Munteanu

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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OLIMPIADA MUNTEANU,

Plaintiff,

REPORT AND

-against- RECOMMENDATION

CV 25-2458 (GRB) (ARL)

VILLAGE OF GREAT NECK and BUILDING

DEPARTMENT OF THE VILLAGE OF

GREAT NECK,

Defendants.

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LINDSAY, Magistrate Judge:

The pro se plaintiff, Olimpiada Munteanu (“Munteanu”), commenced this Section 1983

action on April 28, 2025, against the defendants, the Village of Great Neck (“Village”) and the

Building Department of the Village of Great Neck (“Building Department”). Munteanu’s

complaint asserts five causes of action, namely, unreasonable exercise of governmental power,

infringement of property rights, violation of due process, defamation and emotional distress, all

stemming from the alleged failure to issue her a building permit. ECF No. 1. Before the Court,

on referral from District Judge Brown, is the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s

complaint on the grounds that the plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrines of res judicata

and collateral estoppel, time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitation, and not ripe for

review by this Court. The defendants also contend that Munteanu has failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies and that the Village is entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons

set forth below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the motion to dismiss be granted

in its entirety.

BACKGROUND

The facts in this section are drawn from the complaint and accepted as true for the

purpose of evaluating the defendants' motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Chambers v. Time Warner,

Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). The Court also takes judicial notice of court documents

from Munteanu’s prior state and federal court actions in order to describe the correct procedural

posture of this case.

A. The Instant Complaint

Munteanu is a resident of New York residing at 14 Red Brook Terrace in Great Neck.

Compl. ¶ 1. On July 30, 2021, Munteanu bought a house located at 130 Baker Hill Road in

Great Neck, which she claims was in bad condition. Id. ¶ 2. She alleges that the house was in

such bad shape the “mortgage Banque” required work to be done within the first 90 days after

the mortgage was signed. Id. To this end, Munteanu claims that she was required to sign a

“contractual note” concerning the work to be done. Id.

Munteanu alleges that she immediately showed the contractual note to the Superintendent

of the Building Department but the Building Department refused to give her a “temporary

permit.” Id. ¶ 4. Fearing that she would lose her house, Munteanu started working on the house

without first obtaining the requisite permits. Id. ¶ 5. On September 7, 2021, the Village issued a

Stop Work Order. Id. ¶ 10; Ockert Decl. Ex. G. Munteanu stated in a related state court action

that she removed the Stop Order from the front door because she didn’t know it needed to stay

on the door. Ockert Decl. Ex. E. Nonetheless, Munteanu now contends that Stephen N. Haramis

(“Haramis”), the former Building Superintendent for the Village, damaged her reputation when

he stated at a Board of Trustees meeting that she had removed the Stop Work Order. Compl. ¶

10.

On November 18, 2021, the Village then issued a “Boarding Letter.” Id. ¶ 5; Ockert Decl.

Ex. H. The Boarding Letter stated:

Pursuant to the Village of Great Neck Building Code Section 205-10, this letter

will serve as written notice regarding the circumstances that pose a clear and

imminent danger to life and property due to unsafe hazardous conditions at 130

Baker Hill Road.

Demolition, construction, and alterations have commenced without first

obtaining a building permit, plumbing permit and mechanical permit from the

Building Department. Additionally, there are no records of licensed

contractors, plumbers, nor electricians on file. Pictures taken reveal dangerous

and unsafe conditions due to work performed without the benefit of inspection.

Electrical work was performed without inspections, thereby causing the

possibility of fire if not properly installed. Additionally, it is unknown if the

electrical work is live. Gas work was performed with no gas tests. Gas piping

that is leaking can cause an explosion. Stairs leading from the kitchen to the

basement and stairs and catwalk leading from the second floor to the first floor

have no railings, causing a fall risk. Debris is scattered throughout the interior

and exterior of the property, causing a tripping hazard.

