The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION
TUSHAWN CRAIG, )
MARQUETTA STOKES, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No. 1:23-cv-01575-TWP-MJD
)
CORNERSTONE TRADING GROUP, LLC, )
SETH SMITH, )
CITY OF RICHMOND, INDIANA, )
)
Defendants. )
)
)
CITY OF RICHMOND, INDIANA, )
)
)
Cross Claimants, )
)
v. )
)
CORNERSTONE TRADING GROUP, LLC, )
SETH SMITH, )
MY-WAY TRADING, INC., )
)
Cross Defendants. )
)
)
CORNERSTONE TRADING GROUP, LLC, )
)
Third Party Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
CITY OF RICHMOND, INDIANA, )
)
Third Party Defendant. )
)
)
ALLEN WELLMAN HARVEY KEYES )
COOLEY, LLP, )
)
Interested Party. )
)
ORDER ON OMNIBUS AND SETTLEMENT MOTIONS IN LIMINE
This matter is before the Court on two Motions in Limine: a Motion in Limine, Omnibus
(Filing No. 346) filed by Defendant City of Richmond, Indiana (the "City") which contains thirteen
motions in limine; and Cornerstone Defendants’ Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence, Argument
and/or Reference to Any Settlement Communications, Agreed Judgment and Party Solvency
(Filing No. 352) filed by Defendants Cornerstone Trading Group, LLC and Seth Smith and Cross-
Defendant, My-Way Trading, Inc. (collectively, the "Cornerstone Defendants"). Plaintiffs
Tushawn Craig ("Craig") and Marquetta Stokes ("Stokes") (together, "Plaintiffs") initiated this
action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (collectively, the "Class") alleging
various claims against the City, Cornerstone Trading Group, LLC and Seth Smith after a fire
occurred at 308, 310, and 358 NW F Street Richmond, Indiana (collectively, the "Properties"),
resulting in members of the Class being evacuated from their homes (Filing No. 1-2). The City
owned the properties located at 310 and 358 NW F Street (the "310/358 Properties").
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are set to be tried by a jury on September 14, 2026.
The City recently filed the instant motion seeking preliminary rulings from the Court regarding
admissibility of various types of evidence. For the reasons discussed below, both Motions are
granted in part and denied in part.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
"[J]udges have broad discretion in ruling on evidentiary questions during trial or before on
motions in limine." Jenkins v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 316 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2002). The Court
excludes evidence on a motion in limine only if the evidence clearly is not admissible for any
purpose. See Hawthorne Partners v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
Unless evidence meets this exacting standard, evidentiary rulings must be deferred until trial so
questions of foundation, relevancy, and prejudice may be resolved in context. Id. at 1400–01.
Moreover, denial of a motion in limine does not necessarily mean that all evidence contemplated
by the motion is admissible; rather, it only means that, at the pretrial stage, the Court is unable to
determine whether the evidence should be excluded. Id. at 1401. "The purpose of a motion in
limine is not to weigh competing arguments about the strength of the parties' evidence and theories,
nor is it to decide which party's assumptions are correct. A motion in limine weeds out evidence
that is not admissible for any purpose." Washington Frontier League Baseball, LLC v. Zimmerman,
No. 14-cv-1862, 2018 WL 3120623, at *2 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2018).
II. DISCUSSION
The Court will first address the Cornerstone Defendants' Motion in Limine before turning
to the City's Motion.
A. Cornerstone Defendants' Motion in Limine (Filing No. 352)
The Cornerstone Defendants seek exclusion of any evidence, argument or reference to any
settlement agreement, settlement communications, agreed judgment or a party's solvency (Filing
No. 352 at 2). They point out that they have reached a tentative agreement to settle some of the
City's crossclaims against them which may result in the filing and entry of an agreed judgment.
The Cornerstone defendants argue that there is no proper purpose for which settlement
communications would be admissible in this matter, and any reference to settlements agreements
or an agreed judgment would violate Federal Rule of Evidence 408. Id. Neither the City nor the
Plaintiffs oppose the exclusion of settlement negotiations, agreements, or any agreed judgment to
prove liability, fault, the amount of Plaintiffs' claims, or Cornerstone Defendants' ability to pay
compensatory damages (Filing No. 370).1
The Plaintiffs do, however, oppose the Motion insofar as the categorical exclusion of the
Cornerstone Defendants' financial condition. Id. Plaintiffs contend that their punitive damages
request against Cornerstone Trading Group, LLC and Seth Smith remains pending, and Indiana
law recognizes that a defendant's financial condition is relevant to determining the appropriate
amount of punitive damages. Id. (citing Stroud v. Lints, 790 N.E.2d 440, 445 (Ind. 2003)). Plaintiffs
thus assert that such evidence may properly be reserved for any punitive-damages phase, but it
should not be excluded from the case altogether.
