The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
DUSTIN ROBERT JONES, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 1:24CV450
)
THE CITY OF GREENSBORO and )
GREENSBORO FIRE DEPARTMENT, )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.
This is an action by Plaintiff Dustin Robert Jones against
his former employer, Defendant the City of Greensboro (the “City”),
asserting several claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the North Carolina
Constitution, and North Carolina state law. (Doc. 11.) Before
the court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment
(Docs. 45, 46), as well as the City’s motion to seal (Doc. 71). A
hearing was held on the motions on July 20, 2026. For the reasons
set forth below, the City’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 46)
will be granted; Jones’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 45)
will be denied; and the City’s motion to seal (Doc. 71) will be
granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The court sets out the facts in the light most favorable to
the non-moving parties in the cross-motions for summary judgment.
See Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C., 630 F.3d 351, 354
(4th Cir. 2011) (“When cross-motions for summary judgment are
before a court, the court examines each motion separately,
employing the familiar standard under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.”).
A. Factual Background
Jones is a U.S. Navy veteran who served as a firefighter with
the Greensboro Fire Department (“GFD”) for more than 16 years,
achieving the rank of captain. (Doc. 11 ¶¶ 5-6.) The GFD is a
paramilitary organization with approximately 27 fire stations and
600 members, around 120 of whom are captains. (Doc. 59-2 at 4,
11, 15.) Captains represent the “middle management” of the GFD.
(Id. at 10.) Thus, their responsibilities require that they lead,
supervise, and discipline their crews, manage their fire stations,
and foster public relations and community engagement. (Doc. 59-6
¶ 4.)
In 2021, Jones began a series of posts on his Facebook page
that resulted in attempts at corrective action by his leadership
and, ultimately, his termination. First, in March 2021, Jones
responded to a structure fire at a private residence with hoarding
conditions. (Doc. 59-8 at 2; Doc. 60-24 at 39-40.) He posted a
photograph of the interior of the private residence and noted,
“Just an example of some of our ‘working
conditions’ . . . . . from our job last night.” (See Doc. 68-5.)
This post violated GFD social media policy because it constituted
the unauthorized disclosure of the interior of a citizen’s private
residence. (See Doc. 59-8 at 2; Doc. 59-9 at 4.) Jones received
a coaching session on March 10, 2021 for the inappropriate use of
social media, and he apologetically removed the post. (Doc. 59-8
at 3.)
In November 2022, Jones reposted a Facebook video of Guilford
County Sheriff Danny Rogers dancing at the North Carolina A&T State
University homecoming parade, on which Jones commented, “This is
the clown in charge of keeping you safe. Freaking Joke.” (See
Doc. 59-11.) The original poster had previously commented, “When
yo[ur] Sherrif [sic] is black.” (Id.) Then, on another repost of
the same video, Jones added the comment, “I can’t reply. I might
get my hand smacked.” (Doc. 59-10 at 3.) This comment was in
response to another person who questioned whether Sheriff Rogers
was “pandering to” North Carolina A&T State University and “showing
preferential support” for its students and alumni.1 (Id.) Sheriff
Rogers was up for reelection at the time. (Doc. 11 at 23.)
City personnel became aware of these posts involving Sheriff
Rogers from a citizen’s report (see Doc. 59-10 at 8-9), and GFD
Deputy Chief Dwayne Church met with Jones, along with Maria Hicks-
1 North Carolina A&T State University is a historically black university.
About N.C. A&T, N.C. Agric. & Tech. State Univ., https://ncat.edu/
about/index.php (last visited Aug. 10, 2026).
Few from the City’s human resources department, on November 18,
2022 (Doc. 65-1 at 1; Doc. 65-30 at 27). Jones received counseling
at this meeting that his post describing Sheriff Rogers as a clown
could be perceived as racist. (Doc. 65-30 at 29.) At the direction
of Deputy Chief Church and Hicks-Few, Jones removed the post and
reviewed a copy of the GFD’s social media directive. (Id. at 27-
28.)
In February 2023, following the killing of Tyre Nichols by
Memphis police, Jones shared the headline of a related FOX8 WGHP
news article and commented, “will we see another George Floyd
reaction? Will city’s [sic] burn??? ALL LIVES MATTER.”2 (See
Doc. 59-13.) This time, GFD Chief Jim Robinson met with Jones.
(Doc. 65-1 at 1.) Chief Robinson explained that the reports of
Jones’s postings were making their way to him as chief, told Jones
that he thought he “had a target on his back,” and cautioned Jones
to “just be careful” as the chief “had a lot invested in [Jones].”
(Doc. 65-31 at 16.) Chief Robinson told Jones that his posts were
“borderline,” and the chief’s handwritten notes from the date of
the meeting indicate that he told Jones that the post had been
“just within policy,” based on guidance he received from legal
counsel. (Doc. 60-14 at 2.) Moreover, Chief Robinson’s notes
indicate that he “ask[ed] [Jones] to stop with the post[s] that
2 Nichols was a 29-year-old African American man fatally beaten by African
American officers of the Memphis Police Department.
could be viewed as offensive.” (Id.) Jones understood from this
meeting that his “employment could be threatened” if he continued
to share “political speech” on social media. (Doc. 59-1 at 12-
13.) Shortly thereafter, Jones posted, “To those watching
me . . . . . . keep watching . . . .” (See Doc. 59-17.) Jones
also posted a screenshot from Wikipedia around the same time, which
read in part: “Freedom of speech is a principle that supports the
freedom of an individual or community to articulate their opinions
and ideas without fear of retaliation, censorship, or legal
sanction.” (See Doc. 65-9.)
Over the next several months, Jones continued posting
controversial material to his Facebook page. These posts included
the following:
•
A photograph of a keychain stating, “IF I’VE EVER OFFENDED
YOU, I’M SORRY . . . THAT YOU’RE A LITTLE BITCH,” with
Jones adding, “[‘]Bout right . . . . .” (Doc. 59-18 at 6
(first and third alterations in original).)
•
“Straight Pride. it’s Natural, it’s Worked for Thousands
of years, and you Can Make Babies.” (Id. at 5.)
•
“IF THIS IS A WOMAN,” (superimposed on a photograph of
Rachel Levine, United States Assistant Secretary for Health
during the COVID-19 pandemic) “THIS IS A FISHING POLE”
(superimposed on a photograph of an assault rifle). (Id.
at 4.)
•
“You know what’s insane . . . . A white person can paint
their [sic] face black and be accused of being a racist.
Yet a man can dress as a woman and be called a
hero . . . . . .”; this post, dated April 25, 2023, was
accompanied by a definition of blackface from Wikipedia.
(Id. at 3 (alterations in original).)
•
“I identify as invisible. I’m TRANSparent . . . . . My
pronouns are who/where?” This post was also made on April
25, 2023. (Id. at 2 (alterations in original).)
Members of the GFD knew of and discussed Jones’s posts. (Doc. 59-
15 ¶ 4; Doc. 59-16 ¶ 4.) Moreover, at least some members of the
GFD knew that Jones had been coached by GFD leadership to stop
this type of posting on social media. (Doc. 59-15 ¶ 4; Doc. 59-6
¶ 11.)
