Jones

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

RHONDA JONES, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) No.: 4:23-CV-34-TAV-MJD

)

VIVIANT CARE MANAGEMENT, LLC, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This civil action is before the Court on plaintiffs’ motions for default judgment

against defendants Viviant Care Management LLC (“Viviant”), Glen Oaks Healthcare

LLC (“Glen Oaks”) (collectively, the “Viviant Entities”), and Pollak Innovative

Management Partners LLC (“Pollak”) [Docs. 90, 92, 93, 94]. For the reasons below,

plaintiffs’ motions for default judgment [Docs. 90, 92, 93, 94] will be GRANTED.

I. Background

The Court takes as true the factual allegations in the complaint. Bogard v. Nat’l

Credit Consultants, No. 1:12-CV-2509, 2013 WL 2209154, at *3 (N.D. Ohio May 20,

2013). Viviant owns and operates six skilled nursing facilities in Tennessee and South

Carolina [Doc. 16 ¶ 7]. Glen Oaks is a wholly owned subsidiary or affiliated corporate

entity of Viviant that operates a nursing home facility in Shelbyville, Tennessee (the

“Facility”) [Id. ¶ 8]. Pollak specializes in providing culinary, housekeeping, and linen

services to healthcare facilities [Id. ¶ 9]. On or around July 12, 2022, Pollak contracted

with the Viviant Entities to provide onsite laundry, housekeeping, and dietary services at

the Facility [Id. ¶ 21].

Plaintiffs worked at the Facility from March 2022 through July and August 2022

[Id. ¶¶ 25–32, 61, 67, 75–76, 81, 87]. The Viviant Entities hired plaintiffs Jasmine

Laws-Hord, Veronica Lee, and Brittany Dixon as housekeepers, plaintiff Jamie Laws as a

laundry attendant, and plaintiff Jones as a clinical nurse educator [Id.]. Plaintiffs are all

African American except for Dixon, who is white [Id. ¶ 26]. Dixon is also the

daughter-in-law of Laws [Id. ¶ 27]. Plaintiffs initially worked under the Viviant Entities’

management personnel, including Facility Administrator Heidi Shirley, Human Resources

Director Jennifer Ingram, and Laundry and Housekeeping Supervisor Shauna

Lewis-Taylor [Id. ¶ 33]. Plaintiffs allege that Shirley, Ingram, and Lewis-Taylor engaged

in race-based discriminatory and retaliatory conduct toward plaintiffs, resulting in their

discharge or constructive termination [Id. ¶¶ 36–37, 40–42, 46, 68].

After Pollak and the Viviant Entities entered a contractual relationship, all laundry,

housekeeping, and dietary department employees were required to submit new-hire

applications to Pollak [Id. ¶¶ 21–24]. Pollak then offered Dixon, Laws, and Laws-Hord

employment in their original positions, at the same or reduced hourly payrates, which

Dixon, Laws, and Laws-Hord accepted [Id. ¶¶ 21, 73]. Pollak reduced Laws-Hord’s pay

by $2 per hour [Id. ¶ 23]. Thereafter, Pollak established new payroll practices, payrates,

benefits, identification badges, and an electronic time clock procedure [Id.]. Dixon, Laws,

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and Laws-Hord used equipment and supplies that belonged to both the Viviant Entities and

Pollak to perform their work [Id.].

Lewis-Taylor, who supervised Dixon, Laws, and Laws-Hord, also became an

employee or joint employee of Pollak on or about July 12, 2022 [Id. ¶¶ 21, 33, 73].

Plaintiffs allege that Lewis-Taylor participated in racial discrimination and harassment

against them while she was employed by the Viviant Entities and Pollak [Id. ¶ 46]. Further,

upon being hired by Pollak, Lewis-Taylor told Dixon, Laws, and Laws-Hord that Pollak

would honor the sign-on, referral, and/or work bonuses that the Viviant Entities promised

them [Id. ¶ 74]. Plaintiffs never fully received these bonuses [Id.].

Meanwhile, the Viviant Entities continued to supervise and oversee operations at

the Facility and required Pollak to implement or adopt certain policies and procedures [Id.

¶ 22]. The Viviant Entities provided training materials to plaintiffs, and created plaintiffs’

job descriptions, work schedules, and duties [Id.]. Plaintiffs allege that the Viviant Entities

and Pollak jointly exercised control over their work, and Shirley and Ingram “continued to

exert managerial control over [them], including the authority to make hiring, firing, and

compensation decisions” [Id. ¶ 23]. As for Dixon, Laws, and Laws-Hord, plaintiffs allege

that the Viviant Entities and Pollak shared the ability to (1) hire and fire them; (2) affect

their compensation, terms, conditions, privileges, and benefits of employment; and

(3) direct and supervise their job performance [Id. ¶ 24].

The amended complaint also details the nature of defendants’ allegedly

discriminatory and retaliatory conduct [Id. ¶¶ 36–37, 40–42, 46, 68]. For instance,

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plaintiffs allege that Shirley continuously made derogatory, race-based comments in the

workplace and used the words “nigger” and “nigga” in reference to African American

employees [Id. ¶¶ 36, 40]. Shirley called the African American employees “ghetto” and

often referred to them collectively as “them people” [Id. ¶ 41]. Moreover, Shirley openly

socialized with white employees and not with African American employees, who she

routinely targeted and scolded over minor issues [Id. ¶ 42]. The amended complaint also

alleges that Lewis-Taylor participated in the racial discrimination and harassment and

frequently used the word “nigger” in the workplace [Id. ¶ 46]. Ingram referred to a new

employee as a “little Black girl,” made racist comments, and did not take any corrective

action in response to other employees’ racially discriminatory and retaliatory statements

and conduct [Id. ¶ 45].

Additionally, Jones, Lee, Laws, and Laws-Hord were denied bonuses, promotions,

favorable work schedules, office space, and/or received unequal pay compared to similarly

situated, non-African American employees [Id. ¶¶ 39, 50–51]. For instance, Jones, a

registered nurse with 30 years of experience, was given an office with a picnic table instead

of a desk and paid less than non-African American nurse practitioners [Id. ¶¶ 47–48].

Additionally, Lewis-Taylor gave Dixon more favorable scheduling than Laws who had

more seniority [Id. ¶ 49].

As to employment benefits, Lewis-Taylor promised a bonus payment of $150 if

employees completed offsite laundry duties after the Facility’s washing machines

malfunctioned [Id. ¶¶ 50–51]. Although both Dixon and Laws performed the same tasks

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as instructed, only Dixon received the bonus [Id. ¶ 51]. As a result, plaintiffs allege that

defendants “created, allowed, maintained, and failed to remedy a race-based hostile and

abusive working environment that altered the conditions of [p]laintiffs’ employment and

made it more difficult for them to perform their jobs” [Id. ¶ 35].

Plaintiffs eventually reported their concerns of racial discrimination and harassment

to defendants [Id. ¶ 59]. Plaintiffs allege that defendants did not remedy the discrimination

or harassment, allowed it to persist, and retaliated against them [Id. ¶¶ 58–60]. In addition,

plaintiffs allege that another employee, Jasmine Baez, repeatedly witnessed the

discrimination against them and complained to Ingram who did not address the problem

[Id. ¶¶ 55–56]. Shirley, Lewis-Taylor, and Ingram subsequently “made, influenced, and/or

were involved in” defendants’ decision to terminate plaintiffs’ employment [Id. ¶ 80].

In or about early June 2022, defendants terminated Lee for poor performance days

after she complained about discriminatory pay [Id. ¶ 61]. Thereafter, the Facility

underwent an investigation by state officials related to the death of a resident [Id. ¶ 62].

Shirley instructed plaintiffs to lie to state officials about facts related to the resident’s death,

missing narcotics, and the reason why safety mats were not used [Id.]. Jones and

Laws-Hord refused to remain silent about or participate in illegal activity and disclosed

state law violations [Id. ¶ 64]. Around that time, Laws submitted a written complaint about

Lewis-Taylor and Shirley to Ingram for racially discriminatory pay practices and other

issues [Id. ¶ 66]. A few days later, on or about June 28, 2022, defendants terminated Jones

after she raised discriminatory pay concerns and refused to lie to state investigators about

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violations at the facility [Id. ¶¶ 48, 62–67]. Defendants also terminated Laws-Hord on or

about July 20, 2022, after she submitted written complaints about and refused to obstruct

the investigation of the facility [Id. ¶¶ 66, 75]. Soon thereafter, defendants terminated Laws

after she submitted a written complaint about discriminatory pay and other issues [Id. ¶¶ 66,

76].

Similarly, Dixon complained to Lewis-Taylor that she believed she was being

targeted and retaliated against because of her association with and advocacy on behalf of

Laws [Id. ¶ 86]. Dixon was constructively discharged on August 12, 2022, because

defendants harassed, targeted, and retaliated against her due to her association with and

advocacy on behalf of Laws and others [Id. ¶¶ 84, 87].

On August 30, 2023, plaintiffs filed this action [Doc. 1]. Plaintiffs filed an amended

complaint on October 26, 2023, alleging racial discrimination, harassment, and retaliation

under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”), and Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) (Count 1) [Doc. 16 ¶¶ 88–103]. Jones and

Laws-Hord also assert a retaliatory discharge claim in violation of the Tennessee common

law and/or the Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”) (Count 2) [Id. ¶¶ 104–11].

Lastly, plaintiffs allege piercing the corporate veil of the Viviant Entities (Count 3) [Id.

¶¶ 112–20].1

1 Plaintiffs do not seek default judgment as to Count 3 and request that the Court dismiss

this count without prejudice [Doc. 90, pp. 7, 25].

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Defendants were served with summons [See Docs. 47, 48, 49]. The Viviant Entities

never answered or defended against either complaint. The Clerk of Court entered default

against the Viviant Entities on October 2, 2024 [Docs. 60, 61] because they failed to plead

or otherwise defend in the action. Thereafter, Pollak’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw

[Doc. 65]. On March 5, 2025, the Court entered an order granting counsel for Pollak’s

motion and directing Pollak to have substitute counsel file a notice of appearance on its

behalf within 30 days [Doc. 74]. Due to Pollak’s failure to comply with this order, the

Clerk of Court entered default as to Pollak [See Docs. 86, 87]. On August 18, 2025, the

Court granted plaintiffs’ Motion to Cancel Trial and ordered plaintiffs to file a motion for

default judgment within 60 days [Doc. 89]. Now pending before the Court are plaintiffs’

motions for default judgment as to the Viviant Entities and Pollak [Docs. 90, 92, 93, 94].

II. Analysis

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 “contemplates a two-step process for obtaining

a default judgment against a defendant who has failed to plead or otherwise defend.”

Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Columbia State Bank, No. 3:19-CV-116, 2020 WL 3977635, at *1

(E.D. Tenn. July 14, 2020). “First, pursuant to Rule 55(a), a plaintiff must request from

the Clerk of Court an entry of default, describing the particulars of the defendant’s failure

to plead or otherwise defend.” Id. If the clerk enters default, “the plaintiff must then move

the Court for entry of default judgment pursuant to Rule 55(b).” Id. Pursuant to Rule

55(b), a default can be entered by the Clerk “[i]f the plaintiff’s claim is for a sum certain

or a sum that can be made certain by computation[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1). But “[i]n

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all other cases, the party must apply to the court for a default judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

55(b)(2).

Proceeding under Rule 55(b)(2), after the Clerk has entered default, the court must

take the complaint’s factual allegations as true. Bogard, 2013 WL 2209154, at *3.

However, the Court must determine whether the factual allegations “are sufficient to state

a claim for relief as to each cause of action for which the plaintiff seeks default judgment.”

J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Rodriguez, No. 1:08-CV-1350, 2008 WL 5083149, at *1 (N.D.

Ohio Nov. 25, 2008) (citation omitted). Although the Court takes factual allegations

regarding liability as true, the plaintiff must prove the amount of damages. Bogard, 2013

WL 2209154, at *3.

A. Sufficiency of the Complaint

1. Joint Employment

As an initial matter, “[t]o establish [a] claim under Title VII, [plaintiffs] must show

that [defendants were their] ‘employer’ within the meaning of the statute.” Nethery v.

Quality Care Inves., L.P., 814 F. App’x 97, 102 (6th Cir. 2020). Here, plaintiffs argue that

defendants jointly employed them, resulting in shared liability for their discriminatory and

retaliatory conduct [Doc. 90, p. 7]. “Under the ‘joint-employer’ theory, ‘an entity that is

not the plaintiff’s formal employer may be treated under these doctrines as if it were the

employer for purposes of employment laws such as Title VII.’” Id. at 102–03 (quoting

Sanford v. Main St. Baptist Church Manor, Inc., 449 F. App’x 488, 491 (6th Cir. 2011)).

“One entity is the joint employer of another entity’s formal employees, and thus liable

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under federal and state anti-discrimination laws, if the two ‘share or co-determine those

matters governing essential terms and conditions of employment.’” Sanford, 449 F. App’x

at 492 (quoting Carrier Corp. v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 778, 781 (6th Cir. 1985)).

In determining whether an entity is a joint employer, courts consider facts such as

“the ability to hire, fire, and discipline, affect compensation and benefits, and direct and

supervise performance.” Id. See NLRB v. Centra, Inc., 954 F.2d 366, 370 n.2 (6th Cir.

1992) (identifying factors including “supervision of the employees’ day to day activities,

authority to hire or fire employees, promulgation of work rules and conditions of

employment, work assignments, [and] issuance of operating instructions”) (quoting W.W.

Grainger, Inc. v. NLRB, 860 F.2d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 1988)).

Here, the Court finds that the amended complaint contains sufficient facts to

establish that defendants jointly employed plaintiffs. For instance, after Pollak contracted

with the Viviant Entities to provide services at the Facility, Dixon, Laws, and Laws-Hord,

who initially were employed by the Viviant Entities, were required to submit new-hire

applications to Pollak [Doc. 16 ¶ 21]. Pollak then offered Dixon, Laws, and Laws-Hord

employment in their original positions, at the same or reduced hourly payrates [Id. ¶¶ 21,

73]. Pollak reduced Laws-Hord’s pay by $2 per hour [Id. ¶ 23]. These circumstances give

rise to an inference that Pollak had “the ability to hire, fire, and discipline, [and] affect

compensation and benefits” of plaintiffs. See Sanford, 449 F. App’x at 492.

Moreover, upon hiring Dixon, Laws, and Laws-Hord, Pollak established new

payroll practices and time clock procedures and gave them new identification badges [Id.].

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These plaintiffs continued to work at the Facility using the Viviant Entities’ and Pollak’s

shared equipment and supplies to perform their work, and both the Viviant Entities and

Pollak exercised control over plaintiffs’ work [Id.]. Likewise, in Reyes-Trujillo v. Four

Star Greenhouse, Inc., the court found evidence that the defendant entity jointly employed

the plaintiffs, in part because the defendant directly supervised the plaintiffs, tracked their

tasks using electronic keycards, and required them to log their time through the defendant’s

electronic timekeeping system. 513 F. Supp. 3d 761, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2021).

The amended complaint also shows that defendants jointly directed and supervised

plaintiffs’ performance. Specifically, the fact that Dixon complained to Lewis-Taylor

about discrimination and retaliation while Lewis-Taylor was employed by Pollak indicates

that Pollak acted in a supervisory capacity over her. See EEOC v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc.,

No. 2:10-CV-2717, 2011 WL 13103437, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 20, 2011) (finding the

existence of a joint employer relationship where the plaintiff voiced concerns regarding

racial harassment to a supervisor employed by defendant). Likewise, after Lewis-Taylor

was hired by Pollak, she promised Dixon, Laws, and Laws-Hord that Pollak would honor

sign-on, referral, and work bonuses that the Viviant Entities had promised them [Id. ¶¶ 50,

73]. These facts give rise to an inference that Pollak had power to affect plaintiffs’

compensation and benefits.

As for plaintiffs Jones and Lee, who were employed before Pollak contracted with

the Viviant Entities, the amended complaint alleges that the Viviant Entities drafted

policies and procedures affecting their employment and required Pollak to implement and

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adopt them [Id. ¶ 22]. These facts show that Pollak at least indirectly supervised the daily

activities of Dixon, Laws, and Laws-Hord [Id.]. See NLRB, 954 F.2d at 371 n.2 (quoting

W.W. Grainger, Inc., 860 F.2d at 247).

Further, Jones and Lee worked under management personnel from both entities,

including Shirley and Ingram, who provided training materials to plaintiffs, maintained

their works schedules, and closely supervised operations at the Facility [Id. ¶¶ 22–23].

Taken together, the circumstances indicate that Pollak and the Viviant Entities shared or

co-determined at least some matters governing the terms and conditions of plaintiffs’

employment. See Sanford, 449 F. App’x at 492. Accordingly, the Court finds that

plaintiffs have set forth sufficient facts to demonstrate that defendants jointly employed

plaintiffs.

2. Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiffs also allege that defendants created, maintained, and failed to remedy a

race-based hostile work environment that made it more difficult for plaintiffs to perform

their jobs [Doc. 16 ¶¶ 35–38]. “Title VII prohibits racial harassment that creates a hostile

or abusive work environment.” Newman v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 266 F.3d 401, 405 (6th Cir.

2001). To establish a hostile work environment claim based on race discrimination, “a

plaintiff must show: 1) that [s]he is a member of a protected class; 2) that [s]he was

subjected to unwelcome racial harassment; 3) that the harassment was based on race;

4) that the harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with h[er] work

performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and

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5) the existence of employer liability.” Id. To determine if there is a hostile work

environment, courts look at the totality of the circumstances. Id.

“[A]n employer may create a hostile environment for an employee even where it

directs its discriminatory acts or practices at the protected group of which the plaintiff is a

member, and not just at the plaintiff herself.” Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 668

(6th Cir. 1999). In this regard, the Sixth Circuit has instructed courts to “aggregate hostile

work environment claims, [and to] consider[] even those claims that were not directed at a

particular plaintiff and those claims that a particular plaintiff did not witness.” Berryman

v. Supervalu Holdings, Inc., 669 F.3d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Jackson, 191 F.3d at

661).

First, the amended complaint states that Jones, Laws, Laws-Hord and Lee are

members of a protected class because they are African American [Doc. 16 ¶ 26]. See

Jackson, 191 F.3d at 668 (finding that an African American plaintiff was the victim of a

racially hostile work environment). Dixon, who is white, is also a member of a protected

class based on her advocacy on behalf of other protected class members, including Laws

[Id. ¶¶ 26, 37, 82–87]. See Barrett v. Whirlpool Corp., 556 F.3d 502, 513 (6th Cir. 2009)

(noting that “[i]ndividuals are also protected under Title VII from discrimination because

of their advocacy on behalf of protected class members”); see also Johnson v. Univ. of

Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 573–78 (6th Cir. 2000) (where the plaintiff stated a claim under

Title VII by alleging that he faced discrimination based on his advocacy on behalf of female

and minority employees). Thus, the first element is met.

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The amended complaint further alleges that plaintiffs were subjected to unwelcome

harassment based on race, satisfying the second and third elements. The Sixth Circuit has

determined that a plaintiff may satisfy these elements “by adducing evidence of the use of

race-specific and derogatory terms, or comparative evidence of how the alleged harassers

treated members of both races in a mixed-race workplace.” Smith v. P.A.M. Transport,

Inc., 154 F.4th 375, 383 (6th Cir. 2025).

