Admiral

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

DR. ROSEMARY ADMIRAL and DR. §

BEN WRIGHT, §

§

Plaintiffs, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:25-CV-2843-X

§

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT §

DALLAS, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is a motion to dismiss (Doc. 16) from Defendants The

University of Texas at Dallas (UTD); The University of Texas System (UT System);

Dr. Richard Benson (Benson), in his individual capacity as UTD President at the time

of the protest; Dr. Prabhas V. Moghe (Moghe), in his individual and official capacity

as current President of UTD; Attorney General Ken Paxton (Paxton), in his official

capacity; and Governor Greg Abbott’s (Abbott), in his individual and official capacity,

(collectively, “Defendants”). After reviewing the record and applicable law, the Court

GRANTS the motion and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the First

Amended Complaint (complaint). The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Dr. Rosemary

Admiral (Admiral) and Dr. Ben Wright’s (Wright) leave to amend their complaint to

cure its deficiencies within 28 days of this Order.

I. Background

This case arises from one of the many on-campus pro-Palestine protests that

followed the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. In March 2024, Abbott issued

Executive Order No. GA-44, which addressed “acts of antisemitism in institutions of

higher education” and specifically called for the enforcement of policies addressing

the rise in antisemitism.1 In particular, the executive order called for “groups such

as the Palestine Solidarity Committee and Students for Justice in Palestine [to be]

disciplined for violating these policies.”2

Admiral is a tenure-track Assistant Professor at UTD and Wright is a tenured

Associate Professor at UTD. Admiral is a hijabi Muslim woman. Both professors

were present and subsequently arrested at a May 2024 pro-Palestinian campus

protest at UTD. The professors were released, but Admiral and Wright allege that

they were—and continue to be—subjected to adverse conditions, retaliation, and

disparate treatment by UTD officials. Admiral and Wright have since brought this

case against the Defendants alleging various causes of action. The Defendants seek

dismissal of all claims, asserting they are barred by sovereign immunity, qualified

immunity, and/or failure to state a claim.

1 Texas Governor Greg Abbott’s Executive Order GA-44 (Mar. 27, 2024)

(https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA-44_antisemitism_in_institutions_of_higher_ed_

IMAGE_03-27-2024.pdf (last visited July 15, 2026)).

2 Id.

II. Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to move for dismissal

for “lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”3 When a party files a 12(b)(1) motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in conjunction with other Rule 12

motions, a court must resolve the jurisdictional challenge first.4 This prevents a court

that lacks jurisdiction from improperly dismissing a case on its merits.5

The party asserting jurisdiction carries the burden to prove it.6 At the

pleading stage, the party may meet its burden by alleging a plausible set of facts that

establish jurisdiction.7 A court may look to: “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed

facts.”8

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint must “state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.”9 The complaint must allege facts sufficient “to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”10 And there must be sufficient facts for

the Court to be able “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

3 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).

4 Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001).

5 Id.

6 See id.

7 See id.

8 Id.

9 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).

10 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

the misconduct alleged.”11 In its evaluation, the Court construes the complaint

liberally in favor of the plaintiff and accepts all well pled facts in the complaint as

true.12 Conclusory statements or legal conclusions are not credited.13

III. Analysis

Before reviewing the Defendants’ arguments in its Motion, the Court must first

confirm its jurisdiction, even sua sponte.14 That is because “[f]ederal courts are courts

of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and

statute . . . which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.”15 “Without jurisdiction

the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.”16

A. Standing

One jurisdictional bar the parties failed to brief, but the Court must consider,

is standing.17 To have standing, Admiral and Wright must demonstrate they have

“suffered, or will suffer, an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or

imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable

ruling.”18 Since “standing is not dispensed in gross . . . plaintiffs must demonstrate

11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

12 Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000).

13 See Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.

14 Green Valley Special Util. Dist. v. City of Schertz, 969 F.3d 460, 468 (5th Cir. 2020) (“This

court has a continuing obligation to assure itself of its own jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary.”

(cleaned up)); Louisiana v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 90 F.4th 461, 466 (5th Cir. 2024) (“Jurisdiction is

always first.” (cleaned up)).

15 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (cleaned up).

16 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (cleaned up).

17 Henderson v. Stalder, 287 F.3d 374, 379 n.5 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that courts are “obliged

to raise the jurisdictional issue of standing sua sponte despite the parties’ failure to raise it.”).

18 Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 57 (2024) (cleaned up).

standing for each claim that they press against each defendant, and for each form of

relief that they seek.”19 Rather than “unadorned speculation,” which “will not suffice

to invoke the federal judicial power,” courts look for specific factual allegations in a

plaintiff’s complaint that satisfy the three standing requirements.20

Here, the complaint directs nearly all of its claims “against all Defendants.”21

Further, nearly all forms of relief are requested against the “Defendants” generally.22

Given the myriad of Defendants, claims, and requested forms of relief, the Court must

determine, as a threshold issue, whether standing exists for each defendant as it

pertains to each form of relief.

i. Injury In Fact

An injury in fact must be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.23

To be concrete, the injury “must be real and not abstract.”24 To be particularized,

“the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way and not be a

generalized grievance.”25 To be actual or imminent, “the injury must have already

occurred or be likely to occur soon . . . [a]nd when a plaintiff seeks prospective relief

such as an injunction, the plaintiff must establish a sufficient likelihood of future

19 Id. at 61 (cleaned up).

20 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44 (1976).

21 Doc. 12 ¶¶ 180–99, 217–60; but see Doc. 12 ¶¶ 200–16 (alleging Title VI claim only against

the defendants UTD and UT System).

22 Id. at 30.

23 Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024).

24 Id.

25 Id. (cleaned up).

injury.”26 Here, the alleged injuries are concrete, particularized to Admiral and

Wright, and either actual or imminent.27 Allegations stemming from the May 2024

arrests and “ongoing adverse conditions, retaliation and disparate treatment,” would

be an injury, if cognizable.28

ii. Traceability

To establish traceability, “the plaintiff must show a predictable chain of events

leading from the action to the asserted injury—in other words, that the action has

caused or likely will cause injury in fact to the plaintiff.”29 This inquiry seeks to

determine “whether the plaintiffs’ injury can be traced to allegedly unlawful conduct

of the defendant, not to the provision of law that is challenged.”30 “As with all

standing requirements, traceability may not be based on speculation.”31 Moreover,

the line of causation must be “more than attenuated.”32

The Fifth Circuit has established that “there is significant overlap between its

standing and Ex parte Young analyses,”33 and that the issues of traceability and

determining the right defendant “involve similar questions.”34 The Court applies this

traceability standard to each defendant individually.

26 Id.

27 See Doc. 12 ¶ 135, 180–259.

28 Doc. 12 ¶ 135.

29 Food & Drug Admin., 602 U.S. at 385 (cleaned up).

30 Collins v. Yellen, 594 U.S. 220, 243 (2021) (cleaned up).

31 Greenwald v. Murrill, No. 24-30661, 2026 WL 500139, at *4 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026).

32 Turnbow v. Life Partners, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-1030-M, 2012 WL 4473080, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sep.

28, 2012) (Lynn, J.) (cleaned up).

33 Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389, 401 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).

34 Jackson v. Wright, 82 F.4th 362, 369 (5th Cir. 2023).

1. Abbott, in his individual and official capacity

Admiral and Wright’s injuries are not traceable to Abbott in his individual or

official capacity because the complaint fails to allege the facts necessary to

demonstrate Abbott caused any injuries as to Admiral and Wright.35 Admiral and

Wright allege that Abbott’s Executive Order No. GA-44 “selectively punishes

Palestinian-based student advocacy,”36 by “publicly call[ing] for and direct[ing]

punitive measures against students, faculty, and community members engaged in

pro-Palestinian speech and protest.”37 Admiral and Wright also allege that one of

