WILLIAMSON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

TORSHAZO WILLIAMSON,

Plaintiff,

v. 1:24CV431

CAPTAIN BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION, RECOMMENDATION, AND ORDER

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This case arises from Torshazo Schorder, Officer Ms. Ortagea, and

Williamson’s pretrial detention at the Officer J. Thompson’s (“the moving

Rockingham County Detention defendants”) motion for summary

Center in March of 2024. Williamson, judgment, Docket Entry 52;

the plaintiff in this Section 1983 civil 2) Joanna Peach’s (identified as

action, alleges that he was held in a “Nurse Jo” in the complaint) motion

cell next door to one with a broken for summary judgment, Docket Entry

toilet and when county law 54;

enforcement officers were moving 3) Peach’s motion to seal, Docket

him to that same cell, they tased him Entry 57;

and assaulted him without 4) Williamson’s motion for a

justification. When he requested subpoena, Docket Entry 60; and

medical assistance related thereto, 5) The moving defendants’ motion to

they failed to provide it within strike Williamson’s surreply, Docket

constitutionally-mandated bounds. Entry 71.

There are five pending motions before For the reasons set forth below, the

the Court: Court should grant summary

judgment as to all defendants save

1) Sheriff Sam Page, Cpt. Jennifer Sgt. Rodgers, Officer C.G. Brown,

Brown, Sgt. Rodgers, Cpt. Mr. Brown, Officer Dillon, and Cpl. Kluk in their

Sgt. Lee, Cpl. Kluk, Cpl. Ellis, Officer individual capacities, as genuine

Dillon, Officer G. Brown,1 Officer issues of material fact remain

1 Williamson identifies this defendant as defendants’ motion for summary

“Officer G. Brown”; as indicated in his judgment, he is Officer C.G. Brown.

affidavit in support of the moving

regarding the excessive force claims Williamson did not want to move to

against them. cell H-118 because its toilet was

broken, emanating the odor of feces

The Court should grant Peach’s and urine. See Williamson Aff. ¶ 3.

motion for summary judgment. Specifically, his “food trap in H-117

was allowed open to try to get some

Finally, the Court denies Peach’s fresh air because of the smell from H-

motion to seal and Williamson’s 118 traveled threw [sic] the air vent

motion for a subpoena. The Court into [his] cell.” See id. ¶ 4. Williamson

grants the moving defendants’ motion indicated to the officers that he did

to strike Williamson’s surreply. not want to move to the cell because

of “the unsanitary toilet.” See id. ¶ 7;

I. FACTS see also Rodgers Aff. ¶ 3 (“When I

informed Williamson of the change,

The undisputed facts show the

he stated that he would not move.”);

following2:

C.G. Brown Aff. ¶ 3 (“Sgt. Rodgers

gave Williamson several verbal

A. Sgt. Rodgers tases Williamson

commands to pack his stuff up but Mr.

during a cell transfer.

Williamson continued to refuse.”);

On March 11, 2024, Williamson was a Kluk Aff. ¶ 4 (noting Sgt. Rodgers’s

pretrial detainee at the Rockingham “several attempts to get Williamson to

County Detention Center. See comply”).

generally Docket Entry 61-1

Sgt. Rodgers then approached

(hereinafter “Williamson Aff.”). That

Williamson. See Williamson Aff. ¶ 10;

day, Sgt. Rodgers, Cpl. Kluk, Officer

Rodgers Aff. ¶ 7. The two made

Dillon and Officer C.G. Brown came to

physical contact. See Williamson Aff.

Williamson’s cell, H-117, to move him

¶ 10 (“Sgt. Rodgers come [sic] to the

to cell H-118. See Williamson Aff. ¶ 2;

back of the cell and was threatening

Docket Entry 52-2 (hereinafter

me. He started to bump his head

“Rodgers Aff.”) ¶¶ 2, 8; Docket Entry

against me to get a reaction.”);

52-3 (hereinafter “Kluk Aff.”) ¶ 2;

Rodgers Aff. ¶ 7 (“I stepped over to

Docket Entry 52-4 (hereinafter “C.G.

Mr. Williamson and placed my arm on

Brown Aff.”) ¶ 2.

his right arm to try to talk him into

2 While Williamson’s complaint was not 2021) (“‘As a general rule, when one

verified, he submitted a sworn affidavit party files a motion for summary

along with his opposition to the moving judgment, the non-movant cannot

defendants’ motion for summary merely rely on matters pleaded in the

judgment reiterating the facts set forth in complaint, but must, by factual affidavit

his Complaint, see Docket Entry 61-1, or the like, respond to the motion.’”)

which the Court considers. See Goodman (quoting and citing Williams v. Griffin,

v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493, 498 (4th Cir. 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. 1991)).

complying but he told me step [sic] Sgt. Rodgers then deployed the taser

away from him.”). again, this time striking Williamson in

the neck and face area. See

The parties disagree about what Williamson Aff. ¶ 14 (“Sgt. Rodgers hit

occurred next. Williamson states that me in the face with the taser, similar

Sgt. Rodgers drew his taser and so he to a pistol-whipping”); id. ¶ 15 (“Sgt.

(Williamson) began packing up his Rodgers held the taser to my mouth

things and put his hands up to submit. and dry tased me (he used the taser

See Williamson Aff. ¶¶ 11-12. The without the wires so it was more like a

officers contend that Williamson stun gun). He also tased me on the

continued to refuse orders. See side of my face and head.”); Rodgers

Rodgers Aff. ¶ 8; C.G. Brown Aff. ¶ 3. Aff. ¶ 9 (“I went to apply the taser to

his left arm, but he dropped his head

The parties agree that Sgt. Rodgers

as he approached me, causing the

then deployed his taser, striking

taser to catch him in the left side of the

Williamson. See Williamson Aff. ¶ 13

neck area.”).

(“Sgt. Rodgers then shot the taser at

me in my side.”); Rodgers Aff. ¶ 8 (“I Officers subdued Williamson,

asked Mr. Williamson again to including Cpl. Kluk, who took hold of

comply, but he refused. I then moved Williamson’s feet. See Kluk Aff. ¶ 5

Officer Dillon out of the way and (“At this time, I went to grab Mr.

deployed the taser on inmate Williamson’s feet to assist him to the

Williamson[.]”). ground”); Williamson Aff. ¶ 16 (“Cpl.

