Opinion

Baez

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Jul 14, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 42.1%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JASON BAEZ,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-788-WWB-MCR

REGISTERED NURSE JASON

HOWELL, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________________

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 31) and

Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 44) thereto. For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss

will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff Jason Baez, an inmate of the Florida Department of Corrections (“FDOC”),

is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis on a verified First Amended Complaint

(“Amended Complaint,” Doc. 181), filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff sues the

following Defendants in their individual2 capacities: (1) Registered Nurse Jason Howell

(“Nurse Howell”); (2) Captain Jesus Camacho (“Camacho”); (3) Captain Regina R.

Ratliff (“Ratliff”); (4) Lieutenant Supervisor William B. Boone (“Boone”); (5) Lieutenant

Supervisor Alton McDonald (“McDonald”); (6) Correctional Officer Joseph Finney

1 Attached to the Amended Complaint are Plaintiff’s Sworn Affidavit (Doc. 18-1)

and Amended Verification and Declaration (Doc. 18-2).

2 Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against all Defendants were dismissed without

prejudice on April 3, 2026. (See Doc. 38).

(“Finney”); (7) Correctional Officer Jacob G. Manning (“Manning”); (8) Correctional

Officer Thomas A. Fortescue (“Fortescue”); and (9) Lieutenant Supervisor David

Duckwiler (“Duckwiler”).3 (Doc. 18 at 2–3).

In Plaintiff’s own words, he “was sexually harassed [and] abused by two officers

and tried reporting them to no avail[,] and suffered being gassed and terribly beaten, and

also denied a shower without any medical attention whatsoever.” (Doc. 44 at 14). Plaintiff

alleges the events happened at Suwannee Correctional Institution (“Suwannee C.I.”) on

August 14, 2022. (Doc. 18 at 4; see also Doc. 18-1 at 1; Doc. 18-2 at 1–3). Plaintiff

alleges the following “Facts”:

4. On August 14, 2022, Plaintiff was escorted to Suwannee [C.I.] Annex P-

Dorm . . . by Boone, who[] worked [the 4:00 p.m. to 12:00 a.m.] shift.

5. On the way to confinement[,] Plaintiff asked Boone if [they could] bypass

[the] medical pre-confinement assessment in order to be able to use the

restroom and drink some water as soon as [they arrived at] P-dorm[,] [to]

which Boone agreed.

6. When Plaintiff arrived at P-Dorm[,] Boone placed Plaintiff inside a holding

cell and denied him [access] to . . . the restroom.

7. Plaintiff couldn’t hold [him]self from urinating[,] so he urinated on the

clothes he was wearing.

8. Plaintiff got urine on the floor[,] and Boone got angry.

Racial Discrimination

9. Boone called Plaintiff “you dirty spic,” and Boone is a white male [whereas]

Plaintiff is a Hispanic male.

3 The present Motion is filed on behalf of all Defendants, except Nurse Howell.

(Doc. 31). Nurse Howell’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 49) will be addressed separately.

Sexual Abuse/Harassment

10. Boone kept arguing and threatening Plaintiff to [sic] where Boone went

inside his office and began making lewd and lascivious gestures at Plaintiff

with his hands as if he was masturbating at Plaintiff.

11. Finney entered . . . [the] P-Dorm cell[-]front and began disrespecting

Plaintiff with homosexual sayings[,] . . . stepped into the hallway laundry

room[,] and pulled his penis and began to stroke it in a back[-]and[-]forth

motion.

Failure to Act

12. As soon as Camacho arrived [at] P-Dorm[,] Plaintiff explained what [had]

transpired[,] and Camacho did not want to address [Plaintiff’s Prison Rape

Elimination Act (“PREA”)] allegation[,] which is Plaintiff’s right[,] especially

being a registered transgender at the time.

13. Plaintiff was asked to submit to hand restraints[,] at which time Plaintiff

advised Camacho that as soon as he allow[ed] Plaintiff . . . to report these

sexual harassments and lewd [and] lascivious acts by his subordinate

officers [sic]. Instead[,] Camacho refused . . . .

