Thomas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

SHAWN THOMAS, ) Case No. 1:25-cv-1704

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge

) Jonathan D. Greenberg

DEVIN KEITH, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Shawn Thomas, an inmate representing himself, brings this action

under Section 1983 for alleged constitutional violations against ten staff members of

the Richland Correctional Institution. Mr. Thomas asserts eight claims based on

multiple events that occurred at different times over several months. Defendants

move to dismiss and sever certain claims without prejudice and to dismiss another

with prejudice. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS that motion.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Taking the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construing them in

Plaintiff’s favor, as the Court must in the current procedural posture, Plaintiff Shawn

Thomas bases his claims on the following events.

A. The Alleged Pepper Spray Incident

On August 10, 2023, Mr. Thomas claims that he was taken to an observation

cell at Richland Correctional Institution after learning that his brother died in a

motorcycle accident. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1 & n.1, PageID #5–6.) He was placed there at

the direction of “Mental Health Dr. Mr. Michaels” (who is not a named Defendant)

because of his “mental state of mind” after learning of his brother’s death. (Id.)

Dr. Michaels told Mr. Thomas to go to the observation cell and “cry himself to sleep”

because he was not sleeping well in normal housing within the institution. (Id.,

¶¶ 2–4, PageID #6.) Mr. Thomas agreed and went to the observation cell for the night

“willingly.” (Id., ¶ 4.)

According to Mr. Thomas, the observation cells are “completely ‘see through’

[or] ‘clear.’” (Id., ¶ 5.) Because he has been an inmate at Richland Correctional for

over ten years and knows all the staff members and many of the inmates, Mr. Thomas

did not want anyone to see him crying in the cell. (Id., ¶ 7, PageID #6.) Therefore,

Mr. Thomas used the suicide blankets to make himself a bed on the shower floor

within the cell. (Id., ¶¶ 6–8, PageID # 6–7.) There, he was able to cry himself to sleep

out of view of others. (Id., ¶ 9, PageID #7.)

Although it is unclear whether the following events were part of the same

incident, Mr. Thomas alleges that the following events occurring during his time in

the observation cell. (Id., ¶¶ 10–58, PageID #7–15.)

A.1. Removal from the Cell and Pepper Spray Incident

Shortly after falling asleep on the shower floor in the observation cell,

Mr. Thomas was awakened when Officer John Doe 1 grabbed his “right foot/leg and

forcefully” dragged him across the “cell floor/shower floor.” (Id., ¶ 11, PageID #7.)

Mr. Thomas claims that Officer Devin Keith helped Officer John Doe 1 remove him

from the observation cell. (Id., ¶ 12.) Also, Mr. Thomas appears to claim that when

the officers awakened him, they simultaneously sprayed him with “Oleo Capsicum

Resin (‘OC Pepper Spray’).” (Id., ¶ 15, PageID #7–8.) He states that he was

“unconscious and sleeping on the floor when this OC Pepper Spray was deployed.”

(Id., ¶ 27, PageID #10.) It appears that Mr. Thomas claims that officers

simultaneously deployed the OC pepper spray while they dragged him across the floor

and out of the observation cell. (Id., ¶ 10, PageID #7.)

As the officers dragged Mr. Thomas from the cell, he claims that he “smacked

the right side of his face” on the two-inch water stopper in the shower, which resulted

in severe bruising and a headache. (Id.) After being removed from the cell, Officer

John Doe 1 and Officer Keith allegedly “forcefully yanked” Mr. Thomas to his feet and

moved him to the hallway of the segregation unit. (Id., ¶ 13.) There, the officers

allegedly “forcefully slammed” Mr. Thomas against the wall and “cuffed” him

“extremely tightly.” (Id., ¶¶ 12–13.) Then, the officers escorted Mr. Thomas to a

holding cell. (Id., ¶¶ 13–14 & 19, PageID #6 & #8.) During this incident, Mr. Thomas

alleges that the officers “threatened that if he told or said anything” that “things

would get much worse for him.” (Id., ¶ 13, PageID #6.)

