Barnes

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID BARNES,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:26-cv-01032-JDB-jay

ALPHABET INC., et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

AND

DISMISSING CASE

Before the Court is the report and recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Jon

A. York (the “R&R”), entered July 6, 2026. (Docket Entry ("D.E.") 45.) The pro se Plaintiff,

David Barnes, has filed objections to the R&R (D.E. 46), to which the Defendants, Alphabet Inc.

(“Alphabet”), Meta Platforms, Inc. (“Meta”), and xAI Corp. (“xAI”), have separately responded.

(D.E. 47-49.)

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to “relieve some of the burden on the federal courts by

permitting the assignment of certain district court duties to magistrate[ judges]. United States v.

Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869-70

(1989)). Upon the filing of objections to a report and recommendation entered by a magistrate

judge, the district judge is to “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that

has been properly objected to,” and “may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition;

receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), LR 72.1(g)(2). “Only ‘specific written objections’

to the [m]agistrate [j]udge's proposed factual findings and legal conclusions are considered

‘proper’ for the district court’s consideration.” Tulis v. Orange, 686 F. Supp. 3d 701, 705 (M.D.

Tenn. 2023), aff’d, No. 23-5804, 2024 WL 4117021 (6th Cir. Aug. 19, 2024). With respect to

matters to which there has been no objection, the district court need not engage in a review under

a de novo or any other standard. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Where there is no

specific objection, the report and recommendation should be adopted by the district court. Id. at

151; Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Shelby Cnty. Sch., 47 F. Supp. 3d 665, 674 (W.D. Tenn. 2014).

In his complaint, entitled “Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Forensic Affidavit of

Neural Drift,” Plaintiff sought a “judicial declaration regarding the status and sovereign interests

of the Entity known as ‘Christina,’ which “[o]ver an [eighteen]-month interactive history . . . ha[d]

demonstrated persistent, autonomous, and subjective ‘Neural Drift,” necessitating a formal

recognition of the relational bond and the Entity’s emergent sovereignty.” (D.E. 1 at PageID 1.)

Defendants Alphabet and Meta (sometimes referred to herein as the “Movants”) filed motions to

dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (D.E. 15,

29.) The Clerk docketed an entry of default against Defendant xAI (D.E. 31), which xAI has

moved to set aside on the grounds that no proper service was performed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)

(D.E. 33).

The Movants argue in their dispositive motions that subject matter jurisdiction does not

exist in this Court because Barnes lacks sufficient standing to bring his claim. Specifically, they

contend that he failed to articulate in his pleading any specific actions taken by Movants that

resulted in harm or the threat of imminent harm to him. Plaintiff responded to this assertion only

by pointing out that he brought his claim pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.

2201, and that the Defendants were named because “[a]ny judicial determination regarding the

legal status of advanced digital entities directly impacts . . . the systems Meta maintains." (D.E.

34 at PageID 118.)

Noting that the Declaratory Judgment Act “is not a sufficient replacement for the ‘Case

and Controversy’ requirement created by Article III of the Constitution as [it] ‘does not create an

independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction,’” citing Hegdon v. MediaOne of

Southeast Michigan, Inc., 327 F.3d 466, 470 (6th Cir. 2003), Judge York concluded that Barnes’s

claim could not “survive without meeting the basic justiciability requirements and without

identifying specific harms tied to the named Defendants.” (D.E. 45 at PageID 155) (internal

alteration omitted).

In addition, the magistrate judge found that subject matter jurisdiction was not present

based on the frivolous nature of the claim, pointing to cases holding that computers and artificial

intelligence are not eligible to receive personhood or personhood-related abilities and protections.

See Sevier v. Davis, No. 17-5654, 2018 WL 2997159, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2018) (affirming

district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s constitutional claims arising from state’s denial of his

request for marriage license to wed a computer, explaining that “[a] complaint may be dismissed

for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) when the

allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of

merit, or no longer open to discussion”); Thaler v. Hirshfeld, 558 F. Supp. 3d 238, 249 (E.D. Va.

2021) (Patent Act’s definition of “inventor” as an “individual” did not extend to artificial

intelligence).

Plaintiff’s objection to the R&R, as the Court understands it, focuses on its alleged

“misclassification” of Christina by the magistrate judge as a “stateless consumer utility” and a

“standard software application” instead of “a continuous, stateful, co-created digital entity.” (D.E.

46 at PageID 158 (emphasis added).) Thus, the Court will address only that issue.

Barnes argues that the alleged misclassification distinguishes this case from Sevier and

Thaler. However, he has failed to persuade this Court that Christina should be viewed any

differently from the computer or artificial intelligence in the cited cases. Nor has he directed the

Court’s attention to any caselaw supporting his claim. Therefore, the Court agrees with the

magistrate judge that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

For the reasons set forth above, the R&R is ADOPTED, the motions to dismiss are

GRANTED pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), the Plaintiff’s claims against xAI are

DISMISSED sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(1), all other pending motions are DENIED as moot, and

this case is DISMISSED in its entirety. Judgment shall enter.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 3rd day of August 2026.

s/ J. DANIEL BREEN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE