5

U.S.C. §§ 554(d)(2), 3105). While the challenged quota created no conflict between the CSRA

and APA, the Seventh Circuit refrained from holding that the CSRA barred all agency action

impacting decisional independence, in case a serious infraction allowed for a plausible APA

claim. Id. at 405. It also hypothesized that an administrative law judge could constitutionally

challenge an agency action significantly interfering with her decisional independence,

because that action would “dangerously diminish[]” her ability to provide due process to

claimants. Id. Here, Jamerson’s claims do not invoke statutory protection that may conflict

with the CSRA or demonstrate that his removal creates separate constitutional implications

like an action affecting a judge’s decision-making. His claims align more closely with those

asserted in Paige and Richards and, like those cases, do not present the unique circumstances

that may allow for an exception to the CSRA. See id.

manner that the plaintiffs did in Fausto and Paige to overturn their removals. Thus,

he runs headfirst into the exclusivity bar of the CSRA. Because Congress substituted

the jurisdiction of this Court to hear challenges to adverse employment actions such

as Jamerson’s, his due process claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction.

II. Jamerson’s Remaining Claims (Counts II & III)

Jamerson asserts two other claims about his termination. First, he bases his

claim for harmful procedural errors on Section 7701(c)(2)(A) of Title 5 of the United

States Code. Second, he claims that OIG violated the Postal Service’s internal policy

about appropriate employee behavior. These claims are based on the same factual

allegations as his due process claim and present alternative causes of action to

challenge his removal. However, neither the statute nor policy contains a waiver of

sovereign immunity to allow his claims to move forward. Sovereign immunity is

treated as a jurisdictional issue, so the Court must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction

where it is not waived. Morgan, 129 F.4th at 1049–50, 1052.

Even if Defendants were not immune, the Court would still lack jurisdiction

because these claims are not colorable. The government argues that neither Section

7701 nor the internal policy creates a private right of action upon which Jamerson

can sue, and Jamerson offers no response. Claims that are “‘wholly,’ ‘obviously,’ or

‘plainly’ insubstantial or frivolous” do not provide federal question jurisdiction.

Restoration Risk Retention Grp., Inc. v. Gutierrez, 880 F.3d 339, 347 (7th Cir. 2018)

(citation omitted). Section 7701 governs the appellate procedures for the MSPB “from

any action which is appealable to the Board under any law, rule, or regulation.” 5

U.S.C. § 7701(a). Section 7701(c)(2)(A) explains that the MSPB cannot sustain the

agency’s decision if the employee shows harmful error in the application of the

agency’s procedure. See Oliva v. Dep’t of Vet. Affs., 176 F. 4th 650, 661–62 (Fed. Cir.

2026). However, Jamerson concedes that he did not proceed through the MSPB, so

there is no MSPB decision here to adjudicate under that standard. Nor can the Postal

Service policy provide a cause of action for Jamerson. Agency internal rules have no

legal or binding force. Krasilych v. Holder, 583 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 2009). They

also do not create a property interest here that could support a due process violation.

Catinella v. County of Cook, 881 F.3d 514, 518 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim should be dismissed because the employee

manual did not create a property interest that could be deprived); see, e.g., Sharma

v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 404 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1201 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (same).

Because the claims lack any foundation for plausibility, they do not provide federal

question jurisdiction.7

7 Because the Court grants the government’s motion to dismiss, it need not address its

alternative motion for summary judgment.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the government’s motion to dismiss [33] is

granted. Jamerson cannot assert his Fifth Amendment claim against the individual

Defendants personally because he only seeks declaratory and equitable relief that

they cannot provide. To the extent he claims a due process violation by the individual

Defendants in their personal capacities, the Court dismisses with prejudice Count I

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. His

constitutional claim against the individual Defendants in their official capacities and

OIG must proceed according to the CSRA, which does not provide Jamerson with

judicial review in federal district court. Thus, the CSRA precludes this Court’s

jurisdiction over the remainder of Count I. Counts II and III do not rest upon valid

rights of action, so they do not establish federal subject matter jurisdiction. Nor do

they provide a waiver of sovereign immunity. Without jurisdiction over the claims,

the Court dismisses these remaining claims under Rule 12(b)(1) without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2026 / ( ) 7

Sunil R. Harjani

United States District Judge

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