The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 Adam ORONA, Case No.: 26-cv-02875-WQH-GC
CDCR #BF4477,
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ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION
Plaintiff,
13 TO PROCEED IN FORMA
v. PAUPERIS AND (2) SCREENING
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PRO SE § 1983 COMPLAINT
BALLARD, Corrections Officer;
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LAZARO, Corrections Officer; John DOE
(ECF Nos. 1, 2)
16 1, Corrections Officer; John DOE 2,
Corrections Officer/Policymaker,
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Defendants.
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HAYES, Judge:
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In this civil-rights suit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff Adam Orona,
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proceeding pro se while housed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”),
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claims corrections officers violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when
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they, inter alia, allowed his elbow to be crushed in closing prison cell door and ignored his
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cries for help. (ECF No. 1 at 3–4, 8–12.) Orona did not pay the filing fee but instead has
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filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (ECF No.
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2.)
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As explained below, the Court GRANTS Orona’s IFP motion and SCREENS his
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1 adequately alleges Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Ballard, Lazaro, and Doe
2 1 in Count One. But the Court finds that he fails to state any plausible claim for relief in
3 Count Two against Doe 2. Therefore, the Court ORDERS Orona to either file an Amended
4 Complaint that addresses the pleading deficiencies discussed below, or a Notice of Intent
5 to Proceed with the Eighth Amendment claims alleged against Defendants 1–3 in his
6 current Complaint.
7 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP
8 Anyone instituting a civil action in a district court of the United States must typically
9 pay a filing fee of $405—consisting of a $350 statutory fee plus an additional $55
10 administrative fee—although the administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave
11 to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District
12 Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The action may proceed despite a
13 plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP. See
14 Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007).
15 “While the previous version of the IFP statute granted courts the authority to waive
16 fees for any person ‘unable to pay[,]’ . . . the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act]
17 amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners.” Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the
18 Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2023). Namely, “if a prisoner brings a civil action or
19 files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner ‘shall be required to pay the full amount of
20 a filing fee.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)). Section 1915(b) “provides a structured
21 timeline for collecting this fee.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)-(2)). First, prisoners
22 must submit a “certified copy of the[ir] trust fund account statement (or institutional
23 equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.”
24 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Next, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of the greater
25 of (a) “the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account” or (b) “the average monthly
26 balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing
27 of the complaint.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1) & (4); Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84
28 (2016). Unless the prisoner has no assets, prisoners who proceed IFP must pay the initial
1 partial assessed fee and whatever balance remains in installments regardless of whether
2 their case is ultimately dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Bruce, 577 U.S. at 84.
3 Orona has provided a trust account statement and certificate from RJD showing he
4 had an average monthly balance of $44.94 during the 6-month period preceding the filing
5 of his Complaint, average monthly deposits of $35.34, and an available balance of $26.06
6 at the time of filing. (ECF No. 3 at 4.) Based on this showing, the Court GRANTS Orona’s
7 motion to proceed IFP and assesses an initial partial filing fee of $8.99 pursuant to 28
8 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) but DIRECTS the Secretary of CDCR to collect this initial partial
9 fee on the Court’s behalf only if sufficient funds are available in Orona’s account at the
10 time this Order is executed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall
11 a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal
12 judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the
13 initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding
14 that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s
15 IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when
16 payment is ordered.”). The CDCR must thereafter collect the full balance of the $350 total
17 fee owed in this case and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court as provided by 28
18 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
19 II. SCREENING
20 A. Standard of Review
21 Because Orona is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint also requires a
22 preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these
23 statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it,
24 which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who
25 are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
26 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir.
27 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that
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1 the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’”
2 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
3 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
4 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of
5 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
6 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir.
7 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard
8 applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9 12(b)(6)”). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 “prescribes the information a plaintiff must
10 present about the merits of his claim at the outset of litigation.” Berk v. Choy, 607 U.S. 187,
11 193 (2026). Together Rules 8 and 12(b)(6) require a complaint to “contain sufficient factual
12 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
13 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
14 570 (2007)).
15 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
16 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
18 [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
19 experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned,
20 the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility
21 standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
22 Dismissal “under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when the complaint either (1) lacks a cognizable
23 legal theory or (2) fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”
24 Valame v. Trump, 157 F.4th 1172, 1173 (9th Cir. 2025) (per curiam) (citing Somers v.
25 Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013)).
26 B. Factual Allegations
27 On July 20, 2024, at 9:00 a.m., Orona was in Cell 226 of Building 19 in RJD. (ECF
28 No. 1 at 8.) During release to programming, when Orona’s “body was half[]way out of the
1 cell as he was exiting with his belongings,” his cell “door began to shut.” Id. Orona yelled
2 out to Correctional Officer Ballard [Defendant 1], who was in the lookout tower “looking
3 directly at plaintiff” to “‘watch out,’” but Ballard “continued to close the door.” Id.
4 Orona “reenter[ed] the cell to avoid the door,” but “it crushed his right elbow while
5 his body was inside and [his] right forearm was out[side].” Id.
6 Orona “holl[ered] ‘226’ through the crack in the door . . . to Correctional Officer
7 Lazaro [Defendant 2] and Doe 1 [Defendant 3]” who were “twenty-five feet away at their
8 pod[i]um.” Id. Orona alleges he then yelled “‘open up,’ ‘I’m stuck,’ and ‘226’ at least[,]
9 periodically, ten times, while flashing his light as the pain made him scream when yelling.”
10 Id. at 8–9. Defendants “ignored him” and “continued to ignore him.” Id. at 9.
11 “After about a minute, [Orona’s] cell[mate,] also inside the cell, flashed his lamp
12 toward defendants Ballard, Lazaro and Doe 1 out the window as they,” allegedly,
13 “pretended to be unaware.” Id. Orona’s cellmate “also yelled ‘226’ asking for help[,]
14 saying ‘he’s stuck’ several times.” Id. Other prisoners laughed at Orona and one yelled
15 “‘226[,]’ telling defendants ‘he’s stuck’ more than once.” Id. Defendant 1–3 “continued to
16 ignore [Orona] and released the rest of all the building’s sections before finally releasing
17 plaintiff from the door. He was unreasonably crushed for approximately two minutes.” Id.
18 Since the crushing, no official has apologized to Orona and Ballard and Lazaro have
19 “even mocked plaintiff at times.” Id. Orona alleges he’s “sought medical treatment
20 periodically, to date, regarding serious permanent injury sustained by this incident.” Id.
21 Orona alleges that correctional “officers often exp[e]dite release processes[,]
22 occasionally blocking inmates into their cells and even smashing them.” Id. at 10. Orona
23 further alleges that “Doe 2 [Defendant 4] creates final policy” related to the closing of cell
24 doors. Id. “Despite [o]the[r] cell door crushings during exp[e]dited releases leading up to
25 plaintiff’s incident, defendant Doe 2 never implemented adequate final policy mitigating
26 this known risk to inmate safety.” Id.
27 Orona seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, in Count 1, that Defendants
28 Ballard, Lazaro, and Doe 1 violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by
1 “maliciously ignoring [Orona’s] cries for help” and failing “to reasonably respond to [a]
2 known risk of [his] [being] crushed in the door.” Id. at 3. In Count 2, Orona further contends
3 Doe 2, the “final policymaker responsible for the conditions and operations of” RJD, (ECF
4 No. 1 at 2), violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights through “deliberate
5 indifference . . . to the substantial risk of serious inmate-door-crushings.” Id. at 4.
6 Orona seeks $250,000 in compensatory damages and undetermined punitive
7 damages as well as injunctive relief to prevent (1) “inmates in doors,” (2) “ignoring
8 inmates’ cries for any reason,” and (3) “practicing exp[e]dited releases.” Id. at 7.
9 C. Discussion
10 1. Eighth Amendment Claims
11 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements:
12 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and
13 (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.
14 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 1035–36 (9th Cir.
15 2015). As currently pleaded, the Court finds that Orona’s Complaint alleges a plausible
16 Eighth Amendment claim against Correctional Officers Ballard, Lazaro, and Doe 1
17 sufficient to survive the “low threshold” set for sua sponte screening as required by 28
18 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
19 678; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
20 violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment); Wilkins v.
21 Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam) (for claims arising out of the use of excessive
22 physical force, the issue is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or
23 restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S.
24 at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Caddell v. Gittere, No. 3:19-CV-00053-
25 MMD-WGC, 2019 WL 11825611, at *2‒*3 (D. Nev. Nov. 25, 2019) (finding allegations
26 that correctional officer deliberately pinned prisoner’s head in steel cell door while he
27 reached for a roll of toilet paper sufficient to “state[] a colorable excessive force claim”
28 under the Eighth Amendment).
1 Although Orona’s Complaint only indicates that Defendant Ballard closed the cell
2 door, he does allege that Lazaro and Doe 1 failed to act for minutes even while he and
3 others yelled for help. (See ECF No. 1 at 8–10.) Their alleged inaction and participation in
4 the use of force against Orona, or their failure to act, suffices to meet the applicable
5 pleading standard. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6–7 (an excessive force claim requires a showing
6 that the defendant acted “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”). In other words, to
7 the extent that Orona’s allegations also assails the conduct of Defendants Lazaro and Doe
8 1, Orona plausibly alleges a failure to intervene. An officer can violate an inmate’s
9 constitutional rights by failing to intervene to stop other officers from using excessive force
10 if they are also alleged to have had enough time to observe what was happening and the
11 opportunity to intervene but failed to do so. See Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442
12 (9th Cir. 1995); Hughes v. Rodriguez, 31 F.4th 1211, 1223 (9th Cir. 2022).
13 Likewise, even if read as a failure to protect claim, Orona’s claims against
14 Defendants Lazaro, and Doe 1 survive sua sponte screening. To plead such a claim, Orona
15 must allege facts sufficient to plausibly show that officials acted with deliberate
16 indifference to a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. See Farmer v. Brennan,
17 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). Orona must allege each prison official “kn[ew] of and
18 disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]” Id. at 837. Orona claims his
19 elbow was stuck in the cell door for several minutes, time enough for multiple inmates to
20 call for Defendants’ attention. These allegations are sufficient to support the reasonable
21 inference that both Lazaro and Doe knew his arm was stuck, knew he was in pain, and had
22 both the time and opportunity to intervene. See Robins, 60 F.3d at 442.
23 For these reasons, the Court finds that Orona has sufficiently stated Eighth
24 Amendment claims for relief against Defendants Ballard, Lazaro, and Doe 1. See Iqbal,
25 556 U.S. at 678.1
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1 The Court is liberally construing Orona’s cell-door smashing claims to arise under the Eighth
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1 2. Policymaker Claims
2 Orona also contends Doe 2, who “creates final policy[,]” “never implemented
3 adequate final policy mitigating this known risk to inmate safety.” (ECF No. 1 at 10–11.)
4 A supervisory official is liable under § 1983 if “there exists either (1) his or her personal
5 involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between
6 the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Rodriguez v. County
7 of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks
8 omitted). A complaint asserting supervisory liability “must contain sufficient allegations
9 of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
10 effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Notably, when
11 supervisory liability is alleged to exist without any personal participation, the official must
12 have implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of
13 constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v.
14 Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations marks
15 omitted), abrogated on other grounds, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 825. Proving liability for a
16 policy further entails demonstration that a plaintiff’s “deprivation resulted from an official
17 policy or custom established by a . . . policymaker possessed with final authority to
18 establish that policy.” Waggy v. Spokane County Washington, 594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir.
19 2010).
20 The Court finds that Orona’s conclusory claims against Doe 2 are insufficient to
21 plausibly suggest any individual involvement or causal connection between his or her
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
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842 (1998) (“Where a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
25 protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized
notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”); Graham v. Connor,
26 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1986) (“Any protection that ‘substantive due process’ affords convicted prisoners
against excessive force is . . . at best redundant of that provided by the Eighth Amendment.”); cf. Tennessee
27 v. Enriquez, No. 25-cv-2026-LL-JLB, 2025 WL 3079054, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (dismissing Due
Process claim at screening as redundant to Eighth Amendment claims arising from same factual
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1 actions and the alleged constitutional violation. Not only does Orona not specify the precise
2 role and responsibilities held by Doe 2, he alleges only that Doe 2 “never implemented
3 adequate final policy mitigating this known risk to inmate safety.” Id. While Orona
4 suggests that past events or correctional officer behavior required corrective policy action,
5 such “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations
6 are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
7 Accordingly, the allegations against Doe 2 are dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28
8 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A for failure to state a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
9 3. Plaintiff’s Options
10 Even though Orona’s Complaint requires dismissal with respect to the claims against
11 Doe 2, he may file an Amended Complaint that corrects all the deficiencies of pleading
12 identified in this Order. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A
13 district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless ‘it is
14 absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.’”
15 (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012))).
16 If Orona chooses to file an Amended Complaint, that pleading will be subject to
17 another preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) before
18 the Court determines whether U.S. Marshal Service upon any Defendant is warranted. If
19 Orona does nothing, the Court will dismiss the case based on his failure to prosecute in
20 compliance with a court order.
21 III. CONCLUSION
22 Thus, for the reasons explained, the Court:
23 1. GRANTS Orona’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
24 (ECF No. 2).
25 2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from Orona’s
26 trust account the $8.99 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are available at the time
27 this Order is executed, and forward whatever balance remains of the full $350 owed in
28 monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month's
1 income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in his account exceeds $10 pursuant
2 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
3 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Jeff
4 Macomber, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001, via
5 U.S. Mail, or by forwarding an electronic copy to trusthelpdesk@cdcr.ca.gov.
6 4. DISMISSES Orona’s claims against Defendant Doe 2 based on his failure to
7 state a plausible claim for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1).
8 5. GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in
9 which to either: (A) file a Notice of Intent to Proceed with his excessive force claims
10 against Defendants Ballard, Lazaro and Doe 1 only; or (B) file an Amended Complaint
11 that corrects all the deficiencies of pleading identified in this Order.
12 If Plaintiff files a Notice of Intent to proceed against, Ballard, Lazaro and Doe 1, the
13 Court will direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service of process upon the named Defendants2
14 on his behalf pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3).
15 If Plaintiff instead chooses to amend, his new pleading must be clearly titled as his
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18 2 While the Court finds Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment allegations involving Doe 1 are sufficiently pleaded
to survive screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a), see Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123,
19 Orona would have to first identify this person, submit an amended pleading, and/or file a motion to
substitute Doe’s true name, and request U.S. Marshal service upon them as required by Federal Rule of
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Civil Procedure 4 before any claims alleged against Doe 1 may proceed. See Aviles v. Village of Bedford
21 Park, 160 F.R.D. 565, 567 (1995) (Doe defendants must be identified and served within [90] days of the
commencement of the action against them); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C) & 4(m). Doe pleading is generally
22 disfavored, Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980), and in most cases it is impossible for
the United States Marshal to serve a party identified only as a Doe. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415,
23 1422 (9th Cir. 1994) (In order to properly effect service under Rule 4 in an IFP case, the plaintiff is
required to “furnish[] the information necessary to identify the defendant.”); Finefeuiaki v. Maui Cmty.
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Corr. Ctr. Staff & Affiliates, No. 18-cv-0249-DKW-KJM, 2018 WL 3580764, at *6 (D. Haw. July 25,
25 2018) (noting that “[a]s a practical matter, the United States Marshal cannot serve a summons and
complaint on an anonymous defendant”). However, where the identity of parties is not known prior to
26 filing of an action, Ninth Circuit authority permits a plaintiff the opportunity to pursue appropriate
discovery to identify unknown does, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover their identities, or
27 the pleading requires dismissal for other reasons. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th
Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642).
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1 || Amended Complaint, contain S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 26-cv-2875-WQH-GC in its
2 || caption, and be complete in itself without reference to his original Complaint. Defendants
3 ||not named and any claim not realleged in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, including the
4 || currently sufficient excessive force claim alleged against Defendants Ballard, Lazaro, and
5 || Doe /, will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v.
6 || Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading
7 || supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty, 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012)
8 (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended
9 || pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.’’).
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12 || Dated: July 13, 2026 BME: ie Z. Maa
13 Hon. William Q. Hayes
14 United States District Court
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