Abbott’s posts on X.com shows that he “escalated his animus against pro-Palestinian

advocacy on college campuses.”38

Taken as true, these assertions do not establish any causal link between the

acts described and the injuries sustained by Admiral and Wright. The defendants

are right to point out that the plaintiffs “fail to allege that the executive order applied

to them or that they were part of the two student groups that Abbott allegedly

targeted” in the Executive Order.39 Abbott’s “mere issuance of an executive order is

not enough to sue him, regardless of who is on the receiving end of that order.”40 “The

statutory authority . . . to issue, amend or rescind an Executive Order is not the

35 See Doc. 12 ¶¶ 4, 35, 39–41, 52, 198.

36 Id. ¶ 4.

37 Id. ¶ 35.

38 Id. ¶ 52.

39 Doc. 16 at 9; see Texas Governor Greg Abbott’s Executive Order GA-44 (calling for discipline

against the Palestine Solidarity Committee and Students for Justice in Palestine).

40 United States v. Abbott, 85 F.4th 328, 338 (5th Cir. 2023) (reversing and remanding the

denial of a motion to dismiss).

power to enforce it.”41 In this instance, GA-44 tasks “Texas higher education

institutions”42 with enforcement of the policies therein, and there is no enforcement

role for the governor.43

Admiral and Wright do not allege any particular policy Abbott put in place that

caused “a predictable chain of events” leading to their alleged injuries.44 In fact, they

“have not shown that [Abbott] did anything more than promulgate” GA-44 and later

make a post on X.com.45 Mere atmospherics does not satisfy Article III.46

The remaining allegations are conclusory and devoid of specifically alleged

facts, merely asserting that Abbott “exercises supervisory authority over . . . the UT

System and its component campuses”47 and “actively participated in or ratified the

conduct” of other defendants.48 Therefore, all claims against Abbott are dismissed for

lack of standing.

41 Mi Familia Vota v. Abbott, 977 F.3d 461, 467 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that a claim that an

executive order violated the Constitution did not fall within the scope of Ex parte Young as applied to

the governor when he had no enforcement authority) (cleaned up).

42 Texas Governor Greg Abbott’s Executive Order GA-44.

43 See Tex. Democratic Party, 961 F.3d at 400 (holding that, unlike state agency officials with

an enforcement role, “[b]ecause the plaintiffs have pointed to nothing that outlines a relevant

enforcement role for Governor Abbott, the plaintiffs’ injuries likely cannot be fairly traced to him”).

44 Food & Drug Admin., 602 U.S. at 385.

45 Abbott, 85 F.4th at 337.

46 Even if Admiral and Wright had pled sufficient facts to show traceability between GA-44

and their alleged injuries, claims against Abbott would still be barred by sovereign immunity. Ex

parte Young does not allow suit against a Governor for the mere promulgation of an executive order

which tasks a state agency with its enforcement. See id. at 335 (“Because GA-37 tasks DPS alone with

enforcing the challenged law, and DPS is a separate entity from the Governor, our Young analysis

ends for the Governor.” (cleaned up)).

47 Doc. 12 ¶ 35.

48 Id. ¶ 198.

2. Paxton, in his official capacity

Admiral and Wright’s injuries are similarly not traceable to Paxton. The only

factual allegations about Paxton in the complaint are that “[h]e directed and endorsed

measures to suppress pro-Palestinian speech and association on Texas campuses,

including UTD,”49 and that he “actively participated in or ratified the conduct

described” in the first claim for relief, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.50 Without more,

these conclusory statements do not establish a traceable chain of events to

demonstrate that any specific acts by Paxton are in any way connected to the events

of May 2024. There is no factual basis in the complaint for concluding that Paxton

was even aware of the protest or the subsequent treatment of UTD professors. So

there is certainly no “predictable chain of events” established between the alleged

injuries and anything alleged about Paxton.51 Accordingly, all claims against Paxton

are dismissed for lack of standing.

