Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

BRIDGE HOUSING CORPORATION, Case No. 3:25-cv-2439-SI

Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

ADDIE SMITH,

Defendant.

Michael H. Simon, District Judge.

On March 13, 2026, the Court confirmed an Amended Final Arbitration Award between

the parties to this case. ECF 20. On March 20, the Court entered judgment confirming the award

in its entirety, incorporating it by reference, and confirming an award of attorney’s fees and costs

incurred during arbitration to Plaintiff. ECF 24. During this litigation, Defendant has violated a

permanent injunction issued by the Arbitrator and confirmed by the Court. See ECF 16 (issuing a

Temporary Restraining Order, enjoining Defendant from conduct covered by arbitrator’s

permanent injunction); ECF 18 (extending the TRO); ECF 24 (confirming permanent

injunction); ECF 26 (finding Defendant in contempt and imposing sanctions for violations of the

injunction); ECF 27 (holding Defendant in contempt for willful refusal to comply with the

Confirmed Permanent Injunction). On April 27, the Court entered an Order and Judgment

determining that Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred as part of its

efforts to enforce the arbitration agreement, including the permanent injunction, as an

appropriate sanction for Defendant’s violations of the injunction. ECF 26 at 2; ECF 27 at 2. Now

before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Bill of Costs, ECF 28, ECF 30.

Defendant has filed no response objecting to either of Plaintiff’s requests. See ECF 31.

STANDARDS

A district court’s disposition of a motion for attorney’s fees must “provide a reasonably

specific explanation for all aspects of a fee determination” to allow for “adequate appellate

review.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 558 (2010). The preferred method of

calculating reasonable attorney’s fees is the “lodestar” method. Id. at 551-52. This is because

“the lodestar method produces an award that roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing

attorney would have received if he or she had been representing a paying client who was billed

by the hour in a comparable case,” is “readily administrable,” and is “objective.” Id. (emphasis in

original). Additionally, one purpose of federal fee-shifting statutes is to ensure that a prevailing

plaintiff’s counsel receive a fee that is “sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the

representation of a meritorious . . . case.” Id. at 552. The lodestar method of calculating

attorney’s fees “yields a fee that is presumptively sufficient to achieve this objective.” Id.

Although the lodestar calculation results in a presumptively reasonable fee, this fee may be

adjusted in certain circumstances. Id.

The lodestar amount is the product of the number of hours reasonably spent on the

lawsuit multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102

(9th Cir. 2009). 1 In making this calculation, the district court should take into consideration

various factors of reasonableness, including the quality of an attorney’s performance, the results

obtained, the novelty and complexity of a case, and the special skill and experience of counsel.

See Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553-54; Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1209 n.11 (9th

Cir. 2013).

In determining the number of hours reasonably spent, “the district court should exclude

hours ‘that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’” McCown, 565 F.3d at 1102

(quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). The party seeking an award of

attorney’s fees “has the burden of submitting billing records to establish that the number of hours

it has requested [is] reasonable.” Gonzalez, 729 F.3d at 1202.

The district court may determine, in one of two ways, whether hours are excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, and thus excludable. The court may conduct an hour-by-

hour analysis of the fee request. Id. at 1203. Alternatively, “when faced with a massive fee

application the district court has the authority to make across-the-board percentage cuts either in

the number of hours claimed or in the final lodestar figure.” Id. (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian,

987 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992)). “[W]hen a district court decides that a percentage cut (to

either the lodestar or the number of hours) is warranted, it must ‘set forth a concise but clear

explanation of its reasons for choosing a given percentage reduction.’” Id. (quoting Gates, 987

F.2d at 1400). The Ninth Circuit recognizes one exception to this rule: “[T]he district court can

impose a small reduction, no greater than 10 percent—a ‘haircut’—based on its exercise of

1 It is “well established that time spent in preparing fee applications” also is compensable.

Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1210 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Anderson v.

Director, OWCP, 91 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996)).

discretion and without a more specific explanation.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Moreno

v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008)).

