Manning

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ANTWON MANNING,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 24-cv-1719-NJR

RYAN KILDUFF, DARREN

GALLOWAY, and KARL BRADFORD,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:

Plaintiff Antwon Manning, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

who is currently incarcerated at Shawnee Correctional Center, brings this action for

deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment on the issue of

administrative exhaustion filed by Defendants Karl Bradford, Ryan Kilduff, and Darren

Galloway (Docs. 54, 55). Manning filed a response (Doc. 59) in opposition to the motion.

Defendants filed a reply (Doc. 60).

BACKGROUND

On July 16, 2024, Manning filed a Complaint alleging that he was retaliated against

for filing lawsuits. Specifically, Manning alleged that he was issued a disciplinary ticket

that, although factually accurate, charged him with infractions that did not match his

actions (Doc. 9, p. 2). Manning alleged that adjustment committee member Karl Bradford

found him guilty of the disciplinary ticket despite his defense. Manning alleged Bradford

acted in retaliation because Manning had previously filed a lawsuit against Bradford

regarding his handling of another disciplinary ticket (Id.). Warden Darren Galloway

signed off on the ticket (Id. at p. 3). Manning alleged Galloway also retaliated against him

due to Manning’s lawsuit against Galloway (Id.). Manning wrote a grievance regarding

the ticket and alleged that Warden Darren Galloway and Administrative Review Board

(“ARB”) member Ryan Kilduff failed to investigate and ultimately denied the grievance

in retaliation for Manning’s previously filed lawsuit.

After review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Manning was

allowed to proceed on the following count:

Count 1: First Amendment retaliation claim against Karl R. Bradford,

Darren Galloway, and Ryan Kilduff for issuing a false

disciplinary ticket and upholding it through the grievance

process in retaliation for Manning filing a lawsuit.

(Doc. 9, p. 6).

The parties agree that Manning filed one grievance relevant to his claim. On

February 8, 2024, Manning submitted Grievance #K19-24-02-95 regarding his

disciplinary ticket (Doc. 54-2, pp. 34-41). He alleged that Correctional Officer (“C/O”)

Glover issued him a ticket for Dangerous Disturbance, Damage or Misuse of Property,

and Disobeying a Direct Order (Id. at p. 36). Manning’s grievance acknowledged that he

left his cell unauthorized and went to the dayroom, but he argued that the charges failed

to match his actual actions (Id. at pp. 36-37). He also claimed that Glover failed to

substantiate the elements of each violation in his ticket (Id. at p. 37). Manning complained

that he was found guilty of disobeying a direct order despite Glover failing to state that

Manning was ever given a direct order (Id. at p. 37). Manning noted that he was not

charged with unauthorized movement which was actually the infraction he committed

by leaving his cell (Id.). His grievance noted that he explained his issue with the charges

to Bradford during the hearing on February 7, 2024, but Bradford still found him guilty

of two of the charges. Bradford found Manning not guilty of damage or misuse of

property (Id.).

On February 20, 2024, the grievance officer received Manning’s grievance and

reviewed the grievance the same day. The grievance officer claimed that Manning’s ticket

had not yet been heard by the adjustment committee (Doc. 54-2, p. 35). The grievance

officer noted that the disciplinary ticket could not be grieved until it went through the

entire process, including a hearing before the adjustment committee and the findings

signed by the Chief Administrative Officer (“CAO”) (Id.). That same day, the CAO

concurred with the grievance officer’s findings (Id.).

On February 22, 2024, Manning appealed the grievance to the ARB (Doc. 54-2,

p. 35). He included a response to the grievance officer’s findings (Id. at pp. 38-39).

Manning noted that he had a pending lawsuit against Bradford and Galloway due to

Bradford finding him guilty of a previous disciplinary ticket (Id.). He claimed the lawsuit

was filed a few months prior to his current disciplinary ticket (Id.). Manning claimed that

the grievance officer lied in his response when he alleged that the disciplinary ticket had

not yet been heard by the adjustment committee. He noted that he attended the hearing

on February 7, 2024, was found guilty, and then submitted his grievance the next day (Id.

at pp. 38-39). He alleged that officials were trying to prevent him from challenging his

ticket and challenging Bradford’s actions (Id. at p. 39). Manning claimed he was facing a

cover-up by the prison (Id.).

On February 28, 2024, the ARB received Manning’s grievance (Doc. 54-2, p. 34).

Kilduff noted that Manning grieved a January 24 disciplinary report, noting the incident

number “202400165/1-SHA”. But he ultimately denied the ticket, noting that there was

no record of the disciplinary ticket (Id.).

Although Manning’s grievance was fully exhausted, Defendants argue that the

grievance failed to include any allegations that Bradford, Galloway, or Kilduff retaliated

against him (Doc. 55, p. 10). Manning did not include allegations regarding his pending

lawsuit and his belief in a “cover-up” until he submitted the grievance to the ARB and

included his response letter and information regarding his lawsuit (Doc. 54-2, pp. 38-41).