3. UT System

Admiral and Wright’s injuries are not traceable to UT System. The only facts

alleged about UT System are that it oversees UTD, “promulgates policies governing

campus conduct, and provides central administrative direction.”52 Admiral and

Wright do not allege that UTD’s actions were driven by any directive or policy

promulgated by UT System. Although Admiral and Wright’s opposition brief

49 Id. ¶ 34.

50 Id. ¶¶ 34, 198.

51 Food & Drug Admin., 602 U.S. at 385.

52 Doc. 12 ¶ 33.

retroactively asserts that the complaint alleges that “UT System, emboldened by

Governor Abbott’s statements on social media, created an atmosphere of heightened

scrutiny and punishment for pro-Palestinian expression and advocacy,”53 every

citation to support this assertion relates either to Abbott or UTD, not UT System.54

Similarly, Admiral and Wright’s retroactive assertion that the complaint alleges that

“UT System disproportionately penalized [the Plaintiffs] for their peaceful advocacy,

and refused to change their positions on [the] Plaintiffs’ punishment despite the

absence of any supporting evidence against [the] Plaintiffs,”55 cites allegations

attributable only to UTD and Benson, not UT System.56

Further, even if these retroactive assertions were accurate descriptions of the

complaint, they are wholly conclusory and do not allege any specific acts by UT

System that are traceable to the alleged injuries. Because Admiral and Wright have

not alleged any specific facts about UT System’s actions, there is no “predictable chain

of events” to establish that Admiral and Wright’s injuries are traceable to UT

System.57 Therefore, the Court dismisses all claims against UT System for lack of

standing.

53 Doc. 19 at 14.

54 Id.; see Doc. 12 ¶¶ 39, 42–52, 156–67.

55 Doc. 19 at 14–15.

56 Id.; see Doc. 12 ¶¶ 135–55, 168–79.

57 Food & Drug Admin., 602 U.S. at 385.

4. Moghe, in his individual and official capacity

Admiral and Wright’s injuries are not traceable to Moghe. Moghe is only

referenced in a single paragraph of the complaint—when he is listed as a party.58

There, Admiral and Wright allege that Moghe “authorized, condoned and/or ratified

the unlawful conduct toward [the] Plaintiffs following the May 1, 2024 protest, and

interfered with [the] Plaintiffs’ contractual rights in violation of the law.”59 Aside

from this conclusory statement, there is no allegation of specific fact to demonstrate

Moghe acted in any way to violate the law. Because there is no “predictable chain of

events” established between the alleged actions of UTD following the protest and

Moghe, all claims against Moghe are dismissed for lack of standing.60

5. Benson, in his individual capacity

Contrastingly, Admiral and Wright’s injuries are traceable to Benson. Admiral

and Wright allege that, despite having access to and knowledge of information to the

contrary, then-President of UTD Benson “publicly claimed he did not know whether

the arrestees were armed or had criminal records.”61 Taken as true, this factual

allegation bolsters the claim that he “was at all times aware of the unlawful

discrimination against [the] Plaintiffs and responded with approval and, at best,

58 Doc. 12 ¶ 32.

59 Id.

60 Food & Drug Admin., 602 U.S. at 385.

61 Doc. 12 ¶ 169–71.

deliberate indifference.”62 Admiral and Wright thereby establish “a predictable chain

of events” between their alleged injuries and Benson’s actions.63

6. UTD

Admiral and Wright’s injuries are traceable to UTD. Admiral and Wright

allege that UTD responded unlawfully to the May 2024 protest and engaged in

viewpoint-based discriminatory retaliation against them.64 Admiral and Wright

make specific factual assertions about the actions of various UTD administrators and

officials before and during the protest to allege that “UTD singled out pro-Palestinian

advocacy for disproportionate response.”65 These include assertions that “UTD

officials targeted professors and students for their advocacy on behalf of

Palestinians,”66 and “punished individuals who engaged in protected speech, silenced

those who defended them, and cultivated an atmosphere of fear and censorship that

persists today.”67 These alleged facts establish “a predictable chain of events”

between specific UTD actions and Admiral and Wright’s injuries.68

iii. Redressability

The traceability and redressability requirements “are often flip sides of the

same coin,” because “[i]f a defendant’s action causes an injury, enjoining the action or

