Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF TEXAS CIVIL ACTION

PETROLEUM INVESTMENT COMPANY

NO. 24-2344

SECTION: “D” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Petitioner Texas

Petroleum Investment Company (“TPIC”).1 Claimants The Production Group, LLC

and David Hayes (“TPG Claimants”) oppose the Motion,2 and TPIC has filed a Reply.3

After careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the

applicable law, the Court DENIES TPIC’s Motion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4

This action for exoneration from or limitation of liability arises out of an April

10, 2024 allision involving the Vessel LA 93955 on the inland waters of Plaquemines

Parish, Louisiana.6 At all times pertinent, TPIC owned and operated South Pass 24

1 R. Doc. 81.

2 R. Doc. 85.

3 R. Doc. 86. On May 17, 2026, the Court granted in part and denied in part TPIC’s Motion for

Summary Judgment. See R. Doc. 233. In that Order and Reasons, the Court explained that it did not

address TPIC’s argument that is entitled to summary judgment on TPG Claimants’ contractual

defense and indemnity claim asserted against it, as the “Court has determined that any determination

as to the enforceability of the contractual indemnity provisions in an MSA is premature under the

LOAIA, as there has not yet been a finding of liability as to any indemnitee.” Id. at p. 18 n.99. The

Court revisits TPIC’s argument here and does not revisit any other aspect of the Motion for Summary

Judgment. See R. Doc. 81.

4 In a previous Order and Reasons, the Court recited the factual and procedural background of this

matter in detail. See R. Doc. 91. The Court therefore provides the factual and procedural background

solely as relevant to the instant Motion.

5 Vessel La 9395 is also referred to as the M/V SYDNEY. See R. Doc. 73-1 at p. 2. The Court will refer

to it as the “Vessel” throughout this Order and Reasons.

6 R. Doc. 73-1 at p. 2.

(“SP-24”), a fixed oil and gas production platform located on the inland waters of

Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana.7 David Hayes, an employee of The Production Group,

LLC,8 and George Walcott, an employee of Taylors International Services, were

assigned to work on SP-24.9

On the morning of the incident, David Hayes and George Walcott conducted a

routine crew shift transfer.10 David Hayes operated the Vessel – a small aluminum

hull crew boat owned by TPIC – and departed from SP-24 to a dock in Venice,

Louisiana.11 George Walcott was one of the passengers in the Vessel.12 During the

voyage to Venice, the Vessel allided with a submerged obstruction in the water,

allegedly causing injuries to George Walcott.13

At the time of the allision, TPIC and The Production Group, LLC were

operating under a Master Services Agreement (“MSA”) that was executed on June 1,

2019.14 The MSA, in pertinent part, provides as follows:15

7 R. Doc. 85-1 at p. 2. More specifically, TPIC’s SP-24 is located on State Lease No. 1923 within

Louisiana’s territorial waters. Id. at p. 3.

8 The Court has previously ruled on TPG Claimants’ Moton for Partial Summary Judgment on

Borrowed Servant Status. See R. Doc. 228. The Court’s reference to Hayes as an employee of The

Production Group in this Order is not intended to change the Court’s ruling on Hayes’ borrowed

servant status.

9 R. Doc. 81-2 at p. 1; R. Doc. 85 at p. 2; R. Doc. 85-1 at p. 3.

10 R. Doc. 85 at p. 2.

11 R. Doc. 85 at p. 2; R. Doc. 85-1 at p. 3.

12 R. Doc. 85 at p. 2. The Court acknowledges that there were other passengers in the Vessel at the

time of the accident. Id. at pp. 2–3. The Court only references George Walcott for the sake of

convenience.

13 R. Doc. 85 at p. 3.

14 R. Doc. 81-4 at p. 2; R. Doc. 12-1.

15 It is undisputed that “TPG’s predecessor, E&H Production Group, LLC, entered into the MSA with

TPIC on June 1, 2019[]” and that “E&H Production Group, LLC was subsequently acquired by TPG.”

R. Doc. 85-1 at p. 3. Therefore, the Court, when interpreting the MSA, substitutes ES&H Production

Group, LLC with The Production Group, LLC.

Company: TEXAS PETROLEUM INVESTMENT COMPANY

. . . .

Contractor: ES&H PRODUCTION GROUP, LLC

. . . .

WHEREAS, Company is engaged in the business of exploration,

development and operation of oil and gas wells for others, or for its own

account, or is engaged in the production of oil and gas, and in the course

of such operations regularly and customarily enters into contracts with

independent contractors for performance of service thereto; and

. . . .

11.3 This Agreement shall be governed, construed and interpreted in

accordance with the Laws of the State of Louisiana, Texas or Mississippi

as determined by where the work is performed.16

On September 26, 2024, TPIC filed a Complaint for Exoneration from or

Limitation of Liability in this Court.17 Thereafter, on March 27, 2025, TPG Claimants

filed an Amended Answer and Claim to Texas Petroleum Investment Company’s

Complaint for Exoneration from or Limitation of Liability, in which the TPG

Claimants state as follows:

The TPG Parties aver that the injuries and damages alleged by George

Walcott and Evelyn Walcott were not caused by the fault, negligence,

acts, omissions or culpable conduct of the TPG Parties, but were caused,

in whole or in part, by the faults, negligent acts, omissions or culpable

conduct of Petitioner and/or their employees, agents, servants and/or

other persons, for none of whom the TPG Parties are liable.

. . . .

16 R. Doc. 12-1 at pp. 1, 10–11, 14.

17 R. Doc. 1.

The TPG Parties further assert that they are entitled to contractual

defense and indemnity from Petitioner pursuant to the master services

agreement dated June 1, 2019 . . . .18

On April 3, 2025, TPIC filed an Answer to TPG Claimants’ Amended Answer

and Claim, whereby TPIC denied TPG Claimants’ allegations of entitlement to

contractual defense and indemnity and non-contractual indemnity and/or

contribution under the MSA.19

TPIC filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on November 25, 2025.20

TPIC, in pertinent part,21 seeks summary judgment dismissing TPG Claimants’

claims for contractual defense and indemnity pursuant to the MSA.22 TPIC argues

that TPG Claimants’ claim for contractual defense and indemnity is prohibited under

Louisiana law, specifically the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act (“LOAIA”).23

TPIC contends that the LOAIA is applicable to the instant dispute because the MSA

“is one involving the exploration and production of oil and gas from a fixed structure

situated in the State of Louisiana.”24 No exception to the LOAIA applies, according

to TPIC.25 TPIC submits that The Production Group, LLC has not paid to be named

an additional insured on TPIC’s liability insurance policy, and “[a] review of the

TPIC/TPG MSA reveals, there is no ‘Marcel’ and in fact no insuring provision

18 R. Doc. 12 at p. 13.

19 R. Doc. 13 at p. 4.

20 R. Doc. 81.

21 The Court has previously dismissed TPG Claimants’ non-contractual indemnity and/or contribution

claims in a previous Order and Reasons. See R. Doc. 233.

22 R. Doc. 81-2 at p. 1.

23 Id. at p. 3.

24 Id. at p. 7.

25 Id.

whatsoever in the MSA whereby TPG can be named an additional insured on TPIC’s

policy . . . .”26

TPG Claimants oppose the Motion, asserting that “the [M]otion fails for two

independent reasons.”27 According to TPG Claimants:

TPIC’s motion is premature. Under Meloy v. Conoco, Inc., and consistent

with recent Eastern District of Louisiana decisions applying Meloy, an

indemnity provision cannot be voided under LOAIA until the

indemnitee’s fault has been adjudicated. No such determination has

been made here, and significant factual issues remain unresolved—

including whether David Hayes was TPIC’s borrowed servant at the

time of the allision, a finding that would directly affect whose

negligence, if any, is at issue. Until these factual matters are resolved,

any LOAIA analysis is not ripe for summary judgment.28

Therefore, according to TPG Claimants, the instant Motion should be denied.29

TPIC, in Reply, asserts that TPG Claimants’ defense of prematurity is no

longer viable under recent Louisiana Supreme Court precedent.30 Accordingly, TPIC

reiterates that it is entitled to summary judgment.31

On May 17, 2026, the Court granted in part and denied in part TPIC’s instant

Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that “that any determination as to the

enforceability of the contractual indemnity provisions in an MSA is premature under

the LOAIA, as there has not yet been a finding of liability as to any indemnitee.”32

This matter then proceeded to a bench trial on May 18, 2026.33 On the second day of

26 Id.

27 R. Doc. 85 at p. 1.

28 Id. at pp. 1–2 (citing Meloy v. Conoco, Inc., 504 So.2d 833 (La. 1987)).

29 Id. at p. 2.

30 Id. at p. 10.

31 Id. at p. 10.

32 R. Doc. 233 at p. 18 n.99.

33 R. Doc. 236.

the bench trial, Counsel for George Walcott and Evelyn Walcott advised the Court

that George Walcott and Evelyn Walcott dismissed all claims against all parties with

prejudice in light of a settlement agreement.34 The Court inquired with the parties

with remaining claims in this matter regarding whether they desired to continue with

the trial, and all parties agreed to submit their claims on the briefs previously

submitted to the Court.35 The Court therefore reconsiders TPIC’s Motion for

Summary Judgment in light of the settlement reached at trial.

Subsequently, on June 10, 2026, the assigned Magistrate Judge informed the

Court that the remaining claims between TPIC, Underwriters, and Taylors have been

amicably resolved.36 Accordingly, only TPG Claimants have claims remaining in this

matter—with claims asserted against TPIC, Taylors, and the Underwriters.37 In this

Order and Reasons, the Court only addresses TPG Claimants’ claims against TPIC.38

On June 12, 2026, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of whether

TPG Claimants still have a viable claim for contractual defense and indemnity

against TPIC under Louisiana law in light of the settlement agreements announced

in this case.39

34 R. Doc. 237.

35 Id.

36 R. Doc. 238 at p. 1.

37 See R. Docs. 12 and 93.

38 The Court addresses TPG Claimants’ claims against Taylors and Underwriters in a separate

Order and Reasons. See R. Doc. 261.

39 R. Doc. 239 at p. 2.

In TPG Claimants’ supplemental brief, TPG Claimants contend that their

contractual defense and indemnity claim against TPIC remains viable.40 In support,

TPG Claimants advise that:

TPG did not settle Plaintiffs’ claims, pay settlement consideration, or

foreclose adjudication of its own fault. Quite the opposite, Plaintiffs

dismissed their claims against TPG with prejudice, and without

receiving any compensation or consideration from TPG whatsoever.

TPIC separately resolved Plaintiffs’ claims against TPIC and Hayes,

whom this Court had already determined was TPIC’s borrowed servant.

TPG’s contractual claim against TPIC was not dismissed, released, or

compromised.

That posture distinguishes Tanksley v. Gulf Oil Corp. Tanksley bars

recovery when the party seeking indemnity settles the underlying

claims against itself and thereby prevents the no-fault determination

required by Meloy v. Conoco, Inc. TPG did not do that. Under Meloy,

Melancon v. Amoco Production Co., and American Home Assurance Co.

v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., the Court may determine whether TPG was

independently at fault or whether the claims against it were baseless.

Because the record contains no finding of independent TPG fault and

supports a finding that the claims against TPG were baseless, the

Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act (“LOAIA”) does not bar TPG’s

contractual defense claim.41

TPG Claimants argue that the Walcotts’ dismissal, with prejudice and without

consideration, of all claims asserted against TPG Claimants operates as a de facto

determination that TPG Claimants were not at fault for the April 10, 2024 allision.42

TPG Claimants further contend that “[t]o the extent anything more is required, the

Court can easily determine, on the existing record, that TPG was not independently

40 R. Doc. 246. at p. 1.

41 Id. at pp. 1–2 (citing Meloy v. Conoco, Inc., 504 So. 2d 833 (La. 1987); Tanksley v. Gulf Oil

Corporation, 848 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1988); Melancon v. Amoco Production Co., 834 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.

1988); American Home Assur. Co. v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 400 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2005)).

42 Id. at p. 8.

at fault and that Plaintiffs’ claims against TPG were baseless.”43 In support of their

assertion that the Court can determine TPG Claimants’ absence of fault, TPG

Claimants provide as follows:

Based on this Court’s borrowed servant ruling, Plaintiffs could not

impose liability on TPG based merely on Hayes’s operation of the vessel.

A borrowed servant becomes the employee of the borrowing employer

and is treated as the servant of the borrowing employer. Because Hayes

was TPIC’s borrowed servant, any negligence by Hayes in operating the

M/V SYDNEY is attributable to TPIC, not TPG. The only other theories

against TPG were direct negligence theories, which required Plaintiffs

to prove an independent duty owed by TPG, breach of that duty, and

causation.44

According to TPG Claimants, any direct-negligence theories asserted against them fail

because:

TPG did not own, operate, maintain, inspect, repair, equip, or control

the M/V SYDNEY. TPG did not select the route, determine who would

ride aboard, direct Hayes’s speed, navigation, lookout, use of electronics,

or maneuvering, or supervise the crew-change transit. TPG also had no

supervisor manager, or other personnel stationed in the SP-24 field

directing Hayes’s work. Those facts do not support an independent duty,

breach, or causal act by TPG.45

Thus, TPG Claimants ask the Court to find that its contractual defense and indemnity

claim against TPIC remains viable and that “TPIC owes TPG its defense costs on

account of the dismissal of all claims against TPG with prejudice but without

compensation.”46 TPG then requests “ten days to file its statement of recoverable fees

and costs, with supporting documentation and authorities.”47

43 Id.

44 Id.

45 Id. at pp. 9–10.

46 Id. at p. 10.

47 Id.

TPIC has also filed a supplemental brief in this matter.48 TPIC contends that

the “overarching legal presence in this case is the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity

Act (LOAIA) . . . .”49 According to TPIC, because the applicability of the LOAIA can

only be determined after a trial on the merits, TPG Claimants’ contractual defense

and indemnity claims against TPIC are no longer viable as there has been no finding

of fault on behalf of TPIC.50 Nevertheless, TPIC acknowledges that there have been

various cases addressing subsequent litigation in the LOAIA context where a

settlement is reached prior to a finding of fault at trial.51 According to TPIC, “none of

those cases, and certainly not the Louisiana Supreme Court, have deviated from the

core message of Meloy, which remains the same—no trial on the merits/no recovery.”52

Moreover, TPIC notes that although the Court has previously determined that

David Hayes was a borrowed employee of TPIC, the Louisiana Supreme Court has

found that a lending employer can be solidarily liable for the torts of a borrowed

employee under the “dual-employer” theory.53 Pursuant to this “dual-employer”

theory, TPIC argues that not only is TPIC liable for any tortious conduct of David

Hayes, but The Production Group, LLC is also solidarily liable for any tortious conduct

of David Hayes.54

48 R. Doc. 248.

49 Id. at p. 2.

50 Id. at p. 3.

51 Id.

52 Id.

53 Id. at p. 8 (citing Morgan v. ABC Manufacturing, 710 So. 2d 1077 (La. 1998)).

54 Id.

With leave of Court, TPG Claimants filed a memorandum in reply.55

Addressing its contractual defense and indemnity claims against TPIC, TPG

Claimants argue that:

TPIC overextends Tanksley far beyond its holding. Meloy requires a

judicial determination of the indemnitee’s fault or lack of fault before

defense costs may be recovered; it does not create the categorical “no

verdict, no recovery” rule TPIC proposes. Tanksley applied Meloy to a

specific posture in which the party seeking indemnity settled the

underlying claim against itself and thereby avoided trial on its own

fault. TPG did not do that. TPG did not settle anything, did not

contribute anything, did not provide any release, and did not control

TPIC’s settlement with Plaintiffs, Taylors, or Underwriters. Further,

TPIC’s repeated suggestion that there was “no trial on the merits” of

TPG’s fault is bizarre. TPG was present for the recent two-day bench

trial, as were TPG witnesses that Plaintiffs subpoenaed. The fact that

Plaintiffs elected not to call them and released them from their

subpoenas does not mean TPG’s fault was not on trial. The fact that

Plaintiffs’ marine liability expert did not even mention TPG, much less

assign it fault, supports that TPG was not at fault. TPIC’s and Plaintiffs’

failure or inability to adduce evidence of TPG’s fault when they had the

opportunity does not mean the trial did not occur; it means the trial

exonerated TPG.

TPIC overextends Morgan in a different way. TPIC invokes Morgan to

attribute Hayes’s alleged fault to TPG despite the Court’s borrowed

servant ruling and the application of maritime law to the underlying

tort claims. Morgan applied Louisiana respondeat superior principles

under Civil Code article 2320. Critically, Morgan is not a maritime case,

and it does not govern whether Hayes’s alleged negligence is

attributable to TPG after this Court’s borrowed servant ruling.

Louisiana law may govern the contracts at issue; it does not convert

Plaintiffs’ maritime tort claims into Louisiana tort claims. This case

arises from a vessel allision on navigable waters. TPIC invoked

admiralty and limitation jurisdiction, and the parties stipulated to this

Court’s maritime jurisdiction in the Pretrial Order. TPIC identifies no

authority adopting Morgan’s dual-employer doctrine in a maritime case.

To the contrary, Energy XXI, GOM, LLC v. New Tech Engineering, L.P.,

recognized that, if maritime law applies, Louisiana’s dual-employer

doctrine does not.56

55 R. Doc. 252.

56 Id. at pp. 2–3 (citation modified).

Therefore, according to TPG Claimants, its claim for contractual defense and

indemnity against TPIC remains viable under Louisiana law.57

Also with leave of Court, TPIC has filed a sur-reply.58 TPIC takes issue with

TPG Claimants’ interpretation of Fifth Circuit and Louisiana Supreme Court

caselaw, providing as follows:

TPG contends that as Morgan is not a “maritime case” it has no

relevance here. Quite the contrary. It is TPG who sought to and

successfully had Mr. Hayes declared to be a borrowed servant of TPIC.

It is that status which is the only foundational basis for TPG's claims for

defense and indemnity in that it is that status TPG contends immunizes

it from fault freeing it to assert its demand for Meloy indemnity.

However, Mr. Hayes' identity as a borrowed servant of TPIC arose from

his daily work activities on the TPIC fixed structure located in

Louisiana. As both Federal and Louisiana law are in sync in what

constitutes a borrowed servant, Mr. Hayes' status in that regard would

be derived from the law of Louisiana. If Mr. Hayes is a Louisiana

borrowed servant then, although any liability flowing through his

conduct would be characterized as a maritime tort as to TPIC and TPG,

TPIC suggests that insofar as addressing TPG's contractual claim

against TPIC, which also flows through the Louisiana borrowed servant

Mr. Hayes, his status, being founded in Louisiana State law, should also

carry with it the Rule of Morgan. That rule declares that when you have

both the borrowing, (TPIC) and lending (TPG) employers involved,

liability is shared equally by both. Thus, for that reason alone,

notwithstanding Meloy and Tanksley, TPG's claim is defeated through

its sharing of liability for Mr. Hayes' conduct.59

Thus, according to TPIC, TPG Claimants’ contractual defense and indemnity claim

should be dismissed.60

57 Id.

58 R. Doc. 257.

59 Id. at p. 3 (citation modified).

60 Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”61 A dispute is “genuine” if it is

“real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.”62 Further,

a fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law.”63 When assessing whether a genuine dispute regarding any material fact

exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from

making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”64 While all reasonable

inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, a party cannot defeat

summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or “only

a scintilla of evidence.”65 Instead, summary judgment is appropriate if a reasonable

jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.66

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden

of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would

entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.”67 The

non-moving party can then defeat summary judgment by either submitting evidence

61 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).

62 Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Wilkinson v. Powell,

149 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1945)).

63 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

64 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008)

(citations omitted).

65 Id. (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotations

omitted).

66 Id. at 399 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

67 Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991).

sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact or by

“showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the

reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.”68 If, however,

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue,

the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in

the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s claim.69 The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond

the pleadings and, “by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’”70

III. ANALYSIS

TPIC asserts that TPG Claimants’ contractual defense and indemnity claim

against it is no longer viable, as there has not been a finding of liability as to the fault

of TPIC.71 TPG Claimants, in turn, assert that under Louisiana Supreme Court and

United States Fifth Circuit jurisprudence, the settlements in this matter do not

render their contractual defense and indemnity claim against TPIC invalid.72 The

Court agrees with TPG Claimants.

68 Id. at 1265.

69 See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

70 Id. at 324 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).

71 R. Doc. 248.

72 R. Docs. 246 and 252.

Louisiana law invalidates certain indemnity or “knock for knock” provisions

found in oil and gas contracts.73 The LOAIA, specifically La. R.S. § 9:2780, provides

as follows:

A. The legislature finds that an inequity is foisted on certain contractors

and their employees by the defense or indemnity provisions, either or

both, contained in some agreements pertaining to wells for oil, gas, or

water, or drilling for minerals which occur in a solid, liquid, gaseous, or

other state, to the extent those provisions apply to death or bodily injury

to persons. It is the intent of the legislature by this Section to declare

null and void and against public policy of the state of Louisiana any

provision in any agreement which requires defense and/or

indemnification, for death or bodily injury to persons, where there is

negligence or fault (strict liability) on the part of the indemnitee, or an

agent or employee of the indemnitee, or an independent contractor who

is directly responsible to the indemnitee.

B. Any provision contained in, collateral to, or affecting an agreement

pertaining to a well for oil, gas, or water, or drilling for minerals which

occur in a solid, liquid, gaseous, or other state, is void and unenforceable

to the extent that it purports to or does provide for defense or indemnity,

or either, to the indemnitee against loss or liability for damages arising

out of or resulting from death or bodily injury to persons, which is caused

by or results from the sole or concurrent negligence or fault (strict

liability) of the indemnitee, or an agent, employee, or an independent

contractor who is directly responsible to the indemnitee.74

“The term ‘agreement[]’ . . . means any agreement or understanding, written or oral,

concerning any operations related to the exploration, development, production, or

transportation of oil, gas, or water, or drilling for minerals which occur in a solid,

liquid, gaseous, or other state . . . .”75

73 A “knock for knock” provision is an “indemnity obligation in which each party is required to

indemnify the other for claims brought by its own employees.” Skipper v. A&M Dockside Repair, Inc.,

Civil Action No. 18-6164, 2019 WL 3035447, at *3 (E.D. La. July 11, 2019)(Vance, J.)(citing 1

Admiralty & Mar. Law § 5:16 (6th ed. 2018)).

74 La. R.S. §§ 9:2780(A), (B).

75 La. R.S. § 9:2780(C).

In Meloy v. Conoco, Inc. the Louisiana Supreme Court held that, under the

LOAIA:

[T]he indemnitor’s obligation for cost of defense cannot be determined

until there has been a judicial finding that the indemnitee is liable or

that the charges against it were baseless. Whether an oil company

(indemnitee) is free from fault and thus outside the scope of the Act can

only be determined after trial on the merits.76

“Accordingly, Louisiana law generally provides that the issue of indemnity is

premature and non-justiciable until the underlying issue of liability is resolved and

the defendant is cast in judgment.”77

Nonetheless, in the LOAIA context, when a settlement occurs before a finding

of liability, the Fifth Circuit’s decisions in Tanksley v. Gulf Oil Corporation78 and

American Home Assurance Company v. Chevron, USA, Inc.79 must be considered.