These circumstances pose a clear and imminent danger to life and/or property

due to an unsafe and hazardous condition at 130 Baker Hill Road.

On November 16, 2021, the back door and two-car garage was boarded and the

front door was padlocked to prohibit further work from being performed at 130

Baker Hill Road, as hazardous and unsafe conditions are found to exist.

Id. Munteanu asserts that as a result of the boarding, from November 2021 until May 2022, she

was denied access to her house, which prevented her from hiring contractors needed for the

renovation permit and from removing scaffolding that she had rented from Home Depot. Compl.

¶¶ 7, 8.

B. Prior State and Federal Court Actions

According to the defendants, Munteanu has commenced fourteen lawsuits against the

Village arising from the same general facts and circumstances that are alleged in the instant

complaint. Munteanu first commenced two actions in the Nassau County Supreme Court. See

Ockert Decl. Exs. A, C. In the first lawsuit commenced in 2021, Munteanu sued Haramis for

damages allegedly stemming from the Building Department’s failure to issue her a permit and

for having boarded up her house in accordance with the Village Building Code. Id. Ex. A. The

action was dismissed by the Hon. Eileen C. Daly-Sapraicone, on March 14, 2023. Id. Ex. B. In

her decision, Judge Daly-Sapraicone noted:

It is undisputed that on August 16, 2021, Defendant performed a site

inspection of the premises and observed workers and a van associated with

Francis General Construction, along with debris evincing construction work

was being performed. The construction work was being performed without a

permit issued by the Building Department for the Village. Defendant issued a

Violation on August 19, 2021. On August 31, 2021, another Violation was

issued to the Plaintiff after another site inspection revealed debris and a

dumpster consistent with construction at the premises. On September 7, 2021,

a Stop Work Order was issued for Plaintiff’s repeated violations. On

September 13, 2021, the Stop Work Order was removed from the premises and

a Summons was issued. This Summons charged Plaintiff with a violation of

the Village Code for removing the Stop Work Order and directed Plaintiff to

appear in Village Court in October, 2021. On September 27, 2021, the Nassau

County police were contacted to shut down work being done on the subject

premises. It is further undisputed that Plaintiff refused to get a licensed

general contractor, a plumber licensed with the Village and electrician licensed

with the Town of North Hempstead. In October 2021, Plaintiff plead guilty to

a violation of the Village Code for removing the Stop Work Order placard and

paid the corresponding fine. On November 15, 2021, the Building Department

performed another inspection and it was revealed that construction work

continued to be performed at said premises, still with no permit on file,

resulting in the issuance of an additional summons to Plaintiff. A trial was

held in Village Court, for which Defendant was present, and Plaintiff was

found guilty of the violation and directed to pay the fine. On November 16,

2021, the subject premises were deemed to constitute unsafe and hazardous

conditions that posed a clear and imminent dangers to the life and property of

the general public and the subject premises was boarded up in accordance with

the Building Code.

Id. In addition, in dismissing the complaint, Judge Daly-Sapraicone held, among other things

that, “the grant or denial of a building permit . . . may not form the basis for liability in tort” and

that Munteanu had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Id.

In her second Nassau County Supreme Court action, Munteanu again sued Haramis,

along with three other Building Department employees and an attorney for the Village, alleging

that she had suffered damages stemming from their failure to issue her a permit and the house

being boarded Id. Ex. C. The second action was dismissed on the grounds that the defendants

were immune from liability because they were acting in their official capacities. Id. Ex. D.

Thereafter, Munteanu commenced four actions in the Nassau County District Court

bearing Index Nos. CV-013588-23, CV-000159-24, CV-000160-24 and CV-002546-24. See id.

