The opinion
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued January 13, 2026 Decided August 11, 2026
No. 25-7050
JARED FISHMAN,
APPELLEE
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:21-cv-01847)
Lucy E. Pittman, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia,
argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs were
Brian L. Schwalb, Attorney General, Caroline S. Van Zile,
Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy
Solicitor General, and Graham E. Phillips, Deputy Solicitor
General.
Charles Gerstein argued the cause for appellee. With him
on the brief was Jason S. Harrow.
Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, GARCIA, Circuit Judge,
and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.
2
Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SRINIVASAN.
SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge: Responding to a 9-1-1 call
from a bystander who had witnessed what she thought might
have been a kidnapping or abuse of a child by an adult, D.C.
Metropolitan Police Department officers quickly tracked down
the adult, Jared Fishman, based on vehicle license plate
information. The officers detained Fishman outside his home
while questioning him and his family, including the child
involved in the incident, who turned out to be his young
daughter. Upon concluding that Fishman had not committed a
crime, the officers released him. He had been detained for
around twenty-five minutes.
Fishman then brought this action against the officers,
alleging that they continued to detain him after reasonable
suspicion had dissipated in violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights. The district court denied the officers qualified
immunity, ruling that clearly established law required the
officers to release Fishman before they did. We disagree and
conclude that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. In
detaining Fishman to investigate whether he had committed a
child-abuse-related offense, and in continuing his detention
until they could speak with his daughter, the officers did not
violate clearly established law.
I.
A.
The following facts are undisputed. On February 17,
2020, Jared Fishman took his two daughters to lunch at a
restaurant in D.C.’s Cleveland Park neighborhood. The girls
argued during the meal, and Fishman’s younger daughter, J.M.-
3
F., remained upset after leaving the restaurant. J.M.-F. refused
to get into Fishman’s car, and he allowed her to walk on a
sidewalk near the restaurant to calm down. After several
minutes, J.M.-F. still declined to get into the car, so Fishman
drove the car next to her, exited the car, picked her up over her
protest, and put her into the car.
As Fishman got into the driver’s seat, a man in another car
who had noticed the incident blocked Fishman’s car with his
own and asked whether everything was alright. Fishman
responded that he was taking his younger daughter home, made
a U-turn, and drove off. A second bystander called 9-1-1 to
report the incident, stating that she did not know whether she
had witnessed “an abduction” or “a father manhandling his
child in a really bad way.” Ex. 6 (9-1-1 Call Recording) at
00:10–00:22. She described seeing “a little girl” “walking by
herself,” and then a man pulling up and getting out of his car to
talk to her. Id. at 00:30–00:45. The caller explained that the
man “started screaming at her,” the girl “pushed him,” and then
he “grabbed her,” “threw her over his shoulder, and just threw
her in the car.” Id. at 00:45–1:00. The caller recounted that the
girl then “tried to get out” of the car but the man continued
“grabbing her.” Id. at 1:00–1:05. The caller described the
suspect, reported that his vehicle was a dark green Audi, and
provided the license plate number on the car. Id. at 2:23–3:00.
In response to the 9-1-1 call, Metropolitan Police
Department (MPD) officers were dispatched to investigate “a
call for a kidnapping.” Jaeger Dep. 22:7 (J.A. 334). The
dispatch directed officers to look for “an older white male” who
was “balding,” and indicated that the suspect “grabbed a girl,
threw her over his shoulder, [] threw her into a car, and drove
off.” Id. at 22:8–9 (J.A. 334). The dispatch also provided the
suspect’s license plate number, which matched an address in
MPD’s system. MPD officers went to the site of the incident
4
in Cleveland Park and the address associated with the license
plate.
Upon hearing the dispatch, Lieutenant Patrick Loftus went
to the site of the incident, where he interviewed the 9-1-1 caller.
The witness confirmed the description of the incident she had
provided during the call, explaining that the other bystander on
the scene had “intentionally blocked” Fishman with his car
because “he could tell” that the interaction between Fishman
and the young girl “was not normal.” Ex. 1 (Loftus BWC
Footage at 36th Street) at 19:43:45–19:43:48. While
recounting the incident, the witness told Lieutenant Loftus that
“if it wasn’t abduction, it was child abuse.” Id. at 19:44:01–
19:44:03.