In addition, other courts, including the District of Oregon, specifically caution against

both block-billing and providing vague or otherwise inadequate descriptions of tasks because

these practices hinder a court’s ability to assess the reasonableness of the time expended. See,

e.g., U.S. District Court, District of Oregon, Message from the Court Regarding Fee Petitions,

available at https://ord.uscourts.gov/index.php/rules-orders-and-notices/public-notices (last

updated Nov. 21, 2024). The Court has applied this cautionary statement, noting that “the court

may excuse this method when the billing period is no more than three hours.” Updike v.

Multnomah County, 2020 WL 4736461, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 14, 2020) (quoting Noel v. Hall, 2013

WL 5376542, at *6 (D. Or. Sept. 24, 2013)); cf. Lyon v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 656 F.3d 877,

892 (9th Cir. 2011). For block-billing periods in excess of three hours, however, the Court has

reduced each applicable entry by fifty percent. See, e.g., Fathers & Daughters Nevada, LLC v.

Lingfu Zhang, 2018 WL 3023089, at *5 (D. Or. June 18, 2018).

After determining the number of hours reasonably spent, the district court then calculates

the reasonable hourly rates for the attorneys and paralegals whose work comprise the reasonable

number of hours. This calculation yields the lodestar amount. For this purpose, the “‘prevailing

market rates in the relevant community’ set the reasonable hourly rates.” Gonzalez, 729 F.3d

at 1205 (quoting Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 813 (9th Cir. 2005)). “Generally, when

determining a reasonable hourly rate, the relevant community is the forum in which the district

court sits.” Id. (quoting Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446, 454 (9th

Cir. 2010)). Within this geographic community, the district court should consider the experience,

skill, and reputation of the attorneys or paralegals involved. Id. at 1206.

In determining reasonable hourly rates, typically “[a]ffidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney

and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other

cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the

prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407

(9th Cir. 1990). In addition, courts in the District of Oregon have the benefit of several billing

rate surveys. One useful survey is the Oregon State Bar 2022 Economic Survey (OSB 2022

Survey), which contains data on attorney billing rates based on type of practice, geographic area

of practice, and years of practice. A copy of the OSB 2022 Survey is available at

https://www.osbar.org/_docs/resources/Econsurveys/22EconomicSurvey.pdf (last visited on

July 31, 2026).

There is a presumption that the fee arrived at through the lodestar calculation is a

reasonable fee. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 552. A district court may, however, adjust the lodestar

amount in “rare” and “exceptional” cases, such as when a particular factor bearing on the

reasonableness of the attorney’s fee is not adequately taken into account in the lodestar

calculation.2 See Perdue, 559 U.S. at 552-54 (finding that, in certain circumstances, the superior

performance of counsel may not be adequately accounted for in the lodestar calculation);

Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 488 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that although

2 Factors that may be relevant to the reasonableness of a fee include: (1) the time and

labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to

perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to

acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) time limitations imposed by the client or the

circumstances; (7) the amount involved and the results obtained; (8) the experience, reputation,

and the ability of the attorneys; (9) the “undesirability” of the case; (10) the nature and length of

the professional relationship with the client; and (11) awards in similar cases. See Kerr v. Screen

Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). Based on subsequent case law, a twelfth

factor identified in Kerr, the fixed or contingent nature of the fee, is no longer a valid factor to

consider in determining reasonable attorney’s fees. See In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab.

Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942 n.7 (9th Cir. 2011).

in ordinary cases the “results obtained” factor is deemed adequately accounted for in the lodestar

calculation, it may serve as a basis to adjust the lodestar when “an attorney’s reasonable

expenditure of time on a case [is not] commensurate with the fees to which he [or she] is

entitled”).

DISCUSSION

A. Attorney Fees

The Court already has determined that Plaintiff need not brief the reasonableness of its

rates and has adopted the Arbitrator’s analysis finding that Plaintiff’s Counsel’s rates are

reasonable. ECF 26 at 2 (citing ECF 1-1 at 26-28; ECF 20; ECF 24). Those per-hour rates are

$1,016 for Mr. Briggs, $795 for Ms. Davis, and $379 for Ms. Jones. ECF 29 ¶ 8.