On May 12, 2023, Chief Robinson and Deputy Chief Church met
with Jones and terminated his employment. (Doc. 59-2 at 18-19;
see Doc. 65-1 at 1-2.) The termination letter, presented to Jones
during the meeting, noted that his “posts ha[d] become increasingly
offensive and discriminatory” and that Chief Robinson had
determined his conduct “to be egregious to the point that it
erode[d] public trust and negatively impact[ed] or interfere[d]
with the day to day operations of the Fire Department.” (Doc. 65-
1 at 2.) Chief Robinson attests that he had never terminated
another firefighter for his or her social media posts. (Doc. 68-
31 at 11.)
Jones appealed to Taiwo Jaiyeoba, Greensboro City Manager.
(See Doc. 65-2.) City Manager Jaiyeoba affirmed Chief Robinson’s
decision on May 26, 2023, finding Jones’s dismissal appropriate
because his “misuse of social media and disrespectful treatment of
others continued despite repeated coaching sessions and
opportunities to improve.” (Doc. 65-3 at 1.) He further noted
that “[t]he net effect” of Jones’s posts was “to dehumanize,
delegitimize, disparage and disrespect those who are different
from [Jones].” (Id. at 3.) According to City Manager Jaiyeoba,
the City “simply cannot tolerate this type of behavior from a
leader of this organization.” (Id.)
After his termination, Jones received text messages of
support from several GFD firefighters. (See Doc. 65-19 at 3-6;
Doc. 65-20 at 3-4; Doc. 65-23 at 3.) Moreover, on June 6, 2023,
several firefighters and members of the public addressed Jones’s
termination at the Greensboro City Council’s bimonthly meeting.
Meeting Agenda City Council, City of Greensboro, https://pub-
greensboro-nc.escribemeetings.com/Meeting.aspx?Id=91d17686-0485-
46f7-9224-0872d227a951&Agenda=Agenda&lang=English (last visited
Aug. 10, 2026).3 Thirteen citizens noted their support for Jones’s
termination, while four spoke in opposition. (Id.) Those citizens
3 The City cites to this meeting in its brief in support of its motion
for summary judgment. (See Doc. 59 at 12.)
who supported his termination largely focused on Jones’s social
media activity. (Id.)
B. Procedural Background
On May 9, 2024, Jones filed this lawsuit in North Carolina
state court. (Doc. 4.) Defendants timely removed the case to
this court (Doc. 1), and Jones filed an amended complaint pursuant
to Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc.
11). Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (Doc. 12), which the court
granted in part and denied in part (Doc. 21). Specifically, the
court dismissed the GFD as a party and dismissed Jones’s claims
for violation of North Carolina General Statute § 160A-169, breach
of contract, and punitive damages. (Doc. 21 at 29-30.) Thus,
only Jones’s claims against the City for First Amendment
retaliation, violation of the North Carolina Constitution, and
wrongful termination remain. (Id.)
Following discovery, the parties brought the present motions.
First, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on
Jones’s claims for First Amendment retaliation (First Cause of
Action) and violation of the North Carolina Constitution (Second
Cause of Action). (Docs. 45, 46.) Second, the City moves for
summary judgment on Jones’s wrongful termination claim (Fourth
Cause of Action).4 (Doc. 46.) Each party also filed respective
responses in opposition (Docs. 60, 66 (redacted); Docs. 63, 69
(sealed)), and replies (Docs. 61, 67 (redacted); Docs. 64, 70
(sealed)).
Pursuant to Local Rule 5.4(c) and the court’s Order on the
parties’ Joint Motion for Entry of Amended L.R. 5.5 Order (Doc.
48), the City also filed a motion to seal certain personnel records
of current or former GFD employees other than Jones, along with
information derived from these records and “otherwise sensitive
personal information.” (Doc. 71 at 2.) Jones filed a response in
opposition to some portions of the City’s motion to seal (Doc.
72), and the City replied (Doc. 73).
All pending motions are fully briefed and ready for decision.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
1. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact exists ‘if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
4 Neither Jones’s response in opposition to the City’s motion for summary
judgment nor his brief in support of his own motion for summary judgment
addresses his wrongful termination claim. (See generally Docs. 60, 65
(redacted); Docs. 63, 68 (sealed).)
nonmoving party.’” Basnight v. Diamond Devs., Inc., 146 F. Supp.
2d 754, 760 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). In determining a motion for
summary judgment, the “court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, according that party the benefit
of all reasonable inferences.” Id. Summary judgment should be
denied “unless the entire record shows a right to judgment with
such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and establishes
affirmatively that the adverse party cannot prevail under any
circumstances.” Guessford v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 983 F.
Supp. 2d 652, 659 (M.D.N.C. 2013) (quoting Campbell v. Hewitt,
Coleman & Assocs., Inc., 21 F.3d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1994)).
While the movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating
the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, once that burden
has been met, the non-moving party must demonstrate the existence
of a genuine dispute of material fact. Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens
Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87
(1986). A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to circumvent
summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Dash v. Mayweather,
731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he nonmoving party must
rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the
building of one inference upon another, or the mere existence of
a scintilla of evidence.”); see also Felty v. Graves-Humphreys
Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that there is an
affirmative duty for “the trial judge to prevent ‘factually
unsupported claims and defenses’ from proceeding to trial”
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986))).
Instead, the nonmoving party must convince the court that, upon
the record taken as a whole, the rational trier of fact could find
for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. Trial is
unnecessary only if “the facts are undisputed, or if disputed, the
dispute is of no consequence to the dispositive question.”
Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (4th Cir. 1993).
The standard of review on cross-motions for summary judgment
does not differ from the standard applied when only one party files
a motion. See Desmond, 630 F.3d at 354. Thus, the court must
“consider ‘each motion separately on its own merits to determine
whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of
law.’” Bacon v. City of Richmond, 475 F.3d 633, 638 (4th Cir.
2007) (quoting Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir.
2003)). “When considering each individual motion, the court must
take care to ‘resolve all factual disputes and any competing,
rational inferences in the light most favorable’ to the party
opposing that motion.” Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 523 (quoting
Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st
Cir. 1996)).
2. Wrongful Termination Claim
The City argues that governmental immunity bars Jones’s
wrongful termination claim. (Doc. 59 at 14.) As noted, neither
Jones’s response in opposition nor his own motion for summary
judgment addresses the wrongful termination claim. (See generally
Docs. 60, 65.)
Governmental immunity “shields ‘units of local government
from suit for acts committed in their governmental capacity.’”
Est. of Graham v. Lambert, 898 S.E.2d 888, 895 (N.C. 2024) (quoting
Providence Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Town of Weddington, 876
S.E.2d 453, 462 (N.C. 2022)). North Carolina courts have
repeatedly held that the termination of a public employee
constitutes a governmental function. Oleyar v. County of Durham,
336 F. Supp. 2d 512, 520 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (first citing Phillips v.
Gray, 592 S.E.2d 229, 232 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004); and then citing
Paquette v. County of Durham, 573 S.E.2d 715, 717 (N.C. Ct. App.