After ten minutes in the holding cell, Mr. Thomas alleges that Officer John

Doe 2 escorted him back to the observation cell, where he spent the night. (Id.,

¶¶ 13–14 & 19, PageID #6 & #8.) Mr. Thomas alleges that the cell was not

decontaminated following use of the OC pepper spray and that neither was he. (Id.,

¶¶ 20 & 28, PageID #8 & #10.) Mr. Thomas remained in the observation cell for the

duration of the night then transferred to a different cell in the segregation unit the

following afternoon, where he remained until September 5, 2023. (Id., ¶ 31, PageID

#10.)

A.2. Segregation

From August 10, 2023 to August 21, 2023, Mr. Thomas allegedly stayed in the

clothes in which he was pepper sprayed, irritating his skin and affecting his cellmate.

(Id., ¶¶ 34–36, PageID #11.) On August 21, 2023, Officer Fields (not a named

Defendant) was informed of Mr. Thomas’s condition and returned him to his cell with

a “down-range pack-up (clothes and hygiene).” (Id., ¶ 32, PageID #10–11.) During

his time in segregation, Mr. Thomas claims that he missed “Yard Day,” an annual

celebration at Richland Correctional Institution. (Id., ¶ 38, PageID #12.) Later, on

September 3, 2023, he missed a celebration of life honoring his deceased younger

brother. (Id., ¶ 39.)

Taken together, Mr. Thomas claims that the alleged assault took place on

August 10, 2023 “and lasted until September 5, 2023,” his last day in the segregation

unit. (Id., ¶ 40.) According to Mr. Thomas, Lt. Kevin Sipes was the supervising officer

of the Segregation Unit on August 10, 2023 and allowed the pepper spray incident to

occur. (Id., ¶¶ 3 & 14, PageID #5 & #50.)

A.3. Complaints and Appeals

Personnel at Richland Correctional Institution wrote a conduct report on

Mr. Thomas following the incident on August 10, 2023 for physical resistance and

disobedience to a direct order. (Id., ¶¶ 41–46, PageID #12–13, see also id., ¶ 8,

PageID #51–52.) In response, Mr. Thomas filed an informal complaint resolution

form on August 17, 2023. (Id., ¶ 54, PageID #15.) On an unspecified date, a Rules

and Infractions Board found Mr. Thomas guilty of both physical resistance and

disobedience to a direct order. (Id., ¶ 8, PageID #51–52.)

In the aftermath of the August 10, 2023 incident, Mr. Thomas filed four

appeals challenging the “R.I.B. Guilty Findings that were issued against [him].” (Id.)

But according to the complaint, Lt. Sipes allegedly threw away Mr. Thomas’s appeals.

(Id., ¶ 10, PageID #52). Lt. Sipes did this because he allegedly knew that, if

Mr. Thomas’s appeals failed, his security level would be raised, and he would be

transferred out of Richland Correctional Institution to a higher security penitentiary.

(Id., ¶ 11.)

B. Retaliation for Informal Complaint Resolution Forms

Mr. Thomas alleges that he filed multiple informal complaint resolution forms

against Officer Stephen Mandusic for various forms of misconduct. (Id., ¶ 1, PageID

#17.) “[A]s early as March 17, 2023,” Mr. Thomas asserts that Officer Mandusic or

his partner, “Dean,” (who is not a named Defendant) would “torment” Mr. Thomas in

response to his informal complaint resolution forms. (Id., ¶ 3, PageID #18.) In doing

so, Officer Mandusic either wrote conduct reports himself or had coworkers in the

lower housing unit do it. (Id., ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Officer Mandusic only wrote

the conduct reports because Mr. Thomas wrote informal complaint resolution forms

against him. (Id., ¶ 8, PageID #19.) This back-and-forth between Mr. Thomas and

Officer Mandusic allegedly lasted two to three months. (Id., ¶ 12, PageID #20.)

C. Segregation Unit

On April 27, 2023, Officer Debra Shrader handcuffed Mr. Thomas and escorted

him to the segregation unit. (Id., ¶¶ 1–7, PageID #22.) Mr. Thomas learned that

Officer April Robinson, the lower housing unit manager, decided to place him in the

segregation unit to investigate the informal complaint resolution forms that

Mr. Thomas filed against Officer Mandusic. (Id., ¶ 12, PageID #23, see also id., ¶ 4,

PageID #27.) Mr. Thomas alleges that Officer Robinson told him that he would never

return to the lower housing unit. (Id., ¶ 5, PageID #27.)

