Walls

FOINR T THHEE U SNOIUTTEHD ESRTNA TDEISST DRIISCTTR IOCFT I CLOLIUNROTI S

NIRIN WALLS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 26-cv-00334-SPM

v.

DR. KHAN,

DR. BOOSE,

MS. CUNNINGHAM,

LT. HUNDLEY,

SGT. WILSON,

NURSE J. BROWN,

LATOYA HUGHES,

NURSE SIMPSON,

SUSAN COLE,

LT. YATES,

C/O WHITE,

LT. REID,

C/O STREETER,

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCE INC., and

DR. REISTER,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Nirin Walls, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) currently

housed at Menard Correctional Center, filed the instant lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

the Americans with Disabilities Act for the violations of his constitutional and statutory rights that

occurred while he was housed at Lawrence Correctional Center. The Complaint is now before the

Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section 1915A, any portion

of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or requests money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief

must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

THE COMPLAINT

In the Complaint, Plaintiff states that he was transferred from Pontiac Correctional Center

(Pontiac) to Lawrence Correctional Center (Lawrence) on May 25, 2025, and following his

transfer, he was denied medications and ADA accommodations that he had been previously

provided while at Pontiac. (Doc. 1, p. 9, 12). Specifically, he was not given the following

medicines for four days: Lisinopril and hydrochlorothiazide for high blood pressure; tramadol

(Ultram) for pain; tamsulosin (Flomax) for prostate issues; Depakote for seizures; and Geodon,

Zoloft, and Cogentin for schizophrenia. (Id. at p. 10, 12). Plaintiff claims that he was also deprived

of the use of a wheelchair and cane and not issued a “shower permit,” which allowed him to shower

daily because he suffers from urine incontinence. (Id.).

Upon his arrival at Lawrence, Plaintiff states that Lieutenant Hundley and Lieutenant Yates

pushed him in his wheelchair, with his cane on his lap, to a shower stall for a strip search. (Doc.

1, p. 9). Following the strip search, he asserts that Hundley, Yates, and Correctional Officer

Streeter confiscated his wheelchair and cane and placed him in a “crisis cell strap down chair.”

Plaintiff asserts that he was then “wheeled” in the crisis cell strap down chair to cell 5CL22, where

the officers threw him out of the chair and onto the ground. When Plaintiff was forcefully ejected

from the chair, Plaintiff injured his back, left elbow, and neck. He recounts that he was unable to

stand, and he was left lying on the ground for hours. During that time, Plaintiff states that he

urinated and defecated on himself and had several seizures. (Id.). Hundley informed Plaintiff that

he had been instructed by Nurse Simpson to take away Plaintiff’s wheelchair and cane. (Id. at p.

10). Plaintiff asked to speak with a doctor because Nurse Simpson is not qualified to order the

confiscation of his mobility aids. Hundley, Yates, and Streeter told Plaintiff that he would have to

suffer until he was scheduled to see the doctor. (Id.).

On May 26 and 27, 2025, Plaintiff was taken to cell 5CL22 by Sergeant Wilson, Lieutenant

Hundley, Correctional Officer White, and Lieutenant Reid, and he again was strapped down in a

crisis chair. (Doc. 1, p. 14). White lifted Plaintiff from the chair and threw him onto the ground.

White injured himself in the process, and Wilson, Reid, and Hundley told White to leave Plaintiff

on the ground. (Id.).

From May 25, 2025, through June 5, 2025, Plaintiff’s neighbor wrote several requests on

Plaintiff’s behalf to Dr. Cole and the healthcare unit administrator (HCUA), Cunningham, asking

for his pain medication, a cane, and a wheelchair. (Doc. 1, p. 10). Plaintiff received his medications

around May 29, 2025. Dr. Cole signed a medical permit for Plaintiff to have a wheelchair on June

2, 2025, but Plaintiff was not provided with a wheelchair until June 7, 2025. Without a wheelchair,

he could not go to the dining room for meals, and he did not eat for days. (Id.).

Plaintiff claims that he “passed out” in his cell over six times and had several seizures

during the four days he was not receiving his blood pressure and seizure medications. (Doc. 1, p.

