Swain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

SEAN SWAIN,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:26-cv-542

Judge Algenon L. Marbley

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

DELMER NORRIS, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a state inmate who is proceeding without counsel, brings this civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation’s (“ODRC”) Security

Threat Group (“STG”) Coordinator, Delmer Norris, and Annette Chambers-Smith, the ODRC

Director, alleging that Defendants’ placement of him on ODRC’s STG list violated his

constitutional rights, as well as violated a number of state regulations. This matter is before the

Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to identify

cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, that

is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also

McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the initial

screen, for the reasons that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS

this action pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

I.

According to the Complaint, in 2010, Defendant Norris placed Plaintiff on the STG list

and assigned him an STG profile as an “ANARCHIST.” (Pl.’s Compl. ECF No. 1 at PAGEID #

5.) Plaintiff’s STG designation “occurred without an accusation of misconduct or a finding that

[Plaintiff] engaged in unauthorized group activities.” (Id.). Rather, he was placed on the STG

list because he stated that “he would prefer a world where human society was horizontally rather

than vertically structured.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he has been a model inmate in all regards,

noting his completion of rehabilitation programs, the degrees and certifications he has earned,

and the absence of accusations of violence or substance abuse.

According to Plaintiff, Defendant Chambers Smith has approved of various Ohio

Administrative Code (“OAC”) provisions that set forth the administrative rules for group

activities in prison. Plaintiff asserts that these various code provisions are unconstitutionally

vague and fail to afford sufficient process to appeal an STG designation. For example, Plaintiff

asserts that the OAC’s definition of “unauthorized group activities” is unconstitutionally vague

and fails to define STG or list groups that qualify as STGs and also that the OAC does not

contemplate “an on-the-record hearing” or “appeal of the [STG] determination.” (Id. at PAGEID

## 4-5.) In terms of relief, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Defendants violated his

Constitutional and state-law rights, injunctive relief in the form of removing his STG

designation, and monetary damages.

II.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915A as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act in order

to “discourage prisoners from filing [frivolous] claims that are unlikely to succeed.” Crawford-

El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 596 (1998). Congress directed the Courts to “review, before

docketing, if feasible or in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a

civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee

of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In particular, subsection (b) provides:

On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or

any portion of the complaint, if the complaint—

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or—

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Thus, § 1915A requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination

that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir.

2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915A).

Further, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial

plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

III.

The undersigned construes Plaintiff’s Complaint to advance claims against Defendants

for violation Plaintiff’s rights under the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as

well as a number of state-law claims, arising out of his STG designation. Plaintiff’s federal

claims must be dismissed.

First, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are time-barred. “In § 1983 suits, the applicable statute of

limitations is determined by state law, while the ‘date on which the statute of limitations begins

to run . . . is a question of federal law.’” King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2017)

(quoting Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007)

(alteration in original)). Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10 sets forth a two-year statute of limitations

for § 1983 claims. Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989). That statute of

limitations “begins to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the

basis of the action.” Scott v. Ambani, 577 F.3d 642, 646 (6th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff filed this action

on May 5, 2026. Thus, claims accruing before May 5, 2024, would generally be untimely.

Because Plaintiff’s claims arise from his 2010 STG designation, his claims must be dismissed as

time barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations under § 1915(e)(2).

Second, even if his claims were not time barred, Plaintiff has failed state a viable federal

constitutional claim arising from his STG designation. Notably, Plaintiff has not alleged that he

has faced additional restrictions or hardships as a result of his STG designation. And the Sixth

Circuit has determined that an inmate does not have a liberty interest in the procedures affecting

an STG classification. See Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 2005). In the

absence of a protected liberty interest, a due process claim fails because “[p]rocess is not an end

in itself.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983). Thus, any due process claim premised

upon his STG designation fails. His conclusory assertions that his STG designation violated his

First Amendment and Equal Protections rights likewise fail. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (Conclusory allegations of

unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983.).

See also Washington v. Ramirez, No. 1:25-CV-130, 2025 WL 653468, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Feb.

28, 2025) (dismissing equal protection claims premised upon STG designation as conclusory

where the inmate failed to allege facts to “plausibly show that the others were similarly situated

in all relevant respects”).

IV.

For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS all Plaintiff’s

federal claims pursuant to § 1915A. Because the undersigned is recommending dismissal of all

of Plaintiff’s federal claims, it is further RECOMMENDED that the Court

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state-law claims and that it

dismiss any such claims without prejudice to filing in state court.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14)days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further

evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C.

§636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura __________

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE