Opinion

LEWIS

Court
District Court, N.D. Florida
Filed
Jul 7, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 42.1%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

CHARLES LEWIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-1818-MCR-HTC

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

____________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Charles Lewis has filed a complaint against the United States of

America (the “Government”) under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), alleging

he was injured when a Coast Guard helicopter performing a search and rescue

mission caused a dinghy secured to his boat to detach and strike him in the head.

Doc. 2. The Government has moved to dismiss Lewis’s claims as being time-barred

under the Suits in Admiralty Act (“SAA”) and, alternatively, for lack of jurisdiction

because the claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Doc. 13. Upon careful

consideration of the motion, Lewis’s response (Doc. 14), the Government’s reply

(Doc. 22), and the relevant law, the undersigned agrees and finds the Government’s

motion should be GRANTED and this action should be DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

I. Background1

On February 11, 2023, a kayaker went missing in Destin Harbor. First

responders launched a search and rescue mission that was assisted by a Coast Guard

helicopter. Meanwhile, Lewis was sleeping on his 37-foot boat, which was anchored

in Destin Harbor.

During the search and rescue mission, the Coast Guard helicopter began

hovering “dangerously low” over Lewis’s boat, as the helicopter was using the boat

“as an adjustment target for the helicopter’s flood light during the search for the

missing kayaker.” The helicopter caused the boat to shake violently, which, when

combined with the sound and floodlight from the helicopter, woke Lewis. Lewis

went outside to the back of his boat to investigate. As Lewis stood on the back of

the boat, the helicopter began to maneuver away from the boat, creating rotor wash

and wake turbulence. The helicopter’s maneuver caused a dinghy secured to the

back of the boat to detach and strike him in the head, injuring him and knocking him

unconscious.

As soon as he was physically able to do so, Lewis reported the incident to the

Coast Guard. Two days later, the helicopter pilot contacted Lewis and apologized.

The pilot explained what happened and told Lewis the helicopter crew mistakenly

thought no one was aboard the boat.

1 The factual allegations recited herein are taken from Lewis’s complaint. Doc. 2.

Based on the foregoing, Lewis alleges the Government: (1) negligently failed

to warn him about the search and rescue mission and its associated dangers; (2)

negligently operated the helicopter during the search and rescue mission; and (3)

negligently trained and supervised the helicopter crew.2

II. Legal Standard

The Government moves for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), arguing the claims are time-barred. Alternatively, the Government moves

for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction,

contending the claims are barred by sovereign immunity.

For purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. However,

conclusory allegations and legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are not

2 The complaint contains a fourth claim, titled “Negligence (Res Ipsa Loquitur).” However, “res

ipsa loquitor is not a cause of action but instead a way to prove negligence.” Mucciolo v. Boca

Raton Reg’l Hosp., Inc., 824 F. App’x 639, 644 n.2 (11th Cir. 2020). Thus, the Court need not

separately analyze whether Count IV is covered by the discretionary function exception or is

untimely.

entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681; Papasan v. Allain, 478

U.S. 265, 286 (1986).

In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction, courts may consider matters outside the pleadings without converting

the motion into one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Motions

under Rule 12(b)(1) can be categorized as either “facial attacks” or “factual attacks.”

Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., M.D.’s, P.A., 104 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir.

1997). A facial attack is an assertion that the complaint fails to allege a basis for

subject-matter jurisdiction, which the court resolves by looking to the complaint

alone. Id. at 1261. A factual attack disputes “the existence of subject matter

jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings.” Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Dunbar,

919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). “If the facts necessary to sustain jurisdiction

do not implicate the merits of plaintiff’s cause of action, then ... ‘the trial court is

free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear

the case.’” Id. (quoting Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529).

III. Discussion

The undersigned agrees with the Government that this action does not fall

under the FTCA but is an admiralty action, which can only be brought under the

SAA. Although the Government’s primary basis for dismissal is that Lewis’s claims

are time-barred, because sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, that argument will be

addressed first. See Foster Logging, Inc. v. United States, 973 F.3d 1152, 1167 (11th

Cir. 2020) (“Because the discretionary-function exception applies here, the United

States has not unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity, and the district court

therefore lacked jurisdiction[.]”).