13). He states that under the settlement agreement in the class action lawsuit Lippert, an inmate is

to retain all medical permits and medications following a transfer to a new facility until the inmate

is seen by the facility’s doctor. (Doc. 1, p. 12). Additionally, Dr. Cole should have seen him

urgently in accordance with IDOC protocol. (Id.).

At some point in June or July 2025, Plaintiff spoke with Dr. Khan and informed him that

the Geodon medication, prescribed to treat schizophrenia, was hurting his stomach. (Doc. 1, p. 9,

10). The details of Plaintiff’s conversations with Dr. Khan vary. First, Plaintiff asserts that Dr.

Khan instructed him to take Geodon with a snack, but that Dr. Khan never placed an order for

Plaintiff to receive a snack along with the Geodon medication. (Id. at p. 9). Next, Plaintiff alleges

that he had previously received a snack with Geodon while he was at Pontiac, but that once he was

transferred to Lawrence, Dr. Khan “refused” to order the snack and advised Plaintiff to stop taking

Geodon if it was hurting his stomach. (Id. at p. 10). Finally, Plaintiff claims that Dr. Khan

instructed him not to take the Geodon medication without a snack because the medication will

damage his stomach. (Id. at p. 11, 13). Plaintiff claims that around March 16, 2026, Dr. Khan told

him that he should be receiving a snack with the Geodon medication. (Id.). As of filing the

Complaint on March 25, 2026, he is still not receiving a snack with Geodon, and Dr. Khan has not

prescribed any alternative treatment. (Id.). Because he is not given a snack with Geodon, Plaintiff

has not taken the medication since May 25, 2025, and his schizophrenia has worsened. (Id. at p.

11). He has been placed on crisis watch over seven times, had disciplinary issues, and attempted

suicide. (Id.).

Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Boose refused to place him in mental health group therapy sessions

from September 2023 through November 2024, when he was previously housed at Lawrence, and

Dr. Khan has refused to put him in mental health group therapy sessions since his transfer back to

Lawrence in May 2025. (Doc. 1, p. 11, 13). He states that Dr. Boose, Dr. Khan, Director Hughes,

Dr. Reister, and Warden Brown “are liable for [] zero mental health care.” (Id. at p. 11).

DISCUSSION

Based on Plaintiff’s allegations and his articulation of his claims, the Court designates the

following counts:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Hundley, Yates, and Streeter for

the use of excessive force against Plaintiff on May 25, 2025.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against White for the use of excessive

force against Plaintiff sometime around May 26 or 27, 2025.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment claim against Hundley, Yates, and Streeter for

subjecting Plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment by leaving

Plaintiff on the floor of his cell unassisted for hours on May 25,

2025.

Count 4: Eighth Amendment claim against White, Wilson, Hundley, and

Reid for subjecting Plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment by

leaving Plaintiff on the floor of his cell unassisted sometime around

May 26 or 27, 2026.

Count 5: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Simpson,

Cole, Cunningham, Hundley, Yates, and Streeter for failing to

provide Plaintiff access to a mobility device.

Count 6: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Khan,

Boose, Hughes, Brown, Wexford, and Reister for failing to provide

Plaintiff adequate mental health care.

Count 7: Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants for deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs by failing to ensure

Plaintiff received his needed medications and medical permits upon

his transfer to Lawrence.

Count 8: ADA/RA1 claim for denying Plaintiff access to mobility assistance

from May 25, 2025, through June 7, 2025.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless

otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the

Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice

as inadequately pled under the Twombly2 pleading standard.

Counts 1 and 2

Plaintiff’s allegations that Hundley, Yates, and Streeter threw him onto the ground of his

cell on May 25, 2025, for no reason causing injury to his back, elbow, and neck are sufficient for

Count 1 to proceed against these Defendants for excessive force. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (force applied maliciously to cause harm, as opposed to an effort to maintain or

restore discipline, constitutes excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment).

Likewise, Plaintiff has stated a claim against White for unnecessarily throwing him onto

the ground of his cell sometime on May 26 or 27, 2025 (Doc. 1, p. 14). See Reid v. Melvin, 695 F.