The Court agrees that settlement negotiations or agreements and any agreed judgment may
not be introduced in this case pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 408. See Fed. R. Evid. 408.
However, when punitive damages are found to be appropriate, the Indiana Supreme Court has
expressly stated that the wealth of a defendant is relevant to a determination of the appropriate
amount. See Stroud, 790 N.E.2d at 445 ("[I]f punitive damages are appropriate, the wealth of the
defendant has for many years been held relevant to a determination of the appropriate amount.").
While the Cornerstone Defendants contend that such evidence is substantially outweighed by the
dangers of unfair prejudice and misleading the jury and therefore must be excluded under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 (Filing No. 352 at 2), the Court disagrees. Wealth is an appropriate is a
relevant factor in determining the amount of punitive damages to award should the jury find for
such damages.
Accordingly, the Cornerstone Defendant's Motion is granted as to evidence of settlement
negotiations and agreements and any agreed judgment. However, the Motion is denied as to
1 The City did not file a response opposing the Cornerstone Defendants' Motion.
evidence of the City's respective wealth. Though such evidence may be properly reserved for any
punitive-damages phase if appropriate.
B. The City's Motion in Limine (Filing No. 346)
The City asks the Court to exclude thirteen different categories of evidence which the Court
will address in turn.
1. Motion in Limine 1
The City asks the Court to exclude any testimony from Plaintiff Stokes concerning her
experienced fear, anxiety, and uncertainty with regard to the negative effects the fire had on her
property as a mental health professional (Filing No. 348 at 9). The City argues that this evidence
should be excluded for two reasons: (1) the City has concurrently filed a separate motion in limine
stating that Plaintiffs may not seek emotional distress damages in the absence of proof of a direct
physical impact; and (2) Plaintiffs have not identified Stokes as an expert witness they may use at
trial to present evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, 703, or 705. Id.
The Court has addressed the City's separate motion in limine concerning Plaintiff's
emotional distress damages in a previous Order. (Filing No. 383). Plaintiffs have stated that they
do not plan to introduce testimony from Stokes as a mental health professional and confirmed that
they "will not elicit a mental-health diagnosis, a medical explanation of her symptoms, or any
opinion based upon Stokes's professional education or experience." (Filing No. 366 at 2).
Moreover, Plaintiffs do not plan to have Stokes offer an expert opinion about the medical
significance of her symptoms or whether exposure to any particular chemical caused a medical
condition. Id.
As the Court previously explained, Stokes may offer lay testimony about her experiences.
Accordingly, this Motion in Limine is denied and a detailed discussion of the City's arguments
concerning whether Indiana law bars such evidence can be found in the Court's prior Order. (See
Filing No. 383).
2. Motion in Limine 2
The City seeks to exclude "undisclosed opinion testimony from other fact witnesses that
Plaintiffs have identified on their final witness list." (Filing No. 346 at 2). The City asserts that
Plaintiffs have stated they may call thirty-seven separate witnesses at trial, but they have only
disclosed one witness, William Hicks, Jr. ("Hicks"), as providing opinion testimony (Filing No.
348 at 12). The City provides two examples for its assertion.
First, the City believes Plaintiffs intend to have Doug Gardner testify that he commissioned
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA") to do a plume study to discuss
the concern for a fire on the properties that could be a four-alarm fire, requiring joint assistance
from fire departments to control and the evacuation of the neighboring homes. The City notes that
the plume study is based on NOAA's HYSPLIT air dispersion model which "is a complicated,
multifaceted computer modeling system that predicts how emissions will travel, taking into
account not only wind flow, direction, and speed, but also particle behavior, dispersal mechanics,
and the impact of meteorological and even radioactive factors." Id. (quoting Bahr v. Regan, 6 F.4th
1059, 1085 n.18 (9th Cir. 2021)). The City contends that testimony as to the use and meaning of
the air dispersion model requires an expert qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which Doug Gardner, the Deputy Chief of Fire
Prevention for the Richmond Fire Department, does not possess. Id. at 13.