2002)). A governmental entity “may, however, waive such immunity
through the purchase of liability insurance.” Dawes v. Nash
County, 584 S.E.2d 760, 763 (N.C. 2003) (quoting Doe v. Jenkins,
547 S.E.2d 124, 126 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001)).
Here, Jones has produced no evidence that the City has waived
governmental immunity. By contrast, the City has produced an
affidavit from Teresa Johnston, the Executive Director of the
Guilford City/County Insurance Advisory Committee, to demonstrate
that the City has not purchased liability insurance to cover
Jones’s wrongful termination claim. (See Doc. 59-22 ¶¶ 2-3.) Nor
does the City participate in a local government risk pool. (Id.
¶ 7.) Thus, no dispute exists as to whether governmental immunity
bars Jones’s wrongful termination claim against the City, and the
court will grant the City’s motion for summary judgment on this
claim.
3. First Amendment Retaliation Claim
“The First Amendment ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.’” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
145 (1983) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957)). Public employees do “not relinquish First Amendment
rights to comment on matters of public interest by virtue of
government employment,” id. at 140, and the court must “ensure
that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of
working for the government,” id. at 147. “That being said,
precedent makes clear that courts must also consider ‘the
government’s countervailing interest in controlling the operation
of its workplaces.’” Hunter v. Town of Mocksville, 789 F.3d 389,
396 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 236
(2014)). Thus, a public employee “by necessity must accept certain
limitations on his or her freedom.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
U.S. 410, 418 (2006). To maintain a claim pursuant to the First
Amendment for retaliatory discharge, the plaintiff must satisfy a
three-prong test:
(1) that he was a “public employee . . . speaking as a
citizen upon a matter of public concern [rather than] as
an employee about a matter of personal interest;” (2)
that his “interest in speaking upon the matter of public
concern outweighed the government’s interest in
providing effective and efficient services to the
public;” and (3) that his “speech was a substantial
factor in the employer’s termination decision.”
Grutzmacher v. Howard County, 851 F.3d 332, 342 (4th Cir. 2017)
(alterations in original) (quoting McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271,
277-78 (4th Cir. 1998)).
The parties agree that Jones’s claim brought pursuant to the
North Carolina Constitution rises or falls with his First Amendment
retaliation claim. (See Doc. 21 at 28 n.8.) Moreover, in this
court’s previous ruling, it found that several of Jones’s posts
implicated matters of public concern. (Id. at 11.) Accordingly,
the court now turns to whether Jones’s interest in speaking on
matters of public concern outweighed the City’s interest in
providing effective and efficient services to the public. See
McVey, 157 F.3d at 277; see also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp.
High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (“The problem in any
case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [public
employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.”).
In support of its motion for summary judgment, the City
contends that Jones’s posts created potential and actual
disruption both within the GFD and between the GFD and the
community. (Doc. 59 at 19, 21-28.) The City also asserts that
Jones’s conduct amounted to insubordination, damaging Jones’s
ability to enforce GFD policies and threatening the paramilitary
hierarchy of the GFD. (Id. at 19-20, 28-31.)
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Jones argues
that the City failed to consider his First Amendment rights when
it terminated his employment. (Doc. 65 at 22-23.) He further
asserts that his commentary on matters of public concern drew on
particular knowledge he possessed as an experienced firefighter.
For example, he points to his frequent interaction with the
Guilford County Sheriff’s Office, which he contends made him
“specially situated” to evaluate Sheriff Rogers’s ability to keep
the public safe. (Id. at 24.) He also highlights his experience
addressing fires caused by hoarding and rioting, in reference to
his posts depicting a private residence and the news article on
the Tyre Nichols killing. (Id.) Finally, he argues that the City
falsely assumed his insubordination “to craft a narrative” of
defiance, and he references several statements and text messages
from firefighters who opposed his termination. (Id. at 24-25.)
The Pickering/McVey “balancing test is a ‘particularized’
inquiry.” Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 348 (quoting Goldstein v.
Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 356 (4th Cir.
2000)). In balancing Jones’s First Amendment interest against the
City’s interests, the court must “consider the context in which
the speech was made, including the employee’s role and the extent
to which the speech impairs the efficiency of the workplace.”
Smith v. Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2014).
Factors relevant to this inquiry include whether a
public employee’s speech (1) impaired the maintenance of
discipline by supervisors; (2) impaired harmony among
coworkers; (3) damaged close personal relationships; (4)
impeded the performance of the public employee’s duties;
(5) interfered with the operation of the institution;
(6) undermined the mission of the institution; (7) was
communicated to the public or to coworkers in private;
(8) conflicted with the responsibilities of the employee
within the institution; and (9) abused the authority and
public accountability that the employee’s role entailed.
Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 317 (4th
Cir. 2006). Further, “in this balancing test, ‘the government
bears the burden of justifying the discharge on legitimate
grounds.’” Lawson v. Union Cnty. Clerk of Ct., 828 F.3d 239, 252
(4th Cir. 2016) (citation modified) (quoting Gilchrist, 749 F.3d
at 309). However, “to demonstrate that an employee’s speech
impaired efficiency, a government employer need not ‘prove that
the employee’s speech actually disrupted efficiency, but only that
an adverse effect was reasonably to be apprehended.’” Grutzmacher,
851 F.3d at 348 (citation modified) (quoting Maciariello v. Sumner,
973 F. 2d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 1992)). “Whether the employee’s
interest in speaking outweighs the government’s interest is a
question of law for the court.” Gilchrist, 749 F.3d at 309.
“‘[F]ire companies have a strong interest in the promotion of
camaraderie and efficiency’ as well as ‘internal harmony [and]
trust.’” Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 345 (alterations in original)
(quoting Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 355). Courts thus “accord
‘substantial weight’ to a fire department’s interest in limiting
dissension and discord.” Id. (quoting Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 355).
Nevertheless, as the Fourth Circuit has cautioned, “a fire
department’s interest in maintaining efficiency will not always
outweigh the interests of an employee in speaking on matters of
public concern.” Id. at 348. “A social media platform amplifies
the distribution of the speaker’s message – which favors the
employee’s free speech interests – but also increases the
potential, in some cases exponentially, for departmental
disruption, thereby favoring the employer’s interest in
efficiency.” Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 407
(4th Cir. 2016).
As the City contends, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Grutzmacher guides this case.
(Doc. 59 at 33-34; Doc. 61 at 13-15.) In Grutzmacher, a county
fire department fired a battalion chief after he posted to his
Facebook page, “My aide had an outstanding idea . . lets [sic] all
kill someone with a liberal . . . then maybe we can get them
outlawed too! Think of the satisfaction of beating a liberal to
death with another liberal . . . its [sic] almost poetic . . . ,”
and he “liked” another firefighter’s comment, “But . . . . was it
an ‘assault liberal’? Gotta pick a fat one, those are the ‘high
capacity’ ones. Oh . . . pick a black one, those are more ‘scary.’
