The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
JOEL SOILEAU,
Plaintiff,
vs. Case No. 4:25-cv-217-RH-MAF
BOARD OF PILOT
COMMISSIONERS,
Defendant.
_____________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 alleging a Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claim. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff paid the filing fee. ECF No. 2. The
operative complaint is the amended complaint, ECF No. 6. Before the Court
is Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 43, based on Eleventh
Amendment immunity and failure to state an equal protection claim. Plaintiff
filed a response in opposition, ECF No. 39. The motion is ripe for review.
I. Allegations of the Amended Complaint, ECF No. 6
The Court accepts the non-conclusory, factual allegations in the
amended complaint as true. See Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d
1481, 1485 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1586 (1993). On August
27, 2020, Plaintiff was appointed by the State of Florida Department of
Business and Professional Regulation (“DBPR”) as a deputy harbor pilot.1
ECF No. 6 at 4. Habor pilots are licensed and regulated by DBPR through
Defendant, DBPR’s Board of Pilot Commissioners (“the Board”).2 To maintain
his appointment, Plaintiff was required “to provide documentary evidence
that he was actively training in the port [to] which he was appointed.” Id. at
5. But in March 2022, for unexplained reasons, “14 licensed state pilots for
the Port of Tampa Bay refused to train and compensate” Plaintiff. Id. at 4.
Plaintiff alleges that the failure to train him was a violation of Florida Statutes
requiring “disciplinary action” by DBPR against the pilots. Id. at 4-5.
To remedy the violation, Plaintiff filed complaints against the pilots with
DBPR. Id. at 5. While the complaints were pending, “Plaintiff received a
Notice of Intent to Deny” his renewal application as a deputy harbor pilot
1 Florida (similar to many other coastal states) requires “[a]ll foreign-flag vessels and
certain United States-flag vessels, [like] ships, container ships, tankers, etc…to have a
Florida licensed pilot onboard while maneuvering in Florida waters,” including harbors
and ports. Harbor Pilots – Board Information, Florida Department of Business and
Professional Regulation, https://www2.myfloridalicense.com/board-information/; see also
Fla. Stat. § 310.141 (vessels subject to pilotage). “A ‘deputy pilot’ means any person
authorized by the State of Florida to pilot vessels within the limits and specifications
established by the licensed state pilots at the port where the deputy is appointed to serve.”
Harbor Pilots, Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation,
https://www2.myfloridalicense.com/harbor-pilots/.
2 See Fla. Stat. § 310.011(1) (“A board is established within the Division of Professions of
the Department of Business and Professional Regulation to be known as the Board of
Pilot Commissioners…The board shall perform such duties and possess and exercise
such powers relative to the protection of the waters, harbors, and ports of this state as
are prescribed and conferred on it in this chapter.”).
because he could not show his required training. Id. The Board convened a
probable cause panel, which “failed to find probable cause” of a violation by
the pilots and “determined the complaints did not warrant formal
administrative action.” Id. DBPR “was not able to prosecute” the pilots who
wouldn’t train Plaintiff because the Board made a finding of no probable
cause. Id. at 9. Plaintiff alleges this finding violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. He argues a violation of equal protection occurred because the
Board’s panel “singled the Plaintiff out as a class of one as the only deputy
pilot in which the Florida Statutes…were not enforced.” Id. at 9. “The equal
protection of the law,” in Plaintiff’s view, “would have been the prosecution
by DBPR against the state pilots that have refused to follow the Florida
Statutes.” Id. at 10.
Plaintiff sues the Board in its official capacity. Id. at 3. He seeks only
monetary damages, including more than $300,00.00 in lost compensation
with interest and “judgment for the value of Plaintiff’s professional license,”
which he deems is around $33 million. Id. at 6.
II. Standard of Review – Motion to Dismiss
Defendant does not invoke a specific subsection of Rule 12(b) in its
motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 43 at 1. The Eleventh Circuit has reviewed
Eleventh Amendment immunity under Rule 12(b)(1), lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, as well as Rule 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim. E.g., Myrick v.
