Taylor

FOR TUHNEI TSOEDU TSHTAERTENS D DIISSTTRRIICCTT O CFO IULLRITN OIS

LAREN T.1 )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Civil No. 3:24-cv-02460-GCS

)

COMMISSIONER of SOCIAL )

SECURITY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

In accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff, through counsel, seeks judicial

review of the final agency decision denying his application for Disability Insurance

Benefits (“DIB”).2

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 9, 2022, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB alleging a disability onset

date of February 2, 2020. Plaintiff’s application was denied on December 14, 2022. Plaintiff

requested reconsideration on January 16, 2023; the request was denied on June 13, 2023.

Plaintiff then requested a hearing with an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The

1 Plaintiff’s full name will not be used in this Memorandum & Order due to privacy

concerns. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 5.2(c) and the Advisory Committee Notes thereto.

2 This case was assigned to the undersigned for final disposition upon consent of

the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). See (Doc. 12).

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(Tr. 13-28). On October 16, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for

review, making the ALJ’s decision the final agency decision subject to judicial review. (Tr.

1). Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies and filed a timely complaint with this

Court.

ISSUES RAISED BY PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff raises the following issues:

1. The ALJ erred by formulating the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

contrary to the record as a whole by crediting the severity of Plaintiff’s

narcolepsy but failing to establish an RFC that captured the proper

limitations caused by this impairment.

2. The ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s subjective

allegations concerning his narcolepsy.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS

“The [SSA] provides benefits to individuals who cannot obtain work because of a

physical or mental disability.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 98 (2019). Disability is the

inability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve

months.” Stephens v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(1)(A)).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ considers the following five

questions in order: (1) Is the claimant presently unemployed? (2) Does the claimant have

a severe impairment? (3) Does the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of

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his former occupation? and (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work? See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520.

An affirmative answer at either step 3 or step 5 leads to a finding that the claimant

is disabled. A negative answer at any step, other than at step 3, precludes a finding of

disability. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps 1–4. Once the claimant shows

an inability to perform past work, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show

the claimant’s ability to engage in other work existing in significant numbers in the

national economy. See Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2001).

It is important to recognize that the scope of judicial review is limited. “The

findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial

evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Accordingly, this Court is not tasked

with determining whether Plaintiff was, in fact, disabled at the relevant time, but whether

the ALJ’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and whether any errors of law

were made. See Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003). The

Supreme Court defines substantial evidence as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103 (internal

citations omitted).

In reviewing for “substantial evidence,” the entire administrative record is taken

into consideration, but this Court does not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide

questions of credibility, or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ. Burmester v.

Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019). While judicial review is deferential, it is not

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Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 921 (7th Cir. 2010).

THE DECISION OF THE ALJ

The ALJ followed the five-step analytical framework described above. He

determined that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through March 31, 2024,

and Plaintiff had not worked at the level of substantial gainful activity since his alleged

onset date of December 23, 2021. (Tr. 19). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following

severe impairments: obstructive sleep apnea and type 2 narcolepsy. Id.

The ALJ found Plaintiff had the RFC “to perform a full range of work at all

exertional levels but with the following non-exertional limitations: he should never climb

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can occasionally climb ramps and stairs. He should avoid

all exposure to dangerous workplace hazards, such as exposed moving machinery and

unprotected heights.” (Tr. 20). Thus, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 25).

THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD

The Court has reviewed and considered the entire evidentiary record in preparing

this Memorandum & Order. The Court finds the ALJ’s summary of the record in his

decision, when compared with the points raised by Plaintiff, is sufficiently

comprehensive. There is no need to summarize it here.

DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s brief relies on a statement by Dr. Terry Brown,

who treated Plaintiff for narcolepsy. (Doc. 15, p. 8-9). The statement was presented to the

Appeals Council but was not a part of the record that forms the basis for the ALJ’s

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cannot consider evidence that was not before the ALJ in evaluating the ALJ’s decision. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g); Slayton v. Colvin, No. 15-1254, 629 Fed. Appx. 764, 771 (7th Cir. Dec. 7,

2015); Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 366 n.2 (7th Cir. 2004); Eads v. Secretary of Dept. of

Health and Human Services, 983 F.2d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 1993). Thus, the Court has not

considered Dr. Brown’s statement in determining whether the ALJ’s decision was

supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff also asserts (in passing) that the Appeals Council erred in denying this

request, but he did not include that argument as an issue to be presented to the Court and

he did not develop the argument in his brief. (Doc. 15, p. 1, 8-9). Accordingly, the Court

finds that the Plaintiff waived the argument that the Appeals Council erred in this regard.

See Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 2016); Milburn v. Berryhill, No. 16-cv-03264,

2018 WL 1229753, at *3 (C.D. Ill. March 9, 2018).

I. The RFC is not Supported by Substantial Evidence.

The ALJ erred by reaching a conclusion that was not supported by substantial

evidence. The Court is mindful that an ALJ is “subject to only the most minimal of

articulation requirements,” Warnell v. O'Malley, 97 F.4th 1050, 1053 (7th Cir. 2024).

Nevertheless, the ALJ must “articulate at some minimal level his analysis of the

evidence.” Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 889 (7th Cir. 2001) (cleaned up). This analysis

must “’provide a logical bridge’” between the evidence and its conclusion so that a

reviewing court can “afford the claimant meaningful judicial review.” Jones v. Astrue, 623

F.3d 1155, 1160 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Getch v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 480 (7th Cir. 2008)).

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889. See also Reinaas v. Saul, 953 F.3d 461, 467 (7th Cir. 2020) (criticizing decision where

ALJ “cited only evidence favorable to her decision without discussing any contrary

evidence”). The Court finds the case must be remanded because the ALJ failed to explain

the characterization of Plaintiff’s exam findings as “mild” and his treatment as

“conservative.” The ALJ also fails to discuss contrary evidence and to provide a logical

bridge between the evidence and the RFC that he formulated.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by

substantial evidence. First, the ALJ repeatedly referred to Plaintiff’s “mild” or “very

mild” examination findings. (Tr. 20, 21, 22). However, the ALJ failed to explain how he

concluded that Plaintiff’s examination findings were, in fact, “mild” or “very mild.” The

ALJ found that the initial State agency assessment, which found that Plaintiff’s

impairments “non-severe,” to be unpersuasive. (Tr. 22). On the other hand, the ALJ found

the State agency assessment at the reconsideration level to be persuasive. Id. The

reconsideration assessment concluded that Plaintiff was severely impaired. (Tr. 70). That

assessment does not characterize Plaintiff’s symptoms as mild. Similarly, medical

evidence from Dr. Brown,3 who treated Plaintiff for narcolepsy, noted that Plaintiff

scored 16 or above on the Epworth Sleepiness Scale from October 2019 to April 2023. (Tr.

305-319). The treatment notes interpreted these scores as “high” and noted several times

3 The Court notes that the ALJ did explain the extent to which he found Dr. Brown’s

opinion persuasive. Because the ALJ relied on Dr. Brown’s assessments and did not

articulate any reason to rely on some parts of the assessments but not others, the Court

infers that the ALJ found Dr. Brown’s opinion to be persuasive in its entirety.

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reconsideration assessment noted Plaintiff’s high scores on this scale. (Tr. 72). The ALJ

did not cite to any medical findings that Plaintiff’s impairments, symptoms, or diagnosed

narcolepsy was “mild,” let alone “very mild.”

Second, the ALJ referred to the “conservative treatment” of Plaintiff’s narcolepsy

as a justification for concluding that “[Plaintiff’s] impairments [we]re not as severe as

alleged.” (Tr. 21). None of the medical records in this case characterize Plaintiff’s

treatment as mild. On the contrary, Plaintiff was prescribed the recommended maximum

dose of Adderall for narcolepsy treatment, and then his dosage was increased. (Tr. 311,

313). The ALJ did not explain why this type of treatment might be considered

“conservative.”

