Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

CHILD EVANGELISM FELLOWSHIP OF )

ILLINOIS, INC., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:26-cv-04038-SLD-RLH

)

MOLINE-COAL VALLEY SCHOOL )

DISTRICT NO. 40, RACHEL SAVAGE, )

and MOLINE-COAL VALLEY DISTRICT )

NO. 40 BOARD OF EDUCATION, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

This is a case about religious discrimination by Defendants Moline-Coal Valley School

District No. 40 (the “District”), the District’s Board of Education, and Rachel Savage, the

District Superintendent, against Plaintiff Child Evangelism Fellowship of Illinois, Inc. (“CEF”).

CEF brought suit for violations the First Amendment, alleging that Defendants treated CEF’s

“Good News Club,” a Christian after-school enrichment program, differently than similarly

situated, non-religious groups in the District. After the parties settled the case, they moved for

the Court to embody the terms of the settlement in a permanent injunction and to enter judgment

awarding CEF damages and attorney’s fees and costs. Before the Court is the parties’ joint

motion for the entry of final judgment and a permanent injunction, ECF No. 29, as well as CEF’s

motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 4, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 21.

For the following reasons, the motion for the entry of final judgment and a permanent injunction

is DENIED. Because the parties have settled the case, the motion for a preliminary injunction

and motion to dismiss are MOOT.

BACKGROUND

CEF establishes Good News Clubs at schools across the country, including in the District.

Compl. 5, ECF No. 1. Good News Clubs meet on school campuses to provide all interested

students free religious programing “to encourage learning, spiritual growth, and service to others,

as well as social, emotional, character, and leadership development.” Id. at 5–6. The District has

several policies governing the terms by which community organizations can access school

facilities and school-sponsored fora such as the “Backpack Night” literature-distribution forum.

Id. at 6–13. The District’s policies classify organizations as category I, II, or III, with Category I

organizations receiving the greatest access to school facilities and fora. Id. The District

categorized CEF as a “Category II” organization, requiring it to pay fees for facility use and

preventing it from accessing the Backpack Night forum. Id. at 1.

CEF brought suit against Defendants alleging that, by classifying CEF as a Category II

organization, they had violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Illinois

Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILCS 35/1–35/99, by treating the Good News Clubs at

schools in the district differently than similarly situated, non-religious groups, such as the Boy

Scouts, Girls on the Run, and Moline Little League Softball and Baseball. See generally id.

On May 7, 2026, the parties reached a settlement during a settlement conference before

Magistrate Judge Hanna. See May 7, 2026 Min. Entry, ECF No. 28. Pursuant to this settlement,

the parties filed a joint motion for a permanent injunction and final judgment. The motion asks

the Court to enter a proposed Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment, ECF No. 29-1. The

proposed injunction would require Defendants to amend several of their policies, refrain from

enforcing them in their current form, treat CEF the same as “similarly situated nonreligious

organizations,” and otherwise provide CEF “equal access” to school facilities and fora. See

generally Proposed Inj. & Final J. The proposed order entering final judgment would award

$105,351.25 to CEF “as and for actual damages and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.” Id. at

5.

DISCUSSION

Although the parties style the motion as one for a permanent injunction and the entry of

final judgment, the Court construes the motion as a single request for the entry of a consent

decree. “A consent decree is a court order that embodies the terms agreed upon by the parties as

a compromise to litigation.” United States v. Alshabkhoun, 277 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2002).

Consent decrees may, but do not always, impose a continuing injunction. Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry.

Emp. Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 n.7 (1961). While courts sometimes refer to

such decrees as “injunctions” rather than “consent decrees,” for the sake of clarity, the Court will

refer to the parties’ entire request as a proposed consent decree and the portion styled as a

permanent injunction as a proposed injunction.

In this case, the parties make four specific requests in their motion for a consent decree:

(1) to declare CEF the prevailing party, (2) to award $105,321.25 “as and for actual damages and

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs,” (3) to enter the proposed injunction and declare that, in any

future litigation to enforce it, the prevailing party be entitled to recover attorney’s fees, costs, and

interest, and (4) to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. See generally Proposed Inj. & Final J.

Ordinarily, dismissing a case divests the court of jurisdiction over it. Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377–82 (1994). The mere fact that the parties

agreed to settle their case does not mean the court retains jurisdiction to oversee disputes arising

out of the settlement agreement. Id. at 378 (“Enforcement of [a] settlement agreement . . .

whether through award of damages or decree of specific performance, is more than just a

continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit, and hence requires its own basis for jurisdiction.”).

In most cases, settlement agreements are enforced “just like any other contract.” Lynch, Inc. v.

SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2002). However, a district court may retain

jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement if it embodies the terms of the agreement in a

judicial order such as a consent decree or injunction. Id.; Shapo v. Engle, 463 F.3d 641, 643 (7th

Cir. 2006) (“[A] district judge cannot dismiss a suit with prejudice, thus terminating federal

jurisdiction, yet at the same time retain jurisdiction . . . . (An exception is the inherent power of a

court that has issued an injunction, even if that injunction ended the lawsuit, to enforce it, as by

contempt proceedings.)”). Here, the parties ask the Court to enter a consent decree embodying

the terms of their settlement agreement and awarding the agreed damages amount. Doing so

would give the Court power to enforce the injunction and damages award through, for example,

contempt proceedings even after dismissing the case.

The Court may enter such a consent decree only under certain circumstances. First, the

consent decree “must (1) spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s subject

matter jurisdiction; (2) come within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings; and (3)

further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based.” Komyatti v. Bayd, 96

F.3d 955, 960 (7th Cir. 1996) (alterations and quotation marks omitted). Second, before entering

a consent decree, “the judge must satisfy himself that the decree is consistent with the

Constitution and laws, does not undermine the rightful interests of third parties, and is an

appropriate commitment of the court’s limited resources.” Kasper v. Bd. of Elections of

Comm’rs of Chi., 814 F.2d 332, 338 (7th Cir. 1987). Finally, with respect to the proposed

injunction, the decree must satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d).

See Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n v. Am. Express Co., 467 F.3d 634, 636–38 (7th Cir. 2006);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1) (requiring that every injunction “(A) state the reasons why it issued; (B)

state its terms specifically; and (C) describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to the

complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required”).

The parties have not even attempted to show why it would be appropriate to enter their

consent decree, so the Court denies the motion with leave to renew along with a memorandum

addressing the Komyatti requirements, the Kasper requirements, and Rule 65.

For judicial efficiency, however, the Court notes that the proposed injunction does not

satisfy Rule 65. First, Rule 65(d)(1)(C) demands that the injunction describe the acts restrained

or required without referring to other documents. The proposed injunction would prohibit

Defendants from enforcing several of the District’s policies, including Board Policy 8:20, Board

Policy 8:25, Administrative Procedure 8:20, and Board Policy 8:20E Application. See, e.g.,

Proposed Inj. & Final J. 2. The proposed injunction describes several upshots of the prohibition,

but by referring to the Use Policies instead of describing their content, the precise contours of the

acts restrained and required cannot be determined solely by referring to the proposed injunction.

See Auto Driveaway Franchise Sys., LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670, 676

(7th Cir. 2019) (“[A]n injunction must be embodied in a standalone separate document.”

(emphasis added)); PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 1998)

(stating that an injunction must “be precise and self-contained, so that a person subject to it who

reads it and nothing else has a sufficiently clear and exact knowledge of the duties it imposes on

him that if he violates it he can be adjudged guilty of criminal contempt”).

Second, the proposed injunction does not state its terms with sufficient specificity to

satisfy Rule 65(d)(1)(B). “[F]airness requires that the litigants receive explicit notice of

precisely what conduct is outlawed.” Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2000). Most

notably, the proposed injunction would require Defendants to treat CEF the same as “similarly

situated nonreligious organizations” and otherwise provide “equal access” to several

opportunities provided by the District. See Proposed Inj. & Final J. 2. This language, without

more, does not explain what other organizations the access must be “equal” to, and the injunction

does not describe what organizations are “similarly situated” or outline the criteria necessary for

the Court to know which organizations quality as such. This language is similar in type to the

language of an injunction that the Seventh Circuit vacated in Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River

Hous., Inc., 512 F.3d 412 (7th Cir. 2008). In that case, the district court enjoined a party from

using “confidential information” or “trade secrets” and demanded that such information on

computer files and removable media be deleted. Id. at 414. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that

the injunction failed to detail “the substance of the ‘trade secret’ or ‘confidential information’” to

which it applied. Id. at 415. Like the injunction in Patriot Homes, the proposed injunction fails

to specifically describe how Defendants must treat CEF and instead “is a little more than a

recitation of the law” that “requires a lot of guesswork on [the District’s] part in order to

determine if it is engaging in activities that violate the injunction.” Id. at 415 (collecting cases).

There are other minor issues with the proposed consent decree. Under Seventh Circuit

precedent, a plaintiff that settles its claim is considered a prevailing party for purposes of 42

U.S.C. § 1988. See Hill v. Richardson, 7 F.3d 656, 657–58 (7th Cir. 1993). The request for the

Court to declare CEF a prevailing party is therefore moot. Additionally, while the Court could

adopt a consent decree incorporating an agreed damages payment, that would be distinct from an

award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.1 In any case, since the parties do not justify the

1 If construed as a motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the parties’ request contains several flaws. 42

U.S.C. § 1988 states that, in cases brought to vindicate a right under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “the court, in its

discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the

costs.” 42 U.S.C § 1988(a). “[A] reasonable fee is a fee that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake

entry of the consent decree and because the proposed injunction would violate Rule 65, the

motion is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the joint motion for a permanent injunction and the entry of final judgment,

ECF No. 29, is DENIED. The parties are directed to file, by August 14, 2026, a revised motion

and memorandum explaining why it would be appropriate for the Court to enter the proposed

consent decree, including the requested damages award. Alternatively, since the terms of the

parties’ settlement may be contractually binding apart from any injunction or judgment issued by

the Court, the parties may file a stipulation of dismissal by August 14, 2026. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Because the parties have settled their dispute, CEF’s motion for a preliminary

injunction, ECF No. 4, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 21, are MOOT.

Entered this 31st day of July, 2026.

s/ Sara Darrow

SARA DARROW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

the representation of a meritorious civil rights case.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010)

(quotation marks omitted). The typical manner of achieving this objective is by applying the “lodestar approach.”

Id. at 551–52. The lodestar approach begins with calculating the “lodestar”: “the product of the hours reasonably

expended on the case multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Montanez v. Simon, 755 F.3d 547, 553 (7th Cir.

2014). The resulting amount may then be adjusted based on a number of factors, such as “the degree of success on

the merits.” Id. Importantly, this calculation can only be done with documentation showing how many hours the

attorneys spent on the case and the reasonable hourly rate in the area for that type of case.

Further, a motion for attorney’s fees must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B), which

requires that motions for attorney’s fees “state the amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it.” The parties

request only that the Court award a lump sum of $105,351.25. Proposed Inj. & Final J. 5. They do not distinguish

which portion of the award is for damages as opposed to attorney’s fees or costs. Finally, assuming a portion of the

lump sum is for “costs,” id., the Court will not award costs beyond the agreed settlement amount unless CEF

submits a bill of costs including Form AO-133. See Civil LR 54.1(B).