For the reasons discussed below, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Lewis’s

negligent failure to warn and negligent training and supervision claims because they

fall within the discretionary function exception to the SAA’s waiver of sovereign

immunity. Lewis’s negligent operation claim, however, does not fall within the

discretionary function exception. That claim, nonetheless, is also subject to

dismissal because it (as well as the other two claims) is barred by the SAA’s two-

year statute of limitations.

A. The SAA, not the FTCA, controls Lewis’s claims.

Lewis brings this action pursuant to the FTCA, but the Government argues

Lewis’s claims can only be brought pursuant to the SAA because they are admiralty

claims. As the Government points out, this is an important distinction, because if

the claims are admiralty claims, which arise only under the SAA, then they are

subject to a different filing deadline than if they arise under the FTCA.

“Through the enactment of the FTCA, the federal government has, as a

general matter, waived its immunity from tort suits based on state law tort claims.”

Zelaya v. United States, 781 F.3d 1315, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015). However, the FTCA’s

waiver of sovereign immunity excludes any admiralty claim for which a remedy is

provided by the Public Vessels Act3 or the SAA. Anderson v. United States, 317 F.3d

1235, 1237 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d)). And “if admiralty

jurisdiction exists for [a plaintiff’s] claim, it cannot be brought under the FTCA.”

Id.

Under the SAA, “a civil action in admiralty in personam may be brought

against the United States” “[i]n a case in which, if a vessel were privately owned or

operated, or if cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or

property were involved, a civil action in admiralty could be maintained[.]” 46

U.S.C. § 30903(a). To determine whether a claim falls within a federal court’s

admiralty jurisdiction, courts apply a “location” test and “connection” test, and both

must be satisfied. Anderson, 317 F.3d at 1237. Under the location test, “the incident

or injury must ‘occur on navigable water.’” Maglana v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 136

F.4th 1032, 1037 (11th Cir. 2025) (alteration and citation omitted).

The location test is easily met here because Lewis’s claims arise from injuries

he received on February 11, 2023, while on a boat located in Destin Harbor. See

Harville v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 731 F.2d 775, 782 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Under

the locality test, the tort occurs ‘where the alleged negligence took effect,’ rather

3 The Public Vessels Act applies to “[c]laims seeking relief for damages caused directly by a public

vessel, or by the negligent operation thereof[.]” Uralde v. United States, 614 F.3d 1282, 1286

(11th Cir. 2010). Thus, Lewis’s claims do not implicate the Public Vessels Act.

than where the negligent act was done.”) (citation omitted); Sperry Rand Corp. v.

Radio Corp. of Am., 618 F.2d 319, 321 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[S]o long as the place of the

injury … occurs upon navigable waters, the fact that the negligent act may have

occurred on shore is of no relevance.”). Destin Harbor is a navigable waterway that

connects to the Gulf of Mexico and is “home to numerous activities including charter

fishing [and] boating.” Doc. 2 at 3; see also Sanders v. Placid Oil Co., 861 F.2d

1374, 1377 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[N]avigable waters of the United States are those waters

capable, in fact, of navigation in interstate travel or commerce”); In re Backcountry

Outfitters, Inc., 2008 WL 516792 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2008) (concluding court had

admiralty jurisdiction over claims when boat departed from Destin Harbor and had

accident just outside the harbor near Coast Guard station).

Under the connection test, the incident must have: (1) a potentially disruptive

impact on maritime commerce considering the general features of the type of

incident involved; and (2) a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity

considering the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident. Jerome

B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995). The

connection test is also satisfied.

For the first part of the connection test, courts must consider “the incident at

an intermediate level of possible generality” and ask, “whether the incident could be

seen within a class of incidents that posed more than a fanciful risk to commercial

shipping.” Grubart, 513 U.S. at 538-39 (noting courts consider potential effects, not

the particular facts of the incident). The type of incident at issue here—a search and

rescue mission which damages a boat on navigable water and causes injury to a

bystander on that boat—has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce.

