CIRRINCIONE

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MICHAEL CIRRINCIONE,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No, 25-16191 (MAS) (TJB)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COUNTY OF MERCER, ef al.,

Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants the New Jersey State Police (the

“NJSP”), Sergeant First Class Patrick McLaren (“Sgt. McLaren”), Sergeant Curtis Sand (“Set.

Sand”), and Lieutenant Craig Churney’s (“Lt. Churney” and, collectively with the NJSP, Sgt.

McLaren, and Sgt. Sand, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11) Plaintiff Michael

Cirrincione’s (“Plaintiff’) Complaint (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff opposed (ECF No. 12), Defendants

replied (ECF No. 13), and Plaintiff submitted a sur-reply (ECF No. 18). The Court has carefully

considered the parties’ submissions and reaches its decision without oral argument under Local

Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons below, Defendant’s Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND!

Plaintiff alleges that, in April of 2024, he began frequently visiting the Richard J. Hughes

Justice Complex (“Justice Complex’) in Trenton, New Jersey to “conduct business.” (Compl. {| 1.)

! The Court accepts the factual allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint as true and draws all inferences

in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Phillips v County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232

(3d Cir, 2008).

Each time Plaintiff entered the building, he was forced to identify himself and was escorted by Sgt.

McLaren, Sgt. Sand, and Officers John Does 1-5. (/d.) During various visits to the Justice

Complex, Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. McLaren repeatedly screamed at him. Ud. { 2.)

On October 18, 2024, Plaintiff went to the Justice Complex to file court documents with

the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. (id. 93.) Sgt. McLaren, Sgt. Sand, and Lt.

Churney (collectively, “the Officers”) detained and arrested Plaintiff pursuant to a warrant for his

(/d_) Plaintiff avers this warrant “had never been issued” to him. (/d.) Plaintiff was charged

with harassment pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-4(a). Ud. 7 4.) The charge was dismissed on

September 18, 2025, by the Ewing Township Municipal Court, and the offense was expunged. (/d.

7.)

On October 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendants the County of

Mercer, NJSP, and the Officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and the New Jersey Civil

Rights Act (“NJCRA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2. (See generally id.) Plaintiff asserts the following

causes of action; (1) unlawful arrest and false imprisonment against Sgt. McLaren, Sgt. Sand, and

Lt. Churney (“Count One”); (2) failure to intervene against Sgt. McLaren, Sgt. Sand, and Lt.

Churney (“Count Two”); and (3) Monell liability against the County of Mercer and NJSP (“Count

Three”). (d.*) For each cause of action, Plaintiff pursues monetary relief. Ud.)

On December 11, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff opposed

on December 18, 2025 (see generally Pl.’s Opp’n Br., ECF No. 12), and Defendants replied (see

* On October 15, 2025, the County of Mercer was dismissed from this action with prejudice

pursuant to a stipulation between it and Plaintiff. (ECF No. 7.)

generally Defs.’ Reply Br., ECF No. 13). With leave of the Court (ECF No. 17), Plaintiff filed a

sur-reply on January 14, 2026, (PI.’s Sur-Reply Br., ECF No. 18.)

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1),? a defendant may move to dismiss based

ona lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, a court must

first determine whether the moving party presents a facial or factual attack because that distinction

determines how the pleading is reviewed. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d

884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). “A facial attack concerns an alleged pleading deficiency whereas a factual

attack concerns the actual failure of a plaintiff’s claims to comport factually with the jurisdictional

prerequisites.” Young v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 3d 337, 345 (D.N.J. 2015) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Where, such as here, a defendant files a motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(1) prior to filing an answer, it is considered a facial attack. Const. Party of Pa. v. Aichele,

757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014) (explaining that a defendant’s motion was a “facial attack”

because defendant “filed the attack before it filed an[ | answer to the [clomplaint or otherwise

presented competing facts”); Curlin Med. Inc. vy. ACTA Med, LLC, No. 16-2464, 2016 WL

6403131, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2016) (“[T]he Third Circuit’s recent cases suggest that only facial

attacks, and not factual attacks, can be brought in a motion to dismiss before an answer is filed.”

(citation omitted)).

3 All references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A facial challenge asserts that “the complaint, on its face, does not allege sufficient grounds

to establish subject matter jurisdiction.” Avanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438

(D.N.J. 1999) (citations omitted). As such, a facial challenge “calls for a district court to apply the

same standard of review it would use in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), ie.,

construing the alleged facts in favor of the nonmoving party.” Aichele, 757 F.3d at 358. District

courts considering a facial challenge, then, must construe the allegations in the complaint as true

and determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists. Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891; Cardio-Med.

