Opinion

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

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AT SEATTLE

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10 INGRID JOHNSON, CASE NO. C26-2142JLR

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v.

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MICROSOFT CORPORATION, et

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al.,

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Defendants.

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I. INTRODUCTION

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Before the court are pro se Plaintiff Ingrid Johnson’s complaint (Compl. (Dkt.

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# 2)), and United States Magistrate Judge Brian A. Tsuchida’s order granting Ms.

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Johnson’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and recommending that

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this court review Ms. Johnson’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) before

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issuing summons (7/1/26 Order (Dkt. # 16)). The court has reviewed Ms. Johnson’s

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complaint and concludes that it is frivolous, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

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1 granted, and seeks relief against defendants who are immune from suit. Accordingly, the

2 court DISMISSES Ms. Johnson’s complaint, and this action, with prejudice.

3 II. BACKGROUND

4 This is the fifth lawsuit Ms. Johnson has pursued in this district arising from a

5 child custody dispute and eviction that originated in King County Superior Court.1 See

6 Johnson v. Cary, No. C25-0564KKE (W.D. Wash.) (dismissed with prejudice on April

7 22, 2025, after § 1915(e)(2)(B) review on the basis of judicial immunity and abstention

8 pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)); Johnson v. Santos, No.

9 C25-0911JHC (W.D. Wash.) (dismissed with prejudice on May 27, 2025, after

10 § 1915(e)(2)(B) review on the basis of Younger abstention); Johnson v. King Cnty., No.

11 C25-1109JHC (W.D. Wash.) (voluntarily dismissed on June 22, 2025); Johnson v. King

12 Cnty. Super. Ct., No. C25-1533JHC (W.D. Wash.) (transferred from the Northern District

13 of Texas and dismissed with prejudice on September 2, 2025, after § 1915(e)(2)(B)

14 review). Ms. Johnson has also filed lawsuits arising from the same child custody dispute

15 and eviction in other districts across the country. (See Transfer Order (Dkt. # 10) at 1 n.1

16 (listing actions Ms. Johnson filed in the District of Alaska, the District of Minnesota, the

17 Northern District of Texas, and the Eastern District of Wisconsin).)

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1 The court takes judicial notice of the related cases Ms. Johnson has filed in this court

22 and others pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201.

1 Ms. Johnson’s mother, Carolynn Comstock,2 has filed two additional lawsuits that

2 also arise, at their core, from the same child custody dispute. See Comstock v. Microsoft

3 Corp., No. C26-1307RAJ (W.D. Wash.) (alleging RICO claims as “successor in interest”

4 to Ms. Johnson; voluntarily dismissed on April 23, 2026); Comstock v. Microsoft Corp.,

5 No. C26-1938JLR (W.D. Wash.) (transferred to this district from the District of Puerto

6 Rico on June 2, 2026). Ms. Johnson also raised third-party claims related to the same

7 child custody dispute in a matter that originated in a lawsuit her former landlord brought

8 against Ms. Comstock that was later removed to this court. See generally Order Granting

9 Motion to Dismiss; Remanding Action, Postma v. Comstock, No. C25-2036SAB (W.D.

10 Wash. Jan. 26, 2026), Dkt. # 27 (setting forth the procedural background of that matter,

11 dismissing Ms. Johnson’s third-party claims, and remanding the remaining claims to

12 King County Superior Court).

13 Ms. Johnson originally filed this action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,

14 which transferred the matter to this court on June 10, 2026. (See generally Transfer

15 Order.) Ms. Johnson purports to bring claims for violation of the Racketeer Influenced

16 and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and (d), “against a

17 multi-state association-in-fact enterprise involving state actors, law firms, and corporate

18 entities.” (Compl. at 1-2 (naming approximately 30 defendants3).) She asserts that the

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2 See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Dismiss; Remanding Action at 3, Postma v.

20 Comstock, No. C25-2036SAB (W.D. Wash. Jan. 26, 2026), Dkt. # 27 (observing that “[Ms.]

Johnson is Ms. Comstock’s daughter”).

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3 Ms. Johnson names as Defendants Microsoft Corporation, Apple Inc., OpenAI LLC,

Google LLC, Meta Platforms Inc., LinkedIn Corporation, Washington State Governor Robert J.

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Ferguson, Washington State Attorney General Nicholas Brown, Knauf Santos Law PLLC, Karl

1 “enterprise’s unified purpose is the ongoing aggravated kidnapping and medical neglect

2 of [her son,] minor RR, weaponization of family courts to retain custody with a defaulted

3 kidnapper, deployment of corporate surveillance to silence the protective parent, and

4 obstruction of federal remedies.” (Id. at 2-3; see also id. at 15 (listing 15 alleged RICO

5 predicate acts), 16-21 (describing four “tracks” under which Defendants are allegedly

6 liable under RICO).)

7 III. ANALYSIS

8 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court must dismiss a complaint filed in

9 forma pauperis if “at any time” it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious;

10 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief

11 against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

12 also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (clarifying that § 1915(e)

13 screening applies to all IFP proceedings).

14 A complaint is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

15 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A court may dismiss a claim as frivolous

16 when it is based on a meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are “clearly

17 baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). This standard encompasses

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Reinke, Perkins Coie LLP, Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe

20 LLP, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Betts Patterson & Mines P.S., King County Superior Court

“via Judges Monica Cary, Maureen McKee, Josephine Wiggs[,] Administrator Linda Ridge and

does 1-50,” Seattle Police Department, City of Seattle Attorney’s Office “via Leesa Manion,”

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King County Prosecutor’s Office, King County, the City of Seattle, Karin Young, Jill Irvine,

Judy Roller, Evelyn Johnson, Craig Stahl, and Eric Johnson (together, “Defendants”). (Compl.