The ALJ placed significant weight on the fact that Plaintiff would not use a CPAP

or BiPAP machine. The ALJ wrote that Dr. Brown “had told [Plaintiff] that the machines

would help his narcolepsy. (Tr. 21). But the record does not entirely support that

statement. While Dr. Brown mentioned in his treatment notes that a CPAP machine might

help with sleepiness, (Tr. 306, 313), he did not definitively state that it would help.4

Moreover, the ALJ’s decision does not explain why the ALJ gave such weight to those

two notes but not to Dr. Brown’s repeated notes that Plaintiff’s sleepiness was typical for

treated narcolepsy and was unlikely to improve. (Tr. 306, 307, 309, 311, 313, 318, 319). As

4 Plaintiff relies on a clarifying statement submitted to the Appeals Council by Dr.

Brown. (Doc. 15, p. 8-9). Because the Court is reviewing the ALJ’s decision on appeal, and

Dr. Brown’s clarifying statement was not part of the record that formed the basis of the

ALJ’s decision, the Court cannot consider it here.

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ignoring evidence to the contrary. See Reinaas, 953 F.3d at 467.

Finally, the reasons the ALJ provided in support of the RFC were brief and unclear.

For instance, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s ability to participate in some activities of

daily living meant Plaintiff had overstated the severity of his impairment. However, there

is no explanation as to why that is the case. The record plainly reflects, and the ALJ

acknowledged during the hearing, that Plaintiff’s narcolepsy limits how long Plaintiff can

engage in activity, not whether he can do it at all. See, e.g., (Tr. 54) (stating that “it’s

longevity and endurance that is your problem. You can’t do stuff for long periods,

whatever you’re doing.”). The ALJ did not explain why Plaintiff’s ability to perform daily

activities for short durations necessarily meant that Plaintiff’s impairment was less severe

than alleged. This lack of explanation prevents the Court from meaningfully reviewing

the ALJ’s reasoning.

Furthermore, where a Plaintiff has documented fatigue issues, an ALJ must

“fulsomely ‘discuss . . . how it might affect [his] job performance.’” Rebecca A. v. Kijakazi,

No. 21 C 3185, 2022 WL 16856394, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2022) (collecting cases). See

also Thompson v. Berryhill, Cause No. 2:18-CV-63-JEM, 2019 WL 632189, at *3 (N.D. Ind.

Feb. 14, 2019) (noting that “[b]ecause the ALJ offers no explanation of how the RFC

accommodates Plaintiff's fatigue, the RFC is not supported by substantial

evidence.”); Collins v. Berryhill, No. 17 C 3589, 2018 WL 3361847, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 10,

2018) (similar). But see Matthews v. Saul, No. 19-3529, 833 Fed. Appx. 432, 436-438 (7th Cir.

Nov. 5, 2020) (concluding ALJ reasonably justified decision of how to accommodate

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319). The ALJ’s RFC formulation does not meaningfully address Plaintiff’s documented

fatigue issues beyond obliquely referring to narcolepsy in limiting Plaintiff’s exposure to

hazards and climbing. (Tr. 21). Without a more substantial analysis of these limitations

and how they appropriately address Plaintiff’s problems with the duration of exertion,

the Court cannot meaningfully review the ALJ’s decision. To be clear, the Court does not

fault the ALJ for any particular conclusion he reached. Rather, the problem is that the

Court cannot follow his reasoning. See Reinaas, 953 F.3d at 467.

“If a decision ‘lacks evidentiary support or is so poorly articulated as to prevent

meaningful review,’ a remand is required.” Kastner v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir.

2012) (internal citation omitted). Because the Court finds that it cannot meaningfully

review the ALJ’s decision, it must be remanded for reconsideration. Because the Court

finds that the first ground of appeal requires remand, it does not reach the second ground

of appeal.

This Memorandum & Order should not be construed as an indication that the

Court believes Plaintiff was disabled during the relevant period or that he should be

awarded benefits. The Court has not formed any opinions in that regard and leaves those

issues to be determined by the Commissioner after further proceedings.

CONCLUSION

The Commissioner’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s application for disability

benefits is REVERSED and REMANDED to the Commissioner for rehearing and

reconsideration of the evidence, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk

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NVUUIL to UICC LU CILIe itterle fib Lavell OL ft teatiltill.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 24, 2026. Digitally signed by

- . Judge Sison

Alkled &. de vipntes 2026.07.24

14:36:25 -05'00'

GILBERT C. SISON

United States Magistrate Judge

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