14. Ratliff came into P-Dorm trying to get Plaintiff to cuff up[,] and when

Plaintiff tried explaining his allegations of the serious misconduct, she also

refused to do her duty.

Threats of Harm

15. Camacho got angry and threatened “to beat my ass” [and] “gas me,”

meaning he’d use chemical agents on Plaintiff.

16. Plaintiff is a disabled prisoner with only one eye,[4] and also a seizure

patient on [Keppra medication] with multiple mental health disorders.

17. Camacho and Ratliff used [three] big canisters of chemical agents on

Plaintiff while totally defenseless in a small holding cell.

18. Camacho carried out his threat “to gas me” and ordered a five[-]man

cell extraction riot team, with helmets, padded elbows, knees, vests, boots,

[and] with a huge shield to enter Plaintiff’s cell and use excessive force by

ramming Plaintiff’s head against the wall and bench as well as stomping

[on] both of Plaintiff’s feet.

4 Plaintiff alleges he is permanently blind in one eye. (Doc. 18 at 11–12).

Misuse of Force

19. Camacho gave the order for the extraction team to be formed[,] allowing

Boone to open the holding cell door[,] and watched team members enter

and misuse force on Plaintiff.

20. McDonald was the shield man who[] earlier threatened to use a stun

gun (taser) [on] Plaintiff and [who] also lost Plaintiff’s personal property on

purpose that same night.

21. Camacho and Ratliff both allowed Finney to participate as the third cell

team member after Plaintiff reported sexual misconduct against Finney[,]

which was a violation.

22. McDonald hit Plaintiff with the shield so hard [that] Plaintiff saw stars

and felt like his shoulder broke.

23. Camacho [began] screaming “stop resisting[,]” which is the signal letting

team members know the camera is blocked and unable to see clearly into

the cell.

24. McDonald, Manning[,] and Finney then began to punch, kick, [and]

elbow Plaintiff all over[,] while also slamming his head against the walls

[and] stomping on Plaintiff’s feet[,] causing the los[s] of three . . . toenails.

25. McDonald, Manning[,] and Finney rammed Plaintiff’s head against the

walls and metal bench numerous times causing [four] big,

deep . . . lacerations to the back of Plaintiff’s head[,] which needed stitches

and immediate medical attention, but to no avail.

26. Camacho, Ratliff, Fortescue[,] and Duckwiler stood by and watched this

beating and did nothing to stop this brutal assault.

27. Once these Defendants placed restraints on Plaintiff[,] Camacho

ordered someone to place a tight spit shield over Plaintiff’s head to hide the

injuries from possible eyewitnesses[,] which is routine whenever excessive

force is used.

28. Plaintiff complied with all . . . orders and [was] escorted to wing #2 for a

decontamination shower[,] which Defendants never planned to allow him to

take on his own free will.

Denial of Decontamination Shower

29. Both Camacho and Ratliff denied Plaintiff a decontamination shower

after just using [three] big canisters of chemical agents on Plaintiff in fear

that Plaintiff would become disorderly once the restraints were removed and

made up an excuse to deny a decontamination shower.

Water[-Boarding]

30. Camacho and Ratliff ordered Manning and Fortescue to pour water over

Plaintiff’s head with a hose[,] while Plaintiff was cuffed and wearing a tight

spit shield, blinded in pain and unable to breathe[,] in fear for his life[,]

chocking from the gas all over his head[,] face[,] and eyes, thus destroying

[his] personal clothing[,] torturing Plaintiff and denying him a policy[-]and[-

]procedure shower[,] while Plaintiff was following all orders and not

resisting.

31. Both Camacho and Ratliff ordered team members to cut off all of

Plaintiff’s brand[-]new personal clothing[,] including throwing out his brand[-

]new shoes[,] right in front of male and female officers[,] as well as in front

of the inmate wing population for all to see Plaintiff “butt naked[,]” knowing

that Plaintiff was a registered transgender with a pass to be pat[-]frisked by

female officers only and [to] shower alone[,] which was in fact authorized by

the warden and classification.