In response, Manning argues that his original grievance made clear that he believed

Bradford participated in “trumped charges” and found him guilty on the charges

(Doc. 59, p. 2). Manning argues that because the grievance officer claimed that the hearing

had not yet occurred when Manning noted the hearing date in his grievance, Manning

believed that the grievance officer and Warden Galloway, who signed off on the

grievance, were part of a cover-up (Id. at p. 3). Manning argues that he chose not to write

a follow-up grievance claiming that the warden and ARB official denied the grievance

because the officers would have been the ones to respond to the grievance (Id.). He

believed he would face more harassment and cover-ups as a result of a grievance against

Galloway and Kilduff (Id.).

LEGAL STANDARDS

“Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, discovery materials, disclosures,

and affidavits demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact such that [the defendant] is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Wragg v. Village of Thornton, 604 F.3d 464, 467

(7th Cir. 2010). Lawsuits filed by inmates are governed by the provisions of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). That statute states, in pertinent part,

that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of

this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”

Id. The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.

Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[t]his circuit has taken a

strict compliance approach to exhaustion”). Exhaustion must occur before the suit is filed.

Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff cannot file suit and then

exhaust his administrative remedies while the suit is pending. Id. Moreover, “[t]o exhaust

remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the

prison administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir.

2002). Consequently, if a prisoner fails to properly utilize a prison’s grievance process,

“the prison administrative authority can refuse to hear the case, and the prisoner’s claim

can be indefinitely unexhausted.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809.

In Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740-41(7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit held that

“debatable factual issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust administrative

remedies” are not required to be decided by a jury but are to be determined by the judge.1

Thus, where failure to exhaust administrative remedies is raised as an affirmative

defense, the Seventh Circuit set forth the following recommendations:

The sequence to be followed in a case in which exhaustion is contested is

therefore as follows: (1) The district judge conducts a hearing on exhaustion

and permits whatever discovery relating to exhaustion he deems

appropriate. (2) If the judge determines that the prisoner did not exhaust

his administrative remedies, the judge will then determine whether (a) the

plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and so he must

go back and exhaust; (b) or, although he has no unexhausted administrative

remedies, the failure to exhaust was innocent (as where prison officials

prevent a prisoner from exhausting his remedies), and so he must be given

another chance to exhaust (provided that there exist remedies that he will

be permitted by the prison authorities to exhaust, so that he’s not just being

given a runaround); or (c) the failure to exhaust was the prisoner’s fault, in

which event the case is over. (3) If and when the judge determines that the

prisoner has properly exhausted his administrative remedies, the case will

proceed to pretrial discovery, and if necessary a trial, on the merits; and if

there is a jury trial, the jury will make all necessary findings of fact without

being bound by (or even informed of) any of the findings made by the

district judge in determining that the prisoner had exhausted his

administrative remedies.

Id. at 742.

A. Illinois Exhaustion Requirements

As an IDOC inmate, Manning was required to follow the regulations contained in

IDOC’s Grievance Procedures for Offenders (“grievance procedures”) to properly

exhaust his claim. 20 Ill. Administrative Code §504.800 et seq. The grievance procedures

1 Recently the Supreme Court partially overruled Pavey in Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460 (2025).

Specifically, the Supreme Court held that “parties are entitled to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion

when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim protected by the Seventh Amendment.”

Id. at 479. Here, the issue of exhaustion is not intertwined with the merits of Manning’s

underlying claims. Thus, Perttu is not applicable.

first require inmates to file their grievance with the counselor within 60 days of the

discovery of an incident. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.810(a). The grievance form must:

contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint,

including what happened, when, where and the name of each person who

is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This

provision does not preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the

names of individuals are not known, but the offender must include as much

descriptive information about the individual as possible.

20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.810(c). Grievances that are unable to be resolved through

routine channels are then sent to the grievance officer. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.820(a).

The Grievance Officer will review the grievance and provide a written response to the

inmate. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.830(a). “The Grievance Officer shall consider the

grievance and report his or her findings and recommendations in writing to the Chief

Administrative Officer [“CAO”] within two months after receipt of the written grievance,

when reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.830(e). “The

[CAO] shall review the findings and recommendation and advise the offender of his or

her decision in writing.” Id.

If the inmate is not satisfied with the CAO’s response, he or she can file an appeal

with the Director through the ARB. The grievance procedures specifically state, “[i]f, after

receiving the response of the Chief Administrative Officer, the offender still believes that

the problem, complaint or grievance has not been resolved to his or her satisfaction, he

or she may appeal in writing to the Director. The appeal must be received by the [ARB]

within 30 days after the date of the decision.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(a). The inmate

shall attach copies of the Grievance Officer’s report and the CAO’s decision to his appeal.

Id. “The Administrative Review Board shall submit to the Director a written report of its

findings and recommendations.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(d). “The Director shall

review the findings and recommendations of the Board and make a final determination

of the grievance within six months after receipt of the appealed grievance, when

reasonably feasible under the circumstances. The offender shall be sent a copy of the

Director’s decision.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(e).