While Mr. Thomas was in the segregation unit, corrections staff wrote around

eight to ten conduct reports against him. (Id., ¶ 14, PageID #23.) Then, Officer

Shrader conducted hearings based on these conduct reports and found Mr. Thomas

guilty. (Id.) Because of Officer Shrader and Officer Robinson’s conduct, Mr. Thomas

punched the wall and door of his cell, inflicting injuries to his hands. (Id., ¶ 9, PageID

#27–28.)

Mr. Thomas stayed in the segregation unit from April 27, 2023 to May 2, 2023.

(Id., ¶ 12, PageID #23.) During that time, Mr. Thomas shared a cell with a high-

security level three inmate, even though Mr. Thomas was a lower-security level two

inmate. (Id., ¶¶ 7–8, PageID #27.)

When Mr. Thomas was released from the segregation unit, he was placed in a

different lower housing unit. (Id., ¶ 15, PageID #23.) Mr. Thomas learned from

Officer Shrader that no housing unit wanted to accept Mr. Thomas due to his

reputation as a “High Filer Litigator/Jailhouse Lawyer.” (Id., ¶ 22, PageID #24.)

D. Plaintiff’s Legal Box

On June 27, 2023, Officer Deanna Reinhold (incorrectly spelled as Rineholdt

on the docket) called for Mr. Thomas’s attention. (Id., ¶ 1, PageID #30.) Mr. Thomas

ignored her. (Id.) Then, Officer Reinhold ordered two unknown inmates to remove

Mr. Thomas’s legal box containing his filings from the vault in her office and throw

the box onto the ground in the parking lot near his old lower housing unit. (Id., ¶¶ 2–

4, PageID #31.) Mr. Thomas alleges that Officer Reinhold’s conduct retaliated

against him for informal complaint resolution forms against other officials in his old

housing unit. (Id., ¶ 10, PageID #32.)

E. Additional Library Incidents

On July 1, 2023, Mr. Thomas was suspended from the library facility for

fourteen days. (Id., ¶ 21, PageID #39.) On July 6, 2023, Mr. Thomas was called to

Officer Dougals Smith’s office. (Id., ¶ 2, PageID #35.) At the time of the alleged

conduct, Officer Smith was a librarian at Richland Correctional Institute. (Id., ¶ 12,

PageID #5.) Officer Smith wrote Mr. Thomas several conduct reports for assisting

other inmates with their legal work. (Id., ¶ 3, PageID #35.) Then, Officer Smith

threatened to suspend Mr. Thomas from the library if he continued to assist other

inmates. (Id., ¶ 5, PageID #5.)

On an unspecified date, Mr. Thomas alleges that Officer Smith and Officer

Monetta Johnston (Ervin) read and deleted several of Mr. Thomas’s filings from

computers in the library. (Id., ¶¶ 19 & 47, PageID #39 & #47.) Officer Johnston

(Ervin) was another librarian at the time of the conduct alleged in the complaint.

(Id., ¶ 13, PageID #5.) Mr. Thomas claims that the files were deleted to deter him

from filing both internal complaints and the present lawsuit. (Id., ¶ 19, PageID #39.)

On August 7, 2023, Plaintiff wrote informal complaint resolution forms on

computers in the law library because he did not have access to paper forms or a tablet.

(Id., ¶ 23.) On the same date, Officer Johnston (Ervin) advised Mr. Thomas to stop

recreating documents. (Id., ¶ 25, PageID #40.) On August 8, 2023, Mr. Thomas

received a conduct report for his actions in the library. (Id., ¶ 22, PageID #39.) Then,

on September 6, 2023, Mr. Thomas filed a kite to a supervisory officer expressing his

displeasure with Officer Smith. (Id., ¶ 44, PageID #45.) This was his third attempt

at filing an informal complaint resolution forms against Mr. Smith. (Id.)

On an unspecified date, Officer Johnston (Ervin) ordered an officer in

Mr. Thomas’s housing unit to search his bunk to locate missing books. (Id., ¶ 32,

PageID #41–42.) This led to a confrontation between Mr. Thomas and Officer

Johnston (Ervin), resulting in another conduct report. (Id., ¶ 33, PageID #42.)

On January 27, 2024, Mr. Thomas entered the library to ask Officer Johnston

(Ervin) why she informed unit officers that Mr. Thomas had taken books from the

library. (Id., ¶ 36, PageID #43.) Mr. Thomas was subsequently written a conduct

report. (Id., ¶ 37, PageID #42.) Later that day, Mr. Thomas returned to the library

to pick up materials and received another conduct report for assisting another

inmate, presumably with legal filings. (Id., ¶ 38, PageID #43.) Mr. Thomas was

threatened with suspension if he continued to file legal documents without her

approval. (Id., ¶ 39.)

On July 31, 2024, Mr. Thomas was the subject of another conduct report for

helping a fellow inmate with legal preparation. (Id., ¶ 49, PageID #46–47.)

Mr. Thomas was given commissary and package restrictions because of the conduct

reports written against him. (Id., ¶ 50, PageID #47.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On July 28, 2025, Plaintiff Shawn Thomas filed a complaint against several

staff members of the Richland Correctional Institution, and the case was docketed on

August 15, 2025. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 5–14, PageID #4–5.) In the complaint, Plaintiff

brings several claims against multiple individuals for separate instances spanning

several months. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Devin Keith, during the alleged

assault, used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment right to be free

from cruel and unusual punishment. (Id., ¶ 3, PageID #54.) Plaintiff asserts that

Defendant Kevin Sipes then retaliated against him by deliberately withholding his

clothing, hygiene, and stationary materials while he was housed in the segregation

unit. (Id., ¶ 10, PageID #57–58.) Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Kevin

Sipes discarded Plaintiff’s four appeals challenging the R.I.B. convictions. (Id.)

Plaintiff also brings several claims regarding retaliation and his use of

informal complaint resolution forms. He asserts that Defendant Stephen Mandusic,

along with Defendant Debra Shrader, Defendant April Robinson, and Defendant

Deanna Reinhold retaliated against him because of his complaints. (Id., ¶ 4, PageID

#55.) Likewise, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Shrader retaliated against him “in

connection with [Defendant] Mandusic’s illicit ill-mannered behavior” and for his use

of ICRFs. (Id., ¶ 5, PageID #55.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Robinson

retaliated against him by segregating him in for his use of informal complaint

resolution forms. (Id., ¶ 6, PageID #55.)

Plaintiff’s other claims largely relate to his ability to litigate. He asserts that

Defendant Deanna Reinhold retaliated against him by “throwing his protect[ed] legal

material . . . onto the pavement of the prison yards” and for his use of informal

complaint resolution forms. (Id., ¶ 7, PageID #55–56.) Also, he asserts that

Defendant Douglas Smith and Defendant Monetta Johnston (Ervin) “collectively

suspended [him] from litigating in the law library” and for Plaintiff’s use of informal

complaint resolution forms. (Id., ¶ 8, PageID #56.) Plaintiff’s legal filings were

allegedly deleted from the law library computers “after [Defendant] Johnston and

[Defendant] Smith collectively caught on to what [Plaintiff] was drafting against

them and their staff members.” (Id., ¶ 9, PageID #56–57.) Defendant Johnston

(Ervin) also allegedly retaliated against Plaintiff by writing conduct reports

“sadistically and maliciously,” causing Plaintiff to be subject to several restrictions.

(Id.)

Plaintiff filed motions for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 3), for a control

number (ECF No 4), and twice for leave to amend his complaint (ECF No. 5, ECF

No. 8), which the Magistrate Judge denied (ECF No. 20). Defendants move to

dismiss. (ECF No. 10).

Plaintiff moves join parties and claims in his complaint (ECF No. 14), and

Defendants move to that motion strike (ECF No. 17). Also, Plaintiff moves to strike

Defendants’ reply in support of their motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16), or, in the

alternative, be given the opportunity to respond to file a surreply (ECF No. 21).

Additionally, Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s motion to Strike. (ECF No. 22.)

In total, there are now five pending motions before the Court: (1) Defendants’

motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10); (2) Plaintiff’s motion for joinder (ECF No. 14); (3 and

4) Defendants’ two motions to strike (ECF No. 17; ECF 22); and (5) Plaintiff’s motion

to strike (ECF No. 21).