Another Section of this Court has provided an instructive analysis of those two cases,

providing the following:

In Tanksley, Chevron sought indemnity from its contractor, Services,

Equipment and Engineering, Inc. (“SEE”), related to injuries suffered

by an SEE employee, Wayne Tanksley, while working on a Chevron

platform. While Chevron's claim against SEE was pending appeal,

Chevron and Tanksley agreed to a settlement without SEE. Despite

settling Tanksley's claims, Chevron sought trial on its fault in order to

prove its lack of liability and thereby qualify for indemnification from

SEE under the LOIA.80 The Fifth Circuit determined Chevron was not

entitled to an adjudication of its fault because it voluntarily foreclosed

such a determination by settling with Tanksley. Without a finding that

76 Meloy v. Conoco, Inc., 504 So. 2d 833, 839 (La. 1987).

77 Lexington Ins. Co. v. St. Bernard Parish Government, 548 Fed. Appx. 176, 180 (5th Cir. 2013)(citing

Meloy, 504 So. 2d at 839; Mossy Motors, Inc. v. Cameras Am., 898 So.2d 602, 607 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.

2005)).

78 848 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1988).

79 400 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2005).

80 That court referred to the Louisiana Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act as LOIA. This Court refers to the

Act as LOAIA.

Chevron was free from fault, the LOIA nullified Chevron's

indemnification rights.

. . . .

In American Home [Assurance] Company v. Chevron, USA, Inc., the

Fifth Circuit again considered the LOIA's effect after a settlement. But

instead of a settlement between the indemnitee and the underlying

plaintiff, as in Tanksley, the settlement in American Home Insurance

Company was between the indemnitor oilfield contractor (M-I) and the

underlying plaintiff (Blackmon) after M-I agreed to assume the defense

of the indemnitee oil companies (Chevron and Halliburton). Following

settlement between M-I's insurance company (AIG) and Blackmon, AIG

sued Chevron and Halliburton to recover its expenditures. The district

court ruled in favor of Chevron and Halliburton at summary judgment,

reasoning that the LOIA did not void the indemnity provisions between

the oil companies and M-I because the LOIA only intervenes to nullify

an indemnification provision when the indemnitee is adjudicated at

fault.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit instead found that, for the LOIA to have the

protection legislatively intended, the contractor must be afforded an

opportunity to demonstrate that the indemnity agreements invoked by

the oil companies to defeat the contractor's reimbursement claim are

void under the Act because of the negligence or fault of the oil

companies. Thus, the Fifth Circuit found, the district court should have

permitted further litigation between AIG and the oil companies to

determine if the oil companies were at fault and, consequently, whether

the LOIA voided the indemnity provisions.81

Neither Tanksley nor American Home Assurance Company addresses the precise

scenario before this Court: where an indemnitee (i.e., TPIC) settles with Plaintiffs

(i.e., George Walcott and Evelyn Walcott) in the midst of trial, the remaining parties

are offered the opportunity to continue with the trial but each agree to proceed on the

briefs and record evidence, and then the contractor (i.e., The Production Group, LLC)

seeks to enforce its contractual defense and indemnity claims against the indemnitee

81 Matter of Offshore Oil Services, Inc., Civil Action No. 21-1522, 2024 WL 4626206, at *2 (E.D. La.

Oct. 30, 2024)(Papillion, J.)(citation modified).

(i.e., TPIC). But Tanksley is close. The only difference between Tanksley and the

instant matter is the party seeking to enforce its indemnification rights. Similar to

Chevron in Tanksley, TPIC has settled with the Plaintiffs. Unlike Chevron in

Tanksley, however, TPIC does not seek indemnification from its contractor, The

Production Group, LLC. Instead, it is the contractor (i.e., The Production Group, LLC)

that seeks to enforce its indemnification rights against TPIC.

Despite the slight difference in this matter’s posture, the Court still finds the

instant matter falls under Tanksley’s purview.82 The Fifth Circuit has explained the

rationale of Tanksley:

In Tanksley, this court held that an oil company cannot invoke an

indemnification agreement with a contractor after settling an injured

worker's claims because, by settling, the oil company foreclosed its

opportunity to have a court determine that it was free from fault. The

Tanksley holding furthers the aims of the LOAIA by protecting

contractors from having to litigate an oil company's fault when the oil

company had an opportunity to adjudicate the matter in the previous

underlying action. Furthermore, because the indemnification provision

at issue in Tanksley was declared null and void, there was no risk that

the oil company could shift liability for its own negligence to the

contractor. Thus, Tanksley is consistent with the object of the LOAIA . .