Here, plaintiffs allege that Shirley, Ingram, and Lewis-Taylor continuously used

derogatory race-based language in reference to African American employees in the

workplace [Id. ¶¶ 36, 40, 45–46]. Moreover, plaintiffs allege that Shirley called the African

American plaintiffs “ghetto” and often referred to them collectively as “them people” [Id.

¶ 41]. Shirley openly socialized with white employees and not with African American

employees, who she routinely targeted and scolded over minor issues [Id. ¶ 42]. These

facts raise an inference that defendants treated African American employees less favorably

than other employees.

Fourth, plaintiffs allege that the harassment unreasonably interfered with their work

performance. To satisfy this element, plaintiffs must show that “the race-based harassment

they experienced was ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [their]

employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Smith, 154 F.4th at 391

(quoting Strickland v. City of Detroit, 995 F.3d 495, 505 (6th Cir. 2021)). The Sixth Circuit

has found that “even a single incident of racial harassment, including the use of an

egregious racial slur like the n-word, ‘may be so severe as to constitute a hostile work

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environment.’” Id. at 392 (citation omitted); Ennis v. Tennessee, 835 F. App’x 811, 820

(6th Cir. 2020) (noting that “an isolated act of discrimination can create a hostile work

environment” if it is “extremely serious”); Adams v. Austal, USA, LLC, 754 F.3d 1240,

1253–54 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that a hostile work environment existed where an

employee carved a racial slur into the wall of the workplace); Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae,

712 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (determining that defendant maintained a racially

hostile work environment where a supervisor used an “offensive racial epithet” while

yelling at a subordinate). In particular, “the n-word . . . is odious and degrading and

humiliating in the extreme when used as an insult against African Americans.” Smith, 154

F. 4th at 392 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, “the use of the

word ‘nigger,’ even taken in isolation, is not a ‘mere offensive utterance.” Johnson v.

United Parcel Serv., 117 F. App’x 444, 454 (6th Cir. 2004).

Given plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants’ supervisors repeatedly and frequently

used racial slurs and other derogatory language in reference to African American plaintiffs

in the workplace, plaintiffs have shown that the race-based harassment they faced was

severe [Id. ¶¶ 40–46]. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that Shirley and

Lewis-Taylor had supervisory authority over plaintiffs’ employment and directed offensive

comments towards plaintiffs [Id. ¶¶ 21, 23, 33, 46, 73]. In fact, “[t]he utterance of a slur

by a manager greatly increase[s] its severity, and harassment will be more severe if

offensive comments were directed at a plaintiff.” Smith, 154 F.4th at 392 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.

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742, 763 (1998) (noting that “a supervisor’s power and authority invests his or her

harassing conduct with a particular threatening character”); Rodgers v. Western-Southern

Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that “a supervisor’s use of the

[n-word] impacts the work environment far more severely than use by co-equals”). Thus,

the Court finds that this conduct alone is “extremely serious” such as to indicate that

defendants created and maintained a hostile work environment.

Lastly, the amended complaint sets forth sufficient facts to show the existence of

employer liability. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Shirley, Ingram, and Lewis-Taylor

engaged in race-based discriminatory and retaliatory conduct toward plaintiffs, resulting in

their discharge or constructive termination [Id. ¶¶ 36–37, 40–42, 46, 68]. Furthermore,

plaintiffs assert that Shirley, Lewis-Taylor, and Ingram made, influenced, and/or were

involved in the decision to terminate plaintiffs’ employment [Id. ¶ 80]. Considering the

totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that plaintiffs have set forth sufficient facts to

establish a hostile work environment claim against defendants.

3. Racial Discrimination

In addition, plaintiffs allege that defendants discriminated against them in the terms,

conditions, and privileges of their employment and subjected them to disparate treatment

because of their race, and with respect to Dixon, because of her association with and

advocacy on behalf of Laws and other plaintiffs, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the

THRA, and Title VII [Doc. 16 ¶¶ 88–103]. “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

makes it ‘an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any

15

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’”

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).

“A plaintiff may establish a claim of discrimination either by introducing direct evidence

of discrimination, or by proving circumstantial evidence which would support an inference

of discrimination.” Johnson, 215 F.3d at 572.

“Racial slurs or statements that suggest that the decision-maker relied

on . . . stereotypes to assess an employee’s ability to perform can constitute direct

evidence.” Erwin v. Potter, 79 F. App’x 893, 897 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing

Cushman-Lagerstrom v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., No. 01-2690, 2003 WL 21774017, at *8

(6th Cir. July 30, 2003)) (finding that a decision-maker’s statements referring to an

employee’s protected status may constitute direct evidence of discrimination). However,

“isolated and ambiguous” comments do not establish employer liability. Id. at 898. “Thus,

courts often look for a ‘temporal proximity between the discriminatory act and the

termination.’” Jordan v. Mathews Nissan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 3d 848, 878 (M.D. Tenn.

2021) (quoting DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 417 (6th Cir. 2004)).

In this case, plaintiffs have presented direct evidence of discrimination by alleging

that their supervisors, Shirley and Lewis-Taylor, repeatedly used racial slurs in the

workplace [Doc. 16 ¶¶ 40–46]. Plaintiffs also allege that Ingram referred to a new

employee as a “little Black girl” and frequently made racist comments [Id. ¶ 45].

Moreover, plaintiffs allege that Shirley, Ingram, and Lewis-Taylor were involved in the

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decision to terminate plaintiffs’ employment shortly after they raised complaints about

racial discrimination [Id. ¶¶ 36–37, 40–42, 46, 68, 80]. Thus, the combination of plaintiffs’

termination and the frequent and severe racial slurs used by defendants’ management

constitutes direct evidence of racial discrimination.

Plaintiffs have also presented circumstantial evidence of racial discrimination.

“Under the circumstantial evidence approach, . . . a plaintiff must show that 1) [s]he is a

member of a protected class; 2) [s]he was qualified for h[er] job and performed it

satisfactorily; 3) despite h[er] qualifications and performance, [s]he suffered an adverse

employment action; and 4) that [s]he was replaced by a person outside the protected class

or was treated less favorably than a similarly situated individual outside h[er] protected

class.” Johnson, 215 F.3d at 572–73.