Fulton Cnty., Georgia, 69 F.4th 1277, 1294 (11th Cir. 2023), quoting Seaborn
v. Fla. Dep't of Corrs., 143 F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998) (“An assertion
of Eleventh Amendment immunity essentially challenges a court's subject
matter jurisdiction.”); Thomas v. U.S. Postal Serv., 364 F. App'x 600, 601
(11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (noting that “a dismissal on sovereign
immunity grounds should be pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because no subject-
matter jurisdiction exists”); Monroe v. Fort Valley State Univ., 93 F.4th 1269
(11th Cir. 2024) (affirming district court’s grant of motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim based on Eleventh Amendment immunity).
“Regardless of whether Eleventh Amendment immunity is considered
a jurisdictional defense or some other sort of defense (e.g., failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted), the Court's analysis is substantially
the same.” Singleton v. The Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 203 F.
Supp. 3d 1181, 1184 (S.D. Fla. 2016). This is because in a Rule 12(b)(1)
“facial attack,” as could be construed here, “a plaintiff is afforded safeguards
similar to those provided in opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion—the court must
consider the allegations of the complaint to be true.” Lawrence v. Dunbar,
919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990); Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d
1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (in reviewing for 12(b)(6) sufficiency, “all well-
pleaded” and non-conclusory “facts are accepted as true, and the
reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.”).
III. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Plaintiff’s original complaint had several defects requiring amendment.
See ECF No. 5. The Court also cautioned Plaintiff on the likelihood that this
action was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity:
[A]n official capacity claim is just “another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). In this case, that means an official
capacity claim against the Board or any member of the Board is a claim
against DBPR itself. Absent limited exceptions which are not present
here, the State of Florida and its agencies are immune from suit in
federal court by force of the Eleventh Amendment. Carr v. City of
Florence, Ala., 916 F.2d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990). It is true that a
state official may be sued in their official capacity when the suit alleges
a constitutional violation by the official, acting in their official capacity,
and seeks only prospective injunctive relief. See Grizzle v. Kemp, 634
F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011). But here, Plaintiff only seeks
monetary damages for the Board’s past conduct—he is not seeking
injunctive relief such as being reappointed.
ECF No. 5 at 2-3. Instead of amending his complaint to include either an
individual capacity claim against any state actor he believed violated his
rights, or an official capacity claim against the Board seeking prospective
injunctive relief, Plaintiff maintained his official capacity claim for only
monetary damages against the Board. See ECF No. 6.
Plaintiff’s amended complaint argues, without support, that “the Board
is not a state agency or subdivision.” Id. at 9. Defendant’s motion to dismiss
disagrees. See ECF No. 43 at 4-5. Defendant essentially restates the Court’s
prior instructions on Eleventh Amendment immunity, concluding that
because “the Board…is a division under the Florida [DBPR]…Defendant is
immune from suit in its official capacity…for damages.” Id. at 5.
In response, Plaintiff argues Defendant is “an examining and licensing
board created by” Florida statutes, not “a state government department” or
agency. ECF No. 39 at 10-11. And while Plaintiff concedes that Florida
defines “agency” as “an official, officer, commission, authority, council,
committee, department, division, bureau, board, section, or another unit or
entity of government,” he argues that this definition is only a “contextual term
used to define all facets of government” and thus “provides no value in
determining Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added),
citing Fla. Stat. § 20.03(1) (defining “agency”). But “[t]he way that state law
defines [the board or entity in question] is important in determining its arm-
of-State status…‘because states have extremely wide latitude in determining
their forms of government and how state functions are performed.’” Monroe
v. Fort Valley State Univ., 93 F.4th 1269, 1279 (11th Cir. 2024), quoting
Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1309 n.10 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Plaintiff also cites several cases that, in his view, support his argument.
First, he cites Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,
506 U.S. 139 (1993), claiming “Eleventh Amendment immunity was denied
by the District Court and…the Court of Appeals barred the immediate
appeal.” ECF No. 39 at 11. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme
Court considered the merits of the immunity claim—the only issue
considered was the jurisdictional grounds for appeal. See Puerto Rico
Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 141 n.1 & 147 (reversing the First Circuit and holding
“that States and state entities that claim to be ‘arms of the State’ may take
advantage of the collateral order doctrine to appeal a district court order
denying a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity,” while also noting “we
express no view on the merits of the immunity claim.”). The case does
nothing to advance Plaintiff’s argument.