See Taghadomi v. United States, 401 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding claim

that kayaker thrown overboard died as a result of negligent search and rescue mission

satisfied connection test because “[t]he efficacy of search-and-rescue operations has

a direct effect on the health and lives of seamen” and “insofar as the rescuer can

preserve the vessel, it prevents economic loss to the vessel’s owner”); Johnson v.

United States, 2025 WL 4055404, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2025) (“A]n injury that

occurs on a boat in a navigable waterway certainly has the potential to disrupt

maritime commerce”); Donnelly v. Slingshot Sports LLC, 605 F. Supp. 2d 613, 617

(D. Del. 2009) (“[R]escue efforts and after-accident investigations can lead to

disruption of maritime commerce”).

Lewis’s claims also meet the second part of the connection test because search

and rescue missions have a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.

See Taghadomi, 401 F.3d at 1087 (concluding Coast Guard’s search and rescue

operation “assuredly” shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime

activity”); Kelly v. United States, 531 F.2d 1144, 1147 (2d Cir. 1976) (“[R]escue

operations of the Coast Guard conducted on navigable waters do in fact bear a

significant relationship to traditional maritime activities for purposes of admiralty

jurisdiction.”). Furthermore, while search and rescue missions for individuals lost

at sea may have traditionally been conducted by vessels, the use of a helicopter to

perform the same task does not affect whether a substantial relationship to maritime

activity exists. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 219 (1986)

(“Although the decedents were killed while riding in a helicopter and not a more

traditional maritime conveyance, that helicopter was engaged in a function

traditionally performed by waterborne vessels: the ferrying of passengers from an

‘island,’ albeit an artificial one, to the shore.”). Thus, both parts of the connection

test are met.

Lewis’s response suggests the negligent failure to warn, training, and

supervision claims involve activities distinct from those relating to the negligent

operation claim and do not have a substantial relationship to traditional maritime

activity. See Doc. 14 at 3. He is incorrect. “[A]s long as one of the putative

tortfeasors was engaged in traditional maritime activity the allegedly wrongful

activity will ‘involve’ such traditional maritime activity and will meet the second

nexus prong.” Grubart, 513 U.S. at 541.

Lewis also asserts the helicopter’s use of his boat as an adjustment target

either preceded the search and rescue operation or was outside the scope of it. Doc.

14 at 4. However, that assertion is inconsistent with the complaint, which alleges

the “helicopter negligently used Plaintiff’s boat as an adjustment target for the

helicopter’s flood light during the search for the missing kayaker.” Doc. 2 at 3-4

(emphasis added). Furthermore, the connection test is satisfied even if the Coast

Guard helicopter was merely patrolling navigable water rather than actively

engaging in a search and rescue mission. See Lantigua-Núñez v. U.S. Coast Guard,

174 F.4th 293, 298 (1st Cir. 2026) (concluding incident where man on vessel was

shot by Coast Guard from helicopter satisfied location and connection tests and

noting the Coast Guard’s “actions bear ‘a significant relationship’ to its ‘traditional

maritime activity’ of patrolling and enforcing the law on the waters”); Kelly, 531

F.2d at 1148 (noting “[i]t would be impossible to find an agency of our government

with a closer relationship to maritime activity” than the Coast Guard).

Finally, Lewis suggests the FTCA controls his claims because the search

“necessarily include[d] land immediately adjacent to Destin Harbor.” Doc. 14 at 4.

However, the fact that the search may have extended to nearby land is irrelevant.

Lewis was injured on the water, and thus his torts are deemed to have occurred there.

Indeed, the Supreme Court “has taken an expansive view of admiralty jurisdiction

and stated that in modern maritime commerce ‘the shore is now an artificial place to

draw a line.’” Doe v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 394 F.3d 891, 901 (11th Cir. 2004)

(concluding court had admiralty jurisdiction when cruise ship passenger alleged she

had been sexually assaulted while in a port-of-call).

Because Lewis’s claims meet the location and connection tests, they are based

in admiralty, subject to the SAA, and cannot be brought under the FTCA. See

Cranford v. United States, 466 F.3d 955, 958 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the

SAA “provides a waiver of sovereign immunity and the sole jurisdictional basis for

admiralty claims against the United States that do not involve public vessels.”)