32. Nurse Howell allowed security to commit these violations and did

nothing to intervene[,] which is clearly a violation of privacy.

Denial of Medical Care[]

33. Nurse Howell ordered security to spin Plaintiff around “butt naked” on

the hand[-]held camera in front of the whole wing #2 inmate population,

male and female officers to view him[,] violating his right to privacy[,] which

should have been done in medical per policy[,] and allow[ed] Plaintiff to be

recorded “butt naked” on video footage[,] without ever giving security and

Defendants any instructions to remove the spit shield[,] which was clearly

drenched in blood[,] and didn’t log down any of Plaintiff’s injuries until the

following day whe[n] he had to be taken to the infirmary for medical attention

and evaluation[,] [at which time the injuries were] logged down . . . . Plaintiff

suffered contusions to the face and eyes, bruises all over the body from

head to toes, [four] deep lacerations to the back of the head[,] which needed

to be stitched, bloodied nose, lips, injured shoulder, and the loss of [three]

toenails[,] which was very painful.

34. Plaintiff was then escorted to wing #1 where he was placed inside of an

empty cell without anything to cover up with[,] left cold[,] and bleeding

profusely all night to the point of unconsciousness two times from loss of

blood.

35. Plaintiff lost so much blood that the midnight shift officers placed

sandbags in front of his cell[,] trying to stop the blood from leaking under the

cell door for the camera to view the mess[,] leaving him for dead.

36. Nurse Howell was supposed to have security bring [Plaintiff] to medical

[according to the] procedure for privacy and [do] a post use[-]of[-]force

assessment[,] which he clearly failed to do[,] in order to log down all injuries,

call the provider for further and immediate medical treatment[,] and have my

head wounds sutured, but to no avail[,] [instead,] leaving me in terrible pain

and anguish with[out] any pain medication whatsoever.

37. Plaintiff notified the [12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.] shift officers that he needed

medical attention due to his injuries[,] which would not stop bleeding[,] and

Nurse Howell denied Plaintiff any medical care[,] but instead left him to

bleed out to the point of going unconscious twice during the night[,] waking

[up] in a pool of blood in a cold cell without a suicide blanket to cover up

with[,] which is policy.

38. Plaintiff was denied his breakfast meal by [the 12:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.]

shift officials who[] were all nasty toward Plaintiff[,] as well as [by the 8:00

a.m. to 4:00 p.m.] shift officials Batton and Sgt. Whom [who] denied him

lunch as retaliation for reporting staff abuse.

39. Plaintiff was taken to the infirmary the following day of August 15, 2022[,]

where he was seen by medical who[] advised Plaintiff that sutures could not

be applied to the serious injuries and lacerations to the back of the head

due to medical waiting longer than [four] hours, therefore causing them to

heal on their own [and] leaving huge ugly scars on the back of Plaintiff’s

head.

40. While in the infirmary for [nine] days[,] Plaintiff lost three . . . toenails

from the excessive force[,] which caused excruciating pain from [his] feet

being stomped [on].

41. On August 25, 2022[,] Plaintiff was seen by medical at Lake Correctional

Institution [(“Lake C.I.”)] mental health hospital[,] where nursing staff

reported and documented his injuries.

42. While at Lake C.I.[,] Plaintiff reported his injuries to medical and

security[,] who[] documented all injuries, took photos of his injuries[,] and

allowed Plaintiff to report [the] sexual[] abuse and speak to the inspector

general.

(Doc. 18 at 4–10 (names abbreviated)).