The City also identifies Christopher Abel and asserts that Plaintiffs have identified Abel as
an environmental chemist who will testify regarding an October 31, 2024 Investigation Report that
he authored, and the toxic chemicals that were found in sampled sites. Id. at 14. The City notes
that it had previously identified Mr. Abel as an expert it would call to testify as to site conditions
at the 310/358 Properties, but nowhere in Mr. Abel's expert report does he offer testimony on the
toxicity of the substances his investigation detected in soil and groundwater at the 310/358
Properties. Id.
In Response, the Plaintiffs argue that Gardner has firsthand knowledge concerning his
inspection of the properties, the hazards he observed, the 2019 Unsafe Building Commission
proceedings, his involvement in obtaining the NOAA study, the concerns communicated to City
officials, and the City’s subsequent actions (Filing No. 366 at 5). The City itself concedes that
Gardner may testify "as a fact witness as to the 2019 UBC hearing, including what was said about
the NOAA model." Id. (quoting Filing No. 348 at 13). The Plaintiffs further argue that they do not
have to prove the scientific accuracy of the NOAA model merely to establish what information
was presented to the City and what risks the City understood. Afterall, evidence may be admitted
to establish notice even when it is not offered to prove the truth of every technical statement it
contains. Id. at 6 (citing Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 735–36 (7th Cir. 2016)). Plaintiffs
contend that Gardner's testimony concerning his own observations, actions, and communications
does not become expert testimony merely because he possesses professional experience. Rules
701 and 702 distinguish such firsthand testimony from opinions dependent upon scientific or
technical analysis. Id. The Court agrees.
Here, Plaintiffs do not intend to ask Mr. Gardner about the technical accuracy of the NOAA
HYSPLIT model. Instead, Plaintiffs intend to elicit testimony concerning: (1) that an air-plume
study was obtained in connection with properties; (2) that the study and its figures were presented
or discussed during the 2019 proceedings; the concerns and warnings that Gardner communicated
concerning a potential fire, the need for assistance from other agencies, and possible evacuation;
and what they did, or did not do, after receiving that information (Filing No. 366 at 5). Such
evidence is within Gardner's personal knowledge and does not require an expert disclosure.
Accordingly, a blanket exclusion covering every unidentified question that might be asked of every
fact witness would be unfounded as the Court cannot say that such evidence is inadmissible for
any purpose. Thus, the City's Motion in Limine 2 is denied and the City may object in context.
3. Motion in Limine 3
The City contends that the Court should prohibit argument from Plaintiffs regarding the
standard of care under state and federal fire codes to the extent such evidence or argument is not
based on expert testimony (Filing No. 348 at 15). The City argues that industry standards
concerning the standard of care require explanation and support through an expert witness. Id.
(citing Troutwine Estates Dev. Co., LLC v. Comsub Design & Eng'g, Inc., 854 N.E.2d 890, 902
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). In application, the City argues that this means Plaintiffs and their counsel
must confine their evidence and questioning with respect to the safety concerns from fire codes to
the experts. Id. at 16.
In Response, the Plaintiffs assert that Indiana permits applicable safety regulations to be
considered as evidence of breach when the defendant's duty exists independently under common
law (Filing No. 366 at 7 (citing Beta Steel v. Rust, 830 N.E.2d 62, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (finding
that evidence of violations of the Indiana Administrative Code and National Electrical Code were
relevant to whether a premises owner breached its common law duty and could be considered by
the jury ); Androusky v. Walter, 970 N.E.2d 687, 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (violation of an
administrative regulation is evidence of negligence although not negligence per se))). Plaintiffs
argue that distinction controls here because they do not rely upon the fire and safety codes to create
a duty; and, the Court has already determined that the City owed a common-law duty to the
Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs state that they do not intend to argue that any alleged code violation
independently establishes negligence, replaces the Court's ordinary care instruction, or creates an
independent claim against the City for failing to enforce the law against Cornerstone. They argue
that they should be permitted to present otherwise admissible code-related evidence through Hicks,
and to question City fire and building officials about the codes and safety requirements they
applied, discussed, or communicated in performing their duties. Plaintiffs argue persuasively that
this firsthand evidence may bear upon the hazardous nature of the Properties, Defendants' notice
and foreseeability, and whether Defendants exercised reasonable care. Id. at 8.
The Court will not allow the Plaintiffs to introduce evidence for the purpose of establishing
that any code violation establishes negligence. However, a blanket exclusion of all evidence and
limiting questioning of the fire and safety codes solely to experts is too broad of an exclusion. The
Court cannot say that any evidence or questioning of the fire and safety codes in relation to a non-
expert is automatically inadmissible for any purpose. Accordingly the City's Motion in Limine 3 is
denied.
4. Motion in Limine 4
The City's fourth request is that the expert testimony of Plaintiffs’ expert, William Hicks,
Jr be excluded. However, the City filed a separate motion concerning this same exclusion which
the Court has ruled on. Accordingly, for the reasons explained in Filing No. 380, the City's Motion
in Limine 4 is denied.
5. Motion in Limine 5
The City's fifth request is to exclude evidence, testimony, or argument regarding fear,
anxiety, uncertainty, or other mental distress for future injury (Filing No. 348 at 17). The City filed
a separate Motion in Limine concerning this same evidence which the Court recently ruled on.
Accordingly, the City's Motion in Limine 5 is denied consistent with the Court's ruling in Filing
No. 383.
6. Motion in Limine 6
The City seeks to exclude Plaintiffs’ compensatory damages evidence that was not timely
disclosed or produced. (Filing No. 346 at 2). Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) requires every party, without
awaiting a discovery request, to provide at the outset of litigation "a computation of each category
of damages claimed," along with the underlying documents and evidentiary materials on which
each computation is based. (Filing No. 348 at 21). (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii)). Rule
37(c)(1) is direct, if a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as Rules 26(a) or
26(e) require, the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a
motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless. Id. at
22 (citing Freeman v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 1:18-cv-3844, 2023 WL 2613641, at *1
(S.D. Ind. Mar. 23, 2023)).
The City argues that Craig has failed to produce any evidence supporting categories of
claimed damages, including those incurred because of the evacuation (i.e., the Airbnb costs,
property taxes, home insurance, and sewer, water, and internet fees), and those resulting from his
emotional distress and mental anguish. The City argues that Stokes provided only limited
information and documents with respect to her alleged damages, and it has not received any
additional or supplemental information from Stokes since her June 14, 2024, deposition. The City
explains that it is not suggesting there should have been more evidence, but notes that it is entitled
to an order preventing either Craig or Stokes from testifying regarding the types of damages that
were not disclosed during discovery. Id. at 22–23.
The Plaintiffs do not oppose this request to the extent that it excludes only those economic
categories of damages which were genuinely undisclosed (Filing No. 366 at 12). However,
Plaintiffs argue that the City's request appears much broader. The Plaintiff's point out that the City
acknowledges that their initial disclosures identified evacuation-related expenses, loss of the use
of real and personal property, and anxiety-related damages and the Plaintiffs' interrogatory answers
further itemized their alternate lodging, housing expenses, utilities, food, cleaning expenses and
other losses. Craig and Stokes were then examined extensively about those subjects during their
depositions which the City's memorandum recites. Plaintiffs contend that Rule 26 does not require
documentary corroboration of every fact concerning damages; and argue that Craig and Stokes
may testify from personal knowledge concerning amounts incurred and the City may cross-
examine them about such amounts. Id.
Plaintiffs contend that the absence of a predetermined dollar figure does not preclude
noneconomic damages and loss of use and enjoyment, inconvenience, anxiety, and emotional
distress are not established through receipts or an arithmetic computation. Plaintiffs argue that they
disclosed those categories and testified concerning the nature and duration of their experiences,
therefore, the jury must determine their value from the evidence and the Court's instructions. Id.
(citing Zander v. Orlich, No. 2:14-cv-400, 2017 WL 6262208, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 6, 2017)
(precluding argument that the plaintiff was required to prove a specific dollar amount for
noneconomic damages)).
The Court agrees that any compensatory damages for concrete injuries such as damages
for an Airbnb, property taxes, home insurance, and certain utility expenses were required to be
disclosed. While the Plaintiffs are correct that Rule 26(e)(1)(A) does not require a formal
supplementation when the relevant information has otherwise been made known, the Plaintiffs
must still provide a computation of each category of damages. They may not simply state that they
claim damages for staying in an Airbnb without providing some sort of computation for such
damages. Indeed, it would be impossible for the jury to determine such damages without such
disclosures. Plaintiffs may not simply fail to disclose a computation and then "testify from personal
knowledge concerning amounts actually paid and disclosed." (Filing No. 366 at 12). Rule 37(c)
states that "[i]f a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a)
or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or witness to supply evidence on a motion,
at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless." Fed. R. Civ.
P. 37(c)(1). The Plaintiffs concede that any category of damages which was genuinely not disclosed
at all should be excluded. Accordingly, the City's Motion in Limine 6 is granted as to any
information or computation not disclosed before trial concerning damages, and such testimony
shall be excluded.
However, because the Plaintiffs disclosed the various categories of damages, the Court will
allow them the opportunity to supplement such disclosures with computations for the categories
the City was made aware of, within seven days of this Order.
7. Motion in Limine 7
The City contends that Plaintiffs and Cornerstone Defendants should be prohibited from
providing evidence, testimony or argument about the way the City fought the Fire. (Filing No. 346
at 3). The Cornerstone Defendants do not oppose Motion in Limine 7.
Plaintiffs do not oppose Motion in Limine No. 7 but argue that it should be granted only to
the extent that it prohibits them from asserting that the City was negligent in the manner in which
it fought the fire. Plaintiffs argue that witnesses, including firefighting officials with firsthand
knowledge should remain free to describe the fire's progression, duration, and spread, the
conditions they observed, the timing and nature of the emergency response, the resulting smoke,
ash and debris, and circumstances surrounding the evacuation (Filing No. 366 at 14). Plaintiffs
contend that those facts provide necessary context and bear upon the progression and scope of the
fire and the cause and extent of Plaintiffs' evacuation and property-related damages. Id. The City
does not ask to exclude such evidence.
The City's Motion in Limine 7 is granted. Neither Plaintiffs nor the Cornerstone
Defendants may provide evidence, testimony or argument regarding the way the City fought the
fire for the purpose of arguing the City was negligent. This ruling does not preclude otherwise
admissible factual evidence concerning the fire and emergency response relevant to Plaintiffs’
claims.
8. Motion in Limine 8
The City argues that Plaintiffs and the Cornerstone Defendants should be prohibited from
offering argument, evidence, or testimony regarding the presence (or lack) of liability insurance
that might pay for Plaintiffs’ claims. (Filing No. 346 at 3). The City contends that the presence of
liability insurance or lack of such insurance is irrelevant, prejudicial, and incurable once offered
(Filing No. 348 at 24). The Cornerstone Defendants do not oppose Motion in Limine 8.
Plaintiffs respond that they do not intend to offer evidence, testimony, or argument
concerning whether the City or the Cornerstone Defendants possess liability insurance, whether
insurance may satisfy any judgment, or whether an insurer is paying the City’s defense costs.
(Filing No. 366 at 14). Plaintiffs therefore do not oppose Motion in Limine No. 8, but contend that
they should not be foreclosed from offering such evidence for a purpose expressly permitted by
Federal Rule of Evidence 411, in which case, they will seek a ruling outside the jury's presence.
Id. The Court agrees and the City's Motion in Limine 8 is granted.
9. Motion in Limine 9
The City asks the Court to exclude the financial condition of any party, how an award of
damages would be paid, the City’s litigation strategy or legal fees, punitive damages, or any “David
versus Goliath” themed arguments.(Filing No. 346 at 4). The Cornerstone Defendants do not
oppose this Motion in Limine 9.
The Plaintiffs do not oppose the motion, however, they contend that this ruling should not
eliminate their request for punitive damages against Cornerstone Trading Group, LLC and Seth
Smith (Filing No. 366 at 15). Plaintiffs note that the City's own memorandum recognizes that
punitive damages against the Cornerstone Defendants present a separate issue and proposes that
financial condition evidence be reserved for a subsequent phase following a finding of liability
and compensatory damages. Plaintiffs do not oppose this procedure and the Court finds it
reasonable.
The City's Motion in Limine 9 is therefore granted as to the exclusion of all financial
conditions, how awards of damages would be paid, the City's litigation strategy or legal fees,
punitive damages, or any other "David versus Goliath" themed arguments; subject to the Plaintiffs
ability to introduce such financial evidence and argument supporting punitive damages against
Cornerstone and Smith in a subsequent phase following a finding of liability and compensatory
damages.
10. Motion in Limine 10
The City asks the Court to exclude any testimony, evidence or argument concerning
"golden rule" themes such as asking the jury to place themselves in Plaintiffs' shoes (Filing No.
