Gwynn

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

BRANDY GWYNN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 24-cv-02622-BCL-tmp

)

)

THE DUFRESNE SPENCER )

GROUP, LLC, )

)

Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the court is Defendant Dufresne Spencer Group’s

(“DSG”) Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 22, 2025.1 (ECF

No. 41.) Pro se Plaintiff Brandy Gwynn filed her response in

opposition on January 20, 2026, and DSG filed their reply on

February 3, 2026. (ECF Nos. 45, 49.) For the reasons below, the

undersigned recommends that DSG’s motion be granted.

I. PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT

A. Undisputed Facts

Gwynn, who is African-American, was employed by DSG at its

Ashley Furniture HomeStore in Cordova, Tennessee, as a Visual

1Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 2013-05, this case has been

referred to the United States magistrate judge for management of

all pretrial matters for determination and/or report and

recommendation, as appropriate.

Presentation Manager (“VPM”) between April 17, 2023, and July 27,

2023. (ECF Nos. 41-2 at PageID 145, 150; 46 at PageID 424-26.) She

was responsible for “maintaining tagging standards of products in

the store, maintaining the floor design and placement of furniture

and displays . . . , managing the overall appearance of the

interior of the store, ensuring the store was presentable to

customers . . . , and managing new inventory for placement within

the store.” (ECF Nos. 41-2 at PageID 146; 46 at PageID 424.)

Throughout her employment, Gwynn’s performance was evaluated by

her supervisor, Santina Shook. (ECF Nos. 41-2 at PageID 146-47; 46

at PageID 425.) On multiple occasions, Gwynn’s performance

evaluations were scored lower than what was required by DSG. (ECF

Nos. 41-2 at PageID 148; 46 at PageID 426.)

On July 17, 2023, Shook issued Gwynn two corrective actions,

for poor performance and unexcused tardiness in the first half of

July. (ECF Nos. 41-2 at PageID 149; 46 at PageID 424.) Following

this, Gwynn received a “final written warning.” (ECF Nos. 41-2 at

PageID 149; 46 at PageID 426.) Despite this warning and the prior

corrective actions, Gwynn arrived at work after her scheduled start

time on July 21, 2023. (ECF Nos. 41-2 at PageID 150; 46 at PageID

426.) On July 25, 2023, Gwynn’s performance was evaluated again

and was scored lower than required by DSG. (ECF Nos. 41-2 at PageID

150; 46 at PageID 426.) Shook informed Gwynn that she was not sure

if Gwynn would remain employed. (ECF Nos. 41-2 at PageID 150; 46

at PageID 426.) Two days later, on July 27, 2023, Gwynn’s

employment was terminated. (ECF Nos. 41-2 at PageID 150; 46 at

PageID 426.) Following Gwynn’s termination, Shook hired another

individual, also African-American, to fill the VPM role.2 (ECF Nos.

41-2 at PageID 151; 46 at PageID 427.)

B. Procedural Background

On September 4, 2024, Gwynn filed her complaint alleging race

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq.3 (ECF No. 1.) Using the form

provided by the Clerk’s office to assist pro se litigants, Gwynn

alleges that she was employed at DSG’s Ashley HomeStore at 2385 N.

Germantown Parkway, in Cordova, Tennessee, and was unlawfully

terminated. (Id. at PageID 1-2.) Gwynn filed the position statement

DSG sent to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)

on January 25, 2024, with her complaint. (Id. at PageID 14.)

2Gwynn admits that the person hired to replace her is a member of

her same protected class. In their Statement of Undisputed

Material Facts, DSG states: “After terminating Plaintiff’s

employment, Ms. Shook hired an African American to replace

Plaintiff. (Shook Decl. at ¶ 19).” (ECF No. 41-2 at PageID 151.)

In her response to DSG’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts,

Gwynn states: “Admitted. Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s

implication that replacement by another African American

forecloses a finding of discrimination under Title VII.” (ECF No.

46 at PageID 427.)

3At that time, Gwynn also moved the court to proceed in forma

pauperis. The undersigned granted Gwynn’s IFP application on

September 20, 2024.

In her complaint, Gwynn alleges that “there were disparities

in treatment and opportunities between [her] and [her] white

colleagues[.]” (Id. at PageID 8.) She asserts that her white

colleagues were given extra time to complete assignments and were

sent to set up a new store, while she was not. (Id.) The only other

DSG employee that Gwynn mentions by name in her complaint is an

“Alisha,” who was a VPM at the Tupelo, Mississippi Ashley

HomeStore. (Id. at PageID 7.) Gwynn alleges that Alisha, who is

white, received a passing score on her performance evaluation and

an accompanying bonus after sixty days of employment, which Gwynn

alleges raises “questions about the circumstances surrounding the

Tupelo showroom’s condition prior to her hiring, especially

considering the potential impact on her ability to attain a passing

score within such a short timeframe.” (Id.) Alisha’s name is also

mentioned in Gwynn’s deposition transcript, where she is

identified as the Tupelo VPM whom Gwynn shadowed.4 (ECF No. 43 at

PageID 210.) Although Gwynn testified that she believed she was

discriminated against because she had a bigger workload than other

VPMs and the other VPMs had more time, when asked what deadlines

other VPMs had that were different that hers, she was unable to

identify anything more than that Alisha “was able to take her time

to get her store together[.]” (Id. at PageID 269-70.)

4In the deposition transcript, Alisha is spelled as “Alicia.” (ECF

No. 43 at PageID 210-11, 266-67, 269-71.)

C. DSG’s Motion for Summary Judgment

DSG filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on December 22,

2025. (ECF No. 41.) They argue that there are no material issues

of fact warranting a trial because Gwynn cannot make out a prima

facie case of race discrimination, and that even if she could, she

has no evidence to show that DSG took any action against her

because of her race. (Id. at PageID 128.) First, DSG states that

Gwynn “has failed to proffer affirmative evidence establishing

that she was qualified for her role or that she was treated less

favorably tha[n] similarly-situated employees outside of her

protected class.” (Id. at PageID 138.) They assert that the reason

Gwynn’s employment was terminated was because she was repeatedly

late to work and consistently exhibited poor performance in her

role when evaluated. (Id. at PageID 134-35.) As to DSG’s argument

that Gwynn failed to proffer evidence that she was treated less

favorably than a similarly-situated comparator, DSG argues that

Gwynn has not identified any comparators. (Id. at PageID 139.)

Further, they state that the individual hired to replace Gwynn was

a member of the same protected class, which weighs against a

finding of disparate treatment. (Id. at PageID 139-40.)

Next, DSG argues that even if Gwynn could establish a prima

facie case of race discrimination, she has failed to present

evidence that DSG’s stated reasons for her termination—poor

performance and attendance—were pretext for discrimination. (Id.

at PageID 140.) DSG states that Gwynn does not dispute that her

performance was poor and that she was late to work several times.

(Id.) They argue that these are legitimate and non-discriminatory

grounds for adverse employment actions. (Id.) They state that no

evidence in the record suggests that DSG’s reasons for terminating

Gwynn’s employment lacked a basis in fact, were insufficient to

warrant termination, or were not what motivated the decision to

terminate Gwynn’s employment. (Id. at PageID 141.) They argue that

because of this, Gwynn’s arguments that DSG terminated her

employment for reasons other that poor performance and attendance

are based on Gwynn’s “own speculation and conclusory allegations,

which are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”

(Id.)

In her response in opposition, Gwynn claims that DSG does not

dispute that she was qualified for her position and was treated

less favorably than other similarly-situated employees, even

though DSG plainly does dispute these elements in their motion.

(ECF No. 45 at PageID 421.) She refutes DSG’s argument that their

reasons for terminating her employment were not pretextual. (Id.

at PageID 421-22.) She states that she received two corrective

action documents both labeled “[f]inal” within the span of a few

days and argues that “[a] reasonable jury could find that issuing

multiple ‘Final’ warnings simultaneously is inconsistent with a

genuine corrective process and instead reflects a paper trail

created to justify termination.” (Id. at PageID 421.) Gwynn argues

that she was not given a chance to demonstrate improvement before

she was terminated from her position and that because DSG’s

expectations for her were “vague, generalized, and lacked

measurable benchmarks . . . [a] reasonable jury could conclude

that Defendant’s stated improvement plans were illusory and that

termination was predetermined.” (Id. at PageID 422.) Gwynn further

argues that DSG’s reasons for terminating her employment are not

credible because “[t]he performance corrective action relies on

generalized scorecard percentages without context, explanation, or

evidence that similarly situated employees were treated the same”

and “[t]he attendance corrective action aggregated alleged

tardiness without addressing circumstance or consistency in

enforcement.” (Id.)

II. PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that “[t]he court

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine

dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Leath

v. Collins, No. 25-1408, 2026 WL 228827, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 28,

2026). The moving party bears the initial burden to “demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Hightower-Mathis v. Nextcare

Mich. Providers, PLLC, No. 25-1623, 2026 WL 126494, at *3 (6th

Cir. Jan. 16, 2026). “Once the moving party has presented evidence

sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving

party is not entitled to trial merely on the basis of allegations;

significant probative evidence must be presented to support the

complaint.” Goins v. Clorox Co., 926 F.2d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1991);

Phippen v. Rutherford Cnty. Adult Det. Ctr., No. 3:24-cv-00781,

2026 WL 220826, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 5, 2026), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. Phippen v. Rutherford Cnty., No.

3:24-cv-00781, 2026 WL 213671 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 27, 2026). Rule

56(c) provides that a party must support an assertion of fact by

citing to materials in the record, “including depositions,

documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of

the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers or other

materials[,]” or a party must show “that the materials cited do

not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or

that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support

the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B).

When analyzing a motion for summary judgment, the court must

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party. Huckaby v. Priest, 636 F.3d 211, 216 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986)); Phippen, 2026 WL 220826, at *3. In doing so, the court

may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.

Jordan v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 490 F. App’x 738, 741 (6th

Cir. 2012) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); Harrell v. Equifax

Info. Servs., LLC, No. 1:25-cv-01155, 2025 WL 3260516, at *1 (W.D.

Tenn. Nov. 3, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:25-

cv-01155, 2025 WL 3258632 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 21, 2025). Rather, it

must decide “whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so

one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Block

v. Meharry Med. Coll., 723 F. App’x 273, 277 (6th Cir. 2018)

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52); Harrell, 2025 WL 3260516,

at *1.

B. Title VII Race Discrimination

Title VII provides that it shall be unlawful for an employer

“to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against

any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race[.]” Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714,

726 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Meadows v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,

No. 25-1346, 2026 WL 242884, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 29, 2026). Claims

of intentional discrimination brought under Title VII can be proven

through direct or circumstantial evidence. Meadows, 2026 WL

242884, at *4. “Where direct evidence is present, the jury need

not draw any inferences to conclude that prejudice against members

of a protected group motivated, at least in part, a challenged

employment action.” Id. Where, as in the present case, there is

“only circumstantial [evidence], a plaintiff's claim is analyzed

under the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04

(1973).” Id. “Under McDonnell Douglas, the burden resides first

with the plaintiff to show a prima facie case of race

discrimination[,]” and if they “successfully prove[] their prima

facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to provide a

‘legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for its actions.’” Id.

After the employer “provides such explanation, the burden then

shifts back to the plaintiff to show pretext; meaning, that the

employer’s explanation was merely fabricated to hide an illegal

motive.” Id. To make out a prima facie claim of race discrimination

under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that “1) [they are] a member

of a protected class; 2) [they were] qualified for the job and

performed it satisfactorily; 3) despite [their] qualifications and

performance, [they] suffered an adverse employment action; and 4)

[they were] replaced by a person outside the protected class or

[were] treated less favorably than a similarly situated individual

outside of [their] protected class.” Laster, 746 F.3d at 727; see

also Dixon v. Exel, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-1891, 2026 WL 592212, at *7

(S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2026).

C. Prima Facie Case

DSG argues Gwynn cannot make out a prima facie case of race

discrimination because she was not qualified for her role and was

not treated less favorably than similarly-situated employees

outside of her protected class. (ECF No. 41 at PageID 138.) In her

response, Gwynn does not identify any similarly-situated

comparator. (ECF No. 45 at PageID 421.) Instead, she merely states

in conclusory fashion that she satisfies all the elements of a

prima facie case and that the “Defendant does not seriously dispute

these elements.” (Id.)

DSG argues that Gwynn was not qualified for her position

because she “failed to take the few very fundamental steps

necessary for her to learn the specific requirements of the role

for which DSG had hired” her; however, the undersigned finds that

there is at least some evidence (albeit limited) to the contrary.

(ECF No. 41-1 at PageID 138-39.) Viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, the undersigned cannot conclude

that no reasonable juror could find that Gwynn was qualified for

her position.

Nevertheless, the undersigned finds that Gwynn has failed to

create a genuine issue that she was treated less favorably than a

similarly-situated employee outside of her protected class. In

order to have done so, Gwynn would have needed to establish that,

in all “relevant aspects,” her employment conditions were “nearly

identical” to those of a coworker who received more favorable

treatment, when taking into account factors such as whether the

coworker “(1) engaged in the same conduct, (2) dealt with the same

supervisor, and (3) were subject to the same standards.” Shivers

v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. 22-3574, 2023 WL 3244781, at *7

(6th Cir. May 4, 2023) (quoting Johnson v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub.

Safety, 942 F.3d 329, 331 (6th Cir. 2019)). Without identifying a

comparator, a plaintiff cannot succeed at the summary judgment

stage.5 Jones v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schs., No. 21-1327, 2022 WL 4836421,

at *4 (6th Cir. June 22, 2022); Nagarajan v. Hargrove, No. 3:16-

cv-00495, 2020 WL 2537757, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. May 19, 2020).

Gwynn does not identify any similarly-situated employee in

her response to DSG’s Motion for Summary Judgment. At the summary

judgment stage, “Rule 56 requires parties to support their factual

assertions with admissible evidence.” Gilmore v. Sgt. Blankenship,

No. 3:18 cv 1489, 2019 WL 3821743, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2019),

report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Gilmore v. Blankenship,

No. 3:18 cv 1489, 2019 WL 3818686 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2019) (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); Viergutz v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 375

5A showing that she was replaced with an individual outside of her

protected class could have provided an inference of discriminatory

intent. Johnson v. Oakland Univ., No. 15-12482, 2018 WL 500289, at

*6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 22, 2018).

F. App’x 482, 485 (6th Cir. 2010)). Although Gwynn makes some

general comments about unequal treatment in her complaint,

“[s]tatements made in Plaintiff's [unsworn] Complaint . . .

are not admissible evidence.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c),

(e); Viergutz, 375 F. App’x at 485; United States v. Brown, 7 F.

App’x 353, 354 (6th Cir. 2001)). And even if the allegations in

the complaint were considered, those allegations would still be

insufficient to establish her prima facie case. Similarly, the

brief description of “Alisha” in the deposition testimony falls

well short of creating a genuine issue as to her being a

comparator. Gwynn does not cite to any evidence relevant to whether

they engaged in the same conduct, dealt with the same supervisor,

or were subject to the same standards. Rather than meeting her

burden of identifying a comparator, Gwynn erroneously places the

burden on DSG, arguing that DSG has “failed to produce evidence

that similarly situated [VPMs] outside Plaintiff's protected class

were disciplined or terminated under comparable circumstances.”

(ECF No. 48 at PageID 432.)

Gywnn “has not shown a comparator [and this] failure is fatal

to [her] case[.]” Nagarajan, 2020 WL 2537757, at *2. Therefore,

even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Gwynn,

she cannot establish a prima facie case of employment

discrimination. Since Gwynn cannot make out a prima facie case of

Title VII race discrimination, the undersigned need not consider

whether DSG has provided a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

for terminating Gwynn from her position, or whether Gwynn created

a genuine issue that the proffered reason is pretext for race

discrimination.

III. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that

DSG’s Motion for Summary Judgment be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

s/ Tu M. Pham

TU M. PHAM

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

June 30, 2026

Date

NOTICE

WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A COPY OF THIS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION, ANY PARTY MAY SERVE AND FILE

SPECIFIC WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS. ANY PARTY MAY RESPOND TO ANOTHER PARTY’S

OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER BEING SERVED WITH A

COPY. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); L.R.

72.1(g)(2). FAILURE TO FILE OBJECTIONS WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS

MAY CONSTITUTE A WAIVER AND/OR FORFEITURE OF OBJECTIONS,

EXCEPTIONS, AND FURTHER APPEAL.