Ryder

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

EUGENE DIVISION

CHIARA RYDER. Civ. No. 6:25-cv-01637-AA

Plaintiff, OPINION & ORDER

v.

CITY OF SPRINGFIELD,

Defendant.

_______________________________________

AIKEN, District Judge.

On September 22, 2025, the Court granted self-represented Plaintiff Chiara

Ryder’s Application to Proceed IFP, ECF No. 2, and dismissed the Complaint, ECF

No. 1, with leave to amend. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff was given thirty days in which to

file an amended complaint. Plaintiff timely filed the Amended Complaint. ECF No.

10. For the reasons set forth below, the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without

further leave to amend.

LEGAL STANDARD

Generally, all parties instituting any civil action in United States District

Court must pay a statutory filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal IFP

statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), provides indigent litigants an opportunity for

meaningful access to federal courts despite their inability to pay the costs and fees

associated with that access. To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must make

two determinations. First, a court must determine whether the litigant is unable to

pay the costs of commencing the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Second, it must assess

whether the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

With regard to the second of these determinations, district courts have the

power under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints even before service of the

complaint on the defendants and must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim.

Courts apply the same standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as when addressing

a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter,

668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss under the federal

pleading standards, the complaint must include a short and plain statement of the

claim and “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility

standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. The court is not required to accept legal conclusions, unsupported

by alleged facts, as true. Id.

Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than pleadings by

attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). That is, the court should

construe pleadings by pro se plaintiffs liberally and afford the plaintiffs the benefit of

any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.

1988). Additionally, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the

complaint and the opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies cannot

be cured by amendment. Id.

DISCUSSION

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to have dropped her claims

against all Defendants except for the City of Springfield. See ECF No. 10-1, at 1-2

(civil complaint form listing only the City of Springfield as Defendant).

The facts of this case were discussed in more detail in the Court’s prior

Opinion & Order, but in general Plaintiff alleges that she was involved in an

altercation with the staff of a hotel in Springfield, Oregon and that officers from the

Springfield Police Department were summoned. The police escorted Plaintiff from

the hotel at the request of hotel management. Plaintiff was not arrested or charged

with a crime in connection with the incident, although she was banned from the

hotel. Plaintiff has spent considerable time and effort challenging this incident

and/or seeking records related to it from the City of Springfield and other

governmental entities.

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges (1) “Enduring Harm Through

Misrepresentation, Mishandling, and Abuse of Authority,” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-15; (2)

“Unlawful Removal and Procedural Violations by Hotel and City Officers,” Id. at ¶¶

16-31; (3) “Deliberate Neglect, Misrepresentation, and the Shielding of Misconduct,”

Id. at ¶¶ 32-40; (4) “Failure to De-Escalate, Protect, and Uphold Legal Duties—The

Human Cost of Systemic Neglect,” Id. at ¶¶ 41-54; (5) “Avoidance in Place of

Accountability,” Id. at ¶¶ 55-64; (6) “Failure to Act—Personal Hardship and Public

Resource Waste,” Id. at ¶¶ 65-73. From Plaintiff’s accompanying documentation,

the Court understands these to be claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under the ADA. ECF No.

10-1, at 3.

At the outset, the Court notes that, like the original Complaint, much of the

Amended Complaint is devoted to allegations of misconduct by the hotel and hotel

staff. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2 (“I was subjected to deceit, intimidation,

mishandling, and deliberate misrepresentation by the General Manager and at

least six hotel staff,”); 5 (same) 16 (“The General Manager intentionally

misrepresented my guest status . . . reflects deliberate misconduct by both the

General Manager and hotel staff.”). As the Court explained in the prior Opinion &

Order, the hotel and its staff are not parties to this action and allegations of

misconduct by those entities will not suffice to make out a claim against the City of

Springfield.

In addition, the Amended Complaint appears to base its claims on the police

officers’ alleged failure to fully and completely investigate the hotel’s complaint

against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counter-complaint against the hotel staff. See, e.g.,

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16 (alleging that the City “refus[ed] to investigate” a “false

narrative” against Plaintiff); 18 (alleging police failed to investigate); 22 (same); 25

(same); 26 (same). Plaintiff also alleges that the City failed to investigate Plaintiff’s

complaints concerning the police officers’ alleged failure to investigate and the

contents of the police report. Id. ¶¶ 27, 30, 33-40. As the Court explained in the

prior Opinion & Order, Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to an

investigation. “There is no statutory or common law right, much less a

constitutional right to an investigation.” Frisch v. City of Eugene, Civ. No. 09-6126-

TC, 2010 WL 686754, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 24, 2010); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410

U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (noting that a “private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable

interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another.”); Clark v. Milwaukie

Police Dep’t, Case No. 3:22-cv-00662-SB, 2022 WL 4473487, at *5 (D. Or. Sept. 15,

2022) (a plaintiff “does not have a constitutionally protected right to have the police

investigate his report in a particular way, to police protection, or to have the police

arrest an alleged assailant.”); Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041,

1045 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The police have no affirmative obligation to investigate a

crime in a particular way or to protect one citizen from another even when one

citizen deprives the other of liberty or property.”); Powers v. Layron, Case No. 21-cv-

06382-AGT, 2022 WL 3579887, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2022) (“[T]here is no

constitutional right to an accurate or favorable” police report). Plaintiff

acknowledges that the Court advised her in its prior Opinion & Order that she does

not have a constitutional right to a police investigation or a favorable police report,

Am. Compl. ¶ 55, but nevertheless Plaintiff asserts at length that the officers and

the City failed to investigate her complaints. This claim once again fails.