As explained above, plaintiffs are all members of protected classes. See infra

Section III.A.2. Plaintiffs also allege that they were qualified for their jobs and performed

them in a competent and satisfactory manner [Doc. 16 ¶ 34]. Further, the amended

complaint demonstrates that all plaintiffs suffered adverse employment actions. For

instance, Jones, Lee, Laws, and Laws-Hord were denied pay and referral bonuses,

favorable work schedules, office space, and/or received unequal pay compared to similarly

situated, non-African American employees [Id. ¶ 39]. Jones, a registered nurse with 30

years of experience, was given an office with a picnic table instead of a desk and paid less

than non-African American licensed nurse practitioners [Id. ¶¶ 47–48]. Jones was

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terminated shortly after she complained about discriminatory pay and refused to lie to state

investigators [Id. ¶ 67].

Additionally, Lewis-Taylor gave Dixon more favorable scheduling than Laws who

had more seniority [Id. ¶ 49]. And Laws did not receive the same $150 bonus payment

earned by Dixon although they performed the same tasks [Id. ¶¶ 50–51]. Laws was

terminated shortly after she submitted a written complaint [Id. ¶ 76]. Likewise, Laws-Hord

was terminated shortly after she submitted written complaints about discrimination and

refused to obstruct the investigation of the Facility [Id. ¶¶ 66, 75]. Plaintiffs also allege

that Dixon experienced constant harassment, badgering, and interference with her job,

including nitpicking her while performing her job duties and ignoring her when she made

work-related inquiries, which led to her constructive discharge [Id. ¶¶ 83–87].

Taken together, these circumstances suggest that defendants discriminated against

plaintiffs with respect to their compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment because of their race and with respect to Dixon, because of her association

with and advocacy on behalf of other plaintiffs. Accordingly, plaintiffs have sufficiently

stated a claim for racial discrimination.

4. Retaliation

Plaintiffs further allege that defendants retaliated against them by terminating and

constructively discharging them for opposing, reporting, and complaining about racial

discrimination, harassment, and retaliation [Doc. 16 ¶¶ 60–61, 63, 66–67, 70–71, 75]. To

establish a claim for retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) she

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engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) this exercise of protected rights was known

to defendant; (3) defendant thereafter took adverse employment action against the plaintiff,

or the plaintiff was subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor;

and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

employment action or harassment.” Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784, 792

(6th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original).

First, the amended complaint states that plaintiffs complained of racial

discrimination and harassment to defendants [Id. ¶ 59]. Plaintiffs allege that defendants

did not remedy the discrimination or harassment, allowed it to persist, and ultimately

terminated plaintiffs [Id. ¶¶ 58–60]. Laws confronted Shirley about her discriminatory

conduct and submitted a written complaint about discriminatory pay [Id. ¶¶ 43, 66]. Lee

and Jones also complained about/reported discriminatory pay practices [Id. ¶¶ 61, 64].

Likewise, Dixon complained about the association discrimination, harassment, and

retaliation she faced [Id. ¶¶ 86–87].

Second, plaintiffs allege that defendants had knowledge of their protected activities

through their complaints to management personnel [Id. ¶¶ 43, 54, 66, 71].

Third, defendants thereafter took adverse employment action by terminating the

employment of Lee, Jones, Laws-Hord, and Laws, and constructively discharging Dixon

[Id. ¶¶ 61, 67, 75–76, 87].

Lastly, plaintiffs demonstrate a causal connection by alleging that the termination

and constructive discharge occurred shortly after their protected activities. See Miller v.

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Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Causation sufficient to establish

a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation may be inferred from the proximity in time

between the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory discharge.”).

In Singfield v. Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority, the plaintiff was terminated

three months after he filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission. 389 F.3d 555, 563 (6th Cir. 2004). There, the Sixth Circuit

found that the temporal proximity between the plaintiff’s termination and charge

established a causal connection to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Id. Here, the

amended complaint here alleges that each plaintiff was terminated or constructively

discharged within only days of her protected activity, showing a stronger causal link than

in Singfield [Id. ¶¶ 61, 63, 66–67, 70–71, 75]. Ultimately, the derogatory language used

by management combined with the close temporal proximity between plaintiffs’ protected

activities and termination/constructive discharge establish causation. Accordingly, the

Court finds that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a retaliation claim against defendants.

5. Constructive Discharge

Dixon alleges that she was constructively discharged due to the discrimination,

harassment, and retaliation that she experienced because of her association with and

advocacy on behalf of Laws and other plaintiffs [Doc. 16 ¶ 87]. A constructive discharge

claim has two elements. Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547, 555 (2016). First, “[a] plaintiff

must . . . prove that [s]he was discriminated against by h[er] employer to the point where a

reasonable person in h[er] position would have felt compelled to resign.” Id. Second, a

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plaintiff must “show that [s]he actually resigned.” Id. (citing Penn. State Police v. Suders,

542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004)).

Here, the amended complaint alleges that Shirley, Taylor-Lewis, and Ingram knew

about Dixon’s familial relation and association with Laws, her advocacy on behalf of Laws

and other plaintiffs, and her opposition to defendants’ discriminatory conduct [Doc. 16

¶ 82]. Dixon alleges that defendants harassed, targeted, and retaliated against her as a

result, in part by nitpicking her while she performed her job duties and ignoring her when

she made work-related inquiries [Id. ¶ 84]. Defendants’ conduct adversely impacted

Dixon’s ability to perform her job [Id.]. Dixon complained to Lewis-Taylor that she was

being targeted because of her association with and advocacy on behalf of Laws and

Laws-Hord [Id. ¶ 86]. Eventually, Ingram stated that defendants’ management wanted to

“figure out a way to get rid of” Dixon because she was “snitching” about defendants’

discriminatory and retaliatory conduct [Id. ¶ 85].

These circumstances show that defendants subjected plaintiff Dixon to “badgering,

harassment, or humiliation” intended to encourage her resignation. See Jordan, 539

F. Supp. 3d at 884–85 (noting that “badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer

calculated to encourage the employee’s resignation” supports a finding of constructive

discharge). Therefore, Dixon has shown that defendants discriminated against her to the

point where a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign, and she ultimately

did resign [Id. ¶ 87]. See Green, 578 U.S. at 555 (citing Penn. State Police, 542 U.S. at

21

141). Accordingly, the Court finds that Dixon has sufficiently alleged a constructive

discharge claim against defendants.