. .83

Considering the above rationale of Tanksley, the Court finds that TPG Claimants’

contractual defense and indemnity claim against TPIC remains viable despite the

settlement agreements in this matter.

82 See Matter of Offshore Oil Services, Inc., 2024 WL 4626206, at *3 (“Thus, because the facts of this

case align with those in Tanksley and are distinguishable from the settlement arrangement

in American Home, this Court must follow Tanksley.”).

83 American Home Assur. Co., 400 F.3d at 270 (citing Tanksley, 848 F.2d 515).

The Court determines that this finding is appropriate for several reasons. As

an initial matter, “TPG did not settle Plaintiffs’ claims, pay settlement consideration,

or foreclose adjudication of its own fault.”84 Second, this Court’s holding furthers the

purpose of the LOAIA. As explained by the Fifth Circuit:

The LOAIA was also enacted to protect oilfield workers . . . . It is

universally known that the exploration for oil, gas and other minerals is

extremely hazardous. Any action which might have a substantial effect

on safety in that setting finds an instant audience. So it is with the

Oilfield Indemnity Act of 1981. It prevents one from requiring another

to indemnify one's own negligence or fault. If a person is permitted to

insulate himself from his own negligence, the motivation to institute and

enforce safe work practices and conditions is at best attenuated. One

who remains liable and exposed for his own negligence is more likely to

act with care. This Act is a rational attempt to improve oilfield safety.85

If this Court were to find, by virtue of TPIC’s settlement with Plaintiffs, that TPG

Claimants no longer had a viable contractual defense and indemnity claim against

TPIC, the fundamental purpose of the LOAIA would be frustrated. TPIC, along with

other oil and gas companies, would be free to settle with Plaintiffs and leave

contractors (i.e., The Production Group, LLC) without any recourse, bearing the costs

of litigation. In essence, this would allow oil and gas companies to avoid their

contractual obligations to independent contractors by virtue of settling with third

parties, such as Plaintiffs.

Such “end run around the LOAIA”86 is further exacerbated by the Court’s prior

finding that David Hayes, a payroll employee of The Production Group, LLC, was a

84 R. Doc. 246 at p. 1.

85 American Home Assur. Co., 400 F.3d at 269 (citation modified).

86 Id. at 270.

borrowed servant of TPIC.87 Pursuant to the Court’s prior ruling, TPIC is liable for

any tortious conduct attributable to David Hayes. Allowing TPIC to avoid its

contractual defense and indemnity obligations to The Production Group, LLC, based

on the fault of TPIC’s own borrowed employee, would allow TPIC to “insulate [itself]

from [its] own negligence,”88 thereby reducing the oil and gas company’s “motivation

to institute and enforce safe work practices and conditions . . . .”89 Such a result would

be inconsistent with the LOAIA. The Court therefore finds that TPG Claimants’

contractual defense and indemnity claim against TPIC is still viable under the

LOAIA.

Having found that TPG Claimants’ contractual defense and indemnity claim

against TPIC remains viable and noting that TPIC is liable for the tortious conduct

of David Hayes as its “borrowed employee,” the Court next addresses whether The

Production Group, LLC can be held liable for the tortious conduct of David Hayes, its

payroll employee.90 In a previous Order and Reasons, the Court found that Louisiana

law applies to the instant MSA regardless of whether the MSA was classified as non-

maritime or maritime.91 Accordingly, the Court applies Louisiana law.

In Morgan v. ABC Manufacturer, the Louisiana Supreme Court established

the “dual employer” doctrine, finding that “where a general employer is engaged in

the business of hiring out its employees under the supervision of another employer,

87 R. Doc. 228.

88 American Home Assur. Co., 400 F.3d at 269 (citation modified).

89 Id. (citation modified).

90 For the remainder of the Order and Reasons, the Court intentionally distinguishes between The

Production Group, LLC and David Hayes as opposed to “TPG Claimants.”

91 See R. Doc. 233.

the general employer remains liable for the torts of the ‘borrowed’ employees.”92

“Under this doctrine, the general employer remains liable for its employee's torts even

if it does not control the employee's work because its business is furthered when it

loans out its employee.”93 As explained by another Section of this Court:

Morgan held that when loaned employees are the temporary services

provider's stock in trade, the general employer will remain liable for the

torts of the borrowed employee. Liability remains with the general

employer when a significant feature of its business is to pass control of

the details of the work to its customers and it retains ultimate and

overriding authority over its loaned workers. When both employers

contemporaneously control and benefit from the loaned worker's liability,

both will be held liable under the Dual employer doctrine.94

Here, the record clearly establishes that The Production Group, LLC is a payroll

staffing company that is engaged in hiring out its employees under the supervision

of another employer.95 Indeed, a significant feature of The Production Group, LLC’s

business is to pass control of the supervision of its payroll employees to its customers,

in this case, TPIC.96 Accordingly, because the record establishes that The Production

Group, LLC and TPIC contemporaneously benefited from David Hayes’ assignment

to SP-24, the Court finds that both The Production Group, LLC and TPIC can be

liable for the negligence of David Hayes in this matter.