(cleaned up); see also Uralde, 614 F.3d at 1286 (“[W]hen Coast Guard personnel

are negligent in performing functions other than those ‘in the operation of’ public

vessels, the claims arising from those acts fall under the SAA”).

B. Under the discretionary function exception to the SAA’s waiver of

sovereign immunity, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Lewis’s

claims for negligent failure to warn and negligent training and

supervision.

Although the SAA waives the Government’s sovereign immunity for maritime

tort claims, the waiver is subject to the discretionary function exception, which

preserves sovereign immunity for any claim “based upon the exercise or

performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on

the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the

discretion involved be abused.” Mid-South Holding Co., Inc. v. United States, 225

F.3d 1201, 1204-05 (11th Cir. 2000). The exception “marks the boundary between

Congress’ willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire

to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private

individuals.” United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig

Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984). The discretionary function exception “must be

strictly construed in favor of the Government, and if it applies, federal courts lack

subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims.” Swafford v. United States, 839 F.3d

1365, 1369-70 (11th Cir. 2016).

To determine whether the discretionary function exception applies, a court

must identify the conduct at issue and apply a two-step test. Id. at 1370. At the first

step, a court considers whether the conduct involves an element of judgment or

choice, which will be the case unless a federal statute, regulation, or policy

specifically prescribes a course of action embodying a fixed or readily ascertainable

standard. Cranford, 466 F.3d at 958.

At the second step, a court “ask[s] whether the judgment or choice is grounded

in considerations of public policy, because the ‘purpose of the discretionary function

exception is to prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative

decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of

an action in tort.’” Cranford, 466 F.3d at 958 (cleaned up) (quoting United States v.

Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322-23 (1991)). The “inquiry does not focus either on the

subjective intent of the government agent or on whether the agent actually weighed

policy considerations, but ‘on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they

are susceptible to policy analysis.’” Id. (citations omitted).

Applying the two-step test to the allegations here, the undersigned concludes

Lewis’s negligent failure to warn claim (Count I) and negligent training and

supervision claim (Count III) fall within the discretionary function exception. Thus,

they should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(1).

Decisions regarding what warnings should be given before and during Coast

Guard search and rescue operations involve balancing policy considerations. For

example, the Government would need to decide which personnel should be tasked

with providing warnings to bystanders, what media should be used to communicate

those warnings, and how frequently or early those warnings should be given. Those

decisions would also need to be weighed against concerns that providing warnings

could delay or interfere with potentially time-sensitive rescue efforts. Thus, the

Coast Guard’s failure to warn Lewis also falls within the discretionary function

exception. See Monzon v. United States, 253 F.3d 567, 573 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding

the failure to warn individual visitors of rip currents near a beach area fell within the

discretionary function exception).

Similarly, decisions regarding how to train and supervise crew members

during a search and rescue operation also involve policy considerations, including

those involving manpower and resource allocation. See Andrews v. United States,

121 F.3d 1430, 1441 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[D]ecisions regarding the exercise of

supervisory authority are of the sort the discretionary function exception was

designed to encompass.”); Parker v. United States, 500 F. App’x 630, 632 (9th Cir.

2012) (“[N]egligent supervision claims ‘fall squarely within the discretionary

function exception’”) (citation omitted); Echevarria-de-Pena v. United States, 2013

WL 616932, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2013) (explaining a negligent training claim

fell “within the ambit of the discretionary function exception” because “[t]here is no

doubt that BOP exercises discretion in how it trains its employees” and the “decision

is also grounded in considerations of public policy because decisions as to how to

train employees necessarily involve the allocation of BOP’s economic resources”).

Moreover, Lewis does not identify a federal statute, regulation, or policy

which mandates what warnings, training, or supervision must be provided in

connection with Coast Guard helicopter operations, nor does he allege that any

Government employee failed to comply with those statutes, regulations, or policies.

See Shivers v. United States, 1 F.4th 924, 931 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Only when a federal

employee acts contrary to a specific prescription in federal law—be it a statute,

regulation, or policy—does the discretionary function exception not apply.”)