6. Retaliatory Discharge

Jones and Laws-Hord also bring retaliatory discharge claims under the TPPA and

Tennessee common law as alternate theories of liability [Doc. 16 ¶¶ 104–11]. Under the

TPPA, “[n]o employee shall be discharged or terminated solely for refusing to participate

in, or for refusing to remain silent about, illegal activities.” Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 50-1-304(b). To establish a claim for retaliatory discharge under the TPPA, a plaintiff

must show: “(1) [t]he plaintiff was an employee of the defendant; (2) [t]he plaintiff refused

to participate in or remain silent about illegal activity; (3) [t]he defendant employer

discharged or terminated the plaintiff’s employment; and (4) [t]he defendant terminated

the plaintiff’s employment solely for the plaintiff’s refusal to participate in or remain silent

about the illegal activity.” Sourinho v. Rich Prods. Corp., No. 21-5289, 2021 WL

4735844, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 12, 2021) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).

Under the common law, a plaintiff must show “that retaliation for the protected

conduct was a ‘substantial factor’ in the termination of his employment[]” whereas under

the TPPA, a plaintiff must show that “retaliation for the protected conduct was the sole

reason.” Williams v. City of Burns, 465 S.W.3d 96, 110 (Tenn. 2015) (emphasis in

original); Sykes v. Chattanooga Hous. Auth., 343 S.W.3d 18, 28 (Tenn. 2011) (“[T]he

legislature has chosen to enact a stringent standard and set the bar high for recovery under

a retaliatory discharge claim pursuant to the [TPPA].”).

22

Here, the amended complaint alleges that Laws-Hord and Jones were employees of

defendants [Id. ¶¶ 28, 31]. Further, plaintiffs allege that Shirley instructed them to lie to

state officials regarding the state’s investigation about a resident’s death, missing narcotics,

and the reason why safety mats were not used at the Facility [Id. ¶ 62]. Jones and

Laws-Hord “refused to remain silent about or participate in illegal activity, disclosed what

they believed to be violations of state law, and truthfully answered the state surveyor’s

questions regarding the same” [Id. ¶ 64]. Soon after speaking with the state investigator

and disclosing state law violations, defendants terminated Jones and Laws-Hord [Id. ¶¶ 64,

67, 75].

However, viewing the amended complaint in the light most favorable to Laws-Hord

and Jones, it does not appear that the sole reason for their termination was their refusal to

remain silent about or participate in illegal activities. Rather, the amended complaint

alleges that Jones was terminated “because of her race, her opposition to and reports of

race discrimination, and in retaliation for reporting violations of state law and/or for

refusing to remain silent about or participate in illegal activity” [Id. ¶ 67]. Moreover,

Laws-Hord was terminated “for alleged insubordination and violation of company policy”

after she submitted a written complaint about Lewis-Taylor and Shirley regarding racially

discriminatory pay practices and other issues [Id. ¶¶ 66, 75].

Since other factors, such as written complaints about racial discrimination, allegedly

played a role in the termination of Laws-Hord and Jones, the Court does not find that they

have met the high bar for recovery under the TPPA. See Sykes, 343 S.W.3d at 28.

23

However, the amended complaint suggests that Jones and Laws-Hord’s refusal to remain

silent about or participate in illegal activities was at least a “substantial factor” in their

termination. See Williams, 465 S.W.3d at 110. Accordingly, the Court finds that Jones

and Laws-Hord have sufficiently stated a common law claim for retaliatory discharge.

B. Damages

Turning to the appropriate remedy, plaintiff seeks back pay, compensatory damages,

punitive damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, and attorneys’ fees and costs. Although

the Court must take as true the factual allegations regarding liability in the complaint,

plaintiff must prove the appropriate amount of damages. Bogard, 2013 WL 2209154, at

*3. In determining damages, “[t]he Court may rely on affidavits [and other

materials] . . . without the need for a hearing.” Dirs. of the Ohio Conf. of Plasterers &

Cement Masons Combined Funds, Inc. v. Akron Insulation & Supply, Inc., No. 5:16-CV-

1674, 2018 WL 2129613, at *5 (N.D. Ohio May 8, 2018).

1. Back Pay

As to back pay, plaintiffs filed declarations demonstrating that their total back pay

damages amount to $281,384. In particular, Jones filed a declaration stating that she would

have received $294,384 from late June 2022 through the present if she remained employed

by defendants [Doc. 90-2 ¶ 12]. Jones states that she earned approximately $180,000 from

other jobs during that same period and thus, her lost wages total $114,384 [Id.]. Further,

Lee’s declaration states that she suffered an economic loss of $64,000 due to her wrongful

discharge [Doc. 90-3 ¶ 10].

24

Laws also filed a declaration asserting that she would have earned approximately

$76,800 from July 2022 through the present if she remained employed by defendants [Doc.

90-4 ¶ 13]. Laws submits that she earned approximately $40,500 during that same period

for other jobs and thus, her lost wages are approximately $36,300 [Id.]. Laws-Hord filed

a declaration stating that she would have earned approximately $90,500 from July 2022

through the present if she remained employed by defendants [Doc. 90-5 ¶ 12]. She states

that he earned approximately $81,800 from other jobs during that same period and thus,

her lost wages are approximately $8,700 [Id.].

Lastly, Dixon’s declaration states that she would have earned approximately

$75,000 from the time of her separation through the present if she remained employed by

defendants [Doc. 90-6 ¶ 12]. She states that she earned approximately $17,000 from other

jobs during that period and thus, her lost wages total $58,000 [Id.]. In addition, plaintiffs

filed a damages chart demonstrating that they incurred back pay damages totaling $281,384

[Doc. 90-7]. Based on plaintiffs’ declarations, the Court finds that plaintiffs are entitled to

an award of lost wages in the amount of $281,384.

2. Compensatory Damages

Plaintiffs further request $50,000 each in compensatory damages for emotional

distress and anxiety [Doc. 90, p. 19]. Emotional distress damages are recoverable under

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the THRA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3); Turic v. Holland

Hosp., 85 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1996); Tenn. Code Ann. 4-21-306(a)(7). “A plaintiff’s

own testimony, along with the circumstances of a particular case, can suffice to sustain the

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plaintiff’s burden” to show that a defendant’s unlawful actions caused his or her emotional

distress. Turic, 85 F.3d at 1215.

Here, plaintiffs’ declarations demonstrate that defendants’ conduct caused them

emotional distress and anxiety. For instance, Jones, Laws, Laws-Hord, and Dixon state

that the discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and wrongful termination they experienced

working for defendants has caused ongoing emotional pain and suffering, affecting their

personal relationships and daily life activities [Doc. 90-2 ¶ 13; Doc. 90-4 ¶ 14; Doc. 90-5

¶ 13; Doc. 90-6 ¶ 13]. Their declarations state that they also suffered emotional distress,

depression, constant tension, and anxiety because of defendants’ conduct [Id.]. Jones,

Laws-Hord, and Dixon share that these experiences have made it difficult for them to trust

future employers and/or co-workers [Doc. 90-2 ¶ 13; Doc. 90-5 ¶ 13; Doc. 90-6 ¶ 13].