Kluk grabbed my right leg and held it

The parties agree that Williamson

up.”). Williamson maintains: “I never

removed the taser probes once struck.

fought back or resisted in any way. I

See Williamson Aff. ¶ 13; Rodgers Aff.

never showed any aggression. I never

¶ 8; Kluk Aff. ¶ 4. Officer C.G. Brown

tried to take the taser from the

and Williamson made physical

officers.” See Williamson Aff. ¶ 17.

contact; the parties dispute exactly

how. See Williamson Aff. ¶ 14 (“Ofc. Sgt. Rodgers directed Officers Dillon

G. Brown grabbed me and I was and C.G. Brown to take him to see the

slammed on the floor. Ofc. Cl. Dillon nurse. Rodgers Aff. ¶¶ 10-11 (“I

began to punch me with closed fist instructed Officers Dillon and Brown

[sic]”); Rodgers Aff. ¶ 8 (“Officers to escort Mr. Williamson to see the

Dillon and Brown grabbed him”); C.G. nurse.”); Kluk Aff. ¶ 5 (“Mr.

Brown Aff. ¶ 4 (“Williamson began to Williamson was cuffed in the front

fight myself and Officer Dillon”). and escorted to medical to be seen.”);

Officer Dillon struck Williamson C.G. Brown Aff. ¶ 4 (“Williamson was

multiple times in the arm and one secured and taken to the ground

time to the side of the head. See without injury to him. However, he

Rodgers Aff. ¶ 9; Kluk Aff. ¶ 4. was taken to the nurse as a

precaution.”).

B. Williamson seeks and receives Williamson lodged a March 12 sick

medical care in the jail call request, wherein he reported that

following the taser incident. the left side of his face felt numb and

he was having migraines and pain in

The facility contracted with Southern his neck, left shoulder, and lower

Health Partners, Inc. (SHP) to back. See Peach Aff. ¶ 17. In his March

provide nursing care to inmates. See 13 sick call request, Williamson

Docket Entry 55-1 (hereinafter “Peach reported the same symptoms, adding

Aff.”) ¶ 3. The medical professional on that the left side of his face and his top

duty when officers brought lip were blistered and bleeding from a

Williamson in for care was Joanna taser burn. See id. ¶ 19.

Peach, a licensed practical nurse. See

id. ¶ 2. Peach responded to the March 13

request, advising Williamson that

In addition to Peach, SHP also medical personnel had seen the

contracted a medical doctor, Linwood March 12 request and confirming that

Robinson, as medical director for the he was on the list to be seen. See id. ¶

detention center. See Peach Aff. ¶ 5. 20. In Williamson’s March 14 sick call

Robinson was available for phone request, he reported that he was

consultation and on call to make suffering from migraines, the left side

verbal orders for patients. See id. He of his face was more numb, and he

generally came to the detention center was experiencing neck and lower back

once a week, as well. See id. pain. See id. ¶ 21. In his March 15

request, Williamson asked why he had

While Peach could see inmates for

not yet been seen, and repeated the

sick call visits, she could not do so

symptoms reported in his earlier

unless a detention officer

requests. See id. ¶ 22.

accompanied them, and when she did,

she could not independently make Peach responded to the March 15

medical decisions for inmates. See id. request, advising Williamson that she

¶¶ 7-8. That is, Robinson had to had received the earlier requests and

approve all medical decisions for had intended to see him on March 14

inmates, including prescriptions and but there were no officers available to

treatment orders. See id. ¶ 8. bring inmates for sick visits on that

day or the day prior. See id. ¶ 23. She

Peach treated Williamson after he was

further told Williamson that he would

tased. See id. ¶ 14. She noted that his

soon receive ibuprofen in his

vital signs were stable and that taser

medication package until he could be

darts were located in his shirt, on his

seen. Id. Williamson began receiving

right abdomen and his mid-abdomen.

the medication that evening. Id.

See id. Peach did not recall seeing any

injuries to Williamson’s face; had she That same day, Williamson submitted

noted that, she would have recorded it another sick call request, asking why

in his medical records. See id. ¶ 16. he had not yet been seen. Id. ¶ 26.

Another nurse responded, advising twice-daily and antibiotic ointment,

him that Dr. Robinson would see him both for seven days. See id. Dr.

on the following Monday. Id. On Robinson also entered an order for

March 18, Peach saw Williamson for a Williamson to receive an x-ray of his

sick call visit. Id. ¶ 27. Williamson told left ankle and left foot. See id. ¶ 38.

her he was tased with a dry stun on the

left side of his face; Peach inspected On March 29, Williamson submitted a

his left ear and it was “totally clear.” sick call request, stating that the

See id. ¶ 27. Peach further noted that Excedrin was not helping as much as

Williamson had no taser marks he had reported to Peach during that

anywhere on his body, consistent with evening’s medication pass. See id. ¶

the barbs having attached to his 39. Peach responded to the request,

clothing and not his person on March letting Williamson know that she

11. See id. Williamson’s vital signs would notify Dr. Robinson. See id. ¶

were stable at this visit. See id. 40. Two days later, Dr. Robinson

discontinued the Excedrin and

Peach prescribed a twice daily dose of prescribed naproxen twice daily for

220 mg of naproxen for Williamson, five days. See id. ¶ 41.

which he began receiving on March

19. See id. ¶ 30. On April 2, Williamson submitted

another sick call request, reporting he

Williamson submitted another sick was still having issues with migraines,

call request on March 22, noting that and experiencing numbness on the

he told staff that he was dizzy when he left side of his face. See id. ¶ 42. Peach

got out of the shower and had a sharp responded to the request and told him

pain in his head even after sitting that he would see Dr. Robinson, a

down. See id. ¶ 31. Another nurse message she had already relayed in

responded, confirming that he was on person. See id. ¶ 43.

the list to see Dr. Robinson. See id. ¶

32. On March 26, Williamson Dr. Robinson saw Williamson again

submitted a sick call request, noting on April 4; he noted that the x-ray of

that he was experiencing migraines, Williamson’s left ankle and foot was

as well as pain in his neck, lower back, negative for any issues. See id. ¶ 44.

and ankle, and numbness in his left Williamson complained of numbness

jaw and ankle. See id. ¶ 33. on the left side of his face but it had

not grown worse. Id. Dr. Robinson

Dr. Robinson saw Williamson on prescribed prednisone for the

March 28. See id. ¶ 36. During the numbness, which was dispensed on

examination, he reported numbness April 9. See id. ¶ 45.

and a superficial wound to the left side

of his face; he admitted that he had On April 11, Williamson submitted

repeatedly removed a scab there. See another sick call request, reporting

id. ¶ 36. Dr. Robinson entered an that he was still having migraines and

order for Excedrin headache relief the medications were having no effect.