1 Plaintiff does not mention the Rehabilitation Act (RA), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), in the Complaint, but the Seventh Circuit

has cautioned that claims of discrimination on account of a disability, especially those from a pro se prisoner litigants,

should be analyzed by the district court in light of both the ADA and RA, whether or not the plaintiff has asserted a

claim under the latter statute. See Norfleet v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2012).

2 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

App’x 982, 983-84 (7th Cir. 2017) (when there is no justification for the use of force, even de

minimis force may not be used).

Counts 3 and 4

The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment forbids the

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).

Generally, to establish an Eighth Amendment claim an inmate must plead facts showing an

objectively serious condition, and a defendant’s subjective disregard for a risk to the inmate’s

health or safety.

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from several chronic illnesses, he has limited mobility, and

he incurred further injury when he was forced from the crisis chair onto the cell floor on May 25,

2025. According to Plaintiff, Hundley, Yates, and Streeter left him on the floor of his cell for hours

without assisting him onto a bed or into a wheelchair, and they assist him in obtaining medical

care for his injuries or chronic illnesses. (Doc. 1, p. 9). As a result, Plaintiff urinated and defecated

himself, passed out, and had seizures. Plaintiff was again left on the floor of his cell without

mobility and medical assistance sometime around May 26 or 27, 2025, by White, Wilson, Hundley,

and Reid. These facts state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants, and Counts 3 and 4

survive preliminary review.

Count 5

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s “serious

medical needs,” as deliberate indifference “constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain forbidden by the Constitution.” Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 828

(7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). As stated above, to successfully state an Eighth

Amendment claim of deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must plead that the defendant knew of a

serious risk of harm and consciously disregarded it. See Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1049

(7th Cir. 2019).

Plaintiff claims that at the direction of Nurse Simpson, Plaintiff’s wheelchair and cane were

confiscated upon his arrival at Lawrence. (Doc. 1, p. 10). When Plaintiff asked Hundley, Streeter,

and Yates to call a doctor about his need for a wheelchair, they responded, “You have to suffer till

you see the doctor.” (Doc. 1, p. 10). Plaintiff then submitted request slips to Cunningham and Dr.

Cole requesting a wheelchair. A medical permit for him to receive a wheelchair was issued by Dr.

Cole a week after his arrival on June 2, 2025, and he received a wheelchair on June 7, 2025. While

awaiting his wheelchair, Plaintiff was unable to move about his cell and could not stand and walk

to the dining room. Without a wheelchair, he missed several meals. (Id.).

Plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment claim against Nurse Simpson, Hundley, Streeter,

and Yates for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, which impact his mobility, by

confiscating his medically necessary mobility devices, a wheelchair and a cane.

Plaintiff’s allegations, however, do not allow the plausible inference that Dr. Cole or

Cunningham acted with deliberate indifference. Nothing in the Complaint establishes that

Plaintiff’s mobility devices were confiscated at the direction of Dr. Cole or Cunningham or with

their knowledge or that they were aware he was missing meals and not being provided assistance

while he awaited the issuance of his medical permit and wheelchair. Furthermore, responding to

Plaintiff’s wheelchair requests by issuing him a medical permit for a wheelchair does establish that

Dr. Cole and Cunningham disregarded a serious risk to his health and acted with “total unconcern.”

Stockton v. Milwaukee Cnty., 44 F.4 605, 615 (7th Cir. 2022). For these reasons, Count 5 is

dismissed as to Dr. Cole and Cunningham.

Count 6

Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Khan, Dr. Boose, Director Hughes, Warden Brown, Dr. Reister,

and Wexford have not provided him with constitutionally adequate mental health care at

Lawrence.

Regardless of the exact details of Plaintiff’s interactions with Dr. Kahn, his assertions that

he has schizophrenia and that Dr. Khan has disregarded a serious risk to his health by failing to

ensure that he receives food with the Geodon medication and/or by failing to prescribe an

alternative treatment when Dr. Khan discovered that Plaintiff had stopped taking the medication

because of it hurt Plaintiff’s stomach are sufficient for Count 6 to proceed against Dr. Khan for

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s mental health needs.