Plaintiff’s attorneys have provided billing records showing the hours they spent working

on this case. ECF 29-1. Based on those records, Plaintiff claims that its attorneys worked 102.3

hours in this case. ECF 29 at 2-3; ECF 29 ¶ 10. The Court has carefully reviewed those records

and sees no evidence of excessive, redundant, duplicative, or unnecessary labor, or block-billing.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Briggs, argues that his team efficiently and successfully

litigated the case. ECF 28 at 5. It is clear from Plaintiff’s briefing and declarations that Plaintiff’s

attorneys made affirmative efforts to control costs. The case was leanly staffed, with only two

attorneys and a paralegal assigned. ECF 29 ¶¶ 18-19. Mr. Briggs did not include in his request

time worked that he considered excessive, redundant, or unnecessary. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff did not

seek to recover fees based on the work of other attorneys and support staff who worked on the

case. Id. ¶ 9; see also id. Ex. 1. Finally, presumably in the interest of economy and efficiency,

Plaintiff seeks fees based on the 2025 rates that the Arbitrator already found to be reasonable

rather than their higher 2026 rates. Id. ¶ 8.

There remains, however, one problem with Plaintiff’s Motion. Plaintiff’s attorney

declares that Plaintiff does not seek to recover fees incurred in the arbitration action because

those were already awarded. Id. ¶ 7; see also ECF 24. Plaintiff’s billing records; however, cover

the period from December 2025 to April 2026, and include many entries applicable to the

arbitration action. See ECF 29-1. Although the Court has no reason to doubt Plaintiff’s attorney’s

representations, it also has no adequate way to verify which billing entries are for arbitration-

oriented tasks for which Plaintiff has already been awarded fees and which entries are for the

tasks pertinent to the instant Motion, and thus no adequate way to verify the total number of

hours worked that are relevant here. As a result, to take Plaintiff’s requested figures of 102.3

hours at face value would be to risk an inadvertent double award and fall short of the Supreme

Court’s admonition to “provide a reasonably specific explanation for all aspects of a fee

determination” in order to allow for “adequate appellate review.” Perdue, 559 U.S. at 558. To

resolve this problem, the Court looks to the billing entry descriptions in the records provided and

will grant fees only for those hours that contain descriptions that indisputably confirm the work

performed was relevant to the instant motion. Based upon that review, the Court will award fees

for 6.2 hours worked by Mr. Briggs, 35.8 hours worked by Ms. Davis, and 5.1 hours worked by

Ms. Jones.

Multiplying the hours worked by the requested reasonable rates, the Court calculates that

Defendant shall owe Plaintiff $36,693.10 in attorney’s fees. Plaintiff does not seek to enhance

the award of attorney’s fees based on any of the Kerr factors, and so the Court does not consider

whether such an enhancement is appropriate.

B. Costs

The Court has previously determined that Defendant shall reimburse Plaintiff for

reasonable costs. See ECF 27 at 2. Plaintiff requests $1,704.40 in costs and has provided a Bill of

Costs confirming that Plaintiff paid $405 in fees of the clerk and $1,299.40 in fees for service of

summons. ECF 30. The Court finds these costs reasonable and grants Plaintiff’s request.

C. Interest

Post-judgment interest applies to “any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a

district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961. That interest is “at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year

constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System, for the calendar week preceding.” Id. The rate for the week preceding this order,

beginning on July 24, is 4.10 percent, compounded annually. Interest will begin to accrue from

the date of this Order.

CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees, ECF 28, and awards Plaintiff

$36,693.10. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs, ECF 30, and awards Plaintiff

$1,704.40. Defendant is directed to begin payments within 14 days of this Order. The Court

further ORDERS Defendant to pay post-judgment interest on the amount awarded at a rate

of 4.10 percent, accruing from the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 31st day of July, 2026.

/s/ Michael H. Simon

Michael H. Simon

United States District Judge