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at 1-2.)

1 allegations that describe “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional” scenarios, or scenarios that

2 “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible[.]” Id. at 33. Because Ms.

3 Johnson is a pro se plaintiff, the court must construe her pleadings liberally. See

4 McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, her complaint

5 must still contain factual allegations “enough to raise a right to relief above the

6 speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Fed. R.

7 Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(2) (requiring a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the

8 grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a short and plain statement of the claim

9 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

10 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (requiring a plaintiff to “plead[ ] factual content

11 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

12 misconduct alleged”).

13 The court concludes that Ms. Johnson’s complaint is legally frivolous,4 fails to

14 state a claim on which relief may be granted, and seeks monetary relief against

15 defendants who are immune from suit. First, as this court has previously explained,

16 judges and court staff are absolutely immune from suit “for any acts they perform that

17 relate to the ‘judicial process,’ regardless of the judge’s alleged motives.” Johnson v.

18 Cary, No. C25-0564KKE, 2025 WL 1167549, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 22, 2025)

19 (quoting In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002)). Thus, the court dismisses

20 with prejudice on the basis of judicial immunity Ms. Johnson’s claims against Judge

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4 By concluding that Ms. Johnson’s complaint is legally frivolous, the court does not

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mean to minimize Ms. Johnson’s concern for her child.

1 Monica Cary, Judge Maureen McKee, Judge Josephine Wiggs, Administrator Linda

2 Ridge, and any other court staff involved in her state- or federal-court proceedings.

3 Second, as the Northern District of Texas has held, Ms. Johnson’s allegations of a

4 wide-ranging RICO conspiracy spanning state, city, and county actors, law firms, the

5 largest technology companies in the world, her ex-husband, and her former landlord are

6 frivolous because they “have no basis in law and qualify as clearly irrational or wholly

7 incredible.” Order at 3, Johnson v. Reinke, No. 2:25-cv-00203-Z (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15,

8 2025), Dkt. # 28 (dismissing Ms. Johnson’s RICO complaint with prejudice on

9 § 1915(e)(2)(B) review). This court, too, finds that Ms. Johnson’s expansive RICO

10 claims have no basis in law or in fact, and therefore dismisses them with prejudice.

11 Third, as the Eastern District of Wisconsin has held, Ms. Johnson’s RICO claims

12 are barred by res judicata in light of the Northern District of Texas’s prior dismissal with

13 prejudice of Ms. Johnson’s RICO claims against a similar set of defendants arising from

14 the same custody dispute. See Screening Order at 2-3, Johnson v. Reinke, No.

15 2:25-cv-01407-WCG (E.D. Wisc. Sept. 30, 2025), Dkt. # 11 (dismissing Ms. Johnson’s

16 RICO complaint with prejudice on § 1915(e)(2)(B) review).

17 Finally, Ms. Johnson’s complaint is barred by the Rooker-Feldman5 doctrine,

18 under which federal district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over lawsuits that are,

19 in effect, appeals from state court judgments. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir.

20 2003). A federal lawsuit may be an improper appeal where the federal claims raised are

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5 D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263

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U.S. 413, 415 (1923).

1 intertwined with a state court judgment. Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855,

2 859 (9th Cir. 2008). This occurs where a federal lawsuit requests relief that would

3 effectively reverse a state court decision or void its ruling. Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC v.

4 City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334

5 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not limited to claims

6 that were actually decided by the state courts, but rather it precludes review of all state

7 court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those

8 challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.”) (internal quotation

9 marks and citation omitted). This lawsuit, at its core, challenges a decision made in

10 state-court proceedings to grant custody of RR to Ms. Johnson’s ex-husband, and seeks to

11 return custody to Ms. Johnson. (See, e.g., Compl. at 2-3 (alleging that the RICO

12 “enterprise’s unified purpose is the ongoing aggravated kidnapping and medical neglect

13 of minor RR, weaponization of family courts to retain custody with a defaulted

14 kidnapper, deployment of corporate surveillance to silence the protective parent, and

15 obstruction of federal remedies”), 14 (“The Enterprise consists of four coordinated tracks

16 whose purpose is to seize and retain custody of minor RR, destroy the Johnson family,

17 weaponize courts and police, and deploy corporate surveillance to silence opposition.”).)

18 Thus, because Ms. Johnson’s lawsuit “seeks to disrupt or ‘undo’ a prior state-court

19 judgment,” it is barred by Rooker-Feldman. Bianchi, 334 F.3d at 901 (citation omitted).

20 For all of the above reasons, the court DISMISSES Ms. Johnson’s complaint with

21 prejudice pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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1 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), district courts are ordinarily to

2 “freely give” leave to amend a claim subject to dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

3 Leave to amend is not required, however, where amendment would be futile, such as

4 when the pleading could not possibly be cured by further factual allegations. Foman v.

5 Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). As discussed above, Ms. Johnson has filed numerous

6 lawsuits raising RICO claims arising from the state-court custody dispute, none of which

7 have had merit. Accordingly, the court concludes that further amendment of Ms.

8 Johnson’s complaint would be futile and DENIES leave to amend.

9 IV. CONCLUSION

10 For the foregoing reasons, the court DISMISSES Ms. Johnson’s complaint (Dkt.

11 # 2), and this action, with prejudice on 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) review. The court

12 DENIES Ms. Johnson’s pending motion to transfer this matter to the District of Maine

13 and for other relief (Dkt. # 25) as moot.

14 Dated this 13th day of July, 2026.

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A

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17 JAMES L. ROBART

United States District Judge

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