Similarly, Plaintiff complains of a failure to produce records in response to

her record requests, but as the Court previously explained, there is no federal

constitutional right to public records pursuant to state or local law. Steskal v.

Benton Cnty., No. Civ. 04-6158-TC, 2004 WL 2997461, at *2 (D. Or. Dec. 27, 2004)

(“Generally, access to public records pursuant to state or local law is not a right

guaranteed by federal law,” and “The only area where the Supreme Court has found

a constitutional right of access to public information is in area of criminal trials and

criminal proceedings.”). Plaintiff was not criminally prosecuted for the incident.

This claim once again fails.

Plaintiff appears to assert a § 1983 excessive force claim, but as noted, she has

only named the City of Springfield as Defendant and not the individual officer. The

claim must fail on this basis alone. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

691 (1978) (municipal entities “cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory” based solely on their employment of the alleged tortfeasor); Segura

v. City of La Mesa, 647 F. Supp.3d 926, 941 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2022) (“[A] claim under

Monell is the only means of asserting a § 1983 claim against a municipality.”).

Furthermore, even if there were a valid defendant for her § 1983 claim, the claim

suffers from the same defect as in the original Complaint in that it alleges only a de

minimis use of force in the officer taking her by the arm and escorting her off the

premises. Courts have held that “the constitution does not protect against de minimis

uses of force.” Bishop v. San Quentin State Prison Work Place, No. C 01-3411 SI (PR),

2002 WL 1767416, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2002); see also Bratcher v. Polk Cnty.,

Case No. 3:20-cv-02056-SB, 2022 WL 17184419, at *9 (D. Or. Sept. 1, 2022) (finding

that a claim for excessive force based on a police officer firmly gripping an arrestee’s

arm on the way to the patrol car was “a de minimis use of force” and “insufficient to

support an excessive force claim under the circumstances,”); Parker v. City of Los

Angeles, Case No. 2:15-cv-04670-SVW-JEM, 2016 WL 9153765, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June

22, 2016) (“Courts have held that a de minimis use of force is insufficient to support

a claim of excessive force.”). The claim once again fails.

Plaintiff’s ADA claim also suffers the same defect as in the original Complaint.

As the Court previously explained, under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual

with a disability shall, by reasons of such disability, be excluded from participation

in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,

or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Ninth

Circuit has held that “a Title II claim may arise where police fail to reasonably

accommodate the plaintiff’s disability in the course of an investigation or arrest,

causing the plaintiff to suffer greater injury or indignity in that process than other

arrestees.” Mayfield v. City of Mesa, 131 F.4th 1100, 1109 (9th Cir. 2025) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted, alterations normalized). “To prove that a

public program or service violated Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that: (1)

she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) she was either excluded from

participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services, programs, or

activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) such

exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of her disability.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted, alterations normalized). To recover

monetary damages under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must establish intentional

discrimination on the part of the state officials. Ferguson v. City of Phoenix, 157 F.3d

668, 674 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, as with the original Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

the officers should have allowed her fifteen or twenty minutes to compose herself

before escorting her off the premises after she was ejected from the hotel as an

accommodation for her disability and that they refused to do so. However, as with

the original Complaint, the Amended Complaint again fails to plausibly allege that

the refusal to delay Plaintiff’s removal was by reason of her disability or that the

officers were even aware of her disability. Plaintiff appears to acknowledge this

defect by asserting that she “reserve[s] all rights to assert such claims should further

evidence or discovery substantiate them.” Am. Compl. ¶ 4. This claim again fails.

As with the original Complaint, the Amended Complaint appears to seek to

bring a Monell claim against the City. “[L]ocal governmental unit[s] or municipalities

can be sued as a ‘person’ under § 1983.” Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir.

1995). To prevail on a Monell claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

a municipal custom or policy caused the violation of a constitutional right. Monell,

436 U.S. at 690. To establish Monell liability, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1)

the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which she was deprived; (2) that the

municipality has a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to

the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind

the constitutional violation. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir.

2011). “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic

incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and

consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out police.”

Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996). And if no constitutional violation

occurred, a municipal liability claim necessarily fails. City of Los Angeles v. Heller,

475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). Here, as discussed above, there has been no constitutional

violation and so any Monell claim fails.

The Court will therefore dismiss the Amended Complaint. As discussed above,

the defects in the Amended Complaint are substantially the same as those identified

in the Court’s Opinion and Order dismissing the original Complaint. The Court

concludes that further leave to amend would be futile and so dismissal will be without

leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 10, is

DISMISSED without further leave to amend. Final judgment shall be entered

accordingly.

It is so ORDERED and DATED this 31st day of July 2026.

s/ Ann Aiken

ANN AIKEN

United States District Judge