See id. ¶ 46. Peach advised him that Williamson moved for the issuance of

she would speak with Dr. Robinson. a subpoena directing Central Prison

See id. ¶ 47. On April 16, a in Raleigh to produce his medical

prescription order was entered for records between the dates of

Williamson to receive prednisone November 19, 2025 and January 19,

once daily for six days; Williamson 2026. See Docket Entry 60. He

began receiving his prescribed responded in opposition to the two

naproxen on April 17. See id. ¶ 49. motions for summary judgment. See

Docket Entry 61. In Williamson’s

Williamson finished his regimen on opposition, he voluntarily dismissed

prednisone on April 22 and did not all claims against Lee, Schorder,

submit any further sick call requests Ortega and Thompson, as well as all

notifying the jail medical staff that his claims against all defendants in their

headache pain continued or that he official capacities, save Page. See

needed further pain medication. See Docket Entry 61. Williamson further

id. ¶ 50. agreed that his claims for injunctive

relief were moot upon his transfer to

II. PROCEDURAL

the custody of the North Carolina

HISTORY

Department of Adult Corrections, and

Williamson filed this Section 1983 dismissed those, as well. See id.

suit, alleging that the prison officers

used excessive force in tasing him, in The defendants replied, see Docket

violation of his Eighth Amendment Entries 67, 68, Williamson then filed

rights,3 and the prison medical staff a surreply, see Docket Entry 70, and

was deliberately indifferent to both the moving defendants moved to

his medical needs and conditions of strike it, see Docket Entry 71. These

confinement, in violation of his matters are ripe for disposition.

Fourteenth Amendment rights. See

III. STANDARD OF

Compl. The defendants answered, see

REVIEW

Docket Entries 31, 33, and the

magistrate judge set a discovery

A court “shall grant summary

schedule, see Docket Entry dated

judgment if the movant shows that

06/30/2025. The moving defendants

there is no genuine dispute as to any

moved for summary judgment, see

material fact and the movant is

Docket Entry 52, and Peach

entitled to judgment as a matter of

separately did the same, see Docket

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine

Entry 54. Peach also moved to seal

dispute of material fact exists “if the

Williamson’s medical records and

evidence is such that a reasonable jury

portions of her affidavit incorporating

could return a verdict for the

the same. See Docket Entry 57.

nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

3 Because Williamson was not a prisoner, derives from the Fourteenth

but rather a pretrial detainee, this right Amendment.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Celotex

(1986). In analyzing a summary Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).

judgment motion, courts

“must construe all facts and “An affidavit or declaration used to

reasonable inferences in the light support [summary judgment] must

most favorable to the nonmoving be made on personal knowledge, set

party.” Bandy v. City of Salem, 59 out facts that would be admissible in

F.4th 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2023). evidence, and show that the affiant or

declarant is competent to testify on

The moving party bears the burden of the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

establishing the absence of a genuine 56(c)(4); see also Evans v. Techs.

dispute of material fact by Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954,

“identifying those portions of ‘the 962 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Williams v.

pleadings, depositions, answers to Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir.

interrogatories, and admissions on 1991)).

file, together with the affidavits, if any’

which it believes demonstrate the A party cannot rely on statements in a

absence of a genuine issue of material brief to support a motion for

fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 summary judgment, because they are

U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Rule not evidence. City of Greensboro v.

56). Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No.

15-CV-559, 2017 WL 11488724, at *1

“Where, as here, the nonmoving party n.4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2017)

bears the ultimate burden of proof at (collecting cases); see also Hill v.

trial, the moving party may discharge Carvana, LLC, No. 22-CV-37, 2022

its initial burden at summary WL 1625020, at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 23,

judgment by ‘showing – that is, 2022).

pointing out to the . . . court – that

there is an absence of evidence to IV. GOVERNING LAW

support the nonmoving party’s case.’”

Title 42, United States Code, Section

Anderson v. Diamondback Inv. Grp.,

1983 “is a federal statutory remedy

LLC, 117 F.4th 165, 174 (4th Cir. 2024)

available to those deprived of rights

(quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

secured to them by the Constitution

325). “If the moving party carries this

and, in a more sharply limited way,

initial burden, the burden then shifts

the statutory laws of the United

to the nonmoving party, who must ‘go

States” by persons acting under color

beyond the pleadings and by [his]

of state law. Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l

own affidavits, or by the depositions,

Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir.

answers to interrogatories, and

2009). A plaintiff bringing suit

admissions on file, designate specific

pursuant to § 1983 must show that a

facts showing that there is a genuine

person acting under color of state law

violated a constitutional or other

federal legal right. West v. Atkins, 487 courts to judge the reasonableness of

U.S. 42, 48 (1988). the force applied “from the

perspective and with the knowledge of

A. Excessive Force the defendant officer. We have also

explained that a court must take

Here, as against the moving

account of the legitimate interests in

defendants, the constitutional right at

managing a jail, acknowledging as

issue is the right to be free from an

part of the objective reasonableness

officer’s use of excessive force, derived

analysis that deference to policies and

from the Fourteenth Amendment. See

practices needed to maintain order

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395

and institutional security is

n.10 (1989) (the Fourteenth

appropriate.” See id. at 399-400.

Amendment “protects a pretrial

detainee from the use of excessive

B. Deliberate Indifference

force that amounts to punishment”).

to Serious Medical Needs

and/or Conditions of

To succeed on such a claim, a pretrial

Confinement

detainee must show only that the

force “purposely or knowingly used Here, as against Peach, the

against him was objectively constitutional right at issue sounds in

unreasonable.” See Kingsley v. the Eighth Amendment but derives

Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 from the due process clause of the

(2015). Courts may consider the Fourteenth Amendment because of

following in weighing the Williamson’s status as a pretrial

reasonableness or unreasonableness detainee. See Short v. Hartman, 87

of the force exerted: “the relationship F.4th 593, 606 (4th Cir. 2023)

between the need for the use of force (“[T]his Court extended Estelle from

and the amount of force used; the Eighth Amendment claims to Fifth

extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any and Fourteenth Amendment Due

effort made by the officer to temper or Process Clause claims, reasoning that

to limit the amount of force; the ‘due process is at least as co-extensive

severity of the security problem at as the guarantees of the [E]ighth

issue; the threat reasonably perceived amendment.’”) (quoting and citing

by the officer; and whether the Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1294

plaintiff was actively resisting.” See id. (4th Cir. 1978)).

The United States Supreme Court

In Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160,

recognized in Kingsley that “[o]fficers

164 (4th Cir. 1984), the Fourth Circuit

facing disturbances ‘are often forced

adopted an objective test for

to make split-second judgments—in

Fourteenth Amendment claims of

circumstances that are tense,

deliberate indifference to serious

uncertain, and rapidly evolving.’” Id.

medical needs, derived from the

(quoting and citing Graham, 490 U.S.

Supreme Court’s holding in Bell v.

at 397). Therefore, it has directed

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), wherein

the Court held that “[i]n evaluating (1) they had a medical condition

the constitutionality of conditions or or injury that posed a

restrictions of pretrial detention ... the substantial risk of serious

proper inquiry is whether those harm;

conditions amount to punishment of (2) the defendant intentionally,

the detainee.” See Bell, 441 U.S. at knowingly, or recklessly acted

535. “The Court in Bell explained that or failed to act to appropriately

whereas the Eighth Amendment only address the risk that the

protects post-conviction detainees condition posed;

from ‘cruel and unusual punishment,’ (3) the defendant knew or

the Fourteenth Amendment Due should have known (a) that the

Process Clause protects pretrial detainee had that condition and

detainees from being punished at all.” (b) that the defendant’s action

Short, 87 F.4th at 606, citing Bell, 441 or inaction posed an

U.S. at 535-37. unjustifiably high risk of harm;

and

Thus, “deliberate indifference to (4) as a result, the detainee was

serious medical needs violates the harmed.

Fourteenth Amendment even in the

absence of subjective intent to punish Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 611

because no legitimate nonpunitive (4th Cir. 2023).4

goal is served by a denial or

unreasonable delay in providing A serious medical need is one that has

medical treatment where the need for been “diagnosed by a physician as

such treatment is apparent.” See id. mandating treatment” or is “so

(internal quotation and citation obvious that even a lay person would

omitted). easily recognize the necessity for a

doctor’s attention.” Scinto v.

Thus, Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th

Cir. 2016).

To state a claim for deliberate

indifference to a medical need, As to the jail personnel, principles of

the specific type of deliberate deliberate indifference under the

indifference claim at issue in Fourteenth Amendment also cover

this case, a pretrial detainee inhumane conditions of confinement.

must plead that See Karn v. PTS of America, LLC, 590

4 In Short, the Fourth Circuit found that their action or failure to act would result

in Fourteenth Amendment deliberate in harm … Now, it is sufficient that the

indifference claims, “[t]he plaintiff no plaintiff show … that the defendant

longer has to show that the defendant should have known of that condition and

had actual knowledge of the detainee’s that risk, and acted accordingly.” See 87

serious medical condition and F.4th 593, 611.

consciously disregarded the risk that

F. Supp. 3d 780, 809 (D. Md. 2022) from the challenged conditions or ... a

(citing cases). The Supreme Court substantial risk of such serious harm

recognized as much in Bell v. Wolfish: resulting from ... exposure to the

challenged conditions.” See Scinto v.

[I]f a particular condition or Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 229 n.3

restriction of pretrial detention (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations

is reasonably related to a and citation omitted).

legitimate governmental

objective, it does not, without Next, courts look to whether “the

more, amount to defendant acted or failed to act in the

“punishment.” Conversely, if a face of an unjustifiably high risk of

restriction or condition is not harm that is either known or so

reasonably related to a obvious that it should be known.”

legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary Hammock v. Watts, 146 F.4th 349,

or purposeless—a court 360 (4th Cir. 2025). The injury

permissibly may infer that the suffered or risked must be more than

purpose of the governmental de minimis. See Heyer v. United

action is punishment that may States Bureau of Prisons, 849 F.3d

not constitutionally be inflicted 202, 210 (4th Cir. 2017); Robles v.

upon detainees qua detainees. Prince George’s Cty. Maryland, 302

Courts must be mindful that F.3d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 2002).

these inquiries spring from

constitutional requirements Courts have found that “grossly

and that judicial answers to overcrowded and unsanitary”

them must reflect that fact facilities can satisfy the objective

rather than a court’s idea of prong, see Brown v. Mitchell, 308 F.

how best to operate a detention Supp. 2d 682, 693 (E.D. Va. 2004)

facility. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294

(1991); Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 1375 (4th Cir. 1993)), as can leaving a

(1979) (internal citation omitted). pretrial detainee confined with

human waste, see Clark v.

In considering a conditions of Daddysman, No. 16-cv-0621, 2018

confinement claim, courts employ the WL 1453333, at *10 (D. Md. Mar. 22,

two-pronged deliberate indifference 2018) (citing Williams v. Griffin, 952

test, considering first, whether there F.2d 820, 825 (4th Cir. 1991)); Burkey

was deprivation of a basic human v. Baltimore Cnty., No. GJH-20-

need that was objectively sufficiently 2006, 2021 WL 3857814, at *7 (D.

serious, see Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d Md. Aug. 30, 2021); Webb v. Deboo,

162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995). In so doing, 423 F. App’x 299, 301 (4th Cir. 2011);

courts should determine whether Fletcher v. Dykes, No. 17-cv-0914-

there was “a serious or significant TDC, 2018 WL 3785143, at *7 (D. Md.

physical or emotional injury resulting Aug. 9, 2018); see also Walker v.

Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 127 (2d Cir. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 477 (1986)).

2013). A single decision may create an

official policy “so long as that

V. DISCUSSION governmental unit possessed ‘final

authority to create official policy.’” Id.

A. The Court should grant (quoting Semple v. City of

summary judgment to Page in Moundsville, 195 F.3d 708, 712 (4th

his official capacity on the Cir. 1999)).

basis of sovereign immunity.

“‘The question of who possesses final

At the time of the incident, Page was policymaking authority is one of state

an employee of Rockingham County. law.’” Id. at 555 (quoting Riddick v.

And official capacity lawsuits Sch. Bd., 238 F.3d 518, 523 (4th Cir.