MOTIONS TO STRIKE

Before turning to the substantive motions, the Court addresses the various

motions to strike. Rule 12(f) allows the Court to strike “an insufficient defense or any

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

Courts disfavor motions to strike and should grant such motions “only where the

allegations are clearly immaterial to the controversy or would prejudice the movant.”

Frisby v. Keith D. Weiner & Assocs. Co., LPA, 669 F. Supp. 2d 863, 865 (N.D. Ohio

2009) (citation omitted). The Court should grant them “only when the pleading to be

stricken has no possible relation to the controversy.” Brown & Williamson Tobacco

Corp. v. United States, 201 F.2d 819, 822 (6th Cir. 1953).

A. Defendants’ Motion to Strike

Plaintiff’s motion for joinder is redundant. (ECF No. 14.) Although Rule 20

allows a plaintiff to join multiple defendants in the same lawsuit, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

20(a)(2), Plaintiff’s motion seeks to join Defendants already named in the lawsuit.

Specifically, Plaintiff “moves this Honorable Court to JOIN [ALL] Defendants and

Claims and consolidate this case as One (1).” (ECF No. 14, PageID #389.) However,

Rule 20 does not allow for such joinder—a plaintiff cannot join defendants already

part of the lawsuit. Because Plaintiff’s motion is redundant and improper, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike (ECF No. 17) and STRIKES Plaintiff’s

motion (ECF No. 14).

B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike

Further, Plaintiff attempts to strike Defendants’ reply to his opposition to

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. In doing so, he argues that Defendants’ reply was a

“sur-reply” that Defendants did not have leave to file. (ECF No. 21, PageID #455.)

In turn, Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s motion to strike arguing that they

followed the Local Rules in filing their reply. (ECF No. 22.)

Defendants’ reply is not a sur-reply. It was a reply that was filed in compliance

with the Local Rules, which instruct that “the moving party may serve and file a reply

memorandum in support of any dispositive motion within fourteen (14) days after

service.” Local Rule 7.1(e). Because Plaintiff’s motion to strike attempts to strike a

properly filed reply, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to strike (ECF No. 21) and

DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’ motion to strike (ECF No. 22).

JOINDER

Much of the outcome of this case depends on whether Plaintiff properly joined

Defendants in his suit. Accordingly, the Court begins by addressing this issue. Under

Rule 20, defendants may be joined in one action if “(A) any right to relief is asserted

against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of

the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any

question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 20(a)(2). However, where the claims are not sufficiently related, the court may

sever any claim against a party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; see also Johari v. Ginther,

No. 2:21-cv-4236, 2021 WL 4033163, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 3, 2021). “The

permissive language of Rule 21 permits the district court broad discretion in

determining whether or not actions should be severed.” Parchman v. SLM Corp., 896

F.3d 728, 733 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).

In determining whether to sever claims, courts consider several factors,

including:

(1) whether the claims arise out of the same transaction or

occurrence;

(2) whether the claims present some common questions of law or fact;

(3) whether the settlement of the claims or judicial economy would

be facilitated;

(4) whether prejudice would be avoided if severance were granted;

and

(5) whether different witnesses and documentary proof are required

to separate claims.

Id. at 733 (citation omitted).

A. Same Transaction or Occurrence

In his first cause of action, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Devin Keith, John

Doe #1, and John Doe #2 violated his Eighth Amendment rights by removing Plaintiff

from an observation cell and deploying OC spray on August 10, 2023. (ECF No.

¶¶ 1–58, PageID #5–15.) In Counts 2 through 6, Plaintiff asserts First Amendment

retaliation and due process violation claims against Defendants Stephen Mandusic,

Debra Shrader, April Robinson, Deanna Reinhold, Douglas Smith, and Monetta

Johnston (Ervin). (Id., PageID #17–54.)

Under Rule 20, “a ‘case-specific inquiry’ is utilized to determine whether the

claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.” Reynolds v. Merck Sharp &

Dohme Corp., No. 3:15-cv-397, 2016 WL 3090951, at *2, (N.D. Ohio June 2,

2016) (citation omitted). “To determine whether claims arise out of the same

transaction or occurrence, the Sixth Circuit evaluates whether there is a logical

relationship between the claims.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Electrolux Home Prods., No.