Around the same time, Officer Marck Jaeger heard the
radio dispatch and went to the address linked to the Audi,
which was Fishman’s residence. The vehicle, which matched
the dispatcher’s description, was parked outside. Fishman was
sitting on his front steps.
Officer Jaeger approached Fishman and asked whether
Fishman drove the vehicle. Fishman said that he did and had
just returned home. He added, unprompted, that “that guy who
called in has no idea what’s going on.” Ex. 2 (Jaeger BWC
Footage) at 19:40:25–19:40:28. When Officer Jaeger
responded that Fishman could help him understand “what’s
going on,” Fishman stood up, told Officer Jaeger to “hold on a
sec,” and began opening the front door to his house. Id. at
19:40:30. Despite Officer Jaeger’s repeated directive, “don’t
go inside,” Fishman took steps into his home. Id. at 19:40:33–
19:40:36. Officer Jaeger followed Fishman and pulled him
outside. As Fishman began to scream, other officers—
Christopher Todaro, Jeremy Brady, and Michael Tong—
arrived and helped Officer Jaeger put Fishman in handcuffs.
5
Presumably hearing the commotion, Fishman’s daughters
came to the doorway from inside the house. The older
daughter, A.M.-F., said that her sister had been misbehaving,
while J.M.-F. screamed and cried.
Once handcuffed, Fishman did not resist the officers,
who—over his objection—moved him around the corner from
his house and out of his family’s view. Officer Tong
questioned Fishman there. Fishman gave his biographical
information but repeatedly asked why he was being detained
and whether he needed a lawyer, questions Officer Tong did
not answer. Fishman then gave an account consistent with the
9-1-1 call in key respects, explaining that he had gone to lunch
with his two children, during which his youngest daughter
fought with her older sister. Fishman said that J.M.-F. had
declined to get into the car and, after twenty minutes of trying
to get her into the car, he “picked her up” and “put her in the
car.” Ex. 3 (Tong BWC Footage) at 19:46:23–19:46:25,
19:46:37–19:46:42. Officer Tong later relayed Fishman’s
account to the other officers.
While Officer Tong was with Fishman around the corner,
Officers Todaro and Brady attempted to question Fishman’s
wife Fiona Macaulay and their two daughters. Officer Todaro
first spoke with Macaulay and the two girls on the steps of the
home. J.M.-F. cried and pleaded that her father be brought
back, insisting that he had done nothing wrong. A.M.-F. tried
to explain to Officer Todaro that Fishman had not abducted
J.M.-F., and repeated that, because J.M.-F. had been
misbehaving and refused to get into the car, Fishman “had to
put her over his shoulder and bring her into the car.” Ex. 5
(Brady BWC Footage) at 14:41:50–14:41:59.
Officer Brady explained that they needed to “talk to
everybody individually.” Id. at 14:43:09–14:43:13. When
6
J.M.-F. continued crying, Macaulay brought her inside and
soon asked A.M.-F. to come inside as well. After moving both
daughters inside, Macaulay returned to the doorway and spoke
with Officer Brady. Macaulay confirmed that Fishman was her
husband and the father of both girls. When Officer Brady
asked to speak directly with J.M.-F., Macaulay responded
“absolutely not.” Id. at 14:56:13–14:56:17. She continued to
resist Officer Brady’s request to speak with J.M.-F., but later
relented after he explained that refusing to answer questions
“may delay everything” and that the officers were “trying to
get this over as fast as [they could].” Id. at 14:57:54–14:57:56,
14:58:03–14:58:06.
About twenty-two minutes into the investigation, Officer
Brady spoke directly with J.M.-F., who explained that she had
been in a “tiny fight” with her father but that “he didn’t hurt”
her. Id. at 15:02:28–15:02:33, 15:02:47–15:02:48. After
recounting that she had fought with her sister and run away
from her father’s car, J.M.-F. explained that Fishman “had to
lift [her] up” to put her into the car. Id. at 15:04:30–15:04:36.
In response to Officer Brady’s questions about the way in
which Fishman had picked her up, J.M.-F. confirmed that it
was “an easy pick up” and reiterated that she was unhurt. Id.
at 15:04:45–15:05:14.