62 Id. ¶ 215.

63 Food & Drug Admin., 602 U.S. at 385.

64 Doc. 12 ¶ 39–179.

65 Id. ¶ 157.

66 Id. ¶ 166.

67 Id. ¶ 167.

68 Food & Drug Admin., 602 U.S. at 385.

awarding damages for the action will typically redress that injury.”69 Here, as it

relates to UTD, Admiral and Wright point to injuries in fact that are traceable and

would be redressed either by damages or an injunction. With regard to Benson,

however, the stated injuries could only be redressed by damages—not injunctive

relief—because all alleged action on his part occurred in the past and he is no longer

the president of UTD.70 Therefore, there can be no injunctive relief available against

Benson.

B. Sovereign Immunity

Another jurisdictional bar is state sovereign immunity.71 “Sovereign

immunity bars private suits against nonconsenting states in federal courts.”72

Sovereign immunity “also bars suits against state actors in their official capacities

that are effectively suits against a state.”73 “Suits against the State under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 are doubly dismissible because the State is not a person under that statute.”74

There are two primary exceptions. “First, Congress may expressly abrogate state

sovereign immunity.”75 Second, Ex parte Young “permits suits for prospective relief

against state officials acting in violation of federal law.”76

69 Id. at 380–81 (cleaned up).

70 See Doc. 12 ¶¶ 31, 169–71, 178.

71 See, e.g., City of Aus. v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 2019) (“In most cases, Eleventh

Amendment sovereign immunity bars private suits against nonconsenting states in federal court.”).

72 Wright, 82 F.4th at 367 (cleaned up).

73 Id. (cleaned up).

74 Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Mack, 4 F.4th 306, 311 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).

75 Green Valley, 969 F.3d at 471.

76 Id. (quoting Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004)) (cleaned up).

The Court only analyzes the sovereign immunity defense as it applies to UTD

because Benson is sued in his individual capacity. Because Congress has “expressly

abrogated States’ sovereign immunity” under Title VI, Admiral and Wright’s Title VI

claims against UTD are not barred by sovereign immunity.77 However, UTD is “an

arm of the State and, therefore, an entity entitled to sovereign immunity”78 as to

Admiral and Wright’s claims brought under section 1983. The Ex parte Young

exception does not apply because UTD is not an “individual state official[].”79

Accordingly, the Court dismisses for lack of subject matter jurisdiction all section

1983 claims against UTD.80

C. Qualified Immunity

The motion also alleges that qualified immunity bars Admiral and Wright’s

claims against Benson. When a defendant raises qualified immunity as a defense,

the analysis changes and the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show (1) the violation of

a constitutional right, and (2) that the defendant’s conduct was objectively

unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the incident.81

“Therefore, unless existing precedent squarely governs the conduct at issue, an

official will be entitled to qualified immunity.”82 “The burden here is heavy,” as a

77 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001).

78 Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 328 (5th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).

79 Id. (cleaned up).

80 See Doc. 12 ¶¶ 180–99, 217–59.

81 See Connelly v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 484 F.3d 343, 346 (5th Cir. 2007).

82 Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 204 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen,

543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (per curiam)).

“right is clearly established only if preexisting precedent has placed the constitutional

question beyond debate.”83 That heavy burden is not met with citation to general

principles.84 Admiral and Wright contend that Benson:

[A]uthorized, condoned, or failed to prevent the unlawful arrest and

punishment of [the] Plaintiffs and other community members in

connection with the May 1 protest, interfered with [the] Plaintiffs’

contractual rights in violation of the law and made false public

statements about [the] Plaintiffs designed to interfere with their

employment status and professional reputations.85

Admiral and Wright cite two cases holding that “viewpoint discrimination in a

public university is unlawful.”86 Neither of these cases involve discrimination by a

university president against attendees of a protest at a public university. While “it

is not necessary that a previous case presenting identical facts exist in order for a

right to be clearly established,”87 courts still require that the “unlawfulness of the

challenged conduct must be beyond debate,” especially when the plaintiff fails to point

to any case law that squarely governs the undisputed facts.88 That is a “rare”

occurrence.89

Here, Admiral and Wright have failed to identify a single case that governs the

specific conduct at issue here. Assuming without deciding that Admiral and Wright