(emphasis in original); see also id. (affirming dismissal of claim under discretionary

function exception when plaintiff pointed “to no federal statute, regulation, or policy

that specifically prescribes a course of action that the prison employees here failed

to follow”). In contrast, the Government cites several federal statutes and guidance

which indicate the Coast Guard has discretion when it comes to deciding whether to

engage in search and rescue operations and how to carry out those operations. See

In re Moore, 488 F. Supp. 3d 231, 237 (D. Md. Sept. 21, 2020) (“Congress leaves to

USCG personnel the exact means and methods of conducting search and rescue

missions in which they choose to engage.”); see also 14 U.S.C. § 521.

Whether Lewis’s negligent operation claim (Count II) falls under the

discretionary function exception, however, is a harder call. While the Coast Guard’s

general decisions about what assets to deploy or what tasks to undertake during a

search and rescue mission are considered discretionary functions, see In re Moore,

488 F. Supp. 3d at 237-40, Lewis’s negligent operation claim is based, at least in

part, on the allegation that the Coast Guard helicopter hovered too low over his boat.

The undersigned cannot say at this stage that deciding what distance to maintain

between the helicopter and Lewis’s boat is the type of decision that would involve

policy considerations.4 Instead, that conduct is similar to the negligent operation of

a motor vehicle, which the Supreme Court has indicated is not covered by the

discretionary function exception. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325 n.7 (“If one of the

officials involved in this case drove an automobile on a mission connected with his

official duties and negligently collided with another car, the exception would not

4 Nothing before the Court indicates the efficacy of the search and rescue operation was dependent

upon the altitude at which the helicopter hovered over Lewis’s boat.

apply. Although driving requires the constant exercise of discretion, the official’s

decisions in exercising that discretion can hardly be said to be grounded in regulatory

policy.”); see also Peterson v. United States, 673 F.2d 237, 240 (8th Cir. 1982)

(concluding Government may be liable for aircraft negligently flying too low during

training mission).

Nevertheless, as explained below, Lewis’s negligent operation claim is barred

by the SAA’s two-year statute of limitations.5

C. Lewis’s claims are subject to the SAA’s two-year statute of

limitations.

Actions under the SAA must be brought within two years after the cause of

action arose. 46 U.S.C. § 30905. “[T]he statute of limitations runs from the date of

the injury[.]” McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951). Because Lewis

was injured on February 11, 2023, the deadline for him to file suit was February 11,

2025. But Lewis did not file this case until September 30, 2025.

Lewis argues he is entitled to equitable tolling because the Government

treated his claim as an FTCA claim after the February 2023 incident. Specifically,

Lewis says he reported the incident to the Coast Guard “as soon as [he] was

physically able to do so” and a Coast Guard representative advised him that he could

5 The two-year statute of limitations also applies to the negligent failure to warn and negligent

training/supervision claims. Thus, even if the Court were to determine that it had jurisdiction over

those claims because they do not fall under the discretionary function exception, the claims would

nonetheless be subject to dismissal.

submit a claim for damages pursuant to the FTCA. Doc. 16. A Coast Guard official

told Lewis’s attorney “where to send the [Standard Form 95 (“SF95”)] and

supporting documents pursuant to the FTCA.” Doc. 14 at 6. On January 17, 2025,

Lewis presented his administrative claim to the Government using an SF95,

requesting $350,000 for personal injuries and $9,734.20 for property damage. Doc.

2 at 2. On February 14, 2025, the Government confirmed receipt of Lewis’s

administrative claim and stated it was under review. Doc. 17. And on April 1, 2025,

the Government mailed Lewis a letter informing him his claim was denied “pursuant

to the [FTCA]” and that he could, within six months of the date of the letter, either

file an action in federal court or request reconsideration.6 Doc. 15.