As the officers spoke with Macaulay and the two girls,
Fishman continued to be held at the end of the block. During
this period, Sergeant Adam Bray and Lieutenant Loftus
separately arrived at the scene and were briefed on the
investigation. Sergeant Bray, unaware that Officer Brady had
begun questioning J.M.-F., explained to Fishman that it was
important to speak with J.M.-F. in light of the report that a man
had “grabbed a kid” and “threw the kid . . . into the car.” Ex. 4
(Bray BWC Footage) at 20:04:00–20:04:16; Am. Compl. ¶ 150
(J.A. 41). Sergeant Bray further explained that Fishman’s
7
refusal to speak with officers when they arrived “start[ed]
raising flags” and that they had to “make sure the kid is okay.”
Bray BWC Footage at 20:04:23–20:04:30. Fishman recounted
his side of the story again, and Sergeant Bray ordered that
Fishman be released from handcuffs.
The officers escorted Fishman back toward his house and
shared with one another the information they had learned.
After confirming that Officer Brady had seen both daughters
and that they had no visible injuries, Lieutenant Loftus
concluded the investigation and directed the officers to prepare
a report and notify the Child and Family Services Agency and
MPD’s Youth Division. In total, Fishman was detained for
approximately twenty-five minutes.
B.
In July 2021, Fishman filed this suit against the District of
Columbia and five MPD officers: Lieutenant Loftus and
Officers Jaeger, Brady, Tong, and Todaro. On February 2,
2023, the district court dismissed all of Fishman’s claims other
than those alleging that (i) the officers prolonged their
detention of Fishman after reasonable suspicion dissipated in
violation of the Fourth Amendment; (ii) the officers arrested
Fishman without probable cause in violation of the Fourth
Amendment; and (iii) the officers committed the common-law
tort of false imprisonment.
After discovery, Fishman moved for partial summary
judgment against Officer Todaro, and the defendants cross-
moved for summary judgment, contending that the officers
were entitled to qualified immunity. On March 12, 2025, the
district court granted Fishman’s motion and denied the
defendants’.
8
Although the defendants had contended that Fishman’s
detention was justified by reasonable suspicion of both
kidnapping and child abuse, the district court confined its
analysis to kidnapping. The court held that the officers lacked
reasonable suspicion to detain Fishman for the full duration of
the stop because any suspicion of kidnapping dissipated once
officers learned Fishman was the girls’ father. As for its
decision to grant summary judgment to Fishman against
Officer Todaro, the court relied on Officer Todaro’s deposition
testimony that he came to believe Fishman and Macaulay were
J.M.-F.’s parents within the first few minutes of the
investigation, which meant that Fishman could not be guilty of
kidnapping. Finally, the court concluded that the officers were
not entitled to qualified immunity because, in the court’s view,
precedent clearly established that officers lacked any reason to
hold Fishman in handcuffs for over twenty minutes.
The District and all five officers now appeal the district
court’s denial of qualified immunity to the officers. They may
do so now even though the proceedings in the district court
have not been completed because a denial of qualified
immunity is immediately appealable. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 526–30 (1985).
II.
Qualified immunity shields officers from liability unless a
plaintiff shows both that the officers violated a constitutional
right and that the right was “clearly established” at the time of
the challenged conduct. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615
(1999); Fenwick v. Pudimott, 778 F.3d 133, 137 (D.C. Cir.
2015) (citation omitted). A right counts as clearly established
only if its contours are “sufficiently definite that any reasonable
official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he
was violating it.” Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779
9
(2014); Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); Barham
v. Ramsey, 434 F.3d 565, 572 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In determining
whether a right is clearly established, we ordinarily ask whether
either controlling precedent or “the clearly established weight
of authority from other courts” establishes the parameters of
the right with sufficient specificity that the defendants have
“clear warning of unconstitutional conduct.” Doe v. District of
Columbia, 796 F.3d 96, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (first quoting
Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923 (10th Cir. 2001); then
quoting Merricks v. Adkisson, 785 F.3d 553, 559 (11th Cir.
2015)).
