Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

REYES WELDING

CONTRACTORS LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:24-cv-1800-CLM

PILGRIM’S PRIDE

CORPORATION,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Reyes Welding Contractors, LLC (“Reyes”) contracted with

Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation (“Pilgrim’s”) to perform welding work at

Pilgrim’s Athens, Georgia plant location. Reyes sued Pilgrim’s for breach

of contract, alleging the company failed to pay multiple invoices for sums

owed totaling $1,679,690. Pilgrim’s now moves to dismiss Reyes’ claims

or, in the alternative, transfer this litigation to the Middle District of

Georgia, Athens Division. (Doc. 16).

For the reasons explained below, the court DENIES Defendant

Pilgram’s Pride Corporation’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, or

in the alternative, to transfer venue. (Doc. 16).

BACKGROUND

A. General Allegation: Breach of Contract

Pilgrim’s is a Colorado corporation that produces chicken products,

and Reyes is an Alabama LLC that performs welding services. This case

stems from Pilgrim’s contract with Reyes to manufacture, fabricate, and

install metal objects on a Pilgrim’s plant in Athens, Georgia. Reyes says

Pilgrim’s still owes an outstanding balance of $1,679,690.00 that Pilgrim’s

denies owing Reyes.

B. The Lawsuit

Reyes sued Pilgrim’s in Alabama state court for five counts of

Breach of Contract. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 4-5). Pilgrim’s then removed the case to

this court based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. 1).

And following the removal, Pilgrim’s challenged (1) the court’s personal

jurisdiction over it, and (2) venue being proper in the Northern District of

Alabama. (Doc. 4).

The court could not determine, based on the limited information it

had, whether it had personal jurisdiction over Pilgrim’s. So on September

25, 2025, the court ordered the parties to engage in jurisdictional

discovery and asked the parties to focus on (1) all work Reyes Welding did

for Pilgrim’s, regardless of location, and (2) any ‘prefatory’ work Reyes

performed in Alabama before completing an assignment at a Pilgrim’s

facility outside Alabama. (Doc. 15). The parties completed the

jurisdictional discovery, and Pilgrim’s now renews its motion to dismiss

or, in the alternative, to transfer venue. (Doc. 16).

C. Jurisdictional Facts

In response to the court’s order, the parties submitted declarations,

answers to interrogatories, and a string of messages between employees

of Reyes and Pilgrim’s. (See 16-1, 16-2, 16-3, 16-4, 20-1, 20-2). Based on

these submissions, the court finds these facts for the limited purpose of

deciding whether it has personal jurisdiction over Pilgrim’s:

Reyes Welding is based in Marshall County, Alabama. Before 2016,

Reece Smith worked for Tyson’s (another chicken producer) in Marshall

County. Reyes welded for Tyson’s while Smith worked for Tyson’s.

Reece Smith left Tyson’s to become Pilgrim’s Regional Maintenance

Director for plants in Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Texas. Upon

arriving at Reyes, Smith told Bobby Owsley (and almost certainly others)

about Reyes’ welding work. Since then, Pilgrim’s has paid Reyes to weld

at Pilgrim’s plants in Athens, Georgia; Canton, Georgia; Elberton,

Georgia; Live Oak, Florida; Lufkin, Texas; and, Morefield, West Virginia.

Bobby Owsley was Pilgrim’s Athens plant manager. Owsley called

Reyes to invite Reyes’s owner and employees to the Athens plant to

discuss possible welding work. According to Yonathan Reyes, Reyes

Welding performed work for Pilgrim’s in Athens, Georgia every week after

that first meeting until Pilgrim’s refused to pay its outstanding balance—

a period that ran from approximately 2020 to 2023.