1:16-cv-1946, 2016 WL 6995271, at *2, (N.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2016) (citing LASA Per

L'Industria Del Marmo Soceita Per Azioni of Lasa, Italy v. Alexander, 414 F.2d 143,

147 (6th Cir. 1969)). “[I]f the same issues of fact would determine both claims, they

arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.” Wood v. Smith, No. 2:24-cv-165,

2024 WL 2292020, at *11 (S.D. Ohio May 21, 2024) (quoting LASA, 414 F.2d at 151).

“[B]ut if the proof of one claim would have no connection with the proof of the other,

the claims do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.” CH Liquidation

Ass'n Liquidation Trust v. Genesis Healthcare Sys., No. 1:18-cv-752, 2020 WL

2850283, at *2, (N.D. Ohio June 2, 2020) (citation omitted).

Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Eight Amendment excessive force

claim against Defendants Devin Keith, John Doe #1, and John Doe #2 do not arise

out of the same transaction or occurrence, series of transactions or occurrences, or

have any question of law or fact common to the remaining defendants and claims.

(ECF No. 22, PageID #492, see also ECF No. 10, PageID #360.) In Defendants’ view,

the retaliation claims are separate from the August 10, 2023 pepper spray incident.

A.1. Claims Against Defendants Stephen Mandusic, Debra

Shrader, April Robinson, and Deanna Reinhold

Plaintiff appears to be arguing that the August 10, 2023 incident is part of the

same transaction or occurrence as those against Defendants Mandusic, Shrader,

Robinson, and Reinhold, because it was the culmination of the unrelated events

dating back to “as early as March 17, 2023” that resulted in the pepper spray incident.

(ECF No. 1, ¶ 3, PageID #18.) But that is not enough. The August 10, 2023 incident

occurred in a different location, and at substantially different times than the actions

giving rise to the other claims against the other defendants, perhaps excluding

Defendant Sipes. Additionally, Defendants Mandusic, Shrader, Robinson, and

Reinhold were all staffed in a lower housing unit at Richland Correctional Institution,

not the segregation unit where the pepper spray incident occurred. (Id., ¶¶ 8–11,

PageID # 4–5.) And units within Richland Correctional Institution are distinct and

separate, further supporting that the incidents were not related. Also, Plaintiff does

not even allege that these Defendants were present at the time of the cell extraction

and pepper spray incident.

However, Plaintiff attempts to link his conflicts with the lower housing staff to

the pepper spray deployment by arguing that Defendants Devin Keith, John Doe #1,

and John Doe #2 were aware of the conflicts in the housing unit and that their

awareness of the conflicts was the basis of the pepper spray deployment. (ECF

No. 21, PageID #49.) But the knowledge of Defendants Keith, John Doe #1, and John

Doe #2 of Plaintiff’s reputation and conflicts in the other unit does not make the

alleged instances of retaliation part of the same transaction or occurrence as the

pepper spray incident.

Further, the claims against Defendants Mandusic, Shrader, Robinson, and

Reinhold occurred months before the August 10, 2023 incident. Plaintiff bases his

claims for retaliation against Defendant Mandusic on conduct beginning “as early as

March 17, 2023” and lasting around two to three months. (Id., ¶¶ 3 & 12, PageID

#18 & #20.) Likewise, Plaintiff bases his claims against Defendants Robinson and

Schrader for their conduct from April 27, 2023 to May 2, 2024. (Id., ¶13, PageID #23.)

And Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Reinhold is based on a single incident on

June 27, 2023 (Id., ¶ 1, PageID #30.) Therefore, all these incidents occurred months

before August 10, 2023 and were not part of the same transaction or occurrence.

A.2. Claims against Defendants Douglas Smith and Monetta

Johnston (Ervin)

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Smith and Johnston (Ervin) were the

principal and librarian for the Richland Correctional Institution, respectively. (Id.,

¶¶ 12–13, PageID #5.) Plaintiff does not allege, and the parties do not dispute, that

Defendants Smith and Johnston (Ervin) were not present during the pepper spray

deployment in the segregation unit. Instead, Plaintiffs bases his claims against these

Defendants on his fourteen-day suspension from the library that commenced on or

about July 1, 2023. (Id., ¶ 9, PageID #56–57.) Once again, this incident came several

months before the August 10, 2023 pepper spray incident.