Count 6 is dismissed, however, to the extent Plaintiff claims that Dr. Boose and Dr. Khan

have violated his constitutional rights by refusing to place him in group therapy. (Doc. 1, p. 11,

12). Plaintiff asserts that when he was housed at Joliet Treatment Center in 2023, he received

“inpatient level of care,” which included group therapy sessions. Since his transfer from Joliet

Treatment Center to Lawrence in September 2023 and upon his return to Lawrence in May 2025,

he is receiving “outpatient level of care,” and has not been referred to group therapy sessions.

(Doc. 1, p.14). Plaintiff, however, is not entitled to demand specific care, nor is he entitled to the

“best care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). At this point, Plaintiff’s

assertion that he should be participating in group therapy is a mere disagreement with the doctor’s

treatment decisions concerning his mental health and does not amount to an Eighth Amendment

violation. Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003). Because failure to refer Plaintiff

to group therapy is the only allegation against Dr. Boose, Count 6 is dismissed as to Dr. Boose in

its entirety.

Count 6 is also dismissed as to the upper-level officials – Director Hughes, Warden Brown,

and Dr. Reister, who is described as the mental health supervisor. Plaintiff’s claims against these

Defendants are sparse and conclusory. He states that they are liable for providing zero mental

health care and for the deprivation of mental health needs. (Doc. 1, p. 11, 13). The facts do not

suggest personal involvement on the part of Hughes, Brown, or Reister in Plaintiff’s mental health

care, and Defendants cannot be found liable simply because they are “in charge” or in a supervisory

position. (See Doc. 1, p. 14). The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply to actions filed

under Section 1983, and therefore, Defendants cannot be held liable solely for the errors of their

subordinates. Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). See

also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (deliberate indifference exists only if the

defendant actually “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety”).

Accordingly, Count 6 is dismissed against Hughes, Brown, and Reister.

And finally, Count 6 is dismissed as to Wexford because Plaintiff does not assert that his

constitutionally deficient mental health care was the result of a Wexford policy or custom. See,

e.g., Shields v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating that “[s]uch a private

corporation cannot be held liable under [Section] 1983 unless the constitutional violation was

caused by an unconstitutional policy or custom of the corporation itself.”).

Count 7

Plaintiff claims that the medical treatment that he had been receiving at Pontiac

automatically ceased when he was transferred to Lawrence in violation of the settlement agreement

reached in the class action lawsuit Lippert. (Doc. 1, p. 12). His mobility devices were confiscated,

and his prescriptions and medical permits were canceled. Additionally, he was not scheduled to

see Dr. Cole immediately in violation of IDOC protocol, he was forced to wait almost two weeks

to receive a wheelchair, and he waited four days to receive his prescriptions. (Id. at p. 10, 12).

Because of this lapse in care, Plaintiff suffered from several seizures and pain. (Id.).

Failing to adhere to a settlement agreement does not in and of itself create a cause of action

under Section 1983. See Eason v. Pritzker, No. 20-cv-01157-SPM, 2020 WL 7027485, at *4 (S.D.

Ill. Nov. 30, 2020). A settlement agreement is a contract, and this Court does not have the

jurisdiction to enforce its provisions. (See Id.). Although Defendants may not have implemented

the provisions as agreed upon by the parties in Lippert, Plaintiff must still sufficiently plead facts

that support an Eighth Amendment claim against each Defendant. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff

is attempting to hold Defendants liable simply for failing to comply with the Lippert settlement

agreement, Count 7 is dismissed.

The only assertions that are attributed to specific Defendants regarding lapses in Plaintiff’s

care upon his initial arrival at Lawrence is the denial of his mobility devices and pain medication.

(See Doc. 1, p. 10). Thus, the Court dismisses Count 7 to the extent Plaintiff is asserting a

constitutional violation for the delay in receiving his other medications, and the denial of his

shower permit when he was transferred to Lawrence, as he does associate this claim with a

Defendant.

The Court has already addressed the denial of Plaintiff’s mobility devices in Count 5, and

so, Count 7 is dismissed as redundant to the extent Plaintiff is asserting that his constitutional rights

were violated when his medical permit for use of a mobility device was not honored when he

transferred to Lawrence.

As for the denial of pain medication, Plaintiff asserts that he submitted request slips asking

for pain medication to Dr. Cole and HCUA Cunningham. Although he did not receive a written

response to his requests, he resumed the Tramadol prescription within four days following his

arrival. (Doc. 1, p. 10). These facts are not sufficient for the Court to infer that either Dr. Cole or

Cunningham were involved in the delay Plaintiff experienced in receiving his pain medication or

that they responded with deliberate indifference once they discovered a lapse in his care.