In his “Statement of Claim,” Plaintiff alleges as follows. Plaintiff was viciously

assaulted, and suffered serious physical and emotional injuries, because he tried to report

the lewd and lascivious conduct of Boone and Finney. (Id. at 12). Camacho and Ratliff

did not allow Plaintiff to report Boone and Finney’s conduct, and failed to intervene when

their subordinates rammed Plaintiff’s head against the wall and steel bench maliciously

and sadistically. (Id. at 11). Camacho threatened to “beat Plaintiff’s ass” if he did not

submit to hand restraints, and allowed Finney to participate in the cell extraction and use

excessive force on Plaintiff, knowing of Plaintiff’s PREA-related allegations against

Finney. (Id.). Camacho and Ratliff did not allow Plaintiff to use a decontamination shower

and instead gave orders to water-board Plaintiff with a hose, while Plaintiff was fully

clothed, covered with a tight spit shield, and unable to breathe. (Id. at 11–12). Then,

knowing that Plaintiff was a registered transgender, Camacho and Ratliff ordered that

Plaintiff’s clothing be removed in front of the entire wing population, leaving Plaintiff “butt

naked” and humiliated. (Id. at 12). McDonald, Finney, Manning, Fortescue, and

Duckwiler used excessive force on Plaintiff without any need or provocation, and/or failed

to intervene in the use of force. (Id. at 12–13). Nurse Howell refused to authorize security

to remove Plaintiff’s blood-soaked spit shield to see where the blood was coming from,

refused to provide a medical assessment, refused to document his injuries, and refused

to provide adequate medical care. (Id. at 13). As relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and

punitive damages, declaratory relief, and a permanent restraining order5 against all

Defendants. (Id. at 4, 14–16).

5 Part of the requested injunctive relief is against Boone, Finney, Camacho, Ratliff,

McDonald, Manning, Fortescue, and Duckwiler, but not against Nurse Howell. (Doc. 18

at 15).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to

dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In

determining whether to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court accepts the factual

allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in a light most favorable to the

non-moving party. See United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir.

2009). Nonetheless, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, “[t]o survive a motion

to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Initial Observations and Conclusions

With the benefit of liberal construction, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges the

following claims:

(1) excessive use of force against Camacho and Ratliff (for using chemical agents

without justification, and then ordering the cell extraction team to use excessive force and

water-board Plaintiff), McDonald (for punching, elbowing, and kicking Plaintiff, hitting him

with the shield, ramming his head against the wall and steel bench, and stomping on his

feet during the cell extraction), Finney and Duckwiler (for punching, elbowing, and kicking

Plaintiff, ramming his head against the wall and steel bench, and stomping on his feet

during the cell extraction), and Manning and Fortescue (for punching, elbowing, and

kicking Plaintiff, ramming his head against the wall and steel bench, and stomping on his

feet during the cell extraction, and then water-boarding him with a hose);

(2) failure to protect or intervene against Camacho and Ratliff (for allowing Finney

to participate in the cell extraction, knowing that Finney and Boone had just sexually

harassed Plaintiff; allowing the cell extraction team to use excessive force; and

authorizing the water-boarding and removal of Plaintiff’s clothes, knowing that he was a

registered transgender); McDonald, Finney, Manning, Fortescue, and Duckwiler (for

failing to intervene in the assault and battery during the cell extraction); and Nurse Howell

(for failing to intervene in the other Defendants’ violations);

(3) deliberate indifference against Camacho and Ratliff (for unjustifiably denying

Plaintiff a decontamination shower);

(4) sexual harassment against Finney (for making homosexual remarks, exposing

his penis, and stroking it in front of Plaintiff), and Camacho and Ratliff (for ordering the

removal of Plaintiff’s clothing in front of the entire wing population);

(5) assault and battery against McDonald, Finney, Manning, Fortescue, and

Duckwiler (for their conduct during the cell extraction); and

(6) medical deliberate indifference against Nurse Howell (for failure to provide a

medical assessment, document Plaintiff’s injuries, and provide adequate medical care

post use of force, and then leaving Plaintiff to bleed out to the point of unconsciousness

twice). (See generally Doc. 18).