The grievance procedures allow for an inmate to file an emergency grievance. In

order to file an emergency grievance, the inmate must forward the grievance directly to

the CAO who may determine that “there is a substantial risk of imminent personal injury

or other serious or irreparable harm to the offender” and thus the grievance should be

handled on an emergency basis. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.840(a). If the CAO determines

the grievance should be handled on an emergency basis, then the CAO “shall expedite

processing of the grievance and respond to the offender” indicating to him what action

shall be taken. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.840(b). If the CAO determines the grievances

“should not be handled on an emergency basis, the offender shall be notified in writing

that he or she may resubmit the grievance as non-emergent, in accordance with the

standard grievance process.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.840(c). When an inmate appeals a

grievance deemed by the CAO to be an emergency, “the Administrative Review Board

shall expedite processing of the grievance.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §504.850(f).

DISCUSSION

Because there are no disputes of material fact, an evidentiary hearing pursuant to

Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008), is not necessary. The parties merely dispute

whether Manning’s February 8, 2024 grievance adequately exhausted his retaliation

claim against Defendants.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not intended to provide individual

notice to each prison official who might later be sued; it is designed to provide the prison

with notice of the problem and give them an opportunity to fix it. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d

709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007)); Turley v. Rednour,

729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). The grievance procedures require that an inmate name

the individuals involved in the complaint, or, if their names are not known, an inmate

must, as the very least, “include as much descriptive information about the individual as

possible.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810(c). Further, the Seventh Circuit has held that an

inmate is required to provide enough information to serve a grievance’s function of

giving “prison officials a fair opportunity to address [an inmate’s] complaints.” Maddox,

655 F.3d at 722.

Manning’s grievance adequately apprised prison officials of his issue with Karl

Bradford. He alleged the ticket was improper and Bradford found him guilty despite

Manning informing him of the issues with the ticket. He further asked for Bradford to be

removed from the adjustment committee. Although he did not mention that he believed

the disciplinary ticket or the guilty finding was an act of retaliation, he informed the

prison that there were issues with the ticket that he wanted investigated. He was not

required to articulate the legal theory he intended to pursue in his future litigation. Strong

v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, the prison had a fair notice of Manning’s

issues with Bradford and the disciplinary ticket.

But Manning’s grievance does not mention Warden Galloway or ARB Chairman

Ryan Kilduff. Manning does include Galloway in his letter to the ARB, but those

allegations were not submitted to the grievance office with his original grievance.

A plaintiff must “file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s

administrative rules require.” Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025. See also Pavey, 663 F.3d at 905 (“When

administrative procedures are clearly laid out ... an inmate must comply with them in

order to exhaust his remedies.”). IDOC’s Administrative Code requires that an inmate

first submit his grievance to the prison with either the counselor or the grievance officer.

20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810(a). Here, Manning failed to include his complaints against

Galloway in his original grievance, and the prison grievance officials were never given

an opportunity to address his complaints regarding the warden.2 Because Manning failed

to present his complaints regarding Galloway to the prison, as required by IDOC’s

grievance process, he failed to exhaust his claims against Galloway.

Manning argues in his response that it made no sense to submit a grievance

2 The Court notes that the Seventh Circuit has stated in dicta that when the ARB ruled on a

grievance that included a “continuation” of allegations with additional dates of violations, and

failed to reject the grievance on procedural grounds, the defendants were barred from relying on

the procedural defect at the summary judgment stage. Conley v. Anglin, 513 F. App’x 598, 602 (7th

Cir. 2013). The Seventh Circuit stressed that the defendants failed to cite to any rule or

administrative code barring such additions to an appeal; the opinion did not specifically state

that additions were allowed under the rules. Williams v. Baldwin, 239 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1092 n. 8

(N.D. Ill. 2017). But the Illinois Administrative Code specifically requires that grievances

submitted at the prison “contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint”

and limits the topics that can be directly submitted to the ARB. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code

§§ 504.810(c) and 504.870(a). Nor does it appear that the ARB in this case even considered the

additional filing as the ARB denied the grievance because there was no record of the ticket

(Doc. 54-2, p. 34). The ARB’s response contains no mention of the investigation of the grievance

by the prison. Thus, this case is distinguishable from the situation presented in Conley.

regarding the actions of Galloway and Kilduff because they were part of the “cover-up”

and reporting their actions would have led to further harassment aimed at him. He also

claims that he could not submit a grievance regarding Kilduff because Kilduff was with

the ARB and not an employee of the prison. But “there is no ‘futility exception’ to the

PLRA exhaustion requirement.” Massey v. Wheeler, 221 F.3d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000). An

inmate is required to exhaust his administrative remedies regardless of whether he

believes the attempt will be futile. Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. Here, Manning could have sought

to file a grievance informing officials about the alleged retaliation of Galloway and

Kilduff, but he failed to do so. Thus, he failed to exhaust his claim against Galloway and

Kilduff.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

(Docs. 54, 55) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Summary judgment is

GRANTED as to Darren Galloway and Ryan Kildruff but DENIED as to the claim

against Karl Bradford. The claims against Galloway and Kilduff are DISMISSED

without prejudice for Manning’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 31, 2026 Tl

NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL

United States District Judge

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