Accordingly, Count 7 is dismissed to the extent Plaintiff is asserting that the delay in receiving

pain medication violated the Eighth Amendment.

Count 8

Under the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, because of that

disability...be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be

subject to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006). The RA likewise prohibits

discrimination against qualified individuals based on a physical or mental disability. See 29 U.S.C.

§§ 794-94e. The analysis under the ADA and the RA is the same, except that the RA includes as

an additional requirement, the receipt of federal funds, which all states accept for their prisons.

Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 705(2)(B)).

Discrimination under both statutes includes the failure to accommodate a disability. Id. at 672

(citation omitted).

Plaintiff claims that without his wheelchair or some kind of mobility device, he was unable

to walk to the dining area and attend meals. (Doc. 1, p. 10). As a result, he did not eat “for days.”

(Id.). Access to meals is considered a “program or activity” within the meaning of the ADA/RA.

Jaros, 684 f.3d at 672. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for

violations of the ADA and/or RA. The claim cannot proceed against an individual defendant,

however, because individual employees of IDOC cannot be sued under the ADA and RA. See 42

U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b). See also Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670, n.2 (noting that individual capacity claims

are not available; the proper defendant is the agency or its director (in his official capacity)). As

such, IDOC Director Latoya Hughes will remain in the case in her official capacity only as the

proper defendant for Plaintiff’s ADA and/or RA claim.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking the Court to reconsider the denial

of his Motion for an Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order, and Change of Venue, in which he

sought a change of venue and judge to adjudicate this case. (Doc. 10, 11, 12). Plaintiff argues that

the Court made an error of law in ruling on his Motion for Reconsideration due to a conflict of

interest. (Doc. 12). He also disagrees with the Court’s ruling that his request for injunctive relief

against Director Hughes in his original Motion (Doc. 10) is distinct from his allegations against

Hughes in the Complaint. And finally, Plaintiff contends that his requested injunctive relief, a

transfer to another facility, is appropriate and will prevent further injury. The Motion for

Reconsideration is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Plaintiff is incorrect that it was error for the undersigned to rule on the Motion for an

Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order, and Change of Venue. Section 144 requires that a “judge

shall proceed no further” in presiding over a proceeding “whenever” the moving party files a

“sufficient affidavit” that the presiding judge has personal bias or prejudice against a party. 28

U.S.C. §144; Tezak v. U.S., 256 F. 3d 702, 716-17 (7th Cir. 2001). It is the presiding judge who

decides whether the affidavit is legally sufficient. See Berger v. U.S., 255 U.S. 22, 36 (1921)

(district judge had a “lawful right to pass upon the sufficiency of the affidavit”); U.S. v. Johnson,

658 F. 2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding the district judge properly denied the motion to recuse);

U.S. v. Balistrieri, 779 F. 2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1985) (overruled on other grounds) (the judge is

allowed to rule on the timeliness and sufficiency of the affidavit). Plaintiff did not provide an

affidavit that was legally sufficient, and therefore, there was no requirement for the undersigned

to refer the Motion to another judge and remove himself from the case. In the Motion, Plaintiff

complained of prejudice based on alleged statements made by ADA Coordinators Clump and

Cunningham that incorrectly informed Plaintiff that the undersigned directed for Plaintiff to be

transferred to a new correctional facility. This case, No. 26-cv-00334-SPM, is the only open case

Plaintiff currently has pending with the undersigned, and a review of the docket demonstrates that

no such order was ever issued. Plaintiff did not show any kind of bias that is “personal” as is

required. U.S. v. Sykes, 7 F. 3d 1331, 1339 (7th Cir. 1993). Thus, it was not in error for the

undersigned to rule on the request for reassignment of case. SeeF .R.C .P.54(b).