The Court considers Plaintiff’s general allegations of negligence and threats of

violence by Camacho and McDonald to be part of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims;

as such, the Court does not separately address Defendants’ arguments for the dismissal

of these allegations. (See Doc. 31 at 6–7). Also, the Court does not address Defendants’

arguments for dismissal of any retaliation claim, premised on Defendants’ conduct on

August 14–15, 2022, and motivated by Plaintiff’s earlier reports of staff abuse and sexual

harassment, because Plaintiff admits that he “did not make a retaliation claim.” (Doc. 44

at 14). To the extent Plaintiff alleges he was denied breakfast and lunch on August 15,

2022, by “shift officials,” such as Batton and Sgt. Whom, “as retaliation for reporting staff

abuse,” (Doc. 18 at 10), the “shift officials” are not named as Defendants in this action. If

Plaintiff believes he can state a claim for retaliation against any of the named Defendants,

(see Doc. 44 at 14–15, 21; see also Doc. 18-1 at 1), he may file an appropriate motion in

accordance with all applicable rules and law. Requests for affirmative relief in response

to a motion are improper. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b) (“A request for a court order must be

made by motion.”); M.D. Fla. R. 3.01(b) (providing that a motion must be supported by a

memorandum of law); M.D. Fla. R. 3.01(g) (providing that before filing most motions, a

party must confer with the opposing parties in a good faith effort to resolve the motion).

However, if the retaliation claim is unrelated to the claims raised in this action, Plaintiff

should bring it in a separate action. Further, to the extent the Amended Complaint raises

claims for sexual harassment and racial discrimination against Boone (for making lewd

and lascivious gestures as if he was masturbating at Plaintiff, and calling Plaintiff a “dirty

spic”), for failure to allow Plaintiff to report PREA-related allegations against Camacho

and Ratliff, and for personal property deprivation against McDonald, Manning, Fortescue,

Camacho, and Ratliff (for the loss or destruction of Plaintiff’s clothing and shoes), the

Court will dismiss these claims without prejudice as follows.

First, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for sexual harassment and racial discrimination

against Boone. Plaintiff alleges that Boone called him a “dirty spic,” and made lewd and

lascivious gestures at him as if Boone was masturbating. However, a correctional

officer’s verbal threats and gestures of sexual harassment, without more, do not rise to

the level of a constitutional violation. Watkins v. Azael, No. 22-11648, 2023 WL 4422527,

at *7 (11th Cir. July 10, 2023)6; see also Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1273 n.1

(11th Cir. 1989) (stating that “verbal taunts . . . [h]owever distressing” cannot establish a

claim under the Eighth Amendment); Barfield v. Hetzel, No. 2:11-cv-1114, 2015 WL

758490, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2015)7 (“Derogatory, demeaning, profane, threatening

or abusive comments made by an officer to an inmate, no matter how repugnant or

unprofessional, do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”); Russell v. Walton

Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 3:11-cv-5, 2011 WL 794146, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 1, 2011)

(“Threats, cursing, name-calling, and verbal abuse, while unprofessional and

reprehensible, do not amount to the violation of a federal constitutional right.”); Pete’s

6 Any unpublished decisions cited in this Order are deemed persuasive authority

on the relevant point of law. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1061 (11th Cir.

2022).

7 Although decisions of other district courts are not binding, they may be cited as

persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir.

2004) (“Although a district court would not be bound to follow any other district court’s

determination, the decision would have significant persuasive effects.”).

Towing Co. v. City of Tampa, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (stating that

“verbal threats and harassment are generally not actionable under § 1983”). Therefore,

Plaintiff’s claims of sexual harassment and racial discrimination against Boone will be

dismissed without prejudice.

To the extent Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim against

Finney should be dismissed for the same reasons, the Court disagrees. (Doc. 31 at 16–

17). Accepting as true Plaintiff’s allegations that Finney not only made homosexual

remarks, but also exposed his penis and began stroking it in front of Plaintiff, the Court

will allow Plaintiff’s claim against Finney to proceed. While Defendants speculate that the

officers’ gestures towards their genitalia “likely relate” to Plaintiff “urinating on himself as

opposed to a sexual reference,” Defendants admit that Plaintiff’s interaction with Finney

is not caught on video, and that the Court must accept Plaintiff’s version of the events as

true. (Id. at 16 & n.4).

Next, to the extent any of Plaintiff’s claims are premised on the PREA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 15601 et seq., Plaintiff is advised that the PREA does not create a private cause of

action. See, e.g., Edwards v. Sewell, No. 2:21-CV-79, 2024 WL 629973, at *4 (M.D. Ala.