Sorry had to perfect on a cool idea!” Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at
338 (alterations in original). Moreover, after his initial
disciplining by the department, the battalion chief “liked”
another Facebook post depicting an elderly woman raising her middle
figure with the caption, “THIS PAGE, YEAH THE ONE YOU’RE LOOKING
AT IT’S MINE[.] I’LL POST WHATEVER THE F*** I WANT.” Id. at 339
(first alteration in original). This post appeared to be directed
at the department leadership, as it stated, “for you Chief.” Id.
The Fourth Circuit concluded that at least some of the
battalion chief’s Facebook activity implicated matters of public
concern. Id. at 344. However, the court held that the fire
department’s interest outweighed the battalion chief’s interest in
speech, and thus it affirmed summary judgment in favor of the fire
department on the battalion chief’s First Amendment retaliation
claim. Id. at 348. Specifically, the court noted that his speech
resulted in numerous difficult conversations between at least one
other battalion chief and lower-level employees, in addition to
one African American employee’s expressed desire not to work for
the battalion chief anymore because of a lack of trust. Id. at
345-46. The court also considered the battalion chief’s managerial
role, his perceived defiance and insubordination, and the lack of
specialized knowledge or legitimate public safety concern
associated with his posts. Id. at 346-48.
Here, like the fire department in Grutzmacher, the City
reasonably perceived Jones’s continued posting as insubordinate.
“A public employee’s interest in speaking on matters of public
concern ‘does not require that a public employer tolerate
associated behavior that it reasonably believed was disruptive and
insubordinate.’” Id. at 347 (citation modified) (quoting Dwyer v.
Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 194 (4th Cir. 1989)). The record demonstrates
that Jones received three coaching sessions in which supervisors
expressed disapproval of his posts. (See, e.g., Docs. 59-8, 59-
12, 59-14.) Though his post regarding Tyre Nichols was “just
within policy,” Chief Robinson cautioned Jones at the third session
to “be careful.”5 (Doc. 59-2 at 28-29.) Chief Robinson’s
handwritten notes from this meeting further indicate that he
“ask[ed] [Jones] to stop with the post[s] that could be viewed as
offensive.” (Doc. 60-14 at 2.) Indeed, Jones himself understood
5 Though Jones’s counsel attempted to distinguish Grutzmacher at the
hearing on the ground that the plaintiff in Grutzmacher received an
explicit warning before his termination (Doc. 78 at 46:7-11), the court’s
opinion only reflects that the assistant fire chief “direct[ed] him to
review his recent Facebook posts and to remove anything inconsistent
with the Department’s social media policy,” Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at
338. Here, in addition to Chief Robinson’s guidance, Deputy Chief Church
previously told Jones to review the GFD’s social media policy. (See
Doc. 65-30 at 27.)
from the coaching sessions with GFD leadership that his “employment
could be threatened” if he continued posting controversial
political speech to his social media. (Doc. 59-1 at 12.) Yet, as
Jones’s counsel conceded at the hearing, his subsequent posts
continued to test the boundary of acceptability within the GFD’s
policy,6 and he crossed the line with, at minimum, the repost
stating: “IF I’VE EVER OFFENDED YOU, I’M SORRY . . . THAT YOU’RE
A LITTLE BITCH.” (Doc. 78 at 34:10-35:8.)
Per Chief Robinson, Jones’s disregard of the coaching he
received “was a known fact among parts of the GFD.” (Doc. 59-6
¶ 11.) Similarly, one battalion chief attested that GFD
firefighters knew of the “coaching” efforts made by GFD leadership
toward Jones and that Jones’s continued posting seemed “defiant”
and intended to “stir the pot.” (Doc. 59-15 ¶ 4.) Multiple
firefighters with supervisory roles in the GFD (who were identified
by Jones as persons with knowledge of GFD’s alleged discrimination)
have also provided declarations agreeing that conduct like Jones’s
“cannot be tolerated” because it “risks significant disruption to
the [GFD’s] effective operations and undermines leadership,
discipline, and public trust.”7 (Doc. 59-25 ¶ 7; Doc. 59-26 ¶ 7;
6 Unlike the plaintiff in Grutzmacher, Jones has not levied any challenge
to the GFD’s social media policy.
7 Jones does not object to this testimony. Whether its admissibility
could be questioned as lay opinion lacking in contemporaneous knowledge,
see United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 155-56 (4th Cir. 2006), need
not be determined, as Defendants have otherwise demonstrated a reasonable
Doc. 59-27 ¶ 7; Doc. 59-28 ¶ 7.)
Jones counters that he received only “equivocal” and
“ambiguous” counseling and “coaching sessions,” rather than “clear
directives,” on his social media behavior. (Doc. 60 at 17-18.)
He also contrasts his termination with other GFD employees who
received less harsh disciplinary measures for their own posts, and
he asserts that the City ignored its own policy favoring
progressive discipline. (Id. at 18.) Finally, he argues that the
City ignores the context of his post, “To those watching
me . . . . . . keep watching . . . . ,” by disregarding his nearly
contemporaneous post on freedom of speech and his testimony that
he did not intend to direct this post at the GFD leadership, but
rather at those individuals who, according to Chief Robinson, had
placed “a target on his back.” (Id. at 18-19.)
Jones’s posts may well represent a form of argumentative
(albeit inflammatory) social commentary based on his legitimately
held beliefs, and he may have intended to direct the “keep
watching” post at the individuals who had placed a “target on his
back.” And to be sure, in Grutzmacher, the post of an elderly
woman raising her middle finger with the comment directed at the
chief that the plaintiff “liked” was more obviously directed at
his department leadership. See Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 339. But
perception of disruption and insubordination in light of the other record
evidence.
critically, the City need only demonstrate that it reasonably
believed Jones’s speech to be insubordinate and disruptive, not
that Jones intended his speech as such. See id. at 347; see also
Morris v. Crow, 117 F.3d 449, 458 n.3 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting, in
the context of the Pickering balancing test, that “the perceived
character of the speech is more relevant than the subjective
intentions that accompany its delivery”).
Jones’s response relies in part on his claims of disparate
treatment compared to other firefighters who posted controversial
material to social media but were not terminated. (Doc. 63 at 15,
18.) For example, he points to one firefighter’s post referencing
“Black Pride” alongside the terms “Natural,” “Dope,” “Educated,”
“Melanin,” and “Classy” (Doc. 63-15 at 1), and a post from a GFD
captain reading, “PSA . . . . . If you want to live . . . walk
towards the police and tell them you are going to kill them. DON’T
WALK AWAY” (Doc. 63-17 at 3). He also highlights several posts
from another firefighter, to include one depicting a “Truly” draft
beer tap handle with the caption, “White gurl [sic]
heaven . . . . truly on tap . . . .” and another of a meme
stating, “My generation had WONDER WOMAN . . . y’all generation is
WONDERING if that’s a WOMAN.” (Doc. 63-16 at 11, 14.) Jones
elsewhere contends that the alleged disparate treatment of other
firefighters amounts to a “double standard” that singled out his
“Christian conservative” views. (Doc. 65 at 18-19.) He does not
identify any case indicating that comparators or disparate
treatment are relevant to the Pickering/McVey balancing test, cf.
L.R. 56.1(d), (e) (requiring parties on summary judgment to cite
supporting authority), and the court is aware of none.
Nevertheless, his counsel asserted at the hearing that the fact
that other firefighters were not terminated for their
controversial social media posts demonstrates that the City favors
certain “types and classes of speech” over others. (Doc. 78 at
48:23-53:6.)
Even if comparators were relevant, the undisputed facts
contradict Jones’s claims of disparate treatment because - unlike
the other firefighters who all received some level of discipline
for their potentially offensive posts (upon GFD’s knowledge of
them) and then stopped posting (see Doc. 62-6 ¶ 13; 63-25 at 11-
12; Doc. 64-1 at 3; Doc. 69-2 ¶¶ 5-8) - Jones’s problematic social
media activity intensified after he met with Chief Robinson.8
Jones’s argument that the City failed to follow its own progressive
discipline policy in terminating his employment is also difficult
to square with the fact that he received three separate coaching
8 Jones’s counsel acknowledged at the hearing that he was “not sure if
those specific employees ever did it again.” (Doc. 78 at 52:1-2.) The
record does not reflect that the alleged comparators made any additional
problematic posts after they were counseled by GFD leadership. In fact,
in the letter upholding Jones’s termination, City Manager Jaiyeoba
referenced the alleged comparators and noted that “those employees
received coaching and actually changed their behavior.” (Doc. 65-3 at
3.)
sessions from March 2021 to February 2023 regarding his social
media posts.9 Moreover, his post on freedom of speech does not
materially detract from the City’s perception of his posting as
disruptive and insubordinate. The City therefore reasonably
apprehended that its toleration of Jones’s posts would “impair[]
the maintenance of discipline” at the GFD. See Ridpath, 447 F.3d
at 317.
Further, the City’s evidence of the reasonable apprehension
of disruption extends beyond its perception of Jones’s conduct as
insubordinate. To begin, the City has demonstrated that Jones’s
Facebook activity created some disruption within the GFD itself.
One battalion chief, for example, “observed that Jones’s social
media activity was creating difficult conversations and disruption
within certain parts of the daily GFD environment.”10 (Doc. 59-15
¶ 5.) An African American firefighter who worked for the GFD at
the time of Jones’s termination also attested that Jones’s posts
generated “considerable discussion” among the GFD and that his
posts led her to “fear that [she] could not trust him as [her]
9 Jones does not elaborate on or cite to the City’s alleged progressive
disciplinary policy. (See Doc. 63 at 15, 18.)
10 To the extent Jones objects to the consideration of these conversations
on hearsay grounds, the battalion chief has not provided any “out-of-
court statements offered ‘to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’”
See Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 785 (2024) (quoting Anderson v.
United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219 (1974)). Thus, the court may rely on
the battalion chief’s testimony regarding the conversations “to
illustrate the disruptive effect of Plaintiff’s speech.” See
Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 346 n.5.
commanding officer and fellow firefighter.”11 (Doc. 59-16 ¶¶ 4-
5.)
Jones’s response that some firefighters opposed his
termination and that the City’s evidence relies on declarations
from supervisors rather than line-level firefighters does not
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the City
reasonably anticipated disruption in the GFD. And, while Jones
speculates that there may have been some who sought to discredit
him for his views, as his counsel conceded at argument the record
provides no evidence that any declarant or other GFD personnel
claiming disruption or otherwise favoring Jones’s termination
harbored any personal animosity toward him. (Doc. 78 at 71:1-7.)
The court therefore accords “substantial weight” to the City’s
interest in preventing Jones from impairing harmony among
coworkers at the GFD. See Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 346 (lending
substantial weight to the fire department’s interest in workplace
harmony in part because one African American firefighter stated,
“I don’t want to work for [Plaintiff] anymore. I don’t trust him.”
11 At the hearing, Jones’s counsel distinguished Grutzmacher on the
grounds that the African American firefighter there had voiced
contemporaneous concerns over his or her ability to work with the
plaintiff, whereas the evidence here only demonstrates similar concerns
shared after Jones’s termination. (Doc. 78 at 53:13-54:15.) To be sure,
contemporaneous concerns would provide stronger evidence of actual
internal disruption. However, the City need only provide evidence of a
reasonable apprehension of disruption, and the fact that at least one
African American firefighter harbored concerns over her ability to trust
Jones because of his posts supports the City’s position.
(alteration in original)).
Jones’s leadership position exacerbated the potential
disruption caused by his posts. “The expressive activities of a
highly placed supervisory employee will be more disruptive to the
operation of the workplace than similar activity by a low level
employee with little authority or discretion.” Id. (citation
modified) (quoting McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir.
1997)). And here, according to Chief Robinson, captains “set the
standard” within the GFD. (Doc. 59-2 at 10.) Thus, as a captain,
Jones was “responsible for ensuring implementation of the GFD’s
policy and mission.” (Doc. 59-6 ¶ 4.) Yet as noted, according to
one battalion chief, personnel throughout the GFD knew that Jones
had been “coached” on his “offensive posts” but continued posting,
thereby creating a perception of public defiance. (Doc. 59-15
¶ 4.)
Contrary to Jones’s response (see Doc. 60 at 23), the fact
that Jones did not post “in a supervisory capacity” or direct the
posts “at his subordinates” does not preclude the City’s finding
of potential disruptive effect on his workplace relationships
where, as here, the posts generated discussion and concern among
firefighters at his workplace. Notably, Jones prominently
displayed his employment with the GFD on his Facebook page,
including, at least at one point, setting his profile photograph
as a photograph of him in his GFD uniform. (Doc. 62-2 at 26; Doc.
62-6 ¶ 9.) And while Jones attempts to distinguish Grutzmacher by
arguing that he occupied a lower position in the departmental
hierarchy than a battalion chief, it is not the “policymaking” but
rather the policy-enforcing (that is, supervisory) nature of the
speaker’s role that leads to heightened concerns over disruption.
(See Doc. 59-15 ¶ 5; Doc. 59-16 ¶¶ 4-5.) Moreover, though
battalion chiefs occupy a higher position than captains in the
GFD, the more relevant comparison is that the battalion chief
position described in Grutzmacher appears roughly equivalent to
that of captain at GFD, which was Jones’s role. See Grutzmacher,
851 F.3d at 337 (“Although positioned at the lower end of the
chain-of-command, . . . battalion chiefs directly supervise first
responders.”). Thus, Jones’s position as captain also weighs in
the City’s favor by increasing the potential disruption to the
maintenance of discipline at the GFD. See Ridpath, 447 F.3d at
317; Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 346 (weighing the firefighter
plaintiff’s battalion chief role in favor of the defendants in
part because of concerns regarding his “fitness as a supervisor
and role model” created by his “flouting Department policies he
was expected to enforce”).