The defendants here contend that they are entitled to
qualified immunity on both of Fishman’s Fourth Amendment
claims. With respect to his prolonged-detention claim, the
defendants maintain that the officers had reasonable suspicion
Fishman had committed a child-abuse-related crime and that
no clearly established law demonstrates the suspicion
dissipated before the stop ended. With respect to Fishman’s
unlawful-arrest claim, the defendants submit that the detention
remained only an investigatory stop and never became an
arrest. We agree with the defendants as to the first claim, and
Fishman has forfeited any argument as to the second.
A.
We first address Fishman’s prolonged-detention claim. A
pre-arrest investigative stop is subject to “the Fourth
Amendment’s general proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
In assessing whether such a “Terry stop” violates the Fourth
Amendment, we ask whether the officer had reasonable
suspicion the suspect had committed a crime. See id. at 21–22;
see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). The
presence of reasonable suspicion turns not on an officer’s
10
subjective motivation but on whether the “historical facts,
viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer, amount to reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Hill,
131 F.3d 1056, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). Reasonable
suspicion must justify both the initiation of the stop and its
scope. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. Once reasonable suspicion
has dissipated, continued detention without consent violates
the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Bey, 911 F.3d 139,
147 (3d Cir. 2018).
In the district court, the defendants raised two theories of
reasonable suspicion: they argued that the officers had
reasonable suspicion both that Fishman had kidnapped the
young girl who turned out to be his daughter and that he had
committed a child-abuse-related offense. In denying summary
judgment to the defendants and granting it in part to Fishman,
the district court concluded only that suspicion of kidnapping
could not justify the twenty-five-minute detention; the court
did not affirmatively address whether there was reasonable
suspicion of child abuse. On appeal, the defendants press only
their child-abuse theory, disclaiming any argument that
suspicion of kidnapping could justify the duration of the stop.
We thus assume the officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity
turns solely on whether reasonable suspicion of a child-abuse-
related crime justified the detention.
1.
Before addressing the merits of the defendants’ qualified-
immunity defense, we first consider—and reject—Fishman’s
argument that the defendants forfeited their ability to rely on a
child-abuse theory by failing to meaningfully develop it in the
district court. In their summary-judgment briefing, the officers
expressly rejected the notion that kidnapping was the only
11
pertinent offense, arguing that “child abuse” was another
“relevant crime” and that the officers began the investigation
in part to “gather information about [] potential . . . child
abuse.” Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Summ. J. 9, 12 (J.A. 305, 308).
They disagreed that their knowledge of Fishman’s parental
relationship with J.M.-F. required ending his detention while
investigating if “a crime had been committed, whether it be
parental kidnapping or child abuse.” Id. at 12 (J.A. 308)
(emphasis added). And they cited D.C. statutes criminalizing
child abuse and cruelty to children in arguing that suspicion of
child abuse justified the detention. Officer Todaro’s separate
opposition to Fishman’s motion for summary judgment against
him likewise noted that D.C. “recognizes child abuse and
neglect . . . and cruelty to children” and cited Department of
Justice guidance cautioning officers not to “rule out the
possibility of child abuse with a domestic dispute complaint.”
J.A. 219–20 & n.1 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Just. Off. of Just.
Programs, Law Enforcement Response to Child Abuse 8
(2001), https://perma.cc/Y3TA-WWQN).
To be sure, the officers predominantly focused their
arguments on reasonable suspicion of kidnapping, not child
abuse. But that choice of emphasis did not forfeit their ability
to now rely—even exclusively—on what had previously been
a distant fallback theory, so long as they sufficiently apprised
the district court of the argument and afforded Fishman a fair
opportunity to respond, which we conclude they did. And the
officers’ shift of focus to suspicion of a child-abuse-related
offense does not rely on facts that were inadequately raised in
the district court. Instead, there is no genuine dispute about the
relevant facts, and they were mostly captured on the officers’
body cameras. In these circumstances, the defendants did not
forfeit their argument that reasonable suspicion of child abuse
justified Fishman’s detention.
12
2.
To overcome qualified immunity, Fishman must show
both that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights and
that those rights were clearly established in the circumstances.
We can bypass the first step if Fishman falls short at the second
step regardless, which we conclude is the case. The question
at the latter step is whether clearly established law
demonstrates that reasonable suspicion of child abuse never
existed or dissipated before the end of Fishman’s detention.
We answer that question no.
