Lafferty

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

DANIEL LAFFERTY, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 25-1514

)

JOSEPH HENDERSON et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Daniel Lafferty, an inmate at Illinois River Correctional Center (“IRCC”),

filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient

claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if

it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. Upon

review of the complaint, the court accepts the factual allegations as accurate and

construes them liberally in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th

Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must

be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United

States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

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II. Facts Alleged

Plaintiff names IRCC Sergeant Joseph W. Henderson and Grievance Officer

Lynette M. Boughan as Defendants.

On December 20, 2024, Plaintiff’s cell was searched for a second time that day by

Defendant Henderson and another corrections officer. Although Plaintiff acknowledges

that the search resulted in seizing “miscellaneous items that amounted to nothing but a

minor contraband infraction,” the search resulted in confiscation of over $100 in art

supplies Plaintiff had accumulated. At the subsequent disciplinary hearing, Henderson

was the only Adjustment Committee member who presided over Plaintiff’s disciplinary

hearing. Plaintiff claims that Henderson imposed a seven-day room restriction, which

Plaintiff completed. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a grievance that Defendant Boughan

processed and eventually led to the expungement of the rule violation from Plaintiff’s

record by the Administrative Review Board.

III. Analysis

Plaintiff does not state a plausible claim for the confiscation of his art supplies.

The unauthorized—negligent or intentional—loss, confiscation, or destruction of

a prisoner’s personal property does not violate due process where state law provides a

meaningful post-deprivation remedy. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).

In Illinois, a prisoner has an adequate remedy available to him in the Illinois Court

of Claims. See Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 1993); see also Sorrentino v.

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Godinez, 777 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The Illinois Court of Claims has exclusive

jurisdiction over suits asserting damages to property.”); Court of Claims Act, 705 ILCS

505/8(d) (limiting damages against the State for tort claims and vesting the Court of

Claims with exclusive jurisdiction); Davenport v. City of Chicago, 653 F. Supp. 2d 885, 891

(N.D. Ill. 2009) (“Pursuant to state law, [arrestee] may file a tort claim in the Illinois Court

of Claims for her property losses.”).

Plaintiff’s assertion that his disciplinary hearing was not before a neutral

committee states a plausible Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against

Defendant Henderson.

“Prisoners are entitled to be free from arbitrary actions of prison officials.”

Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 1984). “The protections against this

arbitrary action, however, are the procedural due process requirements” relevant to the

liberty interest at stake. Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 1984)l; see also

McKinney v. Meese, 831 F.3d 728, 733 (7th Cir. 1987) (describing the informal due process

requirements, which includes adjudication by a neutral committee that documents its

findings); Westefer, 682 F.3d at 685 (“[O]nly a single prison official is needed as the neutral

reviewer—not necessarily a committee.” (emphasis added)).

However, Plaintiff does not state a claim against Defendant Boughan. “Prison

officials who simply processed or reviewed inmate grievances lack personal involvement

in the conduct forming the basis of the grievance.” Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th

Cir. 2017). “And the failure to follow a state’s inmate grievance procedures is not a federal

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due-process violation.” Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017); see also Owens v.

Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Prison grievance procedures are not mandated

by the First Amendment and do not by their very existence create interests protected by

the Due Process Clause, and so the alleged mishandling of [the plaintiff’s] grievances by

persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no

claim.”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Complaint [1] under 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, Plaintiff states a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim against

Defendant Henderson. Plaintiff’s claim against Henderson proceeds in his

individual capacity only. Additional claims shall not be included in the case,

except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

2) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to terminate Lynette M. Boughan as a party.

3) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until

counsel has appeared for Defendant before filing any motions to give Defendant

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before

Defendant’s counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as

premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this time unless

otherwise directed by the Court.

4) The Court will attempt service on Defendant by mailing Defendant a waiver of

service. Defendant has sixty days from service to file an Answer. If Defendant has

not filed an Answer or appeared through counsel within ninety days of the entry

of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After

Defendant has been served, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and

dispositive motion deadlines.

5) Concerning a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by Plaintiff,

the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to

the Clerk said Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, said

Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used only for

effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained

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only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed

by the Clerk.

6) Defendant shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk sends the

waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all

defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent

pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this order. In general, an

answer sets forth Defendant’s positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of

those positions unless and until Defendant files a motion. Therefore, no response

to the answer is necessary or will be considered.

7) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendant’s counsel

has filed an appearance, Defendant’s counsel will automatically receive electronic

notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Plaintiff does

not need to mail copies of motions and other documents that Plaintiff has filed

with the Clerk to Defendant’s counsel. However, this does not apply to discovery

requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses are not filed with the

Clerk of the Court. Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests and responses

directly to Defendant’s counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk

will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to

compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s counsel has filed an

appearance, and the Court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the

discovery process in more detail.

8) The Court grants Defendant’s counsel leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of

confinement. Defendant’s counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.

9) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his

mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a

change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit,

with prejudice.

10) If Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within thirty

days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal

service through the U.S. Marshals Service on that Defendant and will require that

Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 4(d)(2).

11) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order under

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

12) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendant under the standard

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procedures.

ENTERED August 4, 2026.

s/ Colleen R. Lawless

____________________________________

COLLEEN R. LAWLESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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