Additionally, several of Plaintiff’s conduct reports that resulted in his

suspension from the library were related to helping other inmates with their legal

work. (Id., ¶¶ 3, 38, PageID #35 & #43.) Therefore, these incidents are legally and

factually unrelated to the excessive force claim and are not part of the same

transaction or occurrence.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the Court determines that the claims against

Defendants Stephen Mandusic, Debra Shrader, April Robinson, Deanna Reinhold,

Douglas Smith, and Monetta Johnston (Ervin) are not part of the same transaction

or occurrence as the August 10, 2023 pepper spray incident. Accordingly, Plaintiff

improperly brings all his claims in a single complaint.

B. Misjoinder

Misjoinder is “not ground for dismissal of an action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.

However, “the manner in which a trial court handles misjoinder lies within that

court’s sound discretion.” Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., 848 F.2d 674,

682 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing 3A J. Moore and J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 21.03,

at 21–26 (1986)). The array of options available to the Court include “dropping

misjoined parties to the lawsuit without prejudice, . . . directing the first-named

party to file an amended complaint after granting the motion to sever, dismissing all

claims of other plaintiffs without prejudice, and directing those parties to file new,

separate complaints within 30 days of granting the motion to severe.” Billingsley v.

Lincoln Electric Co., No. 1:21-CV-00944, 2022 WL 4599189 *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30,

2022).

Because Plaintiff misjoined his claims against Defendants Stephen Mandusic,

Debra Shrader, April Robinson, Deanna Reinhold, Douglas Smith, and Monetta

Johnston (Ervin) with his claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment against Devin

Keith, John Doe #1, and John Doe #2, the Court SEVERS Counts 2 through 6 and

DISMISSES them WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

ANALYSIS

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim

on which a court may grant relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion under Rule

12(b)(6) tests “the plaintiff’s cause of action as stated in the complaint,” and is “not a

challenge to the plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d

950, 958–59 (6th Cir. 2005). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). A claim is plausible where “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” into the

“realm of plausible liability.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 n.5.

On a motion to dismiss, the Court construes factual allegations in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts them as true, and draws all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Wilburn v. United States, 616 F. App’x 848, 852

(6th Cir. 2015) (citing Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)). But

a pleading must offer more than mere “label and conclusions,” and “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nor is a court required to accept “[c]onclusory

allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations.” Eidson v.

Tennessee Dep’t of Child.’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 544).

Therefore, the Court must distinguish between “well-pled factual allegations,”

which must be treated as true, and “naked assertions,” which need not be. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v.

Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 375 (6th Cir. 2011) (determining that because some of the

plaintiff’s factual allegations were not well-pled, their conclusory nature disentitled

them to the presumption of truth). A plaintiff need not include detailed factual

allegations, but must provide more than “an unadorned, the-Defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rule 8 “does not unlock the doors of

discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 678–79.

Although the pleadings and documents pro se litigants file are liberally

construed and held to less stringent standards than the formal pleadings of lawyers,

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004), litigants who do not have a

lawyer are not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Even a pro se complaint must

“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face’” to avoid dismissal. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570).

I. Claims Against Defendant Kevin Sipes

To state a claim against a governmental official in his individual-capacity, “a

complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the alleged

deprivation of federal rights.” Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir.

2002). Absent proof of personal involvement, a Section 1983 plaintiff must, at

minimum, “show that a supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved

or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending

subordinate.” Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 2008). However, “[a]

supervisor cannot be held liable simply because he or she was charged with

overseeing a subordinate who violated the constitutional rights of another.” Peatross

v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 241 (6th Cir. 2016). In other words, a supervisor

or other governmental official is not vicariously liable for the violations of a person’s

civil rights that another commits. Further, “[a] supervisor’s failure to act, without

more, is insufficient to establish supervisory liability.” Hollis v. Erdos, 480 F. Supp.

3d 823, 833 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (citing Peatross, 818 F.3d at 241).