Likewise, Lee’s declaration states that she has faced ongoing emotional pain and suffering

and exacerbated medical conditions due to the discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and

wrongful termination perpetrated by defendants [Doc. 90-3 ¶ 11]. Lee also shares that she

has suffered from depression, anxiety, headaches, constant worrying, insomnia,

moodiness, and agitation due to defendants’ conduct [Id.].

Based on plaintiffs’ declarations and the egregiousness of defendants’ conduct in

this case, including the repeated use of racial slurs by supervisors at the Facility, the Court

finds that plaintiffs have presented evidence to establish that they are entitled to

compensatory damages. See Perry v. Oregon Healthcare, LLC, No. 3:22-CV-1512, 2023

WL 423249, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2023) (awarding compensatory damages to a

26

plaintiff who suffered from “increased anxiety, loss of sleep, restlessness, extreme stress,

and lack of trust for future employers” due to the defendant’s conduct). Therefore, the

Court will award each plaintiff $50,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress

and anxiety, for a total award of $250,000.

3. Punitive Damages

Plaintiffs also request $50,000 each in punitive damages based on defendants’

racially discriminatory conduct [Doc. 90, p. 19]. They contend that the racial harassment

at the Facility was severe and pervasive, and the clear pattern of retaliatory harassment and

discharges shows defendants’ malice and reckless indifference to plaintiffs’ federally

protected rights [Id.].

“Ordinarily, the Court may award punitive damages as part of a default judgment.”

Scrivo v. Kendrick-Hall, No. 2:18-CV-13702, 2020 WL 6335991, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Oct.

29, 2020) (citing Davis v. Brown, 23 F. App’x 504, 506 (6th Cir. 2001)). “Punitive

damages are available in a Title VII claim where the plaintiff can demonstrate by a

preponderance of the evidence that the employer ‘engaged in a discriminatory

practice . . . with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an

aggrieved individual.” Tisdale v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 415 F.3d 516, 531 (6th Cir. 2005)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)). Punitive damages are available in cases involving

intentional discrimination. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999). In

other words, to be liable for punitive damages, “an employer must at least discriminate in

the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law[.]” Id. at 536.

27

The amended complaint alleges that defendants were aware of the racial

discrimination and harassment taking place at the Facility, and their supervisors actively

perpetuated it [Doc. 16 ¶¶ 40–46, 78]. Despite plaintiffs’ verbal and written complaints of

racial discrimination and harassment to defendants’ management, defendants allowed the

harassment and retaliation to continue and did not address it [Id. ¶¶ 58–60]. Thus,

defendants’ conduct demonstrates at least a reckless indifference to plaintiffs’ federally

protected rights. Accordingly, the Court will award each plaintiff $50,000 in punitive

damages, for a total award of $250,000.

4. Pre- and Post-Judgment Interest

Plaintiffs also request pre-judgment interest on their backpay and emotional distress

damages [Doc. 90, pp. 19–20]. In support, plaintiffs state that they have been deprived of

back pay and emotional distress damages for more than over three years, during which they

have struggled financially [Id. at 20]. They contend that the pre-judgment interest rate

applied under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is fair considering the remedial goal of making plaintiffs

whole, the high rates of inflation in recent years, and the fact that no party would be unjustly

enriched or penalized if plaintiffs’ pre-judgment interest was calculated using this interest

rate [Id. at 21]. They also submit that annual compounding is appropriate, and they request

that the Court apply the same pre- and post-judgment interest rate [Id. at 21–22].

“Title VII authorizes prejudgment interest as part of the backpay remedy in suits

against private employers.” Benton v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 765 F. Supp.

3d 723, 740 (E.D. Tenn. 2025) (quoting Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 557 (1988)). To

28

that end, “it is ordinarily an abuse of discretion not to include pre-judgment interest in a

back-pay award.” Id. (quoting EEOC. v. Ky. State Police Dep’t, 80 F.3d 1086, 1098 (6th

Cir. 1996)). “To calculate prejudgment interest, courts often apply the statutory

postjudgment framework set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961.” Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1961,

“[i]nterest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district

court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961. “Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of

the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield,

as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar

week preceding[] the date of the judgment.” Id. In applying this rate, courts examine

factors, such as “the remedial goal to place the plaintiff in the position that he or she would

have occupied prior to the wrongdoing; the prevention of unjust enrichment on behalf of

the wrongdoer; the lost interest value of money wrongly withheld; and the rate of inflation.”

Benton, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 740 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, the Court finds that an award of prejudgment interest is appropriate when

considering the remedial goal of making plaintiffs whole for the discrimination and

harassment they faced, the high rates of inflation in recent years, and the fact that it appears

no party would be unjustly enriched or penalized if plaintiffs’ prejudgment interest was

calculated using 28 U.S.C. § 1961. See Benton, 765 F. Supp. 3d at 740.

Additionally, plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest starting from the dates

of their termination until the dates of the Court’s judgment in their favor, and the Court

finds it appropriate to compound plaintiffs’ prejudgment interest annually as they request.

29

See Lankford v. Reladyne, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-682, 2016 WL 3640691, at *9 (S.D. Ohio

June 29, 2016); Bell v. Prefix, Inc., No. 05-74311, 2010 WL 2089323, at *5 (E.D. Mich.

May 24, 2010). Specifically, the termination dates for plaintiffs are as follows:

Plaintiff Date of Termination/Discharge

Plaintiff Lee June 7, 2022

Plaintiff Jones June 28, 2022

Plaintiffs Laws and Laws-Hord July 20, 2022

Plaintiff Dixon August 12, 2022

[Doc. 90-2 ¶ 7; Doc. 90-3 ¶ 6; Doc. 90-4 ¶ 7; Doc. 90-5 ¶ 7; Doc. 90-6 ¶ 7].

Turning to post-judgment interest, the Sixth Circuit has stated that “the statutory

postjudgment framework set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 is a reasonable method for

calculating prejudgment interest awards.” See Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 848 F.3d

716, 735 (6th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs are also entitled to

post-judgment interest at a rate set by 28 U.S.C. § 1961.

5. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Plaintiffs request $122,485 in attorneys’ fees based on hourly rates of $500 for

attorney Douglas B. Janney III and $350 for attorney Curt M. Masker [Doc. 90, pp. 22–25].

