Penrod

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

EDWARD J. PENROD PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 25-3080

FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Edward J. Penrod, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking

judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(Commissioner) denying his claims for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits

(DIB) under the provisions of Title II of the Social Security Act (Act). In this judicial review, the

Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support

the Commissioner's decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

I. Procedural Background:

Plaintiff protectively filed his current application for DIB on May 17, 2022, alleging an

inability to work since July 21, 2021, due to back problems, bladder problems, insomnia and

anxiety. (Tr. 75, 200). An administrative video hearing was held on August 8, 2024, at which

Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. (Tr. 37-74).

By written decision dated March 27, 2025, the ALJ found that during the relevant time

period, Plaintiff had an impairment or combination of impairments that were severe. (Tr. 19).

Specifically, the ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disk

disease of the lumbar spine/lumbar spondylosis status post two surgeries, chronic pain syndrome,

insomnia, hypertension, and obesity. However, after reviewing all of the evidence presented, the

ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal the level of severity of any

impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments found in Appendix I, Subpart P, Regulation No.

4. (Tr. 22). The ALJ found Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to:

[P]erform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) except that he can lift

and carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. He can occasionally

climb, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and balance on narrow, slippery, or erratically

moving surfaces. The Claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to temperature

extremes, humidity, wetness, and vibration, and due to potential side effects of

prescribed medications, he must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards, meaning

no work at unprotected heights, no work around dangerous unprotected moving

machinery, and no driving as a part of work.

(Tr. 23). The ALJ, with the use of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, found Plaintiff was not

disabled. (Tr. 29).

Plaintiff then requested a review of the hearing decision by the Appeals Council, who

denied that request on September 24, 2025. (Tr. 1-6). Subsequently, Plaintiff filed this action.

(ECF No. 2). This case is before the undersigned pursuant to the consent of the parties. (ECF No.

6). Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the case is now ready for decision. (ECF Nos. 10,

11).

The Court has reviewed the entire transcript. The complete set of facts and arguments are

presented in the parties’ briefs, and are repeated here only to the extent necessary.

II. Applicable Law:

The Court reviews “the ALJ’s decision to deny disability insurance benefits de novo to

ensure that there was no legal error that the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence

on the record as a whole.” Brown v. Colvin, 825 F. 3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2016). Substantial

evidence is less than a preponderance, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it

adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154

(2019). We must affirm the ALJ’s decision if the record contains substantial evidence to support

it. Lawson v. Colvin, 807 F.3d 962, 964 (8th Cir. 2015). As long as there is substantial evidence

in the record that supports the Commissioner’s decision, the court may not reverse it simply

because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome,

or because the court would have decided the case differently. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477

(8th Cir. 2015). In other words, if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent

positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, we must

affirm the ALJ’s decision. Id.

It is well established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden

of proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one

year and that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v.

Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The Act

defines “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). A Plaintiff must show that

his disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.

The Commissioner’s regulations require him to apply a five-step sequential evaluation

process to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial

gainful activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental

impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an

impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past

relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy

given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. Only if the final stage is

reached does the fact finder consider the Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in light

of his residual functional capacity. Id.

III. Discussion:

Of particular concern to the undersigned is the ALJ’s RFC determination. RFC is the most

a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). It is assessed using

all relevant evidence in the record. Id. This includes medical records, observations of treating

physicians and others, and the claimant’s own descriptions of his limitations. Guilliams v.

Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005); Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th

Cir. 2004). Limitations resulting from symptoms such as pain are also factored into the assessment.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held

that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d

700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must

be supported by medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function in the

workplace. Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003). “[T]he ALJ is [also] required

to set forth specifically a claimant’s limitations and to determine how those limitations affect his

RFC.” Id.

In the present case, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff maintained the RFC to perform

sedentary work with limitations. After reviewing the record, the Court is troubled by the ALJ’s

failure to address spinal restrictions indicated after surgical intervention. The record revealed

Plaintiff sustained a back injury and after more conservative treatments failed underwent a right

L5 hemilaminectomy for partial microdiscectomy on September 25, 2023; and an oblique lumbar

interbody fusion, L4-5, a L5 laminectomy with complete right facetectomy, a left L5

foraminotomy, and L4-S1 posterior lateral arthrodesis on August 5, 2024. (Tr. 791, 1128). After

the second spinal surgery, Plaintiff was directed to refrain from lifting over ten pounds and from

performing excessive bending, twisting, pushing and pulling for six weeks. (Tr. 1129). While

APRN William Keller noted Plaintiff was progressing well, he indicated Plaintiff had spinal

restrictions1 at follow-up appointments on October 1, 2024, and October 29, 2024. (Tr. 1089,

1092). In addressing the October 29, 2024, progress note, the ALJ noted APRN Keller indicated

Plaintiff was recovering well and that he could walk and complete activities of daily living without

issue and did not require routine pain medication. (Tr. 27). However, the ALJ did not address the

continued spinal restrictions indicated at this appointment. This is particularly troubling because

the last assessment of Plaintiff’s capabilities to perform work activities by a medical provider

occurred prior to Plaintiff’s second spinal surgery in August of 2024, and as addressed above

Plaintiff’s medical provider appears to have recommended spinal restrictions in the last follow-up

medical appointment of record. The record also revealed that in October of 2024 Plaintiff’s pain

management doctor resumed treatment of his chronic pain and subsequent treatment notes indicate

Plaintiff continued to take prescribed pain medication. (Tr. 999, 1116). After reviewing the record,

the Court finds remand necessary for the ALJ to more fully and fairly develop the record with

respect to Plaintiff’s alleged spinal impairment.

With this evidence, the ALJ should then re-evaluate Plaintiff's RFC and specifically list in

a hypothetical to a vocational expert any limitations that are indicated in the RFC assessment and

supported by the evidence.

IV. Conclusion:

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial

evidence, and therefore, the denial of benefits to the Plaintiff should be reversed and this matter

1 The record does not enumerate Plaintiff’s specific spinal restrictions.

should be remanded to the Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to sentence four of 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).

DATED this 4th day of August 2026.

/si_( Anca, Comatack

CHRISTY GOMSTOCK

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE