Davis

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

*

JOAQUIN DAVIS SR.,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

* Civil No. 26-2523-BAH

JOHN J. NAGLE III ET AL.,

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Defendants.

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* * * * * * * * * * * * * *

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Joaquin Davis Sr. (“Plaintiff”) filed the above-captioned complaint pro se together

with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF 5, which shall be granted.

Section 1915(e)(2)(B) of 28 U.S.C. requires this Court to conduct an initial screening of

this complaint and dismissal of any complaint that (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S.

Ct. 1721, 1723 (2020). The Court is mindful of its obligation to construe liberally a complaint

filed by a self-represented litigant. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless,

liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege

facts which set forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th

Cir. 1990); see also Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating a

district court may not “conjure up questions never squarely presented”). Here, Plaintiff fails to

state a cognizable federal claim for relief, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s claims. As such, the complaint will be dismissed.

Plaintiff brings suit against defendants John J. Nagle III (“Judge Nagle”), David D. Nowak

(“Nowak”), and Crystal Goeller (“Goeller”), who are the judge, opposing counsel, and opposing

party, respectively, in a state court custody suit to which Plaintiff was a party. See ECF 1, at 2–3,

7. He alleges that the three defendants violated his constitutional rights, including to equal

protection under the law and to due process of law, his parental rights, and First Amendment rights

during a modification of custody hearing over which Judge Nagle presided on June 26–28, 2023,

and pursuant to the subsequent custody order issued by Judge Nagle. See id. at 7. He further

alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. Id. He seeks

damages of $3,000,000. Id. at 5. The Court addresses the viability of each of Plaintiff’s claims in

turn as well as the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

First, the criminal statutes cited, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, do not create a private right of

action, and any claims brought under these statutes by Plaintiff must be dismissed. See, e.g.,

Dingle v. Baggett, No. 5:19-CV-34-D, 2019 WL 3194834, at *3 (E.D.N.C. July 12, 2019)

(“[N]either 18 U.S.C. § 241 nor 18 U.S.C. § 242 creates a private right of action.”); Bey v. Sessler,

No. 23-3421, 2024 WL 2078564, at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 29, 2024) (citations omitted) (finding that

none of the relevant criminal statutes—§§ 241, 242, or 2071—create a private right of action).

Second, neither the opposing party nor opposing counsel are state actors, which is

necessary to bring any of the constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Section 1983 authorizes

suits against any “person” who acts under color of law and subjects a claimant to “the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C.

1 The Court construes Plaintiff’s constitutional claims as being brough pursuant to § 1983. Section

1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights” but provides only “a method for vindicating

federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker

v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).

1983. “It has been observed that ‘merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful[,]’

fails to qualify as state action.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 181 (4th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 301 (4th Cir. 2001)) (additional internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). When assessing section 1983 claims brought against ostensibly private actors, courts

must “consider the totality of the circumstances of the relationship between the private actor and the state

to determine whether the action in question is fairly attributable to the state.” Peltier v. Charter Day Sch.,

Inc., 37 F.4th 104, 116 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d

337, 343 (4th Cir. 2000)). “[P]rivate activity will generally not be deemed ‘state action’ unless the state

has so dominated such activity as to convert it to state action: ‘Mere approval of or acquiescence in the

initiatives of a private party’ is insufficient.” Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 616

(4th Cir. 2009) (quoting DeBauche v. Trani, 191 F.3d 499, 507 (4th Cir. 1999)). The Fourth Circuit has

summarized the necessary inquiry as testing whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between a private

actor and the state such that the actions of the former “may be fairly treated” as those of the later. Mentavlos,

249 F.3d at 314 (quoting Brentwood Acad. V. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295

(2001) (internal citations omitted)).

Courts have routinely held that representing an opposing party in litigation does not create

a sufficiently close nexus to make a private actor a state actor, thereby subjecting an opposing

party or lawyer to § 1983 liability. See Dist. 28, United Mine Workers of Am., Inc. v. Wellmore

Coal Corp., 609 F.2d 1083, 1086 (4th Cir. 1979) (discussing general rule that the fact that a private

party uses the state courts to secure relief does not generally create state action); Samson v. Tyler,

Civ. No. JKB-22-1200, 2022 WL 3106950, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 3, 2022) (holding that plaintiff

could not bring constitutional claims against opposing counsel in state domestic relations case

because opposing counsel could not be said to be a state actor); Shelton v. Crookshank, No. 3:17-

CV-108, 2017 WL 9565841, at *11 (N.D. W. Va. Nov. 17, 2017) (dismissing with prejudice §

1983 claims brought against plaintiff’s former husband’s divorce attorney because that attorney

could not be said to be a state actor), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-108, 2018

WL 527423 (N.D. W. Va. Jan. 24, 2018), aff’d as modified, 742 F. App’x 782 (4th Cir. 2018);

Patel v. Heidelberger, 6 F. App’x 436, 438 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[A] divorce lawyer’s efforts on behalf

of his client cannot under any foreseeable set of circumstances be considered state action.”); Catz

v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 289 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming that plaintiff’s ex-wife’s attorneys in

divorce proceeding were not “state actors against whom an allegation of deprivation of

constitutional rights under color of law could be properly lodged”), overruled on other grounds

by Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 859 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006)). Because Nowak and Goeller are not

state actors, Plaintiff cannot state a cognizable constitutional claim against them.

Section 1985 does not require state action, but Plaintiff has not stated a viable claim for

relief under this statute. He does not specify under which subsection of § 1985 he brings this

claim. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 724 (1983) (outlining the “five broad classes of

conspiratorial activity” outlawed by § 1985). “Each . . . portion[ ] of the statute contains language

requiring that the conspirators’ actions be motivated by an intent to deprive their victims of the

equal protection of the laws.” Id. at 725. The motivation requirement means “there must be some

racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the

conspirators' action.” Id. at 726 (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)); see

also Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 268–69 (1993). “[T]he law is well

settled that to prove a section 1985 ‘conspiracy,’ a claimant must show an agreement or a ‘meeting

of the minds’ by defendants to violate the claimant's constitutional rights.” Simmons v. Poe, 47

F.3d 1370, 1377 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fourth Circuit has “rarely, if ever, found that a plaintiff has

set forth sufficient facts to establish a section 1985 conspiracy” and has “specifically

rejected section 1985 claims whenever the purported conspiracy is alleged in a merely conclusory

manner, in the absence of concrete supporting facts.” Id.

“Under th[e] relatively stringent standard for establishing section 1985 conspiracies,” id.,

Plaintiff has not put forth anywhere close to sufficient facts to support a claim that defendants

conspired together, based on discriminatory animus, to deprive him of any constitutional

right. See Doe v. Meron, Civ. No. PX-17-812, 2018 WL 3619538, at *14 (D. Md. July 30,

2018) (dismissing § 1985 claim where “Plaintiffs offer absolutely no facts to support that the

Defendants were motivated by racial animus during their non-specific collusive activities” and

collecting cases demonstrating that “[t]his kind of conclusory legal allegation couched as fact is

insufficient to survive challenge”), aff'd, 929 F.3d 153 (4th Cir. 2019). Without a viable §

1985 claim, the § 1986 claim must also be dismissed. See Trerice v. Summons, 755 F.2d 1081,

1085 (4th Cir. 1985) (“A cause of action based upon § 1986 is dependent upon the existence of a

claim under § 1985.”).

As to Judge Nagle, the doctrine of judicial immunity protects him from liability. Judges

“are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts,” including under § 1983, “even when such

acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.”

Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 351

(1872)); see also Dean v. Shirer, 547 F.2d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 1976). “If judges were personally

liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but

vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to

provoke such suits.” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226–27 (1988). “[J]udicial immunity is an

immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9,

11 (1991). Judicial immunity can only be overcome if the suit is for a judge’s non-judicial acts,

or the judge, acting in the course of their judicial duties, “acted in the ‘clear absence of all

jurisdiction.’” Stump, 435 U.S. at 357 (quoting Bradley, 13 Wall. at 351). Neither of these two

circumstances are present here, where Plaintiff alleges he suffered injuries from the rulings in the

state custody proceedings.

Without a viable federal basis for jurisdiction, the Court does not possess subject matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and “may not

exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545

U.S. 546, 552 (2005). The Court must have subject-matter jurisdiction either based on diversity

of citizenship or a federal question. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a)(1). Federal question jurisdiction

is determined “by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists

only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Federal courts “have an independent

obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges

it.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

For the reasons noted above, Plaintiff’s complaint does not support a valid federal claim.

To the extent Plaintiff’s complaint can be construed as bringing a state law claim, see ECF 1-1

(civil cover sheet alleging personal injury tort), the Court does not have diversity jurisdiction,

which requires complete diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy over $75,000. 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). All parties are citizens of Maryland, so there is no diversity of citizenship.2

2 While Plaintiff does not appear to seek modification of any state court order, that is for good

reason, as this Court would not have jurisdiction to do so. See T. M. v. Univ. of Maryland Med.

Sys. Corp., 146 S. Ct. 1739, 1739–44 (2026) (“Under what has become known as the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over ‘cases brought by state-court losers

complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable federal claim for relief,

and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint. As such, it must be dismissed.

See Morales v. Richardson, 841 F. Supp. 2d 908, 913 (D. Md.) (citing Ellenburg v. Spartan Motors

Chassis, Inc., 519 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2008)) (noting that the district court may sua sponte

consider and rule on the question of subject matter jurisdiction), aff’d, 475 F. App’x 894 (4th Cir.

2012); see also Samson, 2022 WL 3106950, at *2 (sua sponte dismissal of a civil rights complaint

brought against state court judge and opposing counsel); cf. Robertson v. Anderson Mill

Elementary Sch., 989 F.3d 282, 291 (4th Cir. 2021) (affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal

because plaintiff could not plausibly allege a constitutional violation so dismissal without notice

was harmless).

Accordingly, it is this 21st day of July, 2026, by the United States District Court for the

District of Maryland, hereby ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF 5, is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and

3. The Clerk is directed CLOSE this case and MAIL a copy of this memorandum and

order to Plaintiff.

_____________/s/_______________

Brendan A. Hurson

United States District Judge

proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’”

(citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005))).

Additionally, federal courts typically do not weigh into matters of family law, which traditionally

has been reserved to the state or municipal court systems, which have the expertise and

professional support staff. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979). Under “the domestic

relations exception” to federal jurisdiction, federal courts do not have the power to “determine

alimony or support obligations, or decide child custody rights.” Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671

F.2d 832, 834 (4th Cir. 1982); see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703–04 (1992) (no

jurisdiction over custody disputes).