83 Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159, 1165 (5th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (quoting

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

84 See id. at 1165–66.

85 Doc. 12 ¶ 31.

86 See Doc. 19 at 18 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,

829 (1995) and Heaney v. Roberts, 846 F.3d 795, 802 (5th Cir. 2017) for the proposition that universities

may not discriminate based on viewpoint).

87 Aguirre v. City of S.A., 995 F.3d 395, 415 (5th Cir. 2021).

88 Estate of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).

89 Id. (cleaned up).

could show that Benson’s actions constituted unconstitutional discrimination in

violation of sections 1981 or 1983, this is not an obvious case of unlawful conduct

“beyond debate.”90 Benson is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law.

Therefore, all remaining claims against Benson are dismissed.

D. Title VI

“A complaint that does not set forth specific allegations of acts that were taken

with discriminatory intent does not state a claim for Title VI violations.”91 Wright

and Admiral allege that they were discriminated against under Title VI, which

protects against discrimination “on the ground of race, color, or national origin.”92

But Wright does not allege to be in any of Title VI’s protected classes. Instead,

Admiral and Wright argue that “[t]he scope of Title VI includes discrimination based

on shared ancestry and ethnic characteristics, including those associated with the

predominant religious beliefs of that shared ancestry and the relevant ethnic

characteristics and those perceived as having that shared ancestry.”93 Building on

that assertion, Wright argues that “[h]e experienced targeting, arrest, and retaliatory

treatment based on his views and association with students advocating for

Palestinian rights.”94

90 Id. (cleaned up).

91 Mohamed for A.M. v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 252 F.Supp.3d 602, 627 (N.D. Tex. 2017)

(Lindsay, J.) (cleaned up).

92 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

93 Doc. 12 ¶ 203.

94 Id. ¶ 28 (emphasis added).

This alleged discrimination, based merely on Wright’s association with

“Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim individuals,”95 does not amount to discrimination “on

the ground of race, color, or national origin.”96 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act speaks

of discrimination against “person[s]” based on their personal protected

characteristics, not that of amorphous groups based on the general messaging around

which they rally.97

Further, insofar as any discrimination was based upon religious motivation,

“Title VI, on its face, does not prohibit”98 such action, and “lower courts may not

recognize causes of action when a statute has not created them.”99

Admiral fares no better. For the same reasons as those stated above, any

arguments based on associational discrimination stemming from her involvement

with the pro-Palestine protest or from perceived religious beliefs fail. Admiral makes

an additional allegation that she “experienced heightened scrutiny and punitive

treatment by [the] Defendants as a result of sharing visible or perceived ethnic

characteristics with hijabi Muslim women of Arab descent.”100 However, Admiral

fails to provide any factual statements to support this allegation. Without more, the

mere conclusory assertion that Admiral was punished to a greater degree than

Wright does not automatically mean that such disparate treatment must have been

95 Id. ¶ 204.

96 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

97 Id. (cleaned up).

98 Mohamed for A.M, 252 F.Supp.3d at 627.

99 Id. (quoting Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291).

100 Doc. 12 ¶ 205.

based on perceived race, color, or national origin. Therefore, Admiral and Wright’s

remaining Title VI claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim against UTD.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motion and DISMISSES

WITHOUT PREJUDICE Admiral and Wright’s claims. The Court GRANTS

Admiral and Wright leave to amend their complaint within 28 days of this Order.

Changes to the complaint are limited to remedying the defects this order identifies.

The amended complaint may not add new parties or claims.

IT ISSO ORDERED this 20th day of July, 2026.

Lads STARR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

18