Cornelius

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ESLEY D. CORNELIUS, III, #Y23796, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 26-cv-00516-JPG

)

CITY OF MARION, ILLINOIS, )

MARION POLICE DEPARTMENT, )

CHARLES WELGE, )

WILLIAM LANNOM, )

TERANCE HENRY, )

SHAWN ANGLIN, )

and CHRISTINA BURNS, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

GILBERT, District Judge:

Plaintiff Esley D. Cornelius, III, an inmate in custody of the Illinois Department of

Corrections and currently housed at Murphysboro Life Skills Re-Entry Center & Impact Program,

brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

he was subjected to an unlawful and discriminatory traffic stop by Officers Charles Welge and

William Lannom on May 8, 2021. (Doc. 1, pp. 1-11). Although the officers never issued him a

citation, they arrested him, seized $5,231 from him, and detained him for 34 days at Marion County

Jail. They also used racially charged language throughout the stop. Id.

Public records of the incident, including dashboard camera footage, were not preserved in

compliance with the Illinois Public Records Act or produced in compliance with the Illinois

Freedom of Information Act. Plaintiff blames the City of Marion and Marion Police Department

for failing to properly train or supervise its public records employees about proper records

retention, including Terance Henry, Shawn Anglin, and Christina Burns. Plaintiff seeks monetary

relief. Id.

The Complaint is now subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court

to screen and dismiss portions that are legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief,

or seek money damages from an immune defendant. Id. The factual allegations in a pro se

complaint are liberally construed at this stage. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d

816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

Discussion

Based on the allegations, the Court designates the following counts that were either

explicitly designated by Plaintiff or mentioned in the pro se Complaint:

Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against Defendants for failing to

preserve and produce exculpatory evidence from Plaintiff’s traffic stop on

May 8, 2021, including dashboard camera footage.

Count 2: Monell claim against City of Marion and/or Marion Police Department for

maintaining policies, customs, and/or practices surrounding the

preservation of evidence that resulted in the loss or destruction of

exculpatory evidence from Plaintiff’s traffic stop on May 8, 2021.

Count 3: Illinois state law claim against Charles Welge, William Lannom, Terance

Henry, Christina Burns, and Shawn Anglin for their willful and wanton loss

or destruction of dashboard camera footage from the traffic stop involving

Plaintiff on or around May 8, 2021.

Count 4: Illinois state law claim against Defendants for their intentional infliction of

emotional distress against Plaintiff arising from their loss or destruction of

dashboard camera footage from the traffic stop involving Plaintiff on or

around May 8, 2021.

Count 5: Fourth Amendment claim against Defendants Welge and Lannom for

Plaintiff’s unlawful stop, search, arrest, and seizure of $5,231 without

probable cause on or around May 8, 2021.

Count 6: Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against Defendants for

racially profiling Plaintiff before and during the traffic stop on or around

May 8, 2021.

Count 7: Illinois state law claim against Defendants for Plaintiff’s false arrest and

imprisonment on or around May 8, 2021.

Count 8: Illinois Public Records Act claim against Defendants for failing to preserve

public records of the unlawful stop of Plaintiff on or around May 8, 2021.

Count 9: Illinois spoliation of evidence claim against Defendants for losing or

destroying public records of Plaintiff’s unlawful stop on or around May 8,

2021.

Count 10: Illinois Freedom of Information Act claim against Defendants for failing to

produce public records, including dashboard camera footage, of Plaintiff’s

traffic stop on or around May 8, 2021.

Count 11: Illinois state law claim against City of Marion for failing to train Marion’s

Records Supervisors and Employees on proper retention of public records,

including dash camera footage, resulting in the loss or destruction of footage

from Plaintiff’s traffic stop and arrest on or around May 8, 2021.

Count 12: Illinois state law claim against Defendants for their malicious prosecution

of Plaintiff.

Any other claim mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed herein is considered dismissed

without prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly.1

Counts 1 and 2

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit outside of the 2-year statute of limitations applicable to his

federal constitutional claims. Counts 1 and 2 arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although § 1983

includes no statute of limitations, the Court borrows the statute of limitations for personal injury

actions that apply in the state where the alleged injury occurred. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Chambers

v. Cross, 788 F. App’x 1032, 1033 (7th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s injury occurred

in Illinois, so this Court looks to Illinois state law for the applicable limitations period.

1 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).