“’generally represent only another 2000)). Courts “‘must look to the

way of pleading an action against an relevant legal materials, including

entity of which an officer is an agent.’” state and local positive law, as well as

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, custom or usage having the force of

165 (1985) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of law.’” Id. (quoting Riddick, 238 F.3d

Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, at 523). A “municipality may delegate

436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)). its final policymaking authority to

other officials or governing bodies.”

And “[f]or purposes of Section 1983, a Id.

municipality is considered a ‘person’

and thus is subject to suit.” Hunter v. Here, there are no genuine issues of

Town of Mocksville, 897 F.3d 538, material fact wherein a reasonable

553 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Monell, jury could find that Page, as an agent

436 U.S. at 690). However, a city of the municipality, was acting

cannot be vicariously liable for the according to an official municipal

acts of its employees. Id. at 553-54. policy of some nature. Accordingly,

“Rather, ‘it is when execution of a the Court should dismiss the claim

government’s policy or custom, against him in his official capacity.

whether made by its lawmakers or by

those whose edicts or acts may fairly B. The Court should grant

be said to represent official policy, summary judgment to Cpt. Mr.

inflicts the injury that the government Brown and Cpl. Ellis in their

as an entity is responsible under § individual capacities.

1983.’” Id. at 554 (quoting Monell,

436 U.S. at 694). Government officials may be liable

under § 1983 “only for their personal

In other words, “municipal liability wrongdoing or supervisory actions

under Section 1983 attaches only to that violated constitutional norms.”

‘action [taken] pursuant to official Timpson ex rel. Timpson v. Anderson

municipal policy of some nature.’” Id. Cnty. Disabilities & Special Needs

(quoting Pembaur v. City of

Bd., 31 F.4th 238, 257 (4th Cir. 2022); used on several different occasions

see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 and that the conduct engaged in by

(“Government officials may not be the subordinate poses an

held liable for the unconstitutional unreasonable risk of harm of

conduct of their subordinates under a constitutional injury.” See id.

theory of respondeat superior.”). In

other words, liability under § 1983 is Here, defendant Captain Brown

“personal, based upon each (versus Officer C.G. Brown) was Sgt.

defendant’s own constitutional Rodgers’s supervisor and was not

violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d present at the time that Sgt. Rodgers

391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). tased Williamson. And the record is

devoid of facts a reasonable jury could

However, a plaintiff can prevail on a rely upon to find that, assuming

claim against a supervisor with facts arguendo Williamson was acting in a

wherein a reasonable jury could find: manner that posed “a pervasive and

unreasonable risk of constitutional

(1) that the supervisor had injury” to Williamson, Captain Brown

actual or constructive had actual or constructive knowledge

knowledge that his subordinate of it, let alone a causal link between

was engaged in conduct that his inaction and the conduct. The

posed a pervasive and Section 1983 claim against Captain

unreasonable risk of Brown in his individual capacity

constitutional injury to citizens should therefore be dismissed.

like the plaintiff;

(2) that the supervisor’s The undisputed facts also show that

response to that knowledge was named defendants Cpt. Jennifer

so inadequate as to show Brown and Cpl. Ellis were not

deliberate indifference to or involved in any manner in any alleged

tacit authorization of the use of excessive force (the tasing

alleged offensive practices; and incident), the conditions of

(3) that there was an confinement (the odiferous toilet) or

affirmative causal link between deliberate indifference to medical

the supervisor’s inaction and needs (the follow-up care).

the particular constitutional Accordingly, the Court should dismiss

injury suffered by the plaintiff. the claims against them in their

individual capacities.

Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th

Cir. 1994) (internal quotations and C. The Court should deny Officers

citations omitted). As to the C.G. Brown and Dillon, Cpl.

“pervasive and unreasonable risk”

element, there must be facts wherein

a reasonable jury could find that it

was “widespread, or at least has been

Kluk, and Sgt. Rodgers’s And “if testimony of a nonmovant is

motion for summary judgment. based on personal knowledge or

firsthand experience, it can be

As the moving party seeking summary evidence of disputed material facts,

judgment, these defendants bear the even if it is uncorroborated and self-

initial burden of demonstrating the serving.” See Nalls v. Baltimore

absence of a genuine issue of material Cnty., Maryland, No. CV ELH-23-

fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. 0183, 2026 WL 885716, at *22 (D.

Md. Mar. 30, 2026) (citing Lovett v.

There is no dispute that Rodgers tased

Cracker Barrel Old Country Store,

Williamson twice, that Officer Dillon

Inc., 700 F. App’x 209, 212 (4th Cir.

struck Williamson multiple times in

2017) (unpublished)). In fact, “a great

the arm and once to the side of the

deal of perfectly admissible testimony

head, and that Officers C.G. Brown

fits the description” of self-serving.

and Dillon subdued him immediately

Cowgill v. First Data Technologies,

thereafter. There is no dispute that

Inc., 41 F.4th 370, 383 (4th Cir. 2022)

Cpl. Kluk was present in the cell at the

(citation modified).

time of the tasing and assisted officers

in subduing Williamson after the fact. Sgt. Rodgers does represent in his

affidavit that prior to deploying his

To meet their burden as the moving

taser, “I stepped over [sic] Mr.

parties that the manner in which the

Williamson and placed my arm on his

defendants tased and/or subdued

right arm to try to talk him into

Williamson did not amount to

complying but he told me [sic] step

excessive force, these defendants

away from him. I asked Mr.

represent, as to the facts, that prior to

Williamson again to comply, but he

the first taser strike, “Plaintiff actively

refused.” See Rodgers Aff. ¶¶ 7-8. But

resisted” Sgt. Rodgers when he put

“[w]hen there is contrary evidence, a

hands on him to gain compliance. See

court may not simply accept what may

Docket Entry 53, at 11. But

be a self-serving account by the police

significantly, they cite to no record

officer.” Jackson v. Carin, 128 F.4th

evidence to support that assertion. By

525, 535 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting

contrast, Williamson affirmatively

Ingle ex rel. Est. of Ingle v. Yelton,

represents that he was defenseless,

439 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2006))

hands in the air, when Rodgers

(internal quotation marks omitted).

deployed his taser: “Sgt. Rodgers …

drew his taser … I stopped packing my

The Supreme Court in Kingsley

things, faced Sgt. Rodgers, and put my

directed courts to consider, in

hands strait [sic] up to submit,” see

weighing excessive force claims under

Williamson Aff. ¶¶ 11-12, and “I never

the Fourteenth Amendment, “the

fought back or resisted in any way. I

relationship between the need for the

never showed any aggression. I never

use of force and the amount of force

tried to take the taser from the

used; the extent of the plaintiff’s

officers.” Id. ¶ 17.