Plaintiff asserts three claims against Defendant Sipes, the Court addresses

each in turn.

I.A. Pepper Spray Deployment

First, Plaintiff asserts that the pepper spray deployment occurred under the

supervision of Lt. Sipes. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 3, PageID #50.) However, Plaintiff does not

plead facts alleging that Lt. Sipes was personally involved. Failure to make such

allegations shifts this claim into the realm of supervisory liability. Although Plaintiff

asserts that Lt. Sipes is responsible for the security and safety of prisoners who stay

in the segregation unit (id., ¶ 2, PageID #50), nothing in the complaint alleges that

Lt. Sipes “implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced” to the other

officer’s deployment of the pepper spray. Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d at 421. To

hold Lt. Sipes liable on the facts alleged would make him vicariously liable for other’s

alleged violations, which the law does not authorize. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to

state a claim against Defendant Sipes for the pepper spray incident.

I.B. Failure to Decontaminate

Second, Plaintiff asserts that Lt. Sipes deliberately withheld clean clothes and

hygiene products from him and “tossed Thomas into a cell without ever

decontaminating [him] first,” leaving Plaintiff contaminated for twelve days. (Id.,

¶ 10, PageID #58.) Again, these allegations do not implicate Lt. Sipes directly and

fail to plead supervisory liability. Nowhere in the complaint does Plaintiff allege that

Lt. Sipes had anything to do with other officers’ failure to decontaminate Mr. Thomas.

And “failure to act” is not enough. Hollis, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 833. Accordingly,

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Lt. Sipes for failure to decontaminate him after

the pepper spray incident.

I.C. Appeals Destruction

Third, Plaintiff asserts that Lt. Sipes obstructed Plaintiff’s efforts to exhaust

his grievances by “interfering and throwing away or dismissing the Plaintiff’s

Appeals challenging Plaintiff’s R.I.B. convictions.” (Id., ¶ 11, PageID #58.) Taking

these allegations at face value, Plaintiff makes no allegation that these actions on the

part of Lt. Sipes prevented him from taking the additional steps necessary to exhaust

his claims. Ohio Admin. Code § 5120–9–31(J)(3). Therefore, these actions did not

frustrate Plaintiff’s effort to exhaust his claims.

* * *

Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim for any of the three allegations against

Lt. Sipes, the Court DISMISSES the claims against Lt. Sipes WITH PREJUDICE.

II. Eighth Amendment Claim

Defendants do not argue that the excessive force claim should be dismissed.

(ECF No. 10, PageID #361.) In fact, Defendants affirmatively argue that Plaintiff’s

Eight Amendment excessive force claim against Defendants Keith, John Doe #1, and

John Doe #2 should proceed. (Id.) Accordingly, the Court the Eighth Amendment

claim proceeds against Defendants Keith, John Doe #1, and John Doe #2.

However, Defendants assert that the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s

claims against these Defendants in their official capacities. (ECF No. 10,

PageID #361–62.) Claims against defendants in their official capacities amount to a

claim against the State. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985).

In other words, “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a

suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v.

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also Doe v. Claiborne Cnty.,

103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996). As a result, “there is no longer a need to bring

official-capacity claims against local government officials.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 167

n.14. Because Defendants are State employees and Ohio has not waived its sovereign

immunity, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ official-capacity claims.

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to strike

(ECF No. 17), STRIKES Plaintiff's motion for joinder (ECF No. 14), DENIES

Plaintiffs motion to strike (ECF No. 21), and DENIES AS MOOT Defendants’

motion to Strike (ECF No. 22). Further, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to

dismiss (ECF No. 10). In doing so, the Court SEVERS Counts 2 through 6 against

Defendants Stephen Mandusic, Debra Shrader, April Robinson, Deanna Reinhold,

Douglas Smith, and Monetta Johnston (Ervin) and DISMISSES them WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Count 7 against

Defendant Kevin Sipes. This disposition allows Plaintiffs claim for excessive force in

violation of the Eighth Amendment to proceed against Defendants Devin Keith, John

Doe #1, and John Doe #2 in their individual capacities, but the Court DISMISSES

the claim against them in their official capacities.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 31, 2026

J.PhilipCalabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

23