Jan. 23, 2024) (“Courts have uniformly held that the PREA does not create a private

cause of action.”), rep. & recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 627984 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 14,

2024); A.G. v. Riverside Christian Ministries, Inc., No. 23-cv-22776, 2023 WL 6443118,

at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2023) (“Although the Eleventh Circuit hasn’t yet opined on whether

the PREA creates a private right of action, many district courts in this Circuit (and others)

have held that it does not. And every federal circuit court to have passed on this question

has likewise held that the PREA doesn’t establish a private cause of action.” (citations

omitted); Jacoby v. PREA Coordinator, No. 5:17-cv-53, 2017 WL 2962858, *7 (N.D. Ala.

Apr. 4, 2017) (concluding that plaintiff’s “claims based on the PREA and failure to

investigate, report, and prosecute claims should all be dismissed,” because “plaintiff has

no protected interest or right to have alleged wrongdoers investigated or prosecuted”),

rep. & recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 2957825, *1 (N.D. Ala. July 11, 2017).

To the extent Plaintiff alleges that Camacho and Ratliff failed to allow him to report

his PREA-related allegations about Boone and Finney to trigger an investigation, such

allegations do not give rise to a constitutional violation. See Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d

1340, 1356 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding no constitutional right to an investigation of an

excessive-force complaint), overruled in part on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan,

555 U.S. 223 (2009); Jacoby, 2017 WL 2962858, at *5 (“The failure or refusal to

investigate a prisoner’s complaints creates no liability under § 1983.”); Fulmore v. Andre,

No. 8:12-cv-1705-T, 2012 WL 4856938, at *3 n.8 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2012) (“[P]risoners

do not have a constitutional right to any specific kind of investigation by prison officials.”).

Finally, while Defendants’ Motion does not address Plaintiff’s claims of personal

property deprivation, such claims will be dismissed without prejudice because Plaintiff’s

remedy is in state court. The Due Process Clause is not violated when a state employee

intentionally deprives an individual of his property as long as the State provides him with

a meaningful post-deprivation remedy. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984);

Jackson v. Hill, 569 F. App’x 697, 698 (11th Cir. 2014); Taylor v. McSwain, 335 F. App’x

32, 34 (11th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff has an adequate post-deprivation remedy under Florida

law because he can sue Defendants for conversion. Jackson, 569 F. App’x at 698 (citing

Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009)).

B. Excessive Force and Related Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to establish claims of excessive force and

failure to protect or intervene, or “any facts that overcome Defendants’ entitlement to

qualified immunity.” (Doc. 31 at 1, 7–8). To support their Motion, Defendants submit two

videos that they believe “clearly depict[] the events that are central to Plaintiff’s claim.”

(Id. at 9). Defendants argue the videos should be incorporated into the Amended

Complaint based on the “incorporation by reference” doctrine.8 (Id. at 8–10).

Even if the videos are incorporated into the pleading, they depict only some of the

events alleged in the Amended Complaint.9 (See Doc. Nos. 31-1, 33). At most, the

videos capture what happened between 11:11 p.m. on August 14, 2022, and 12:40 a.m.

on August 15, 2022. (See id.). The first video, which is 50:57 minutes, shows that Plaintiff

was ordered to submit to hand restraints, he refused and was sprayed with chemical

agents three times, and then preparations commenced for a cell extraction. (Id.). The

second video, which is 25:55 minutes, shows the cell extraction from a distance; the

8 Generally, a court should not consider extrinsic evidence when ruling on a motion

to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters

outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be

treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”). However, a court may consider

extrinsic evidence when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if a document incorporated by

reference in the complaint “is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim and (2) undisputed.” Day

v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125,

1134 (11th Cir. 2002)); see also Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d

1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[W]here the plaintiff refers to certain documents in the

complaint and those documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim, then the Court may

consider the documents part of the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.”).