Plaintiff also lists seven Supreme Court cases with “boards” as parties
in § 1983 suits “to show historical precedence.” ECF No. 39 at 13, 17. None
are applicable here, for various reasons. The only case on Plaintiff's list that
actually discusses Eleventh Amendment immunity is Lapides v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613 (2002). There, the Supreme
Court noted that while the state university board was an arm of the State of
Georgia and would typically have Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal
court for a § 1983 suit seeking money damages, it waived that immunity
when it “voluntarily agreed to remove the case to federal court,” thus
“voluntarily invok[ing] the federal court’s jurisdiction.” Lapides, 535 U.S. at
620. There has not been a waiver in the instant case. Of Plaintiff’s remaining
six cases, five involve prospective injunctive relief, not monetary damages.
E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Ed. of Topeka, Shawnee Cnty., Kan., 347 U.S. 483
(1954);3 Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). And
the last involves a federal board, not a state entity. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
Plaintiff’s arguments are not well taken. DBPR is an agency of the
State of Florida. The Board of Pilot Commissioners is a “board” within DBPR,
which the State includes in its definition of agency. See Fla. Stat. §§ 20.03(1)
(defining “agency,” supra at 6), 20.165 (creating DBPR and establishing its
divisions and boards, including the Board of Pilot Commissioners, “created
under chapter 310”), 310.011-310.185 (including the Board’s purpose,
organization, disciplinary authority, rulemaking, etc). Even if DBPR and the
Board weren’t defined as state agencies, Florida’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity extends to arms and instrumentalities of the state as well as state
officials in their official capacity. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519
3 Further, local school boards are usually not considered arms of the state, since they are
more like counties. E.g., Walker v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 771 F.3d 748, 752 (11th Cir.
2014); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
U.S. 425, 429–30 (1997). An official capacity claim against DBPR or one of
its boards for money damages is a claim against the State of Florida where
Eleventh Amendment immunity attaches:
A state is liable for money judgments against officers who are sued in
their official capacity. It follows, then, that such actions are in effect
actions against the state, and thus are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
***
[DBPR] and the Board [of Dentistry] are state agencies; they are not
entities independent and separate from the state. To the extent that the
[DBPR] and the Board [of Dentistry] are defendants, then, this is an
action against the State of Florida. Accordingly, [DBPR] and the Board
[of Dentistry] are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.
Schopler v. Bliss, 903 F.2d 1373, 1378 n.3 & 1379 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal
citations omitted) (reversing district court and holding motion to dismiss §
1983 action should have been granted for official capacity defendants based
on Eleventh Amendment immunity, noting Florida has not waived that
immunity in federal court).
When it comes to Eleventh Amendment immunity, there is no
difference between the Board of Dentistry and the Board of Pilot
Commissioners. The Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Schopler applies to this
case. Other courts in this circuit have found the same for similar divisions
and boards within DBPR. See, e.g., In re Diquez, 477 B.R. 257, 260 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 2012) (Construction Industry Licensing Board); Freeman v. Fla.
Dep't of Bus. & Pro. Regul., No. 6:14-CV-333-ORL-37, 2014 WL 6673559,
at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2014) (Division of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco); Cahill v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Pro. Regul., No. 94-343-CIV-T-17C,
1994 WL 378678, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 5, 1994) (dismissing § 1983 action by
harbor pilot against DBPR for its suspension of pilot’s license because DBPR
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity).
The Board was created by the State of Florida, is defined by state law
as an agency of the state, is funded and controlled by the state, and the
responsibility of paying any monetary judgment in this action would fall to the
state. See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1309 (discussing four factored arm-of-the-
State test). Therefore, a suit against the Board in its official capacity is a suit
against the State of Florida. Under the Manders factors and binding Eleventh
Circuit precedent, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s claim against the
Board, which seeks only monetary damages. Because Defendant’s motion
to dismiss should be granted on the basis of immunity, it is not necessary for
the Court to discuss the alternative argument of failure to state an equal
protection claim. Finally, Plaintiff was already given an opportunity to pursue
individual-capacity claims in an amended complaint but elected not to do so.
Further amendment is not warranted.
IV. Recommendation
For the reasons discussed, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that
Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 43, be GRANTED and Plaintiff’s
amended complaint be DISMISSED based on Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida on July 1, 2026.
s/ Martin A. Fitzpatrick
MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific
written objections to these proposed findings and recommendations.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon
all other parties. A party may respond to another party’s objections
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Any different deadline that may appear on the
electronic docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not
control. If a party fails to object to the Magistrate Judge’s findings or
recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this
Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge
on appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual
and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).