When Pilgrim’s needed Reyes, Bobby Owsley (in Georgia) would call

or text Luis Reyes (in Alabama) to tell Reyes what work was to be done

and how many men to bring. Luis Reyes would then email a quote for the

work to Pilgrim’s, which Pilgrim’s would approve. If Reyes needed

materials for the job, Reyes would order them from a different company

in Georgia, Stewart Stainless, have the materials shipped to Reyes’ shop

in Alabama, and send the invoice to Pilgrim’s. In his declaration,

Yonathan Reyes did not address how often Reyes prefabricated these

materials at his Alabama shop before taking them to Georgia, versus

taking the raw materials to Georgia and completing all fabrication work

on site. But one email exchange between Luis Reyes and a Pilgram’s

manager shows that Reyes prefabricated hangers at its Alabama shop

before driving them to a Pilgrim’s facility in Elberton, Georgia, where

Reyes was to perform work on a freezer. (Doc. 20-2, pp. 34-37). So the court

finds that sometimes Reyes prefabricated materials that Pilgrim’s paid for

in Alabama before moving them to Georgia for installation.1

Once the materials were ready, Reyes would collect the needed men

and equipment, including welding machines, grinders, cutting discs,

buffing pads, casters, chain hoists, and argon bottles, and drive to Athens

to perform the agreed-upon work. Once Reyes finished its works, Reyes

would bill Pilgrim’s, and Pilgrim’s would direct payment to Reyes’ bank,

Wells Fargo.

1 One of Reyes’ invoices for work at the Athen’s plant lists this task: “make guarding for belts to

shipping and install[.]” (Doc. 20-1, p. 35). As best the court can tell, this indicates that Reyes

fabricated metal guards for conveyor belts at its Alabama shop, then shipped them to Athens

for installation—just as Reyes fabricated hangers in Alabama before driving them to Elberton,

Georgia for installation. But the invoices are admittedly difficult to read, hence the court’s

finding that prefabrication occurred “sometimes,” not often or always.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When considering a Rule 12 motion, the court accepts the

allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and views them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 F.3d 1267,

1275 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Moore v. Cecil, 488 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1155

(N.D. Ala. 2020). If the facts as pleaded could give rise to an entitlement

of relief, then the court must deny the defendant’s motion to

dismiss. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). If, however, the

court accepts the pleaded facts as true, and the plaintiff “still would not

be entitled to relief, the court must grant the motion.” Moore, 488 F. Supp.

3d at 1155.

To survive a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff has the

burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant.” Meier ex rel. Meier v. Sun Int’l Hotels, Ltd., 288

F.3d 1264, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2002) (footnote omitted). A prima facie case

of personal jurisdiction “is established if the plaintiff presents enough

evidence to withstand a motion for directed verdict.” Id. (quoting Madara

v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990). Like a 12(b)(2) standard, to

survive a 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has the burden of

establishing a prima facie showing of venue. Home Ins. v. Thomas Indus.,

Inc., 896 F.2d 1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 1990). When deciding either motion,

the court looks to the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and

takes the facts as true “to the extent they are uncontroverted by

defendants’ affidavits.” Id.

DISCUSSION

The court starts by explaining why it has personal jurisdiction over

Pilgrim’s, then explains why it will not transfer venue to Georgia.

I. Personal Jurisdiction

Pilgrim’s is registered to do business in Alabama (doc. 16-2, p. 5)

and has two processing plants within the Northern District of Alabama,

one in Guntersville and the other in Russellville. As discussed later,

Pilgrim’s presence within this district has caused Pilgrim’s to sue and be

sued in Marshall County state courts and this federal district court many

times.

Yet Pilgrim’s argues that this courts lacks personal jurisdiction over

it because Pilgrim’s did not act in Alabama, or make any omissions in

Alabama, related to Reyes’s claims for unpaid invoices. Instead, all

relevant action or inaction occurred in Georgia, where the Athens plant is

located. So the court decides personal jurisdiction by applying controlling

precedent discussed below. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth

Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351 (2021); Del Valle v. Trivago GMBH, 56 F.4th

1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2022).

A. Legal Standard

“[A] federal court generally undertakes a two-step analysis to

determine whether there is personal jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant. First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has

alleged sufficient facts to subject the defendant to the forum state’s long-

arm statute. Second, if the court determines that the forum state’s long-

arm statute has been satisfied, it must then decide whether the exercise

of jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1272. In Alabama, these inquiries

merge because the state’s long-arm statue permits the exercise of personal

jurisdiction over nonresidents to the fullest extent allowed by the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Sloss Indus. Corp. v.

Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 925 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Ala. R. Civ. P. 4.2. So

the question is whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Pilgrim’s

would violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

“At bottom, due process prohibits the exercise of personal

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant unless its contacts with the

state are such that it has a fair warning that it may be subject to suit

there.” Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1275 (citing Ford, 592 U.S. at 360). A

nonresident defendant’s contacts with a state can be evaluated one of two

ways: “(1) the plaintiff can show that the defendant has continual and

systematic contact with the State (i.e. ‘general jurisdiction’), or (2) the

plaintiff can establish a substantial connection between the conduct at

issue and the state where the lawsuit was filed (i.e. ‘specific jurisdiction’).”

Moore, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 1156.

The parties agree that general jurisdiction is lacking because

Pilgrim’s does not have continual and systematic business in Alabama. So

Reyes must plead facts showing the requirements for specific jurisdiction

are satisfied. Specific jurisdiction is a “defendant-focused” inquiry,

meaning “the relationship must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant

himself’ creates with the forum State.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284

(2014) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). When looking

for specific jurisdiction, courts examine “whether (1) the plaintiff’s claims

‘arise out of or relate to’ one of the defendant’s contacts with the forum

state; (2) the nonresident defendant ‘purposefully availed’ itself of the

privilege of conducting activities within the forum state; and (3) the

exercise of personal jurisdiction is in accordance with traditional notions

of ‘fair play and substantial justice.’” Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1275.

Reyes must plead enough facts to establish the first two elements.

See id. If it does, Pilgrim’s must then “make a compelling case that the

exercise of jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and

substantial justice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

B. Application

While Reyes pleads five one-sentence counts, all essentially raise

the same claim: Pilgrim’s breached its contract with Reyes by failing to

pay about $1.7 million in invoices. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 4-5). While Pilgrim’s has

yet to file an answer, the parties’ jurisdictional discovery suggests the

dispute is over the billed amount, with Pilgrim’s arguing that its payment

of about $1.3 million covered “all bills to date since 2020” (doc. 20-2, p. 15),

and Reyes responding that the $1.3 million paid did not accurately reflect

the quoted cost and/or did not cover the correct work done (id., p. 21).

With that in mind, the court must determine whether it has specific

personal jurisdiction over this dispute by looking at three things: (1)

whether Reyes’s claim rises from or relates to Pilgrim’s contact with

Alabama; (2) whether Pilgrim’s “purposefully availed” itself of the

privilege of conducting activities in Alabama; and (3) whether it would

violate fair play and substantial justice to force Pilgrim’s to litigate in

Alabama. Del Valle, 56 F. 4th at 1275. Reyes has the burden for the first

two elements; Pilgrim’s bears the third.

1. Purposeful Availment

The court finds that Pilgrim’s has purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of doing business in Alabama. As mentioned, Pilgrim’s is

registered to do business in Alabama and has two processing plants in

Alabama. So there’s no question that Pilgrim’s takes advantage of the

business opportunities afforded by Alabama’s laws and court systems.

That said, Pilgrim’s was not doing business in Alabama in this case;

it was using an Alabama business to perform work in Georgia. Normally,

that would mean Reyes must show that Pilgrim’s availed itself of

Alabama’s privileges under either the effects test or the minimum

contacts test. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984); see Louis Vuitton

Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1356 (11th Cir. 2013). But the

effects test does not apply in contract cases, Louis Vuitton, 736 F.3d at

1357, so Reyes’ facts must satisfy the traditional minimum contacts test

to establish personal jurisdiction.

And pointing to a contract alone is not enough. “[N]either merely

contracting with a forum resident nor the forum resident’s unilateral acts

can establish sufficient minimum contacts.” Diamond Crystal Brands,

Inc. v. Food Movers Intern., Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1268 (11th Cir. 2010).