D.C. law establishes two relevant child-abuse-related
crimes: second-degree cruelty to children and assault. A
person commits second-degree cruelty to children if he
“intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly . . . [m]altreats a child
or engages in conduct which causes a grave risk of bodily
injury to a child.” D.C. Code § 22-1101(b)(1). The offense
does not require intent to harm the child, only “intent to do the
act that constituted the offense.” Lee v. United States, 831 A.2d
378, 382 (D.C. 2003). It also does not require actual injury—
creating a grave risk of bodily injury suffices. See Coffin v.
United States, 917 A.2d 1089, 1093–94 (D.C. 2007); Jones v.
United States, 67 A.3d 547, 549–50 (D.C. 2013). As for assault
under D.C. law, see D.C. Code § 22-404(a)(1), the offense
encompasses any offensive touching, however minor, and the
defendant need not have a specific intent to injure the victim,
nor need the victim suffer actual injury. See Perez Hernandez
v. United States, 286 A.3d 990, 997–1001 (D.C. 2022) (en
banc).
Here, clearly established law at no point denied the
officers authority to stop and detain Fishman to investigate
those D.C. child-abuse-related offenses. The investigation
began with a radio dispatch describing an incident of suspected
13
“kidnapping” by “an older white male” who “grabbed a girl,
threw her over his shoulder, [] threw her into a car, and drove
off.” Jaeger Dep. 22:7 (J.A. 334). Also, Lieutenant Loftus—
the officer ultimately involved in supervising the scene at
Fishman’s residence—personally interviewed the 9-1-1 caller,
who described the altercation between Fishman and his
daughter as sufficiently concerning that a bystander intervened
to physically block Fishman’s car, and who also told
Lieutenant Loftus that if it “wasn’t abduction, it was child
abuse.” Loftus BWC Footage at 36th Street at 19:44:01–
19:44:03.
Regardless of whether the information Lieutenant Loftus
learned during his in-person interview of the 9-1-1 caller can
be directly attributed to other officers already at the scene of
the detention, their decision to temporarily detain someone
who engaged in behavior characterized by witnesses in the
manner relayed over the radio dispatch is not so manifestly
unreasonable as to contravene clearly established law. The
dispatch’s description is consistent with the kind of conduct
that could involve “grave risk of bodily injury to a child,” D.C.
Code § 22-1101(b)(1), and offensive touching, see Perez
Hernandez, 286 A.3d at 997–1001—the sort of conduct
officers could reasonably want to investigate.
Additionally, Fishman’s reaction to Officer Jaeger’s
arrival at his home, as Sergeant Bray later put it, “start[ed]
raising flags.” Bray BWC Footage at 20:04:23–20:04:40.
Before being informed of the purpose of Officer Jaeger’s visit,
Fishman demonstrated knowledge that someone had “called
in” a police report about his behavior. Jaeger BWC Footage at
19:40:25. And rather than cooperate with answering Officer
Jaeger’s questions, Fishman disobeyed multiple requests from
Officer Jaeger to remain outside and attempted to retreat inside
his home, where the potential victim may have been. Faced
14
with an uncooperative individual matching the description of
someone who may have engaged in child-abuse offenses, the
officers at Fishman’s Georgetown residence reasonably
decided to detain him so they could investigate.
Given that the officers’ initiation of the Terry stop was not
manifestly unreasonable, the question is whether either the
manner or duration of the stop violated clearly established
Fourth Amendment law. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20, 28–30.
We have no occasion to consider any potential objections to the
manner of the stop: Fishman does not argue that the officers’
decision to restrain him with handcuffs around the corner from
his home—after he attempted to retreat into the house and
began screaming at them—was unreasonable under clearly
established Fourth Amendment law. As for the duration of the
stop, it did not infringe clearly established Fourth Amendment
principles.
Nothing that transpired over the course of Fishman’s
detention clearly dispelled the officers’ suspicion that he may
have committed a child-abuse-related offense. Rather, the
statements by A.M.-F. and Fishman himself to the
investigating officers corroborated in substance the 9-1-1
caller’s description of the incident. Fishman’s own account to
Officer Tong confirmed that he had physically picked up J.M.-
F.—over her protests and after a standoff—and put her into his
car. A.M.-F.’s contemporaneous account to Officer Todaro,
while exculpatory in her own estimation, described Fishman as
“frustrated” and “angry” and explained that he “put [J.M.-F.]
over his shoulder and br[ought] her into the car.” Brady BWC
Footage at 14:41:50–14:41:59, 14:46:19–14:46:28. That
A.M.-F. told the officers her father “did nothing wrong” did not
itself cause reasonable suspicion to dissipate: police officers
of course need not immediately accept at face value a child’s
defense of her parent.