Ex. E; ECF No. 10.1 According to the defendants, all of the Nassau County District Court

actions were dismissed on the merits. See e.g. Ockert Decl. Exs. F. For example, in the action

bearing index number CV-000159-24, Munteanu, as she has in this case, sued the Village and the

Building Department for Unreasonable Exercise of Governmental Power, Infringement of

Property Rights; Violation of Due Process, Defamation, Emotional Distress, Negligence and

Impending Ability to Obtain Permit. Id. Ex. E. The action was dismissed by the Hon. Norman

A. Sammut on June 11, 2024, for failure to comply with General Municipal Law Section 50-e.

Id. Ex. F. Specifically, Judge Summut found that Munteanu had failed to timely file a Notice of

Claim with the Village requiring dismissal of that action.

Despite having her first six lawsuits dismissed, Munteanu then commenced four

additional actions in the county district court bearing Index Nos. CV-013432-24, CV-013433-24,

CV-003598-25 and CV-003599-25, all stemming from the same general facts and circumstances

alleged in this case. Defs.’ Mem. at 5. According to the defendants, prior to filing the motion

pending before this Court, actions CV-013432-24, CV-003598-25 and CV-003599-25 were

dismissed on the merits but the defendants were still awaiting decision on action cv-013433-24.

Finally, Munteanu commenced two actions in the Small Claims Court based on the same facts,

1 The defendants note that Munteanu stated in her action bearing Index No.: cv-010664-24 that she was seeking to

relitigate the previously dismissed action of cv-000160-24.

one of which was dismissed and one of which was filed the week the defendants filed the instant

motion to dismiss. Id.

DISCUSSION

A. Standards of Review

In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege a

plausible set of facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” See

Swiatkowski v. Citibank, 745 F. Supp. 2d 150, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 2010), aff'd, 446 F. App'x 360 (2d

Cir. 2011) (citing Operating Local 649 Annuity Trust Fund v. Smith Barney Fund Mgmt. LLC,

595 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2010)). The Supreme Court clarified the appropriate pleading standard

in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), in which the court set forth a two-pronged approach to

be utilized in analyzing a motion to dismiss. District courts are to first “identify [ ] pleadings

that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id.

at 679. Though “legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be

supported by factual allegations.” Id. Second, if a complaint contains “well-pleaded factual

allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give

rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a [d]efendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678

(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007) (internal citations omitted)).

“A court considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) generally limits its review

‘to the facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint, the documents attached to the

complaint as exhibits, and any documents incorporated in the complaint by reference.’”

Florimon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 616 F. Supp. 3d 180, 185 (D. Conn. 2022) (citing McCarthy v. Dun

& Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007)). However, “[w]here a document is not

incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint ‘relies

heavily upon its terms and effect,’ thereby rendering the document ‘integral’ to the complaint.”

Nicosia v. Amazon.com, Inc., 834 F.3d 220, 230–31 (2d Cir. 2016). Id.

B. The Building Department

As a threshold matter, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the claims against

the Building Department be dismissed since the Building Department is not a legal entity that

can be subject to suit under § 1983. See Wozar v. Campbell, 763 F. Supp. 3d 179, 198 (D. Conn.

2025) (dismissing action against municipal police department); Brunson v. City of New York

Dep't of Correction, No. 16 CV 1471 RRM LB, 2016 WL 4203485, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9,

2016) (finding that the New York City Department of Correction, as an agency of the City of

New York, does not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and cannot be

sued).

C. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel

The Court turns next to the Village’s argument that the actions should be dismissed based

on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. “A court may dismiss a claim on res

judicata or collateral estoppel grounds on either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary

judgment.” Umar Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Carlson & Carlson, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 218, 223

(E.D.N.Y. 2010).

1. Res Judicata

“Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits of

an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have

been raised in that action.” McCluskey v. Lopez, No. 24-381, 2024 WL 5182876, at *4 (2d Cir.

Dec. 20, 2024) (citing TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc., 758 F.3d 493, 499 (2d Cir. 2014)

(quotation marks omitted)). “Even claims based upon different legal theories are barred

provided they arise from the same transaction or occurrence.” L-Tec Elecs. Corp. v. Cougar

Elec. Org., Inc., 198 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1999). “‘To prove the affirmative defense of res

judicata, a party must show that (1) the previous action involved an adjudication on the merits;

(2) the previous action involved the plaintiffs or those in privity with them; and (3) the claims

asserted in the subsequent action were, or could have been, raised in the prior action.’”

McCluskey, 2024 WL 5182876 at *4. However, “‘[i]n determining whether a second suit is

barred by this doctrine, the fact that the first and second suits involved the same parties, similar

legal issues, similar facts, or essentially the same type of wrongful conduct is not dispositive.’”

Umar Oriental Rugs, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d at 224 (citing Maharaj v. Bankamerica Corp., 128

F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1997)). “Rather, the first judgment will preclude a second suit only when it

involves the same ‘transaction’ or connected series of transactions as the earlier suit.” Id.

Here, there is no question that the state court actions described above not only involve the

same facts and allege the same type of wrongful conduct, but the cases also involve the exact

same “transaction.” In her first Nassau County Supreme Court lawsuit, Munteanu sued Haramis

for damages allegedly stemming from the Building Department’s failure to issue her a permit

and for having boarded up her house in accordance with Village Building Code. Ockert Decl.

Ex. A. Munteanu alleged in that action that she had attempted to access her property, but her

phone calls and emails to the Village requesting access remained unanswered – in other words,

the Village had denied her access to her property without explanation. Id. In her second Nassau

County Supreme Court lawsuit, Munteanu sued Haramis and four other Village employees

seeking damages for the same set of events. Id. Ex. C. Although, read liberally, Munteanu was

only seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for defamation in her first two state court

actions, her claims for unreasonable exercise of governmental power, infringement of property

rights, violation of due process and emotional distress, could have been brought in those prior

actions as they involved the same events, evidence and factual issues. Umar Oriental Rugs, Inc.,

757 F. Supp. 2d at 224 (finding plaintiff's new negligence claim barred by the doctrine of res

judicata because it was based on the same series of facts and events as the claims brought in the

prior action): see also Sure–Snap Corp. v. State St. Bank and Trust Co., 948 F.2d 869, 873–75

(2d Cir.1991) (“[a] party may not avoid the preclusive effect of res judicata by asserting a new

theory or a different remedy”).

Moreover, in at least one of the Nassau County District Court actions, Munteanu did sue

the Village and the Building Department for the unreasonable exercise of governmental power,

infringement of property rights, violation of due process, defamation, emotional distress,

negligence and impending ability to obtain a permit, once again, complaining about the Building

Department’s failure to give her a permit for work at 130 Baker Hill Road, the Stop Work Order

and the subsequent boarding of her house. Id. Ex. E. Accordingly, res judicata applies here

because the fundamental basis of all of the lawsuits have remained the same.

In addition, the parties are in privity. “A privity analysis for res judicata purposes is

broader than a traditional privity analysis.” Waldman v. Vill. of Kiryas Joel, 39 F. Supp. 2d 370,

380 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff'd, 207 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2000). In this Circuit, privity has been found

when a non-party's interests in a prior litigation is virtually identical. Id. Indeed, where, as here,

there is a close or significant relationship to a defendant previously sued, res judicata is available

to a newly named defendant. Id. (“Village officials are entitled to res judicata because

government officials sued in their official capacities are generally considered to be in privity

with the governmental entity that they serve.”). As such, the Village and the Building

Department are entitled to res judicata despite the fact that they were not named in the first two

state court actions.

Finally, all three of the lawsuits, offered by the defendants as examples, were adjudicated

on the merits. See Berrios v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 564 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2009)(“[T]he

dismissal for failure to state a claim is a final judgment on the merits and thus has res judicata

effects.). In sum, the undersigned concludes that the entire case is barred by the doctrine of res

judicata and recommends that the defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted.

