EDWARDSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

ROBERT LEE WASHINGTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:24-cv-00382-JPH-MG

)

STEPHANIE EDWARDSON, )

CHELSEA LAFLEUR, )

RICHARD FIELDS, )

EMILY MEADOWS, )

CASEY LEE, )

CHARLES FUNK, )

DANICKA MITCHELL, )

T. SWITZER, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT

Robert Lee Washington alleges that Defendants violated his due process

rights by subjecting him to disciplinary proceedings and sanctions when he was

a pretrial detainee at the Vigo County Security Center. The parties have filed

cross-motions for summary judgment. Dkt. [45]; dkt. [50]. For the reasons below,

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Mr. Washington's

motion is DENIED.

I.

Summary Judgment Standard

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is

unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and,

instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a). When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the

record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565,

572–73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility

determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the fact-

finder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). A court only has to

consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); it need

not "scour the record" for evidence that might be relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind.

Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573−74 (7th Cir. 2017).

A party seeking summary judgment must inform the district court of the

basis for its motion and designate the evidence that it contends demonstrates

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986). Whether a party asserts that a fact is undisputed or genuinely

disputed, the party must support the asserted fact by citation to specific parts

of the record, including depositions, documents, or affidavits. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c)(1)(A). Failure to properly support a fact in opposition to a movant's

factual assertion can result in the movant's fact being considered undisputed,

and potentially in the grant of summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

For cross-motions for summary judgment, all reasonable inferences are

drawn in favor of the party against whom the motion at issue was made. Valenti

v. Lawson, 889 F.3d 427, 429 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Tripp v. Scholz, 872 F.3d

857, 862 (7th Cir. 2017)). The existence of cross-motions for summary judgment

does not imply that there are no genuine issues of material fact. R.J. Corman

Derailment Servs., LLC v. Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, Loc. Union 150, AFL-

CIO, 335 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003).

II.

Factual Background

Mr. Washington was a pretrial detainee in the Vigo County Security Center

from 2021 through sometime in 2024, when he began serving a prison term at

the Indiana Department of Correction. Dkt. 45-1 at 8–9 (Washington deposition).

The designated evidence contains records of four disciplinary charges that were

brought against Mr. Washington while he was housed at the Security Center:

• On December 8, 2022, Defendant Danicka Mitchell wrote a conduct report

accusing Mr. Washington of using a sock to tamper with a cell door lock.

Dkt. 45-7 (12/8/2022 conduct report).

• On April 7, 2024, Defendant Mitchell wrote a conduct report accusing Mr.

Washington of improperly having two mattresses instead of one. Dkt. 45-

8 (4/7/2024 conduct report).

• On July 4, 2024, non-defendant Officer Whalen wrote a conduct report

stating that Mr. Washington had "returned a razor with it having the razor

blade itself completely removed from the razor making into a deadly

weapon." Dkt. 45-9 (7/4/2024 razor conduct report). Defendant Richard

Fields was the CAB hearing officer for this charge and found Mr.

Washington guilty. Dkt. 45-2 ¶¶ 22, 23 (Fields affidavit).

• Also on July 4, 2024, non-defendant Officer Mawi wrote a conduct report

accusing Mr. Washington of writing and sending a sexual note to a

Security Center nurse. Dkt. 45-10 (7/4/2024 letter conduct report).

Defendant Torie Switzer was the CAB hearing officer for this report and

found that Mr. Washington had violated two Security Center rules – one

prohibiting "sexual conduct" and one prohibiting "trafficking." Dkt. 45-4

¶¶ 16–19 (Switzer affidavit).

Mr. Washington does not contend that he did not receive notice of any of these

conduct reports, or that the proceedings related to the conduct reports did not

comply with due process. Dkt. 1; dkt. 50; dkt. 52. Instead, Mr. Washington

argues that Defendants violated his due process rights by subjecting him to

disciplinary proceedings and sanctions when he did not have notice of the

Security Center's rules and regulations and possible sanctions for violations of

those rules. Dkt. 45-1 at 45, 51. Defendants have designated evidence that the

rules and regulations in the handbook were available to all detainees through

the Security Center's kiosks. Dkt. 45-4 ¶ 15. Mr. Washington testified that

"[t]here wasn't any postings of the rules by a kiosk or anywhere in eyesight in

the dorms, the regular dorms or [in] segregation. I wasn't given a rule book." Dkt.

45-1 at 12.

The Court screened Mr. Washington's complaint and allowed him to

proceed with claims based on allegations that Defendants placed him in

segregation for disciplinary reasons without due process. Dkt. 29 at 2-3.1 The

parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Dkt. 45; dkt. 50.

1 Mr. Washington did not file a motion asking the Court to reconsider its screening order;

nor did he properly file an amended complaint. See dkt. 59 (order striking belated and

unsigned motion to file an amended complaint that did not have an amended complaint

III.

Discussion

A pretrial detainee's placement in disciplinary segregation for prison rule

violations can trigger the detainee's right to due process. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441

U.S. 520, 535–36 (1979); Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1005 (7th Cir. 1999).