15
The officers also repeatedly explained their need to speak
with everyone—including J.M.-F.—before they could
conclude the investigation. Officer Brady, Sergeant Bray, and
Lieutenant Loftus each independently, and reasonably,
believed they should speak with J.M.-F. and confirm she was
unharmed before ending the stop. And, for the first twenty-two
minutes after restraining Fishman, the officers attempted to do
just that. Macaulay, though, initially declined to allow Officer
Brady to speak with J.M.-F. Officer Brady attempted to
explain that the officers were “trying to get this over as fast as
[they could]” and that their inability to confirm directly that
J.M.-F. was unhurt “may delay everything.” Id. at 14:57:54–
14:57:56, 14:58:03–14:58:06. After Macaulay allowed Officer
Brady to speak with J.M.-F., the officers’ actions confirm that
the duration of Fishman’s detention stemmed from their desire
to evaluate the possibly abused child. Shortly after Officer
Brady was able to speak with J.M.-F., the stop ended and
Fishman was released.
For qualified-immunity purposes, the question is whether
the officers’ actions were so manifestly unreasonable as to
violate clearly established Fourth Amendment principles. In
light of the reasons to suspect Fishman may have committed a
child-abuse-related crime, his initial behavior at the scene, and
the relevance of J.M.-F.’s condition and account to the
investigation, the officers’ actions did not fall so far outside the
bounds of reasonableness as to defeat their assertion of
qualified immunity, which is all we need to determine.
There is no “controlling authority” or “a robust consensus
of cases of persuasive authority” indicating otherwise. District
of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (quoting al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741–42) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context
16
of the case, not as a broad general proposition,” Rivas-Villegas
v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (per curiam) (citation
omitted), and asks whether the relevant authority is “clear
enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to
establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply,” Wesby,
583 U.S. at 63. Fishman identifies no authority placing
“beyond debate,” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741, the
unconstitutionality of his detention. The absence of such
authority takes on added significance in light of the fact-bound
judgment call the officers faced: how urgently to treat an
eyewitness’s report that a small child had been forcibly thrown
into a car; how much weight to give reassurances from family
members with a potential interest in minimizing the incident;
and how important it is to wait to hear from the child herself.
We thus conclude that the officers are entitled to qualified
immunity.
B.
Fishman brought an alternate claim under the Fourth
Amendment: that his detention became an unlawful arrest
without probable cause. On appeal, the defendants argued in
their opening brief that Fishman’s detention did not cross the
line from a Terry stop into an arrest because the officers
diligently pursued their suspicions and reasonably restrained
Fishman during the investigation. Fishman did not address the
issue in his response brief, forfeiting any argument that an
arrest occurred. See Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 949 (D.C.
Cir. 2008). And absent an arrest in the first place, there can be
no arrest without probable cause, so Fishman’s alternate Fourth
Amendment claim cannot afford a basis to deny the officers
qualified immunity.
17
C.
Finally, Fishman and the defendants advance arguments
about Fishman’s common-law false-imprisonment claim. We
may exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review that D.C.
law claim only if it is “inextricably intertwined” with an
appealable qualified-immunity ruling or if review is necessary
to ensure meaningful review of the immunity decision. In re
Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 215 F.3d 26, 31 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (citation omitted). Fishman’s false-imprisonment claim
turns on distinct factual inquiries that are not inextricably
intertwined with the qualified-immunity question presented in
this appeal. We thus decline to exercise jurisdiction over the
claim, though we note that Fishman has conceded in his
briefing that the district court’s grant of summary judgment
against Officer Todaro on the D.C. law claim should be
reversed.
* * * * *
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s
grant of partial summary judgment against Officer Todaro and
remand for the court to enter summary judgment in favor of the
officers on Fishman’s Fourth Amendment claims and to
consider the false-imprisonment claim.
So ordered.