Assoes., Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester Med, Ctr, 721 F.2d 68, 75 (3d Cir. 1983). “When subject matter

jurisdiction is challenged under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must bear the burden of persuasion.”

Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b){6)

Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests.” Bel? Atl, Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting

Conley y. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).

A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss under

Rule 12(b)(6). See Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). First, the court must

identify “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, Second, the

court must identify all of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations, accept them as true, and

“construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,

578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The court can discard bare legal conclusions

or factually unsupported accusations that merely state the defendant unlawfully harmed the

plaintiff. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Avombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Third, the court must

determine whether “the [well-pleaded] facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that

4d

the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’” Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting /qbal, 556 U.S, at

679). A facially plausible claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd. at 210 (quoting /gbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Ona

Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been

presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Fidelcor, 926 F.2d

at 1409),

In assessing a pro se plaintiff's complaint, the court construes a plaintiff’s allegations

liberally. Beasley v. Howard, 623 F. Supp. 3d 434, 439 (D.N.J. 2022) (citing Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Even under this liberal standard, “pro se litigants still must allege

sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d

239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).

Il. DISCUSSION .

Defendants raise several arguments in favor of dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint: (1) all

claims against NJSP and the Officers, in their official capacity, are barred under the Eleventh

Amendment; (2) Counts One and Two of Plaintiff’s Complaint fail to state a claim against the

Officers in their individual capacity; and (3) the Officers, in their individual capacity, enjoy

qualified immunity. (See generally Defs.’ Moving Br, ECF No. 11-1.) For the reasons discussed

below, the Court agrees that dismissal is appropriate.*

A. The NJSP and the Officers, in their official capacities, are immune from suit

pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.

Defendants argue that the NJSP and the Officers, in their official capacity, are immune

from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and are not “persons” amenable to suit under Section

1983 or the NICRA. (Defs.’ Moving Br. 6-10.) While Plaintiff concedes that dismissal against the

Court does not reach the issue of qualified immunity.

NJSP and the Officers, in their official capacities, is appropriate for the claims in which he seeks

monetary relief, Plaintiff nevertheless contends that he is pursuing prospective relief to enjoin

Defendants from continuing their “pattern of harassment and intimidation in a public building.”

(Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 4-5.) Although the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has not sought

prospective relief in his Complaint and Plaintiff cannot amend his pleadings through his briefing

(see Defs.’ Reply Br. *3°), because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will briefly address

why dismissal is appropriate. See also Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181

(3d Cir. 1988) (“It is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition

to a Motion to dismiss.”); Bivings v. Wakefield, 316 F. App’x 177, 181 (3d Cir, 2009) (We construe

pro se filings liberally, and hold them ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers.’” (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972))); Campbell v. United States, No.

24-5642, 2025 WL 1527463, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. May 29, 2025) (addressing unopposed motion to

dismiss on the merits in light of the plaintiff's pro se status (citation omitted)).

Section 1983 operates as the procedural vehicle by which a plaintiff may bring a claim for

violation of constitutional rights in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under

[Section] 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws

of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting

under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).°

“The Eleventh Amendment ‘is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject

matter jurisdiction’ over actions against a [s]tate.” Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 280

> Page numbers that are preceded by an asterisk refer to the page numbers atop the ECF header.

The NICRA is closely modeled after Section 1983 and construed identically. See, e.g., Coles

Carlini, 162 F. Supp. 3d 380, 404-05 (D.N.J. 2015).

(D.N.J, 2013) (quoting Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 693 n.2. (3d Cir. 1996)).

“The state’s immunity from suit also extends to ‘arms’ of the state, such as agencies or

departments.” /d. (citing Penniuerst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984)).

Moreover, “a suit against a state official in... her official capacity is not a suit against the official

but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Mich. Dept of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71

(1989) (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)), “As such, it is no different from a suit

against the [s]tate itself” and is barred. Wi//, 491 U.S. at 71 (citations omitted).