9 Both videos, particularly the shorter one, repeatedly skip backwards, making it

very difficult to follow the events. If Defendants intend to rely on these videos in the future,

they should make every effort to provide the Court and Plaintiff with new copies of the

same.

placement of a spit shield on Plaintiff’s head; the washing of Plaintiff’s body with a hose,

which seemed to occur in a hallway, while Plaintiff was still wearing his pants, shoes, and

the spit shield; the removal of Plaintiff’s clothing and shoes at the same spot; the

placement of a one-piece “turtle suit” over Plaintiff’s naked body; Plaintiff’s brief medical

assessment by a male nurse; and Plaintiff’s placement in a cell. (Id.).

Based on these videos, Defendants ask the Court to conclude that the

“[u]ndisputed video evidence demonstrates that the force used during [Plaintiff’s] August

14, 2022, cell extraction and before[,] was reasonably necessary under the

circumstances.” (Doc. 31 at 11). Importantly, however, the videos do not seem to cover

the entirety of Plaintiff’s interactions with Defendants on the night of August 14, 2022.10

For the interactions that are captured on video, the conversations are sometimes

inaudible, and the parties are sometimes hard to identify either due to their protective

gear, location, distance, or because the camera points elsewhere (e.g., when Plaintiff was

naked). Additionally, Plaintiff points out that most of the video footage depicting the

events on August 14, 2022, is missing, because the battery of the camera died as soon

as the cell extraction team entered the cell. (Doc. 44 at 2, 6, 12). In his affidavit, Plaintiff

avers that the dead battery is the reason why the video footage “goes from [the officers]

entering the cell and skips to [where] the officers [are] on the ground on top of [Plaintiff]

blocking [the] view of what[’]s going on.” (Id. at 21).

Accepting Plaintiff’s averments and factual allegations as true, the Court will allow

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims for Defendants’ excessive use of force, failure to

10 If the Court is mistaken, Defendants may present declarations or other evidence

to support their positions.

protect or intervene, and denial of a decontamination shower, as well as the related state-

law claims of assault and battery, to proceed. On the current record, the Court cannot

determine whether the two videos support Defendants’ view of the facts.11 Thus, to the

extent Defendants seek dismissal of these claims, Defendants’ Motion will be denied.

Defendants’ Motion will also be denied to the extent it raises the defense of

qualified immunity. Defendants argue, without much elaboration, that they are entitled to

qualified immunity because:

Defendants were all performing their duties at the time of the allegations in

Plaintiff’s complaint and deny that they violated Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights. . . . .

It is beyond dispute that the officers were acting within their corrections

enforcement functions. Thus, the burden shifts to Baez to demonstrate that

qualified immunity is not appropriate.

(Doc. 31 at 15–16).

“In order to receive qualified immunity, the public official must first prove that he

was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts

occurred.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). “The

question is ‘whether the act complained of, if done for a proper purpose, would be within,

or reasonably related to, the outer perimeter of an official’s discretionary duties.’” Hargis

v. City of Orlando, No. 6:12-cv-723-Orl, 2012 WL 6089715, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2012)

(quoting Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2006)).

11 While Defendants seemingly ask the Court to assume that the force used was

reasonable and that Plaintiff was “immediately combative” upon the officers’ entry,

Defendants admit that Plaintiff cannot be seen because the officers’ bodies are blocking

the camera, and that even the officers “cannot be seen fully on camera” during the cell

extraction. (Doc. 31 at 10, 12 & n.3).

There is no dispute that Defendants were acting within their discretionary duties

as correctional officers during the events underlying Plaintiff’s claims. Thus, the burden

shifts to Plaintiff to sufficiently allege that Defendants “(1) violated a constitutional right,

and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” Holloman

ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). “For a right to be

clearly established, ‘[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929

F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987)). In the context of an excessive force claim, courts “may find fair warning in the

law without also finding a factually identical case.” Id. at 1312.

“Under the Eighth Amendment, force is deemed legitimate in a custodial setting if

it is ‘applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline’ and not ‘maliciously

and sadistically to cause harm.’” Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)). “This standard requires a prisoner

to establish two elements – one subjective and one objective: the official must have both

‘acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind’ (the subjective element), and the conduct

must have been ‘objectively harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation.’”

Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at

8). “In determining whether force was used ‘maliciously and sadistically,’ [courts]

consider: (1) ‘the need for the application of force’; (2) ‘the relationship between the need

and the amount of force that was used’; (3) ‘the extent of the injury inflicted upon the

prisoner’; (4) ‘the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates’; and (5) ‘any efforts

made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Sears, 922 F.3d at 1205 (Cockrell

v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2007)). Additionally, “[a]n officer who is present

at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another

officer’s use of excessive force can be held liable for his nonfeasance.” Williams v.

Radford, 64 F.4th 1185, 1199 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Velazquez v. City of Hialeah, 484

F.3d 1340, 1341 (11th Cir. 2007)).

The Court notes that although “the defense of qualified immunity is typically

addressed at the summary judgment stage of a case, it may be . . . raised and considered

on a motion to dismiss.” St. George v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.

2002). “Generally speaking, it is proper to grant a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity

grounds when the ‘complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established

constitutional right.’” Corbitt, 929 F.3d at 1311 (quoting St. George, 285 F.3d at 1337).

Here, at the time of the alleged events (August 2022), it was clearly established

that “government officials may not use gratuitous force against a prisoner who has been

already subdued.” Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002); see also

Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1576 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The basic legal principle is that

once the necessity for the application of force ceases, any continued use of harmful force

can be a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and any abuse directed at

the prisoner after he terminates his resistance to authority is an Eighth Amendment

violation.”). It was also clearly established that failing to intervene in a use of excessive

force violates the Eighth Amendment. See Velazquez, 484 F.3d at 1341 (“The law of this

circuit is that ‘an officer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable steps

to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force, can be held liable for his

nonfeasance.’” (quoting Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1302)). Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as

true, he has sufficiently alleged violations of his clearly established constitutional rights.

While Defendants may be entitled to qualified immunity after further factual development,

at this stage of the proceeding, their request is denied.

C. Declaratory Relief

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief

should be dismissed as moot, because Plaintiff was housed at another institution at the

time he filed this action. (Doc. 31 at 18). The Court agrees that Plaintiff’s requests for

declaratory and injunctive relief have been rendered moot by virtue of his transfer. See

Spears v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d 1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that a prisoner’s

requests for injunctive and declaratory relief relating to the conditions of his confinement

were rendered moot by the prisoner’s transfer to a different facility). Thus, the Court will

dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief relating

to the conditions of his confinement at Suwannee C.I.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 31) is GRANTED only to the extent

the Court dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims for failure to allow

reporting of Plaintiff’s PREA-related allegations against Camacho and

Ratliff, sexual harassment and racial discrimination against Boone, and

personal property deprivation against McDonald, Manning, Fortescue,

Camacho, and Ratliff, as well as Plaintiff’s requests for declaratory and

injunctive relief. In all other respects, the Motion is DENIED.

2. The following claims remain: excessive use of force against Camacho,

Ratliff, McDonald, Finney, Duckwiler, Manning, and Fortescue; failure to

protect or intervene against Camacho, Ratliff, McDonald, Finney, Duckwiler,

Manning, Fortescue, and Nurse Howell'?; denial of a decontamination

shower against Camacho and Ratliff; assault and battery against McDonald,

Finney, Manning, Fortescue, and Duckwiler; sexual harassment against

Finney, Camacho, and Ratliff; and medical deliberate indifference against

Nurse Howell.

3. Defendants Camacho, Ratliff, McDonald, Finney, Duckwiler, Manning, and

Fortescue shall file an answer to the Amended Complaint within twenty-

one days from the date of this Order.

4. Aseparate order setting case management deadlines will be entered after

the Court rules on Nurse Howell’s Motion to Dismiss.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, on July 14, 2026.

UNITED STATES T JUDG

Jax-11

C: Jason Baez, #169800

Counsel of Record

‘2 The Court has not yet addressed the claims against Nurse Howell. (See Doc.

49).

20

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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