injury; any effort made by the officer

to temper or to limit the amount of having any reason to believe that a

force; the severity of the security lesser amount of force—or a verbal

problem at issue; the threat command—could not exact

reasonably perceived by the officer; compliance.”). This weighs against

and whether the plaintiff was actively granting summary judgment.

resisting.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson,

576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). In terms of the extent of Williamson’s

injuries, it is undisputed that the first

As a threshold matter, it is well- strike made contact with his

settled in this Circuit that abdomen. See Peach Aff. ¶ 14;

“[d]eploying a taser is a serious use of Williamson Aff. ¶ 13. It is also

force. The weapon is designed to undisputed that he had the

caus[e] ... excruciating pain[.]” See wherewithal to remove the taser

Est. of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong probes immediately thereafter. See

v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, Rodgers Aff. ¶ 8; Williamson Aff. ¶ 13;

902 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal Kluk Aff. ¶ 4. And, while the record is

quotation and citation omitted) replete with Williamson’s sick call

(alteration in original). And the requests related to the second taser

Fourth Circuit has determined that strike, there is very little record

“tasers are proportional force only evidence regarding the effects of the

when deployed in response to a first, which weighs in favor of

situation in which a reasonable officer granting the motion. As to the security

would perceive some immediate threat, it is undisputed that there were

danger that could be mitigated by three other officers present in the cell

using the taser.” See id. at 902. to assist Sgt. Rodgers in gaining

Williamson’s compliance even if he

Here, regarding the first taser strike, was physically resisting. This weighs

there is a dispute as to whether against granting the motion.

Williamson was physically resisting

the officers’ directive, implicating the As to the second taser strike, there

first Kingsley factor of the necessity of again is a dispute as to what happened

the force. Williamson maintains that immediately beforehand: whether

not only was he not physically Williamson was the aggressor in the

resisting, he was actively compliant – physical contact with Officers Dillon

packing up his belongings to move and C.G. Brown or whether they acted

and raising his hands in surrender. unprovoked. Williamson states: “Ofc.

Thus, there would have been no need G. Brown grabbed me and I was

to exert the level of force that Sgt. slammed on the floor. Ofc. Cl. Dillon

Rodgers did and its use was not began to punch me with closed fist

proportional. See Casey v. City of Fed. [sic].” See Williamson Aff. ¶ 14. Sgt.

Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1286 (10th Rodgers maintains: “Officers Dillon

Cir. 2007) (“[I]t is excessive to use a and Brown grabbed [Williamson].”

Taser to control a target without See Rodgers Aff. ¶ 8. And Officer C.G.

Brown states: “Williamson began to FDW, 2017 WL 581324, at *5

fight myself and Officer Dillon.” See (W.D.N.C. Feb. 13, 2017) (Kingsley

C.G. Brown Aff. ¶ 4. injury prong not satisfied where the

plaintiff “suffered only minimal

It is undisputed, though, that Sgt.

injuries from the use of the TASER,

Rodgers tased Williamson in the neck

including a hole where the barb of the

area. See Williamson Aff. ¶ 15;

TASER pricked him and the pain ...

Rodgers Aff. ¶ 9 (“I went to apply the

from getting electrocuted. Plaintiff

taser to his left arm, but he dropped

did not require any medication from

his head as he approached me,

these injuries.”) (internal quotation

causing the taser to catch him in the

and citation omitted).

left side of the neck area.”).5

Finally, as to the security threat

And the record contains far more

posed, the same issues of material fact

information about the extent of the

bubble up there as to the necessity of

injury Williamson suffered from the

the force exerted: it depends on

second strike: he submitted ten sick

whether Officers C.G. Brown and

call requests between March 11 (the

Dillon and Cpl. Kluk laid hands on a

date of the taser strike) and April 11,

passive or resistant detainee. This is a

recounting symptoms related thereto.

credibility issue that cannot be

See Peach Aff. ¶¶ 17, 19, 21-22, 27, 31,

resolved at this stage in the

33, 40, 42, 46. He also had two visits

proceedings, and weighs against

with Dr. Robinson during that same

granting the motion for summary

stretch wherein he recounted pain

judgment as to Sgt. Rodgers and

and numbness in the left side of his

Officers C.G. Brown and Dillon.

face related to the second taser strike

and pain in his ankle (presumably In sum, construing the facts in the

related to the way that Officers C.G. light most favorable to Williamson, a

Brown and Dillon and Cpl. Kluk reasonable jury could return a verdict

brought him to the ground). See in his favor on his § 1983 claim

Peach Aff. ¶¶ 36, 44. Thus, while the against these three defendants. The

care that Peach provided was Court should deny Sgt. Rodgers,

responsive to his pain and Officer Dillon, and Officer C.G.

constitutionally sound (as set forth Brown’s motion for summary

infra), the sustained nature of judgment.

Williamson’s complaints about the

There remains the issue of Cpl. Kluk’s

effects of this strike weighs against

liability in his individual capacity. It is

granting summary judgment.

undisputed that he was present for

Compare with Jones v. Henderson

both tasing incidents, and that he

Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 1:15-CV-132-

5 In her affidavit, Peach states that she Aff. ¶ 16. However, both Williamson and

saw Williamson on March 11 and did not Sgt. Rodgers agree that the taser struck

recall seeing any evidence that he the left side of his neck area at the very

sustained injuries to his face. See Peach least.

participated in bringing Williamson Robinette, 105 F.4th 99, 124 (4th Cir.

to the ground by holding onto his foot. 2024) (quoting and citing Randall v.

Williamson’s sick call requests often Prince George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 188,

made reference to pain in his ankle, 204 and n.24).

such that it was x-rayed. See Peach

There remain factual disputes as to

Aff. ¶¶ 33, 38, 44.

whether Williamson physically

Thus, while Williamson does not resisted officers attempting to move

articulate the legal theory supporting him from one cell to the other. If a jury

his claim against Cpl. Kluk, it could be accepted Williamson’s version of

based upon participation in an events, Sgt. Rodgers tased Williamson

unlawful assault and/or bystander unprovoked, and then tased him a

liability. Williamson has alleged very second time after two other officers

few facts as to the first theory of (Officers C.G. Brown and Dillon)

liability, but the Court need not make assaulted him. Again, accepting

a determination as to its viability Williamson’s account, Cpl. Kluk then

because genuine issues of material still laid hands on him to bring him to

fact remain under the bystander the ground.

theory.