First, NJSP is an “arm” of the state and, therefore, it is not a “person” amenable to suit

under Section 1983 and the NICRA. See Johnson v. New Jersey, No. 18-11299, 2024 WL 4906034,

at *12 (D.N.J. Nov. 27, 2024) (dismissing Section 1983 and NJCRA claims against NISP as not a

“nerson” amenable to suit); Wilson v. NJ, State Police, No. 04-1523, 2006 WL 2358349, at *4

(D.N.J, Aug. 15, 2006) (“The NJSP is an arm of the State of New Jersey and is not subject to suit

under Section 1983.” (citation omitted)). Additionally, although Plaintiff contends that his failure

to train, supervise, and discipline claims can proceed for prospective relief against the NJSP (PI.’s

Opp’n Br. 5), it is long settled that “a [p]laintiff cannot circumvent the [s]tate’s sovereign immunity

by alleging Monell liability under [S]ection 1983. Specifically, Monell liability only attaches to

local governments, and does not attach to the [s]tate or its agencies.” Lepping v, County of Mercer,

No. 18-2118, 2018 WL 5263281, at *8 (D.N.J, Oct. 23, 2018) (quoting Rowse v. NJ Dept of

Health & Human Servs., No. 15-1511, 2015 WL 5996324, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 13, 2015)), Even if

Plaintiff were to seek prospective relief against the NJSP for its alleged failure to train, supervise,

and discipline its officers, Eleventh Amendment immunity would still apply regardless of the relief

sought. See Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1982) (holding that “the Eleventh Amendment by

its terms clearly applies to a suit seeking an injunction’).

Next, Plaintiff’s claims for monetary relief against the Officers, in their official capacity,

are barred under the Eleventh Amendment. As explained above, an official capacity suit is “no

different from a suit against the [s]tate itself.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (citations omitted). As Plaintiff

recognizes, claims against state officials, in their official capacity, for prospective relief are not

precluded by the Eleventh Amendment under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). (Pl.’s Opp’n

Br. 4.) Ex parte Young is applied narrowly—the inquiry focuses on whether the complaint:

(1) alleges an ongoing violation of federal law; and (2) seeks prospective relief. Del. River Joint

Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Sec’y Pa. Dept of Lab. & Indus., 985 F.3d 189, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2021)

(quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comun’n of Md., 535 US, 635, 645 (2002)). Here, the

Complaint seeks redress for the Officers’ past “harassing” and “intimidating” conduct as Plaintiff

“attempted to conduct his business” at the Justice Complex. (See generally Compl.) There are,

accordingly, no allegations of an ongoing violation of federal law, nor does Plaintiff assert that he

is seeking injunctive relief for such violations. (/d.) As such, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for

prospective relief against the Officers acting in their official capacity to circumvent the Eleventh

Amendment’s jurisdictional bar.

Finally, insofar as Plaintiff claims that sovereign immunity is different under the NICRA

and Section 1983 (P1.’s Opp’n Br. 5), the Court does not agree, See Brown vy. State, 124 A.3d 243,

255 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015), rev’d on other grounds, 165 A.3d 735 (N.J. 2017) (Given

that the Legislature did not choose to include an express waiver of sovereign immunity in the

[NICRA] and that the [s]tate enjoys immunity under the analogous [Section] 1983, we conclude

that the [s]tate is immune from a suit for damages under the [NJCRA].”); see also Didiano v.

Balicki, 488 F. App’x 634, 638 (3d Cir. 2012) (disagreeing that “the word ‘person’ should be

interpreted differently in the NJCRA context than in [Section] 1983”).

In sum, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s suit for monetary relief against NJSP and

the Officers, in their official capacity. The Court thus lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims

against NJSP and the Officers, in their official capacity. Counts One and Two, as asserted against

the Officers, in their official capacity, will be dismissed without prejudice.’ Count Three, as

asserted against NJSP, will be dismissed without prejudice and without further leave to amend

because it would be futile.®

B. Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the

Officers acting in their individual capacity.

For both Counts One and Two of Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendants argue that dismissal is

warranted because Plaintiff does not allege that the Officers lacked probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff. (Defs.’ Moving Br, 12-16.) In response, Plaintiff contends that the Court can infer the

Officers lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for harassment “given the repeated dismissals and

expungements” of that charge by the Ewing Township Municipal Court. (P1.’s Opp’n Br. 6-7.) The

Court addresses Counts One and Two in turn.

? The Court will permit Plaintiff to amend Counts One and Two only to the extent Plaintiff intends

to seek prospective relief against the Officers acting in their official capacity, See Fletcher-Harlee

Corp. v. Pete Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 Gd Cir. 2007) “Our precedent

supports the notion that in civil rights cases district courts must offer amendment .. . unless doing

so would be inequitable or futile.”).

Claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment are dismissed without prejudice because “Eleventh

Amendment immunity is a ‘threshold, nonmerits issue’ that ‘does not entail any assumption by the

court of substantive law-declaring power[.]’” Merrits v. Richards, 62 F.4th 764, 772 Gd Cir. 2023)

(quoting Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 433 (2007)). A court

may, however, deny leave to amend the complaint where the plaintiff seeks to assert a claim against

a defendant shielded by sovereign immunity as futile for want of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Pickney v.

Somerset Prob. Child Support Enf t, No. 24-8474, 2025 WL 2346440, at *5 (D.N.J, Aug. 13, 2025)

(dismissing state-entity without prejudice on Eleventh Amendment grounds and denying leave to

amend),

i. Count One: False Arrest/False Imprisonment

Claims for false arrest and false imprisonment “‘are merely separate names for the same”

cause of action. Roth v. Golden Nugget Casino/Hotel, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 262, 265 (D.N.J. 1983).

To state a claim for false arrest and/or false imprisonment under Section 1983, a plaintiff must

allege that there was (1) an arrest and (2) it was made without probable cause, James v. City of

Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). “Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and

circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a

reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be

arrested.” Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Orsatti v.

N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995)). Courts examine the totality of the circumstances

_ when determining whether probable cause exists. Peterson v. Att’y Gen. Pa., 551 F. App’x 626,

628-29 (3d Cir. 2014).

Plaintiff has not stated a claim for false arrest or false imprisonment because he does not

allege facts suggesting that the Officers lacked probable cause for his arrest. (See generally

Compl.) Although Plaintiff avers that an arrest warrant was never issued and that the Municipal

Court dismissed his harassment charges U/d. {9 3-6), those allegations alone are not determinative

of whether the officers had or lacked probable cause to make their arrest. Probable cause is assessed

at the time of the arrest and ““‘[t]he validity of the arrest is not dependent on whether the suspect

actually committed any crime, and ‘the mere fact that the suspect is later acquitted of the offense

for which he is arrested is irrelevant.’” Meleika v. Bayonne Police Dept, No. 17-1958, 2020 WL

2214584, at *7 (D.N.J. May 7, 2020) (quoting Jolson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 211 Gd Cir.

2003)). Moreover, the Constitution permits an officer to arrest a suspect with or without a warrant

if there is “probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that the

person to be arrested has committed or is committing [an offense].” Stankevicius v. Town of

10

Harrison, No. 18-9649, 2022 WL 3273872, at *6 n.7 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2022) (citations

omitted). Plaintiff, accordingly, “needed to point to facts suggesting that [the Officers] lacked

probable cause to believe he had committed the offense for which he was arrested.” Godfrey v.

Pennsylvania, 525 F. App’x 78, 80 (3d Cir. 2013). He has not done so here. He has alleged only

that he was arrested based upon allegations in a warrant that was never issued, and that his

harassment charge was later dismissed by the Municipal Court. (See generally Compl.) Count One

is, therefore, dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff will have an opportunity to amend Count One.

See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. vy. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir, 2007),

2 Count Two: Failure to Intervene

To state a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation for failure to intervene, a plaintiff must

allege that: “(1) the police officer failed or refused to intervene when a constitutional violation

took place in his or her presence or with his or her knowledge; and (2) there was a ‘realistic and

reasonable opportunity to intervene.’” Bethea v. Delaware, 17 F. Supp. 3d 407, 417 (D. Del. 2014)

(quoting Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650-51 (3d Cir. 2002)).

Here, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for failure to intervene because Plaintiff has not

alleged an underlying constitutional violation. As discussed previously, Plaintiff has not alleged

facts sufficient to show that the Officers lacked probable cause for his arrest. While Plaintiff alleges

that the Officers repeatedly restricted his movements about the Justice Complex and asked for

identification upon his entry (see Pl.’s Sur-Reply Br. 4-5; Compl. § 1), those allegations do not

demonstrate a constitutional violation. An unconstitutional seizure under the Fourth Amendment

“does not occur whenever there is a governmentally caused termination of an individual’s freedom

of movementf.]” Kay v. Godfrey, No. 26-09, 2026 WL 939214, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7, 2026)

(quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989)). Nor does the mere request for

identification qualify as a seizure. United States v. Cephas, 808 F. App’x 122, 124 (3d Cir. 2020)

1]

(citing United States v. Smith, 575 F.3d 308, 312 (3d Cir. 2009)). Count Two of the Complaint is,

consequently, dismissed without prejudice. The Court will grant Plaintiff the opportunity to amend

Count Two. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp, 482 F.3d at 251.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion. The Court dismisses

Plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice in its entirety. The Court will issue an order consistent with

this Memorandum Opinion.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: July gat 2026

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