Next, the City has produced evidence that Jones’s conduct
threatened the GFD’s relationship with the community. “The more
the employee’s job requires public contact, the greater the state’s
interest in firing him for expression that offends his employer.”
Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 346 (citation modified) (quoting McEvoy,
124 F.3d at 103). “[F]irefighters . . . are quintessentially
public servants. As such, part of their job is to safeguard the
public’s opinion of them, particularly with regard to a community’s
view of the respect that . . . firefighters accord the members of
that community.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Locurto
v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 178-79 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Here, according to City Manager Jaiyeoba, the “net effect” of
Jones’s posts was “to dehumanize, delegitimize, disparage and
disrespect” the members of the community who were different from
him. (Doc. 65-3 at 3.) Indeed, one member of the community filed
a complaint with the City over Jones’s post referring to Sheriff
Rogers as a “clown,” describing the post as “blatantly racist” and
alleging its “wide[] circulat[ion].” (Doc. 59-10 at 7.) Jones’s
other posts on the killing of Tyre Nichols, “Straight Pride,”
former Assistant Health Secretary Levine, and blackface raised
similar concerns by commenting on “hot-button political issues”
like race, sexual orientation, and gender identity “in a mocking,
derogatory, and disparaging manner.” See MacRae v. Mattos, 106
F.4th 122, 137 (1st Cir. 2024). A public employee has a reduced
First Amendment interest in speech of an “insulting and
disparaging” nature. Id.; see Moser v. L.V. Metro. Police Dep’t,
984 F.3d 900, 907 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that “racially charged
comments . . . arguably receive less First Amendment protection
under the Pickering balancing test for government employees”
(citing Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 348)).
Indeed, less than one month after Jones’s termination from
the GFD, thirteen community members voiced their support for his
termination at the Greensboro City Council’s bimonthly meeting.
(Doc. 62 at 12 (citing Meeting Agenda City Council).) Jones argues
that this commentary is only “post-hoc political pressure” used by
the City as a retroactive justification for his termination. (Doc.
63 at 20.) But the mere fact that Jones’s termination generated
such a reaction corroborates the City’s reasonable apprehension
over the deleterious effects of his posts. The City need not,
despite Jones’s suggestion to the contrary, wait until more fallout
from his posts materialized to find that Jones’s posts risked
damage to its relationship with the public. Cf. Connick, 461 U.S.
at 152 (“Furthermore, we do not see the necessity for an employer
to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the
office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest
before taking action.”).
Moreover, the Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have all
tempered any concerns related to an alleged heckler’s veto in the
context of the Pickering balancing test. See Bennett v. Metro.
Gov’t of Nash. & Davidson Cnty., 977 F.3d 530, 544 (6th Cir. 2020)
(“Because effective emergency service ‘presupposes respect for the
members of [minority] communities,’ such agencies are permitted to
account for the possible reaction of the public when disciplining
their employees.” (quoting Locurto, 447 F.3d at 182)); Dible v.
City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting
that worries over a heckler’s veto “do not directly relate to the
wholly separate area of employee activities that affect the
public’s view of a governmental agency in a negative fashion, and,
thereby, affect the agency’s mission”); Locurto, 447 F.3d at 182
(holding that minority communities’ negative reactions to the
speech at issue “cannot properly be characterized as ‘outsiders
seeking to heckle [the plaintiffs] into silence’” (alteration in
original) (quoting Melzer v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist., 336
F.3d 185, 199 (2d Cir. 2003))). One district court in the Fourth
Circuit has similarly rejected heckler’s veto concerns where, as
here, the public employee’s speech “threatened internal
employment . . . relations and operations.” See Durstein v.
Alexander, 629 F. Supp. 3d 408, 426 (S.D. W. Va. 2022); cf. Berger
v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1000-01 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting the
“insidious threats” to First Amendment rights posed by the
“heckler’s veto” where there was “no suggestion of the kind of
internal disruption” noted in the caselaw). The City therefore
reasonably apprehended that Jones’s conduct would “interfere[]
with the operation” and “undermine[] the mission” of the GFD. See
Ridpath, 447 F.3d at 317.
Finally, the GFD’s paramilitary nature strengthens its
interest in policing Jones’s disruptive and controversial speech.
“Fire departments operate as ‘paramilitary’ organizations in which
‘discipline is demanded, and freedom must be correspondingly
denied.’” Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 347 (quoting Maciariello, 973
F.2d at 300). Courts therefore afford fire departments “greater
latitude . . . in dealing with dissension in their ranks.” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Maciariello, 973 F.2d at 300).
Jones is correct that this consideration is far from controlling.
See id. But “it does further tip the scale” in the City’s favor.
Id.
By contrast, the interest in Jones’s commentary on matters of
public concern does not outweigh the significant governmental
interests identified above. To be sure, a public safety official’s
interest in speaking on matters of public concern will outweigh
even a compelling government interest “when, for example, the
official’s speech is ‘grounded . . . in specialized knowledge [or]
expresse[s] a general “concern about the inability of the
[Department] to carry out its vital public mission effectively.”’”
Id. at 347-48 (alterations in original) (quoting Liverman, 844
F.3d at 410). This balancing comports with the fact “that public
employees are often the members of the community who are likely to
have informed opinions as to the operations of their public
employers,” City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per
curiam), as “[g]overnment employees are often in the best position
to know what ails the agencies for which they work,” Liverman, 844
F.3d at 408 (alteration in original) (quoting Waters v. Churchill,
511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion)).
But here, though Jones’s firefighting experience may have
given him some particular insight into the Guilford County
Sheriff’s Office or the dangers of riots and hoarding, his actual
posts on these matters failed to demonstrate any specialized
knowledge that would heighten the interest of his speech. Jones
did not, for example, raise “[s]erious concerns regarding officer
training and supervision” at the GFD, see Liverman, 844 F.3d at
410-11, nor did he note that GFD leadership “was overlooking
violations of safety regulations,” see Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 355;
cf. Templeton v. City of High Point, No. 24cv671, 2026 WL 1759255,
at *5 (M.D.N.C. June 18, 2026) (finding that the firefighter
plaintiff had a clearly established right to speak on “the ability
of the fire department to carry out its mission effectively”
without suffering an adverse employment action). Rather, he
described Sheriff Rogers as a “clown” and a “Freaking Joke” without
further explanation,12 and he queried whether cities would burn
because of Tyre Nichols’s death at the hands of Memphis police
officers before asserting that “ALL LIVES MATTER.” (See Docs. 59-
12 Jones’s post concerning Sheriff Rogers superficially touched on public
safety. But beyond his identification of Sheriff Rogers as “the clown
in charge of keeping you safe,” his post is devoid of any particular
knowledge or insight into how Sheriff Rogers might have posed a threat
to public safety. (See Doc. 59-11.)