A reasonable jury could thus find that

To that end, the Fourth Circuit has Sgt. Rodgers violated Williamson’s

recognized, as an outgrowth of constitutional right under the

supervisory liability in Section 1983 Fourteenth Amendment to be free of

cases, that “in certain circumstances, excessive force as a pretrial detainee

liability may attach to one who did not and that Cpl. Kluk had a reasonable

personally inflict the excessive force.” opportunity to prevent that harm,

See Wetherington v. Keil, 2025 WL specifically Sgt. Rodgers’s second

3035172, at *11 (E.D. Va. Oct. 30, deployment of the taser. And not only

2025) (citing Johnson v. Robinette, would that set of facts show that Cpl.

105 F.4th 99, 123–24 (4th Cir. 2024)). Kluk failed to act to intercede, but that

“‘[A]n officer may be liable under § he participated in assaulting a passive

1983, on a theory of bystander detainee.

liability, if he: (1) knows that a fellow

Accordingly, because those issues of

officer is violating an individual’s

material fact remain as to Cpl. Kluk,

constitutional rights; (2) has a

the Court should deny his motion for

reasonable opportunity to prevent the

summary judgment as to him in his

harm; and (3) chooses not to act.’ The

individual capacity.

‘bystanding officer must know of his

fellow officer’s misconduct .... If the D. The Court should grant Peach’s

bystander lacks such specific motion for summary judgment.

knowledge, he cannot be a participant

Finally, Williamson alleges that Peach

in the unlawful acts, and the

violated his constitutional rights by

imposition of personal liability is

showing deliberate indifference to his

impermissible.’” Johnson v.

medical needs arising from the tasing

incidents and ensuing scuffle that 2009) (finding, on summary

took place on March 11. Because there judgment, that ulcer caused by taser

are no genuine issues of material fact burn was not an “objectively serious

as to this claim, the Court should medical need”), report and

grant summary judgment in Peach’s recommendation adopted, 2009 WL

favor, as she is entitled to relief as a 2045923 (S.D. Ga. July 13, 2009)).

matter of law.

The Court need not make a finding as

As referenced above, for Williamson to whether the tasing and its

to prevail on a deliberate indifference aftermath meet the Kingsley

claim under the Fourteenth standard, though, because the

Amendment, a jury would need to undisputed facts show that Peach did

find that he had an injury that posed a not act intentionally, knowingly, or

substantial risk of harm, Peach acted recklessly in failing to address

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly Williamson’s complaints. His medical

in failing to act appropriately to records tell the opposite tale: every

address it, she knew or should have time he submitted a sick call request,

known that her inaction posed an it was answered, and both Peach and

“unjustifiably high risk of harm,” and Dr. Robinson took multiple steps,

that Williamson was, in fact, harmed. including examinations and the

See generally Short v. Hartman, 87 prescription of painkillers, to address

F.4th 593, 611 (4th Cir. 2023). Williamson’s stated ailments. See,

e.g., Richards v. Glover, No. 2:16-CV-

A serious medical need is one that has 707-ALB, 2019 WL 2608366, at *11

been “diagnosed by a physician as (M.D. Ala. May 29, 2019), report and

mandating treatment” or is “so recommendation adopted, No. 2:16-

obvious that even a lay person would CV-707-ALB, 2019 WL 2606931

easily recognize the necessity for a (M.D. Ala. June 25, 2019) (granting

doctor’s attention.” Scinto v. summary judgment to medical

Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th providers on deliberate indifference

Cir. 2016). Other courts have claim for care provided after prison

determined that “minor burns and attack where providers “evaluated

associated scarring” from tasing do [the plaintiff] after the … attack,

not constitute a serious medical need prescribed medication to him in

to support a deliberate indifference accordance with their professional

claim. See Roebling v. City of judgment, and ordered x-rays to assist

Tuscaloosa, Alabama, No. 7:14-CV- in their assessment and treatment of

151-SGC, 2015 WL 7433147, at *5 his injuries”).

(N.D. Ala. Oct. 30, 2015), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 7:14- And Williamson’s “self-serving

CV-151-RDP, 2015 WL 7424120 (N.D. assertion of deliberate indifference

Ala. Nov. 23, 2015) (citing Hayward does not create a question of fact in

v. Kile, No. CIV.A CV607-68, 2009 the face of contradictory,

WL 2045925, at *8 (S.D. Ga. June 12,

contemporaneously created medical requisite objective test. Accordingly,

records.” See id. at *11 (citation to the extent that he would advance a

omitted). This is because it is well- conditions of confinement claim

settled that “[w]hen opposing parties against any of the defendants, in their

tell two different stories, one of which individual or official capacities, the

is blatantly contradicted by the defendants would be entitled to

record, so that no reasonable jury judgment on those claims as a matter

could believe it, a court should not of law.

adopt that version of the facts for

purposes of ruling on a motion for F. Peach has not made a sufficient

summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, showing to support her motion

550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). to seal.

Accordingly, because no reasonable Contemporaneous to filing her

jury could conclude that Peach acted motion for summary judgment, Peach

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly filed a motion to seal the medical

in failing to act appropriately to records associated therewith. See

address the aftermath of the tasing Docket Entry 57. In support thereof,

incidents, the Court should grant Peach notes the Court’s authority to

summary judgment to Peach. seal materials pursuant to Local Rule

5.4, and her desire to present them as

E. Any deliberate indifference exhibits to her motion without

conditions of confinement violating federal and state

claim fails as a matter of law. confidentiality statutes.

Finally, a word about the toilet: The public has a long-established

Williamson maintains in his sworn right of access to judicial records.

affidavit, filed in opposition to the Nixon v. Warner, Commc’ns, Inc.,

defendants’ respective motions for 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Va. Dep’t of

summary judgment, that the toilet in State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d

the next-door cell, H-118, had been 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004). The right

broken for approximately eight derives from two sources, the

months prior to March 11. See Docket common law and the First

Entry 61-1, ¶ 3. Amendment. United States ex rel.

Oberg v. Nelnet, Inc., 105 F.4th 161,

But Williamson sets forth no facts 170–71 (4th Cir. 2024). However, the

indicating that the smell emanating right of access is not absolute and can

from the toilet into his cell risked “a be rebutted. Rushford v. New Yorker,

serious or significant physical or Mag., Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th

emotional injury … or ... a substantial Cir. 1988). The burden of establishing

risk of such serious harm resulting a right to limit public access is on the

from ... exposure[,]” see Scinto v. party claiming the need for

Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 229 n.3 confidentiality. Id.