2. Collateral Estoppel

It warrants mention that even if the defense of res judicata was unavailable, Munteanu

would be precluded from relitigating many, if not all, of the issues she has raised in her federal

action under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. “‘[C]ollateral estoppel . . . means simply that

when an issue of ultimate fact has . . . been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue

cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’” Ashworth v. Boggio,

No. CV 15-948 (JFB)(ARL), 2016 WL 4398956, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2016), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 15 CV 948 JFB ARL, 2016 WL 4399311 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15,

2016) (quoting Caldwell v. Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt, P.C., 701 F. Supp. 2d 340,

349-50 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)(citing Leather v. Eyck, 180 F.3d 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1999)) (quoting

Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232, 114 S. Ct. 783, 127 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1994)). “‘Collateral

estoppel, like the related doctrine of res judicata, has the dual purpose of protecting litigants

from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of

promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.’” Id. (citing Parklane Hosiery Co.

v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979)).

“‘Under New York law, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue when (1) the

identical issue necessarily was decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action,

and (2) the party to be precluded from relitigating the issue had a full and fair opportunity to

litigate the issue in the prior action.’” Id. (citing In re Hyman, 502 F,3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 2007)

(citations omitted).2 In this case, it is clear that many, if not all, of the issues presently raised by

Munteanu were decided by the state court. For example, in this lawsuit, Munteanu claims that

her property was unreasonably seized and access to her house was restricted without any

explanation. Yet, in direct contradiction to those claims, Judge Daly-Sapraicone already

determined that Haramis had performed a site inspection of the premises and observed

construction work being performed without a permit. Ockert Decl. Ex. A. Judge Daly-

Sapraicone also described a number of interactions with Munteanu that ultimately led to the

boarding of her home. Id. In fact, Judge Daly-Sapraicone established that a Stop Work Order

had been issued for repeated violations, that Munteanu was aware of the Stop Work Order and

had even pleaded guilty to removing it from the front door, and that the premises were deemed

unsafe after Munteanu refused to hire a licensed general contractor, electrician or plumber.

Finally, Munteanu had a full and fair opportunity to challenge the state courts’ findings.

Therefore, the Court concludes that, in addition to being barred by the doctrine of res judicata,

Munteanu’s federal claims are also barred by collateral estoppel. The undersigned, therefore,

respectfully recommends that the complaint be dismissed.

D. Remaining Arguments

The defendants also contend that (1) the defamation claim is barred by the one year

statute of limitations applicable to torts, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(3); (2) the unreasonable

exercise of governmental power claim is barred by the four month statute of limitations

applicable to Article 78 proceedings, see C.P.L.R. §7801; (3) the defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity as their acts were discretionary, see Rottkamp v. Young, 21 A.D.3d 373 (2d

2 The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving the identity of the issues, while the

party challenging its application bears the burden of showing that he or she did not have a full and fair opportunity

to adjudicate the claims involving those issues.’” Ashworth, 2016 WL 4398956, at *6 (citing Khandhar v.

Elfenbein, 943 F.2d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1991)(citation omitted)).

Dept. 1964) (neither municipality nor the building inspector liable for discretionary act); and

Munteanu’s claims are barred as she failed to avail herself of all administrative remedies.

Although there appears to be merit to these arguments, the undersigned will not address the

additional contentions given the Court’s determination that the suit is barred by the doctrine of

res judicata and collateral estoppel.

OBJECTIONS

A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being served by the Court on the parties.

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of the Court

with a courtesy copy to the undersigned within 14 days. Failure to file objections within this

period waives the right to appeal the District Court’s Order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed R.

Civ. P 72; Mejia v. Roma Cleaning, Inc., No. 17-3446, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 28235, 2018 WL

4847199, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2018) ("Plaintiff has waived any objections to the Magistrate's

finding" by failing to timely object); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis,

Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010); Beverly v. Walker, 118

F.3d 900, 902 (2d Cir. 1997).

Dated: Central Islip, New York

June 24, 2026

________/s/________________

ARLENE R. LINDSAY

United States Magistrate Judge