Equitable tolling “is an extraordinary remedy which should be extended only

sparingly.” Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1479 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation

omitted). “[T]raditional equitable tolling principles require that the claimant

demonstrate extraordinary circumstances, such as fraud, misinformation, or

deliberate concealment.” Jackson v. Astrue, 506 F.3d 1349, 1355 (11th Cir. 2007)

(emphasis in original). “But equitable tolling is inapplicable to ‘late filings where

the claimant failed to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights’ or for

6 Although Lewis filed this action on September 30, 2025, it appears he also contemporaneously

requested reconsideration of his administrative claim, as he submitted a letter from the

Government dated October 2, 2025, which confirms receipt of a request for reconsideration. Doc.

18.

‘what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect.’” Raziano v. United

States, 999 F.2d 1539, 1541 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Irwin v. Veterans Affs., 498

U.S. 89, 96 (1990)).

Here, the circumstances described by Lewis do not justify equitable tolling.

First, as a general matter, “[i]t is well-established that the filing of an administrative

claim under the FTCA will not toll the limitations period for an action under the

SAA.”7 Ayers v. United States, 277 F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 2002).

Second, while the Government may have told Lewis that he could file an

administrative claim pursuant to the FTCA, it never affirmatively told him the FTCA

was his exclusive avenue for relief or that he did not have a claim under the SAA.

The fact the Government references the FTCA in relation to an administrative claim

is not, alone, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.8 See

Farhat v. United States, 2022 WL 2840483 (10th Cir. 2022) (equitable tolling did

not apply to SAA claim when plaintiffs alleged they were misled by letters from the

Government, which indicated the FTCA’s statute of limitations would be tolled

while administrative claim was pending but made no representation regarding the

SAA’s time limitation); Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 752 (3d Cir. 2005)

7 Although certain admiralty statutes require a plaintiff to submit an administrative claim, Lewis

did not have to file an administrative claim before bringing suit under the SAA.

8 The undersigned also notes the Government’s April 1, 2025 letter—which informed Lewis that

he had six months to file suit—could not have led him to miss the filing deadline under the SAA,

as the statute of limitations for his claims had already expired on February 11, 2025. Thus, the

April 2025 letter is not relevant to the equitable tolling analysis.

(equitable tolling did not apply to SAA claim when plaintiff was told by government

officials to pursue an administrative claim under the FTCA because the officials “did

not induce or trick [plaintiff] into foregoing his judicial remedies by making any

affirmative misrepresentations regarding the proper avenues to pursue his claim”);

Ammer v. United States, 881 F. Supp. 1007 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 1994) (equitable tolling

did not apply despite claim that Government induced plaintiff’s untimely filing by

providing him with an SF-95 form that mentioned the FTCA but not the SAA).

Third, Lewis’s untimely filing was avoidable with diligence. Even if Lewis

and his counsel were confused by the Government’s references to the FTCA,

“[d]iligent research would likely have revealed not only the existence of an SAA

claim but also that the limitations period under the SAA would not be tolled during

the period in which he pursued an administrative complaint.” Hedges, 404 F.3d at

753-549; Johnson, 2025 WL 4055404, at *6 (“While the Court understands

Plaintiff’s frustrations as Defendant clearly moved the claim along as though it was

going to process an FTCA claim, it does not find Defendant’s actions rise to the level

of justifying equitable tolling. … Defendant did nothing to induce Plaintiff from

exploring whether his claims were more properly asserted under the SIAA or mislead

9 In Hedges, the court determined equitable tolling did not apply even though the plaintiff was

proceeding pro se when the Government told him to file an administrative claim. In contrast,

Lewis indicates he retained counsel within a month of the incident and counsel participated in the

administrative claims process. Doc. 14 at 6.

him into allowing the two-year limitations period to lapse. … [Plaintiff] could have

done his own research and figured out the proper statutory basis for his claims.”).

Because the two-year statute of limitations expired on all of Lewis’s claims

and the undersigned finds equitable tolling does not apply, the Government’s motion

should be granted, and this action should be dismissed.

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1. The Government’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 13) be GRANTED.

2. This case be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3. The clerk close the file.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 7th day of July, 2026.

/s/ Hope Thai Cannon

HOPE THAI CANNON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within

fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation.  Any different

deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only

and does not control.  An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon all

other parties.  A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to

challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and

legal conclusions.  See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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