“Rather, when inspecting a contractual relationship for minimum

contacts, [courts] follow a highly realistic approach that focuses on the

substance of the transaction: prior negotiations, contemplated future

consequences, the terms of the contract, and the actual course of dealing.

The focus must always be on the nonresident defendant’s conduct, that is,

whether the defendant deliberately engaged in significant activities

within a state or created continuing obligations with residents of the

forum. This focus ensures that a defendant will not be subject to

jurisdiction based solely on random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.”

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). Instead, “those contacts

must show that the defendant deliberately reached out beyond its home,

such as by entering a contractual relationship centered in the forum.”

SkyHop Techs., Inc., 58 F.4th at 1230.

Here, the jurisdictional evidence shows that Pilgrim’s deliberately

and repeatedly reached into Alabama to create contractual agreements

that impacted Alabama. Having just left Alabama, Reece Smith suggested

that Pilgrim’s reach out to Reyes, who Smith knew was based in Alabama,

to perform welding works at Pilgrim’s Athens, Georgia plant, plus several

other plants around the Southeast. Bobby Owsley called the Reyes’s in

Alabama and invited them to leave Alabama and come to Georgia to look

at the Athens plant, then contracted with Reyes for several years to leave

Alabama to come work in Georgia. Every time Pilgrim’s needed work

done, someone from Pilgrim’s would call, text, or email someone in

Alabama. Every time materials were needed for the job, Pilgrim’s paid for

the materials that were shipped to Reyes’s shop in Alabama, where the

materials were either prefabricated in Alabama for installation in

Georgia, or they were driven by Alabama workers into Georgia. And

Pilgrim’s paid Reyes to send those Alabama workers into Georgia to

perform work. The jurisdictional evidence suggests this happened

between 100-200 times (see doc. 20-2, pp. 17-32)—meaning that Pilgrim’s

reached into Alabama to initiate more than 100 distinct agreements with

an Alabama-based company.

In short, Reyes points to more than just contracts. Reyes offers some

of the “plus factors” that the Circuit Court has used to connect the

defendant with the jurisdiction, including “initiating the contractual

relationship,” “sending materials to the plaintiff for inspecting or use in

shipping,” “establishing a relationship by placing multiple orders,” and

“negotiating the contract via telefaxes or calls with the plaintiff” in the

forum state. Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc., 593 F.3d at 1268-69. The

court thus finds that Reyes sufficiently shows purposeful availment.

2. Related to Contact with Alabama

Having found that Pilgrim’s deliberately reached into Alabama, the

court must “focus on the essential foundation of specific jurisdiction–

whether there is a strong relationship among the defendant, the forum,

and the litigation.” SkyHop Techs., Inc. v. Narra, 58 F.4th 1211, 1229

(11th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). And a relationship is enough;

Reyes need not prove direct causation. Id. (citing Ford, supra).

The court finds that Reyes’s breach of contract claim is sufficiently

related to Pilgrim’s repeatedly reaching into Alabama to contract for

Reyes’s services. The agreements (i.e., the contracts that were breached)

were simple: Reyes agreed to send men and materials to Georgia to

perform welding work, and in return, Pilgrim’s agreed to send money to

Reyes in Alabama. The alleged “breach” is Pilgrim’s failure to send the

agreed-upon amount of money to Alabama. Of course, that’s not all that

Pilgrim’s sent or failed to send into Alabama that must be proved at trial.

To prove there was a valid contract to breach, Reyes will show that

Pilgrim’s reached into Alabama by telephone, email, or text to initiate

then execute the agreement. The court thus finds that there is a sufficient

relationship between Pilgrim’s reaching into Alabama to initiate and

execute the agreement and Reyes’s claim against Pilgrim’s.

3. Fair Play and Substantial Justice

The burden now shifts to Pilgrim’s to explain why this court

exercising personal jurisdiction would offend “traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.” SkyHop Techs., 58 F.4th at 1231. To do so,

the court considers “(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum’s

interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining

convenient and effective relief; and (4) the interstate judicial system’s

interest in resolving the dispute.” Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1277 (citing

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)

(quotation marks omitted)).