Here, Mr. Washington does not allege or argue that he was denied due process

during any disciplinary proceeding. Dkt. 1; dkt. 50; dkt. 52. Rather, he argues

that subjecting him to disciplinary proceedings and sanctions violated his due

process rights because he was not given the Security Center's rules and

regulations setting forth what conduct was sanctionable.

Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because

they did not violate Mr. Washington's due process rights by denying him access

to the Security Center's list of sanctionable conduct, and regardless are entitled

to qualified immunity. Dkt. 46. In a one-page response, Mr. Washington

contends that "Defendants factual allegations are not correct or are incomplete,

specifically the date the Vigo County Jail obtained its inmate handbook", and

that disciplining him for violating rules that were not posted violates due process.

Dkt. 50 at 1.

"[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their

conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.'" Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11

attached to it). To the extent Mr. Washington now suggests that he also was subjected

to First Amendment retaliation or deprivation of his religious freedoms at the Security

Center, those claims are not raised in this case. See Schmees v. HC1.COM, Inc., 77 F.4th

483, 488–90 (7th Cir. 2023).

(2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). "Once the

defense of qualified immunity is raised, a defendant is entitled to dismissal

unless a plaintiff comes forward with facts showing a constitutional violation and

law showing his right was 'clearly established' at the time of the alleged violation."

Thomas v. Carmichael, 164 F.4th 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2026) (quoting Siddique

v. Laliberte, 972 F.3d 898, 902-03 (7th Cir. 2020)). To overcome qualified

immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing "clearly established law . . .

particularized to the facts of the case." Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d 629, 633 (7th

Cir. 2017). Meeting that burden "is a 'do or die' requirement for the plaintiff's

suit. If a plaintiff fails to identify analogous precedent clearly establishing the

law, the district court must grant summary judgment for the defendant."

Villalobos v. Picicco, 168 F.4th 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 2026); accord Thomas v.

Carmichael, 164 F.4th 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2026).

In response to Defendants' summary judgment motion, Mr. Washington

cites Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1986), and Garcia v. Salt Lake

County, 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1986). That is not enough to overcome qualified

immunity. First, Fifth and Tenth Circuit cases do not govern Defendants' actions

in the Southern District of Indiana. See Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540 (7th Cir.

2018) (explaining that precedent from other circuits can clearly establish the law

only if there's "such a clear trend in the caselaw that we can say with fair

assurance that the recognition of the right by a controlling precedent was merely

a question of time").2 Moreover, Gibbs recited only a general principle that "an

inmate is entitled to prior notice, or 'fair warning,' of proscribed conduct before

a severe sanction may be imposed." 779 F.2d at 1044; see Zorn v. Linton, 146 S.

Ct. 926, 930 (2026) ("The relevant precedent must define the right with a high

degree of specificity, so that every reasonable official would interpret it to

establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply."). And Garcia does not

address due process related to prison discipline at all. 768 F.2d 303.

Further problematic for Mr. Washington, "[d]ue process does not require

specific notice of a rule prohibiting an act commonly known to be unlawful." Ard

v. Hanks, 67 F. App'x 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2003). Mr. Washington provides no

argument—much less citations to clearly established law—that it was not

commonly known that inmates were not allowed to possess razor blades or write

sexual notes to staff. See id.; cf. Orozco v. Dart, 64 F.4th 806, 815 (7th Cir. 2023)

(noting that unlike books, inmates lack a property interest in "cocaine or other

banned substances").3 Even more, Mr. Washington designated no evidence that

any individual defendant was responsible for informing him of what conduct was

prohibited or ensuring that the Security Center's kiosks had copies of the

2 Mr. Washington also cites a district court opinion, Hodges v. Jones, 873 F. Supp. 737

(N.D.N.Y. 1995), but in addition to being outside the Seventh Circuit, district court

opinions "have no weight as precedents and therefore cannot clearly establish a

constitutional right." Lovett v. Herbert, 907 F.3d 986, 994 (7th Cir. 2018).

3 While it is not necessary for the qualified immunity analysis, the Court notes that it

appears that the first two instances of discipline that Mr. Washington alleges did not

lead to any sanction, including disciplinary segregation. See Obriecht v. Raemisch, 565

F. App'x 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting inmate could not "prove a violation of

procedural due process without evidence that he was deprived of a protected liberty or

property interest").

handbook available. See dkt. 50. For these reasons too, Defendants are entitled

to qualified immunity. See Mabes v. Thompson, 136 F.4th 697, '706 (7th Cir.

2025).

Mr. Washington has not overcome qualified immunity, so the Court "must

grant summary judgment for the defendant|s]." Villalobos, 168 F.4th at 1063;

accord Thomas, 164 F.4th at 1067.4

IV. Conclusion

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Mr.

Washington's motion is DENIED. Dkt. [45]; dkt. [50]. Final judgment will issue

by separate entry.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 7/29/2026 Pas +

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

All ECF-registered counsel of record via email

ROBERT LEE WASHINGTON

967130

CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIAL FACILITY (CIF)

CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIAL FACILITY

Inmate Mail/Parcels

9124 West Reformatory Road

PENDLETON, IN 46064

4 Because Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court does not consider

the other arguments made regarding summary judgment.