92 Morgan v. ABC Manufacturer, 710 So.2d 1077, 1078 (La. 1998).

93 Parkman v. W&T Offshore, Inc., 675 F.Supp.3d 684, 697 (M.D. La. 2023)(citing Morgan, 710 So.2d

at 1083).

94 Delozier v. S2 Energy Operating, LLC, 498 F.Supp.3d 884, 895 (E.D. La. 2020)(Morgan, J.)(citation

modified).

95 See generally, R. Doc. 228; see also R. Doc. 222 at p. 2 (“TPG is a staffing company that supplied

production operators, including Hayes, to TPIC.”).

96 See R. Doc. 222 at p. 2.

To the extent that The Production Group, LLC relies on Energy XXI, GoM, LLC

v. New Tech Engineering, L.P.97 for the proposition that “if maritime law applies,

Louisiana’s dual-employer doctrine does not[,]” the Court is unpersuaded due to the

distinguishable nature of Energy XXI, GoM, LLC.98 In that case, that court

determined that the pertinent Master Service Agreement was a maritime contract,

and therefore, federal maritime law governed the agreement.99 Here, as noted above,

the Court has determined that Louisiana law applies to the instant MSA regardless

of whether the MSA was classified as non-maritime or maritime.100 To be clear,

however, “[t]he analysis for determining whether general maritime law applies to the

Plaintiffs’ tort claim based on respondeat superior liability for [] alleged negligence is

identical to the analysis for determining whether federal admiralty jurisdiction exists

over the claim.”101 Because “[i]njuries sustained by workers during transfers between

a fixed platform and a vessel in navigable waters have been held to be neither

potentially disruptive to maritime commerce nor substantially related to traditional

maritime activity[,]” the MSA would not be classified as maritime in nature.102

97 787 F.Supp.2d 590 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2011).

98 R. Doc. 252 at p. 3 (citing Energy XXI, GoM, LLC, 787 F.Supp.2d at 620–21).

99 Energy XXI, GoM, LLC, 787 F.Supp.2d at 605 (“[T]he court concludes that the contract at issue is a

maritime contract. Thus, federal maritime law applies . . . .”).

100 See R. Doc. 233.

101 Delozier, 498 F.Supp.3d at 895 (citing Hamm v. Island Operating Co., Inc., 450 Fed.Appx. 365, 368

(5th Cir. 2011)).

102 Id. (citing Hufnagel v. Omega Serv. Industries, Inc., 182 F.3d 340, 349 (5th Cir. 1999); Exploration

& Production, Inc., 308 F.Supp.3d 878, 890 (E.D. La. 2018)). Notably, this finding does not deprive

this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Recar v. CNG Producing Co., 853 F.2d 367, 370 (5th

Cir. 1988)(finding that the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act can “invest[] [a] district court with

original federal question jurisdiction.”).

Accordingly, insofar as TPG Claimants assert that the “dual-employer”

doctrine is inapplicable based on Energy XXI, GoM, LLC, the Court disagrees as

general maritime law does not govern the MSA. Instead, the Court has determined

that Louisiana law applies either through the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act or

from Book IV of the Louisiana Civil Code for the reasons set forth in its May 17, 2026

Order and Reasons.103 This Court agrees with another Section of this court in a nearly

identical scenario which found that Louisiana’s “dual-employer” doctrine applies.104

This Court finds similarly.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that TPIC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that TPIC and TPG Claimants confer among

themselves to determine whether the parties are able to reach a stipulation as to the

allocation of fault between the two parties. TPIC and TPG Claimants shall advise the

Court whether or not a stipulation as to the allocation of fault between the parties

has been reached on or before August 14, 2026. If the parties are able to reach such

a stipulation, they are to file the stipulation into the record by the above date. If the

parties are unable to reach an agreement or stipulation as to the allocation of fault,

103 See R. Doc. 233.

104 See Delozier, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 895 (finding that the accident at issue was not subject to admiralty

jurisdiction and that Louisiana’s “dual-employer” doctrine applies in a case involving injuries to a crew

boat operator sustained while the operator transferred from a crew boat to a fixed drilling platform).

they are to notify the Court by sending an email to efile-Vitter@laed.uscourts.gov by

the above date. If the Court is advised by the parties that they were unable to agree

to a stipulation, the Court will determine the percentage of fault between TPIC and

TPG Claimants based on the record and the evidence presented at trial.

New Orleans, Louisiana, July 31, 2026.

WENDY B. (ieee

United States District Judge

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