1. Burden on Pilgrim’s: Pilgrim’s argues that “[l]itigation in

Alabama increases the burden on all parties regarding inspection of the

disputed work and examination of relevant documents.” (Doc. 16, p. 10).

But this is an overstatement. The parties needn’t be in Georgia to examine

the relevant documents; they need only be at a computer or conference

table. That can be done anywhere. Nor does the jurisdictional discovery

suggest that physically examining the Athens Georgia plant is the crux of

the dispute because it doesn’t appear that the parties dispute the quality

or quantity of Reyes’ work. Rather, Pilgrim’s told Reyes that it had paid

all invoices (see Doc. 20-2, p. 15), and Reyes complained in part that

Pilgrim’s invoices suggest that Pilgrim’s paid the wrong amount—i.e.,

Pilgrim’s did not pay the “quoted numbers.” (Id., p. 21). Reyes also

complained that Pilgrim’s P.O. numbers wrongly matched the work done.

(Id.). In other words, the parties have picked an accounting fight, not a

work quality fight. Georgia provides no better venue to fight about

accounting than Alabama does. Plus, Pilgrim’s witness Reece Smith (who

initiated the contract) appears to be based in Kentucky, not Georgia, (see

doc. 16-1, p. 4), and its seems that whoever processed Pilgrim’s purchase

orders and payments worked at Pilgrim’s headquarters in Colorado, not

at the Athens plant. (See, e.g., doc. 20-1, pp. 5, 13-15) (Pilgrim’s purchase

orders and payments). So even though Georgia may provide some

advantages for discovery, it does not appear to provide as much of an

advantage as Pilgrim’s suggests.

2. Alabama’s interest: Because Reyes is an Alabama company that

pays Alabama residents, Alabama has “significant interests at stake,

including providing its residents with a convenient forum for redressing

injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors.” Del Valle, 56 F.4th at 1277

(cleaned up). So this factor weighs heavily in Reyes’ favor.

3. Reyes’ interest: Similarly, Reyes has “an interest in litigating this

case in [its] chosen home forum.” Id. Because it appears that Reyes and

its owners reside in Alabama, this factor weighs heavily in Reyes’ favor.

4. Interstate judicial system’s interest: Pilgrim’s argues that “[t]he

dispute wholly concerns alleged acts or omissions in Georgia,” (doc. 16, p.

10), so the system’s interest lies in Georgia. But “wholly concerns” is not

accurate. This is a breach of contract case. The contract(s) were initiated

by Pilgrim’s reaching into Alabama to recruit then contract with an

Alabama business. For years, Pilgrim’s paid that Alabama business. Then

Pilgrim’s allegedly failed to pay that Alabama business, thus causing

injuries that were felt in Alabama. So the court finds that the interstate

judicial system’s interest finds no less satisfaction in Alabama than it does

in Georgia.

—

To sum up, all three factors favor this court exercising personal

jurisdiction. So will DENY Pilgrim’s motion to dismiss based solely on the

reasons mentioned above. But the court would be remiss not to also

mention that, with two processing plants and many employees in this

district, Pilgrim’s often avails itself of the privilege of Alabama’s state and

federal court systems it tries to avoid here. In just the past year, Pilgrim’s

has filed lawsuits in the Marshall County state court, see Pilgrim’s Pride

Corp. v. E-Crane Int’l USA, Inc., Case No. 50-CV-2026-900116 (Marshall

Co. Circuit Court, Mar. 26, 2026), and this federal district court, see

Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Veal, et. al, Case No. 5:25-cv-1949 (ALND Nov.

10, 2025). So Pilgrim’s assertion that it would “offend traditional notions

of fair play and substantial justice,” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.

310, 316 (1945), to force Pilgrim’s to appear in either court here rings

hollow, particularly because Pilgrim’s reached into Alabama to initiate

the agreements at issue.

Because the court has personal jurisdiction over Pilgrim’s, the court

now must take up Pilgrim’s alternative motion to transfer and determine

the proper venue to adjudicate Reyes’ claims.

II. Transfer Under § 1404(a)

Pilgrim’s alternatively argues that the court should transfer this

case to the Middle District of Georgia, Athens Division, under 28 U.S.C. §

1404(a). (Doc. 4, pp. 10-15). 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the

convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district

court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where

it might have been brought.” To address a motion under § 1404(a), “a court

must determine: (1) whether the plaintiff could originally have filed the

case in the venue to which the movant seeks to transfer the case; and (2)

whether the circumstances of the case warrant transfer.” Walter Energy,

Inc. v. Walter Inv. Mgmt. Corp., 2015 WL 12751048, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Jan.

12, 2015).

A plaintiff’s choice of forum is accorded considerable deference. See

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981). And a “plaintiff’s

choice of forum should not be disturbed unless it is clearly outweighed by

other considerations.” Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253,

260 (11th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). That said, “[t]he decision to

transfer a case to another district is left to the sound discretion of the trial

court.” Brown v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 1193, 1197 (11th Cir.

1991).

Reyes does not dispute that venue would be proper in the Middle

District of Georgia, Athens Division, so the court only evaluates whether

the circumstances of this case warrant transfer. Courts consider the

following factors when evaluating whether transfer is appropriate: “(1)

the convenience of the witnesses; (2) the location of relevant documents

and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (3) the convenience of

the parties; (4) the locus of operative facts; (5) the availability of process

to compel the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (6) the relative means of

the parties; (7) a forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight

accorded a plaintiff’s choice of forum; and (9) trial efficiency and the

interests of justice, based on the totality of circumstances.” Manuel v.

Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135, n.1 (11th Cir. 2005).

1. Convenience of Witnesses

Pilgrim’s argues that the first factor tilts heavily in its favor because

“most, if not all, of the relevant witnesses to the underlying investigation

will be found in or around Athens, Georgia.” (Doc. 16, p. 12).

Consequently, Pilgrim’s says, “[t]he expenses, time away from work,

hardships, and inconvenience required of the key witnesses are

substantially reduced if the case is transferred to the Middle District of

Georgia, Athens Division.” (Id.) The court disagrees.

It is true that any Pilgrim’s witness who works at Pilgrim’s plant in

Athens is closer to the Georgia-based court. But all of the Reyes employees

that negotiated the work orders or worked on the Pilgrim’s projects are

likely in Alabama. And Reece Smith, who prompted the relationship

between the parties, seems to be in Kentucky.

Plus, this case is based on the nonpayment of invoices, not the

quality of Reyes’s work. So accounting witnesses are key. Reyes’s

witnesses on the accounting issues are likely in Alabama, while Pilgrim’s

are likely in Colorado.

So as best the court can tell, more of the relevant witnesses live in

outside of Georgia than in Georgia. And all of Reyes’s witnesses seem to

live in Alabama. So this factor is neutral at best.

2. Location of Relevant Documents and Sources of Proof

The second factor turns on the location of relevant evidence.

Pilgrim’s says there may be documentation stored at its Athens, Georgia

plant location. Perhaps. But the court finds it just as likely that most of

the relevant documents (i.e., emails, invoices, etc.) are stored

electronically. And even if there is physical evidence stored at Pilgrim’s

Athens plant, there is no significant burden placed on Pilgrim’s to retrieve

and transmit the documentation electronically.

That said, there may be a need to inspect the Athen, Georgia plant

if the amount or quality of Reyes’s work becomes an issue. And that

evidence is in Georgia. So this factor weighs slightly in favor of transfer.

3. Convenience of Parties

The parties consist of one company located in Alabama, and another

that is incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in

Colorado, whose relevant plant is in Georgia, but also has locations in

Alabama. Whether this case is litigated in Alabama or Georgia, Pilgrim’s

will be litigating away from its home states (Delaware and Colorado). So

the court finds that Pilgrim’s would not be unduly burdened by litigating

in Alabama. And because Reyes is already based in Alabama, the court

finds that this factor weighs against transfer.

4. Locus of Operative Facts

The fourth factor, the locus of operative facts, slightly supports

transfer. Again, this is a breach of contract case that centers on the

nonpayment of invoices. While some of the relevant facts will relate to the

communications between the parties, the unpaid invoices pertain to work

performed in Georgia. The court has explained why the jurisdictional facts

suggest that accounting, not quality or amount of work, is the central

issue. But it could be that whether Reyes performed certain work, or

performed it well, could become an issue. Based on that possibility, the

court finds that the locus of operative facts favors Georgia.

5. Availability of Process to Compel Witnesses

The fifth factor—the availability of process to compel the

attendance of unwilling witnesses—weighs against transfer. Pilgrim’s has

not shown any witnesses who are unwilling to testify, provide documents,

or otherwise cooperate in the litigation. And courts have found this factor

to be unimportant when the movant fails to show that compulsory process

would be necessary. See, e.g., Mason v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical

Lab’ys, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1361-62 (S.D. Fla. June 28, 2001)

(“[Transfer] may also be denied where the movant does not show that the

witnesses would be unwilling to testify and that compulsory process would

be necessary.”).

6. Relative Means of the Parties

The sixth factor, the relative means of the parties, weighs slightly

against transfer. Reyes is a two-member limited liability company, so it

could be that the company would face a greater burden litigating the case

in Georgia than Pilgrim’s, a much larger corporate entity, otherwise

would. But Reyes and Pilgrim’s are both corporate entities, both

represented by sophisticated counsel, and nothing suggests that either

party lacks the means to litigate this case in Georgia. So this factor weighs

only slightly against transfer.

7. Forum’s Familiarity with Governing Law

Pilgrim’s also raises concerns about the seventh factor—the forum’s

familiarity with the governing law. (Doc. 16, p. 14). Pilgrim’s asserts that

the law of Georgia should be applied because the key events leading to the

creation of the contract took place in Georgia. Even if that’s true (and the

court does not find that it is), courts in Alabama routinely apply the law

of other states. So the court gives no weight to this factor.

8. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum

The eighth factor—the plaintiff’s choice of forum—weighs against

transfer. A plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to considerable deference.

See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255. But the plaintiff’s choice may be

entitled to less weight when the plaintiff is not a resident of the forum.

See Combs v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 461 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1214 (N.D. Fla.

2020) (citing additional district court authorities). “Similarly, when the

conduct at issue did not occur in plaintiff’s chosen forum, court’s give less

deference to plaintiff’s desired forum.” Id.

Reyes’ principal place of business is in Alabama, and the impact of

the alleged lost payment was felt in Alabama. So this factor weighs

against transfer.

9. Trial Efficiency, Interest of Justice, Totality of Circumstances

Lastly, the ninth factor—trial efficiency and the interests of justice

based on the totality of the circumstances—does not support transfer.

Pilgrim’s says most or all of the witnesses and relevant evidence are in

Georgia, so it would be more efficient for the litigation to proceed there.

But Pilgrim’s hasn’t provided any further details proving this assertion to

be true, and as explained, the court questions its accuracy. Plus, Reyes is

an Alabama-based company, so there is a direct connection between this

case and Alabama.

The Eleventh Circuit has directed that the plaintiff’s choice of forum

should govern in the absence of significant contrary considerations.

Robinson, 74 F.3d at 260. And here, there are simply no significant

contrary considerations that warrant transfer. So the last factor weighs

against transfer.

—

Having weighed all of the factors discussed above against each

other, the court finds that the interests of justice are best served by

litigating this action in the Northen District of Alabama, and that transfer

of this case would be inappropriate. Particularly weighty was Reyes’

choice to litigate in its home forum, where Pilgrim’s reached to initiate the

relationship and where the impact of Reyes’s alleged losses were felt. So

the court will exercise its discretion and DENY Pilgrim’s alternative

motion to transfer venue, (doc. 16).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the court DENIES Defendant Pilgram’s Pride

Corporation’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, or in the

alternative, to transfer venue. (Doc. 16). The parties shall proceed with

their Rule 26(f) conference and shall file their Rule 26(f) Report on or

before August 25, 2026.

DONE and ORDERED on August 7, 2026.

COREY‘L. MAZE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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