In support, plaintiffs submit that Janney has 27 years of employment litigation experience

and was approved at $400 per hour in this district in January 2020 [Id. at 23]. Plaintiffs

also note that Masker has practiced law since 2017, and his practice has been focused

exclusively on employment litigation in Tennessee since September 2019 [Id.]. Plaintiffs

30

substantiate their request with Janney and Masker’s affidavits, in which they outline their

education, credentials, and professional experience [See Docs. 90-8, 90-10]. Further,

Janney and Masker represent that they have performed extensive work on this case without

compensation for more than three years, including drafting two lengthy complaints,

responding to two motions to dismiss, completing extensive written discovery and motion

practice, participating in mediation, and preparing their default judgment motions [Doc.

90, pp. 23–24]. Additionally, counsel for plaintiffs attach time records demonstrating that

Janney is owed $48,250 in attorneys’ fees based on 96.5 hours of work, and Masker is

owed $74,235 in attorneys’ fees based on 212.1 hours of work [Doc. 90-8, pp. 8–19; Doc.

90-10, pp. 5–21].

In determining whether the requested amount of attorneys’ fees is reasonable, courts

often employ the “lodestar method” which is “the proven number of hours reasonably

expended on the case by an attorney, multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Isabel v.

City of Memphis, 404 F.3d 404, 415 (6th Cir. 2005). Twelve factors are considered in

determining the reasonableness of hours and the rate:

(1) time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions

presented; (3) the skill needed to perform the legal service properly; (4) the

preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case;

(5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time and

limitations imposed by the client or the circutances; (8) the amount involved

and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the

attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of

the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in “similar

cases.”

Id. at 415–16 (quoting Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 471–72 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999)).

31

However, “the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award

is the degree of success obtained. Id. at 416 (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114

(1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining the appropriate hourly rate to

apply, courts “must consider the prevailing market rate in the relevant community for the

same type of work at issue.” Brooks v. Invista, No. 1:05-CV-328, 2008 WL 304893, at *3

(E.D. Tenn. Jan. 30, 2008) (citations omitted). For fee purposes, the “relevant community”

is the “legal community within the court’s territorial jurisdiction or venue.” Id. (citations

omitted). The “prevailing market rate” is “that rate which lawyers of comparable skill and

experience can reasonably expect to command within the relevant community.” Id.

(citations omitted).

Based on the professional experience, skill, and education of Janney and Masker as

outlined in their declarations [Docs. 90-8, 90-10], the Court finds that the requested

attorneys’ fees are reasonable. Specifically, Janney’s declaration states that he has

practiced employment litigation in Tennessee for 27 years, he has been an active member

of the National Employment Lawyers Association since 2003, and he has received several

awards for his work in employment litigation [Doc. 90-8, pp. 1–2]. Masker’s declaration

notes that he received his J.D. from Vanderbilt University in 2017, and he has been licensed

to practice law in Tennessee since 2019 [Doc. 90-10, p. 1]. Masker also notes that he has

practiced employment litigation since September 2019, he is a member of the National

Employment Lawyers Association, and he has received several awards for his work in

employment litigation [Id. at 2]. Given the experience, reputation, and ability of the

32

attorneys involved in this matter, the Court finds that the requested attorneys’ fees are

reasonable.

Moreover, the Court finds that the hourly rates requested are reasonable and

consistent with the prevailing market for highly experienced counsel. This determination

is supported by the Knoxville Bar Association’s 2023 Economic & Law Practice

Management Survey, which found that 18% of Knoxville attorneys have average hourly

rates of $301-$350 and 20% have average hourly rates over $350. See KNOXVILLE BAR

ASSOCIATION, ECONOMICS & LAW PRACTICE MANAGEMENT SURVEY 43 (2023), available

at https://www.knoxbar.org/?pg=EconomicSurvey2023.

Additionally, Janney’s uncontested declaration confirms that his requested hourly

rate of $500 is significantly less than his typical hourly rate of $650 to $750 and rates

prevailing in Nashville where he practices most of the time [Doc. 90-8, pp. 3–4]. Given

his skills and extensive experience in employment litigation, Janney’s requested rate of

$500 per hour appears to appropriately reflect his expertise. See Benton, 765 F. Supp. 3d

at 739 (finding that $450 per hour was a reasonable hourly rate for an experienced East

Tennessee employment attorney). Since defendants have not objected to the requested

rates or to the total amount requested, the Court finds that the requested fees are reasonable.

The Court also finds that the time and labor involved in this matter was significant,

as shown by Janney and Masker’s declarations and a review of the record. Specifically,

the record shows that Pollak actively litigated this case for several years by filing multiple

motions to dismiss and opposing plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain entries of default against the

33

defendants before Pollak’s counsel withdrew from the case [See Docs. 11, 26, 36, 37, 38,

40, 55, 56, 58]. Furthermore, Janney and Masker represent that the parties engaged in

extensive written discovery and participated in mediation, demonstrating that this matter

involved substantially more work than a default judgment case in which a defendant simply

fails to answer or appear [Doc. 90-8, p. 6; Doc. 90-10, p. 3]. The Court also acknowledges

that plaintiffs “have been paid nothing for the considerable amount of time that [they] have

put into the case, which impacted [their] ability to accept representation in and litigate other

cases” [Doc. 90-8, p. 6]. Thus, the requested attorneys’ fees are reasonable considering the

time and labor required in this matter.

Lastly, the services provided by Masker and Janney helped plaintiffs obtain

favorable rulings from the Court, including the Clerk’s entry of default judgment against

three defendants [See Docs. 60, 61, 87]. Accordingly, the Court will award plaintiffs

$122,485.00 in attorneys’ fees.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that plaintiff is entitled to a default

judgment against defendants. Accordingly, Count 3 of the amended complaint is

DISMISSED without prejudice, and plaintiffs’ motions for default judgment [Docs. 90,

92, 93, 94] will be GRANTED. The Court will ORDER that plaintiffs recover the

following from defendants the following:

• Lost wages in the amount of $281,384.00;

34

• Compensatory damages in the amount of $250,000.00 ($50,000 per

plaintiff);

• Punitive damages in the amount of $250,000.00 ($50,000 per plaintiff);

• Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest according to 28 U.S.C. § 1961; and

• Attorneys’ fees in the amount of $122,485.00.

The Clerk of Court will be DIRECTED to CLOSE this case. A separate order will

enter.

ENTER:

s/ Thomas A. Varlan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

35