The Court will also not reconsider Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order

(TRO). The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that any grant of prospective relief, “shall

extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff

or plaintiffs” and cannot issue “unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends

no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive

means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626. Federal courts

must exercise equitable restraint when asked to take over the administration of a prison, something

that is best left to correctional officials and their staff. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482

(1995); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). In the Motion for an Injunction, Temporary

Restraining Order, and Change of Venue, Plaintiff does not clearly specify the type of relief he

seeks in order to restore his ADA status and wheelchair, which were revoked following his transfer

to Menard Correctional Center (Menard). The only relief Plaintiff asks for is a change of judge

and venue to protect his rights and health. (Doc. 10, p. 2). Not only has Plaintiff failed to establish

a legal basis for assigning this case to another judge or a different venue, but this type of relief is

not narrowly tailored to correct the alleged harm he is experiencing at Menard and not properly

directed at Director Hughes. The Court did not commit error of fact or law in denying Plaintiff’s

request for a TRO, which would require the Court to issue an injunction before Defendants had a

chance to respond to the Motion.

For the same reasons, the Court also did not err in denying the request for a preliminary

injunction. However, in Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration he clarifies he seeks transfer to

another facility (Doc. 12), and the Court finds it concerning that Plaintiff, who suffers from

mobility issues and has been issued a wheelchair at previous facilities, has now been denied access

to a wheelchair for allegedly non-medical reasons. Because the Court has liberally construed

Plaintiff’s ADA/RA claim and allowed him to proceed with Count 8 against Director Hughes in

her official capacity, Director Hughes is directed to respond to the request for a preliminary

injunction and the allegations in Doc. 10 and 12 within 14 days of service of the pleadings in

this case, at which point the Court will determine the need for a hearing on the request for a

preliminary injunction. In response, Director Hughes shall provide information on Plaintiff’s

current medical diagnosis and care and his ADA status. Director Hughes shall support any factual

assertions with relevant evidence, such as affidavits and/or medical records.

MOTIONS FOR STATUS

To the extent Plaintiff seeks an update on the status of the case, his Motions for Status are

GRANTED in light of this Order. (Doc. 6, 8, 13). Plaintiff’s request for the Court to order the

release of all property and legal documents is DENIED. (Doc. 8). To the extent Plaintiff is

claiming that he is being denied access to his property and legal documents in violation of the First

Amendment, such assertion is outside the scope of this lawsuit. A motion requesting emergency

injunctive relief is not the appropriate avenue to add parties or claims. See Bird v. Barr, No. 19-

cv-1581 (KBJ), 2020 WL 4219784, at *2 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2020) (a court “only possesses the

power to afford preliminary injunctive relief that is related to the claims at issue in the litigation”).

DISPOSITION

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint survives preliminary review pursuant to

Section 1915A. COUNT 1 will proceed against Hundley, Yates, and Streeter. COUNT 2 will

proceed against White. COUNT 3 will proceed against Hundley, Yates, and Streeter. COUNT 4

will proceed against White, Wilson, Hundley, and Reid. COUNT 5 will proceed against Simpson,

Hundley, Yates, and Streeter, and is DISMISSED without prejudice as to Cole and Cunningham.

COUNT 6 will proceed in part against Khan, and is DISMISSED without prejudice as to Boose,

Hughes, Brown, Wexford, and Reister. COUNT 7 is DIMISSED without prejudice. COUNT 8

shall proceed against Hughes in her official capacity only. Because there are no surviving claims

against Cole, Cunningham, Boose, Brown, Wexford, and Reister, the Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to terminate them as parties on the docket.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Hundley, Yates, Streeter, White, Wilson, Reid,

Simpson, Khan, and Hughes (official capacity only) the following: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit

and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons).

The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum

and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails

to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from

the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the

Defendant, and the Court will require the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the

extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer

shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, his last known

address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally

effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address

information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Because this suit includes claims of physical injury and medical care, the Clerk of Court is

DIRECTED to enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance

Portability and Accountability Act.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to Local

Rule 8.2(b), Defendants should respond to the issues stated in this Merit Review Order.

Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for

leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give security

for the same, the applicant and (if applicable) his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into

a stipulation that any unpaid costs taxed against the applicant shall be paid from any recovery

secured in the action.

Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 14 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 24, 2026

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge

N P

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit and

serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants will

enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from

the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take

90 days or more. When all of the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling

Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is

advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the

defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit

any evidence to the Court at this time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.