11, 59-13.) In fact, the post most directly grounded in Jones’s
specialized knowledge also violated GFD policy by exposing the
interior of a private residence. (See Doc. 59-8.) The court also
need not find that the City’s interest outweighed Jones’s interest
as to each individual post, and Jones makes no argument as to how
his posts on sexual orientation, gender identity, or blackface –
not to mention his post referring to any person offended by his
commentary as a little bitch - were grounded in the specialized
knowledge he obtained as a captain in the GFD.
To oppose the City’s motion for summary judgment, Jones cites
Moser, 984 F.3d at 911, where a divided panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government
employer. In Moser, the plaintiff, who served as a member of the
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s special weapons and
tactics unit, commented on a friend’s social media post concerning
the arrest of a man suspected of shooting another police officer:
“Thanks to a Former Action Guy (FAG) and his team we caught that
asshole . . . It’s a shame he didn’t have a few holes in him . . .”
Moser, 984 F.3d at 902-03. The Ninth Circuit held that a genuine
dispute of material fact existed as to the “objective meaning” of
the plaintiff’s social media comment, yet the district court
“appeared to accept” the employer’s interpretation. Id. at 907.
This interpretation in favor of the moving party prevented the
district court from correctly determining “how much weight to give
the government employee’s First Amendment interests” and, as a
result, how high to set the employer’s burden in justifying the
discharge. Id. at 906. The Ninth Circuit then held that the
employer had not met its burden to demonstrate a “reasonable
prediction of disruption,” in part because the employer provided
“no evidence that anyone other than the anonymous tipster even saw
[the plaintiff’s] Facebook comment.” Id. at 909-10.
Unlike the social media post in Moser, Jones’s posts plainly
do not “address[] problems at the government agency where” he
worked even under his proffered meaning. See id. at 906 (noting
that commentary about such problems rests “[a]t the apex of the
First Amendment”). Nor do Jones’s posts meaningfully “touch[] on
an important public policy issue that falls within his personal
experience.” Id. Indeed, even Chief Robinson expressed doubts on
whether he, as chief, would “have an understanding of what the
upper administration in the sheriff’s department does.” (Doc. 59-
2 at 26.) As already noted, the City has also provided evidence
well beyond the viewing of his Facebook posts by a single anonymous
tipster of its reasonable apprehension of the disruption caused by
Jones’s speech. Cf. Moser, 984 F.3d at 910. And unlike the
plaintiff in Moser, Jones made posts that the City reasonably
believed to be insubordinate. See Grutzmacher, 851 F.3d at 347.
Ultimately, the GFD has demonstrated that it reasonably
believed that its interest in efficiency and preventing disruption
outweighed whatever public interest was present in Jones’s social
media activity. Though Jones seeks to frame this case as one where
the City terminated his employment because he expressed a viewpoint
contrary to what he contends is the City’s preferred stance on
matters of public interest, the record instead demonstrates that
Jones repeatedly ignored the coaching efforts of his leadership
and posted increasingly inflammatory material to his Facebook
profile, which prominently identified him as a member of the GFD.
These posts were largely unrelated to his experiences as a
firefighter and created a reasonable apprehension of disruption to
the efficiency of the GFD’s operations. The court will thus grant
the City’s motion for summary judgment on Jones’s First Amendment
retaliation and North Carolina constitutional claims. Moreover,
because the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to
Jones, indicate that the City is entitled to summary judgment on
the Pickering/McVey balancing test, Jones’s motion for summary
judgment will correspondingly be denied.
B. Motion to Seal
“[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to
inspect and copy . . . judicial records and documents.” Nixon v.
Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). “The operations
of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of
utmost public concern,” Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435
U.S. 829, 839 (1978), “and the public’s business is best done in
public,” Cochran v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d 725,
727 (M.D.N.C. 2013). “When parties ‘call on the courts, they must
accept the openness that goes with subsidized dispute resolution
by public (and publicly accountable) officials.’” Doe v. Pub.
Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 271 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Union Oil Co.
of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000)).
The right of public access derives from both the common law
and the First Amendment. See Va. Dep’t of State Police v.
Washington Post, 386 F.3d 567, 576 (4th Cir. 2004). “While the
common law presumption in favor of access attaches to all ‘judicial
records and documents,’ the First Amendment guarantee of access
has been extended only to particular judicial records and
documents.” Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178,
180 (4th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted) (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at
597). Thus, in any given case, some documents will “fall within
the common law presumption of access,” while others will be
“subject to the greater right of access provided by the First
Amendment,” and some “may not qualify as ‘judicial records’ at
all.” United States v. Moussaoui, 65 F. App’x 881, 889 (4th Cir.
2003) (citing United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145-46 (2d
Cir. 1995)).
When a party makes a request to seal judicial records, a
district court “must comply with certain substantive and
procedural requirements.” Washington Post, 386 F.3d at 576.
Procedurally, the court must (1) give the public notice and a
reasonable opportunity to challenge the request to seal; (2)
“consider less drastic alternatives to sealing”; and (3) if it
decides to seal, make specific findings and state the reasons for
its decision to seal over the alternatives. Id. “As to the
substance, the district court first ‘must determine the source of
the right of access with respect to each document,’ because ‘[o]nly
then can it accurately weigh the competing interests at stake.’”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Stone, 855 F.2d at 181).
“Generally, the public interest in disclosure heightens as the
underlying motions are directed more to the merits and as the case
proceeds toward trial. SmartSky Networks, LLC v. Wireless Sys.
Sols., LLC, 630 F. Supp. 3d 718, 732 (M.D.N.C. 2022). Pursuant to
this court’s Local Rules, “[n]o motion to seal will be granted
without a sufficient showing by the party claiming confidentiality
as to why sealing is necessary and why less drastic alternatives
will not afford adequate protection, with evidentiary support.”
L.R. 5.4(c)(3).
Here, the City’s motion to seal was filed by the same party
claiming confidentiality. Specifically, the motion seeks to seal
portions of both parties’ briefs in support of their motions for
summary judgment, their responses and replies, and their attached
exhibits. According to the City, the relevant information includes
personnel records of current or former GFD employees (other than
Jones), information derived from these records, and “otherwise
sensitive personal information.” (Doc. 71 at 2.) No one other
than Jones has objected to or filed any opposition to the motion
to seal.
The City argues that most of the material it seeks to seal
falls within the purview of North Carolina General Statute § 160A-
168. (Id. at 4.) Section 160A-168 provides that “all information
contained in a city employee’s personnel file,” with some
exceptions, “is confidential and shall be open to inspection” only
in certain instances, such as “[b]y order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-168(c)(4). The City seeks
to seal the remainder of the material because of the privacy
concern for “sensitive personal information.” (Doc. 71 at 5
(quoting Courthouse News Serv. v. Smith, 126 F.4th 899, 910 (4th
Cir. 2025)).) This information includes the photograph of the
interior of a private residence, posted by Jones to his Facebook
page, and Chief Robinson’s place of worship. (Id.) Further, in
the event the court decides to unseal any document or portion of
any document filed by the City, the City requests the opportunity
to withdraw the document or strike the portion of the document.
(Id. at 7.)