Illinois law provides a 2-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. 735 ILCS

§ 5/13-202; Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 721-22 (7th Cir. 2017). This means that Plaintiff must

bring suit within 2 years of his injury. As alleged, Plaintiff’s injury occurred on or around

May 8, 2021. He should have filed this lawsuit in federal court no later than May 7, 2023. Plaintiff

signed the Complaint on March 31, 2026, and he filed it on April 20, 2026. This was almost 3

years after limitations period for his federal claims expired. Counts 1 and 2 are thus time-barred.

Plaintiff attempts to save these claims by ambiguously alleging the following: “Plaintiff

discovered on 6/13/2025 lost, destroyed footage of a traffic stop that occurred on May 8, 2021.”

(Doc. 1, p. 6). Plaintiff offers no other allegations to clarify this assertion. As alleged, the Court

is left to guess whether Plaintiff learned on June 13, 2025 that the dashboard camera footage from

his May 8, 2021 traffic stop was lost or destroyed sometime between May 8, 2021 and June 13,

2025; whether Plaintiff learn that a defendant had the footage but lost or destroyed it on June 13,

2025; whether Plaintiff learned that a defendant found the footage, previously believed to be lost

or destroyed, on June 13, 2025; or, whether Plaintiff meant to communicate something entirely

different. The Court simply cannot tell, and this ambiguous statement does not save his federal

constitutional claims.

A complaint must include enough factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief

that is facially plausible. O’Gorman v. City of Chicago, 777 F.3d 885, 888-89 (7th Cir. 2015)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Mann v. Vogel, 707

F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2013)). The allegations must raise a plaintiff’s right to relief above the

speculative level. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A plaintiff can plead himself out of court

with factual allegations that clearly establish he is not entitled to relief as a matter of law. Id.

(citing Hollander v. Brown, 457 F.3d 688, 691 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2006)). Although a plaintiff is not

required to overcome affirmative defenses like the statute of limitations when preparing a

complaint, the district court may dismiss a complaint if a plaintiff alleges facts that establish a

statute of limitations defense. Id. (citing Cancer Fndtn., Inc. v. Cerberus Capital Management,

LP, 559 F.3d 671, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiff’s complaint shows that he brought this § 1983

action well beyond the 2-year limitations period for his federal constitutional claims. As such,

Counts 1 and 2 shall be dismissed as being time-barred.

Counts 5, 6, and 7

Plaintiff previously filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Charles Welge,

William Lannom, and other Marion County officials for the same conduct giving rise to Counts 5,

6, and 7. See Cornelius v. Marion, Ill., et al., Case No. 23-cv-01165-NJR (S.D. Ill. filed April 6,

2023) (See Docs. 16, 48, and 60) (prior action). In his prior action, Plaintiff’s claims are numbered

Counts 1, 2, and 3, and all three claims remain pending against the defendants. For the same

reasons set forth above, Counts 5, 6, and 7 are also time-barred in this case. Plaintiff has not

reasserted the claims here. Accordingly, Counts 5, 6, and 7 shall be dismissed from this action.

Counts 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12

Plaintiff’s remaining claims arise under Illinois state law. Jurisdiction over these claims is

conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The statute authorizes a district court to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims when the state claims “are so related to [the federal claims] that

they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). When a district court dismisses all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction, however, the district court has discretion to either retain jurisdiction over the

supplemental claims or dismiss them. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher &

Newman, Ltd., 140 F.3d 716, 717 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 870 (1998). Generally, a district

court will dismiss the pendent state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(2), (3); Carnegie-Mellon

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988). The Court will follow the general rule here. Counts

3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 shall be dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff pursuing them in state

court.

Disposition

IT IS ORDERED that the Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. COUNTS

1 and 2 are DISMISSED with prejudice as time-barred; COUNTS 5, 6, and 7 are DISMISSED

with prejudice as time-barred and the focus of pending Case No. 23-cv-01165-NJR; and

COUNTS 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 are DISMISSED without prejudice because the Court

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims, see 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1367(c)(2), (3). Plaintiff is free to pursue his state law claims in Illinois state court.

If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, his notice of appeal must be filed with this Court

within thirty days of the entry of judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). A motion for leave to

appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See FED.

R. APP. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate

filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2). Moreover, if the appeal is found to be nonmeritorious, Plaintiff may also incur a

“strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A proper and timely motion filed pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 59(e) may toll the 30-day appeal deadline. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4). A Rule 59(e)

motion must be filed no more than twenty-eight (28) days after the entry of the judgment, and this

28-day deadline cannot be extended.

The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to close this case and enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 8/3/2026

J. PHIL GILBERT

United States District Judge