348 at 29). Neither the Cornerstone Defendants nor the Plaintiffs oppose this request and the Court
agrees. Accordingly, the City's Motion in Limine 10 is granted.
11. Motion in Limine 11
The City asks the Court to prohibit evidence, testimony or argument regarding settlement
negotiations or the failure of the parties to reach a settlement in this case. Id. at 30. Neither the
Cornerstone Defendants nor the Plaintiffs oppose this request and the Court agrees. Accordingly,
the City's Motion in Limine 11 is granted.
12. Motion in Limine 12
The City asks the Court to prohibit testimony, evidence, or argument regarding other fires
not at issue in this litigation. (Filing No. 346 at 3). The City argues that such evidence is, at best,
marginally probative and would be prejudicial to the Defendants. (Filing No. 366 at 30). The City
asserts that the Defendants' acts must be judged by the conditions and conduct at the Properties
and must not be confused with conditions and conduct that may have caused fires at unrelated
properties. Accordingly, such evidence is not relevant and should be excluded under Rule 401, and
if not, excluded under Rule 403 because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and wasting time. Id. at 31.
The Plaintiffs oppose this request. While they do not intend to offer evidence of fires at
unrelated properties involving unrelated parties merely to suggest that Defendants acted
negligently, Plaintiffs argue that the City's request is too broad and the categorical request should
be denied. (Filing No. 366 at 17). Plaintiffs argue that admissibility of such evidence depends upon
the particular incident, its similarity to the circumstances presented here, and the purpose for which
it is offered. Id. Plaintiff's contend that the Seventh Circuit recognizes that evidence of another
accident may be relevant when the circumstances are substantially similar. Mihailovich v. Laatsch,
359 F.3d 892, 908–13 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that the district court abused its discretion by
categorically excluding evidence of substantially similar accidents). Id.
The Court concludes that Plaintiffs may not introduce evidence of an unrelated fire to show
that the Defendants were negligent and the motion is granted in this respect. However, the City's
categorical exclusion of every unrelated fire for every purpose irrespective of the context within
which such evidence is offered is too broad. The Court cannot say that such evidence would be
inadmissible for every purpose, especially considering the lack of context surrounding the purpose
for which the evidence might be offered. Accordingly, the City's Motion in Limine 12 is denied in
part, and the City can object in context should the need arise.
13. Motion in Limine 13
Finally, the City asks the Court to prohibit testimony, evidence, or argument that the
litigation is causing or adding to Plaintiffs' emotional distress (Filing No. 348 at 31). Plaintiffs do
not oppose this request and the Court agrees. Accordingly, the City's Motion in Limine 13 is
granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Cornerstone Defendant's Motion (Filing No. 352) is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Motion is granted as to evidence of
settlement negotiations and agreements and any agreed judgment. However, the Motion is denied
as to evidence of their respective wealth which may be properly reserved for any punitive-damages
phase if appropriate.
The City's Motion in Limine, Omnibus (Filing No. 346), is also GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART. The Motion is granted to the extent outlined above for Motions in
Limine 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 13. The Motion is denied to Motions in Limine 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The
Motion is granted in part and denied in part as to Motion in Limine 12.
An order in /imine is not a final, appealable order. If the parties believe that evidence
excluded by this Order becomes relevant or otherwise admissible during the course of the trial,
counsel may request a hearing outside the presence of the jury. Likewise, if the parties believe that
specific evidence is inadmissible during the course of the trial, counsel may raise specific
objections to that evidence.
SO ORDERED.
Date: _ 8/10/2026 O Watton ath
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana
Distribution:
MY-WAY TRADING, INC.
c/o Seth Smith
P.O. Box 1282
308 NW F St.
Richmond, IN 47374
plasticman1 @earthlink.net
Benjamin D. Felton
DYER GAROFALO MANN & SCHULTZ
bfelton@dgmslaw.com
Arie J. Lipinski
Lipinski Law
lipinski@lipinski-law.com
Andrew M. McNeil
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP (Indianapolis)
amcneil@boselaw.com
Jackson Lee Schroeder
Bose McKinney & Evans LLP
jschroeder@boselaw.com
John Smalley
Dyer, Garofalo, Mann, & Schultz
jsmalley@dgmslaw.com
17
Brad R. Sugarman
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP (Indianapolis)
bsugarman@boselaw.com
Seth M. Thomas
BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP (Indianapolis)
sthomas@boselaw.com