In response, Jones has objected to several of the City’s
requests for sealing. Jones contends that the City’s redactions
are “overly broad and not narrowly tailored.” (Doc. 72 at 3.)
Specifically, Jones argues that Section 160A-168(b) permits
disclosure of personnel records to the extent they relate to the
“type of suspension taken for a disciplinary reason.” (Id. at 4-
5 (emphasis omitted) (citing § 160A-168(b)(11)).) Moreover, Jones
asserts that portions of several fully sealed exhibits contain
public social media posts of non-party GFD employees, who can have
no expectation of privacy in the posts given their circulation on
social media. (Id. at 5.) Finally, Jones contends that Section
160A-168 alone does not justify sealing, that the relevance of the
City’s response to non-party employees’ social media posts
warrants their unsealing, and that the City employs an overly broad
interpretation of personnel records under the statute to conceal
Jones’s “disparate treatment argument” from the public. (Id. at
5-7.)
To begin, “the more rigorous First Amendment standard”
applies “to documents filed in connection with a summary judgment
motion in a civil case.” Rushford v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 846
F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988). The court agrees that the
photograph of the interior of a citizen’s private residence and
Chief Robinson’s place of worship constitute “sensitive personal
information,” and safeguarding such information “is an important
governmental interest.” See Courthouse News Serv., 126 F.4th at
910. The same goes for Jones’s date of birth and specific shift
and station information of non-party GFD employees. Moreover, the
parties have taken care to limit the opacity of documents with
this information through targeted redactions. See Fortson v.
Garrison Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 19-CV-294, 2022 WL 824802, at
*5 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2022) (noting that “[r]edaction is also the
least drastic alternative to sealing” because it “maintain[s] a
significant degree of transparency in the proceedings”). Thus,
the court will seal docket entries 62, 62-1, 62-7, 63-5, 68-5, 69-
5, and 70-5. The court will also permit sealing of the redacted
portions of page 4 of docket entry 62-2 and page 21 of docket entry
63-25, which similarly identify Chief Robinson’s place of worship,
and paragraph 8 of docket entry 62-16, which references a non-
party employee’s medical leave.
Further, the court agrees that the disclosure of the names of
GFD personnel who previously complained of or were involved in
alleged inappropriate relationships or sexual harassment incidents
involving Jones would not serve the public interest. A redacted,
public version available at docket entry 66-8 omits the
individuals’ names but otherwise provides all the necessary
context. The court will protect the identities of these non-party
individuals and therefore seal docket entry 69-8. Cf. Alexander
v. City of Greensboro, Nos. 09-CV-00293, 09-CV-00934, 2013 WL
6687248, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 18, 2013) (“Names of alleged sexual
assault victims ‘serve no useful public or investigative
purpose.’” (quoting Wilmink v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 03-
0179, 2006 WL 456021, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 23, 2006))).
The remaining exhibits, which largely deal with Facebook
posts made by other GFD employees who received less severe
punishments than Jones, present a closer call. On the one hand,
the court agrees with Jones and will not seal documents that only
reference the City’s responses to this other controversial social
media activity without identifying the individual personnel
involved. The court also declines to seal records that merely
provide the phone number and office address of Chief Robinson, or
the name, email address, office address, and phone number of the
City’s law and compliance consultant, as this information appears
readily available to the public on the City’s website. See Just.
360 v. Stirling, 42 F.4th 450, 455 (4th Cir. 2022) (noting that
courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public
record” (quoting Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176,
180 (4th Cir. 2009))); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201. Accordingly,
the City’s motion to seal will be denied regarding docket entries
62-6, 62-10, 63, 64-1, and 69, along with page 9 of docket entry
62-2 and pages 11 and 12 of docket entry 63-25. The court will
not permit the City’s withdrawal of any documents, or the striking
of portions therein, because the First Amendment right attaches to
the public’s access to the documents “once the documents are ‘filed
in connection with a summary judgment motion in a civil case.’”
See United States ex rel. Oberg v. Nelnet, Inc., 105 F.4th 161,
172 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253).
On the other hand, the court finds that the actual personnel
records of non-parties - which contain the complaints filed with
the City, internal discussions between GFD leadership and the human
resources department, copies of the social media posts at issue,
and the discipline ultimately meted out – should largely remain
sealed. Section 160A-168 provides “evidence of a strong public
policy in North Carolina in favor of privacy with respect to
particularly sensitive personnel . . . records.” Alexander, 2013
WL 6687248, at *5. The court will not permit the sealing of all
relevant docket entries in their entirety, however, because the
government’s public policy interest does not extend to the
individuals’ social media posts. Thus, while docket entries 63-
15, 68-16, 69-1, and 70-7 will remain fully sealed, the court will
require Jones to file new versions of docket entries 63-16, 63-
17, 68-17, 68-18, 70-8, and 70-9 within seven days. These versions
should provide the offending social media posts for public review
to the greatest extent possible without disclosing the names or
faces of the non-party GFD employees.
The remainder of the documents reside somewhere in between
these two poles. Generally, the documents identify the individuals
who were disciplined for their social media posts, and they include
a description of both the offending post and the punishment
received. However, most of these documents can easily be further
redacted to protect the privacy of the individuals while also
providing relevant context to the public. Accordingly, as to
docket entries 68, 69-2, and 70, the court will require the filing
party to file a new redacted version within seven days that limits
the redactions only to the names of the individuals who made the
posts. Docket entry 62-15 and paragraph 7 of docket entry 62-16
will remain sealed, however, due to the inability to preserve the
non-party individuals’ privacy with a more targeted redaction.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff Jones’s motion for
summary judgment (Doc. 45) is DENIED, Defendant the City of
Greensboro’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 46) is GRANTED, and
this case is DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the City’s motion to seal (Doc.
71) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Docket entries 62, 62-
1, 62-7, 62-15, 62-16, 63-5, 63-15, 68-5, 68-16, 69-1, 69-5, 69-
8, 70-5, and 70-7 shall be SEALED. Page 4 of docket entry 62-2
and page 21 of docket entry 63-25 shall also be SEALED.
The motion to seal is otherwise DENIED, and docket entries
62-6, 62-10, 63, 64-1, and 69 shall be UNSEALED. Page 9 of docket
entry 62-2 and pages 11 and 12 of docket entry 63-25 shall be
UNSEALED, and within seven days Jones shall file new copies of
docket entries 62-2 and 63-25 containing only the redactions on
page 4 and page 21, respectively. Within seven days, the filing
party shall file new redacted versions of docket entries 68, 69-
2, and 70 that limit the redactions to the names of the individuals
who made the posts. And within seven days, Jones shall file new
versions of docket entries 63-16, 63-17, 68-17, 68-18, 70-8, and
70-9 to provide only the relevant social media posts of the non-
party GFD employees with all personally identifying information
redacted.13 Upon the filing of these materials, the court will
enter judgment.
/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder
United States District Judge
August 10, 2026
13 Because these docket entries represent three sets of the same two
documents, Jones need only provide one set of new, redacted documents.