(4th Cir. 2016), that would satisfy the

The common law right of access his or her medical information or

applies to all judicial records but can status into issue, it is more difficult to

be rebutted if “countervailing find that the party’s privacy interests

interests heavily outweigh the public constitute a compelling interest that

interests in access.” Id. The First outweighs the First Amendment right

Amendment right of access is of access to documents, even if the

narrower and applies only to documents are medical records.” See

particular judicial records and Johnson v. City of Fayetteville, No.

documents. Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 12–cv–456, 2014 WL 7151147, at *11–

F.3d 246, 266 (4th Cir. 2014). To 12 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 11, 2014). As the

overcome the right of access based on court noted in Musgrove in denying

the First Amendment, a party must such a motion to seal in a deliberate

show “a compelling governmental indifference case:

interest” and that the restriction is

“narrowly tailored.” Id. While the Court recognizes that

medical records are ordinarily

When documents are filed in kept confidential, that is not

connection with a dispositive motion, always the case when those

the “more rigorous First Amendment records are important to a

standard ... appl[ies].” Va. Dep’t of lawsuit the patient himself has

State Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d brought. Mr. Musgrove has

567, 576 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining neither joined in the motion to

that once documents produced in seal nor expressed any

discovery are “made part of a concerns about the

dispositive motion, they [have] lost confidentiality of the materials,

their status as being raw fruits of indicating he has no

discovery.”) (internal quotation and confidentiality concerns about

citation omitted). Thus, Peach “must the limited records at issue.

present specific reasons in support of

[her] position.” See id. at 575. 2022 WL 19977408, at *2.

This she does not do. See Musgrove v. Like Musgrove, Williamson has

Moore, No. 1:19-CV-164, 2022 WL placed his medical condition squarely

19977408, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 20, at issue in his claim against Peach. He

2022) (“The defendants’ conclusory has not joined in her motion to seal,

references to an assortment of and she has not identified, with the

statutes and regulations does not specificity required, the justification

establish these records are therefor. Accordingly, the motion to

confidential or show a compelling seal is denied.

interest to justify sealing.”) (citing Va.

G. Williamson’s motion for a

Dep’t of State Police, 386 F.3d at 575).

subpoena is denied.

And “[f]ederal courts have recognized

... that where a party voluntarily puts

Williamson has also filed a motion (W.D.N.C. 2002) (“[A] Rule 45

requesting that this Court issue a subpoena does in fact constitute

subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule of discovery.”) (citing cases).

Civil Procedure 34 for Central Prison

in Raleigh to produce his While courts have recognized that

psychological records generated parties may occasionally use Rule 45

between November 19, 2025 and to “itemize[e] specific documents

January 19, 2026. See Docket Entry necessary for use as exhibits at trial,”

60. In support thereof, Williamson see id., such is not the case here,

states only the need “to substantiate where summary judgment motions

findings of material fact.” See id. The were pending and Williamson

North Carolina Department of Adult indicated his need for the subpoena to

Corrections, which manages Central shed light on material facts,

Prison, is not a party to this suit and presumably related to the motions for

thus, service pursuant to Federal Rule summary judgment that were filed

of Civil Procedure 45 would apply. See shortly before his motion.6 And “when

Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(c). a plaintiff ... is aware of the existence

of documents before the discovery

Both the moving defendants and cutoff date and issues discovery

Peach oppose the motion. See Docket requests including subpoenas after

Entries 62, 63. In so doing, the the discovery deadline has passed,

moving defendants correctly note that then the subpoenas and discovery

this Court entered a scheduling order requests should be denied.” See

governing all discovery in the matter, McNerney v. Archer Daniels Midland

including the date it would close, Co., 164 F.R.D. 584, 588 (W.D.N.Y.

December 30, 2025. See Docket Entry 1995); see also Fleetwood Transp.

dated 06/30/2025. Williamson filed Corp. v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No.

the instant motion on February 17, 1:11MC45, 2011 WL 6151479, at *2

2026, well over a month past that (M.D.N.C. Dec. 12, 2011) (“Upon the

date, and after the defendants moved determination that a Rule 45

for summary judgment. As such, they subpoena constitutes discovery,

argue that Williamson’s attempted courts have routinely held that said

service of such a subpoena is subpoenas served outside of the

untimely. And there is case law to discovery period are untimely.”).

support that proposition. See

Mortgage Info. Servs., Inc. v. Here, Williamson seeks a subpoena

Kitchens, 210 F.R.D. 562, 566 for his own medical records starting

6 Williamson, in his reply to the fact,” phraseology that smacks of the

defendants’ respective oppositions to his summary judgment standard. This

motion for the subpoena, headlines one cursory reference to trial is an

of his arguments as “Trial Preparation insufficient basis for the Court to grant

Materials,” but had, in the original his motion.

motion, referenced “findings of material

in November 2025, prior to the the Local Rule and does not assist the

December 30, 2025 conclusion of Court in its analysis. Accordingly,

discovery. As such, he was “aware of Williamson’s surreply is struck.

the existence of documents before the

discovery cutoff date,” see McNerney, VI. CONCLUSION

164 F.R.D. at 588. Because

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

Williamson seeks discovery in this

that the Court GRANT IN PART

motion and that deadline has long

AND DENY IN PART the motion

since passed, his motion is denied.

for summary judgment filed under

Docket Entry 52 in that the Court

H. The moving defendants’

DENY the motion as to defendants

motion to strike Williamson’s

Sgt. Rodgers, Officer C.G. Brown,

surreply is granted.

Officer Dillon, and Cpl. Kluk in their

individual capacities and GRANT the

After the defendants filed their

motion as to all remaining

respective replies to Williamson’s

defendants.

opposition to their motions for

summary judgment, he filed a

IT IS FURTHER

surreply. See Docket Entry 70. The

moving defendants move to strike it. RECOMMENDED that the Court

See Docket Entry 71. The Court will GRANT Joanna Peach’s motion for

grant the motion. summary judgment filed under

Docket Entry 54.

Local Rules 7.3 and 56.1 govern

motion practice as it relates to IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

summary judgment. Local Rule 7.6 Peach’s motion to seal, Docket Entry

authorizes surreplies in limited 57, is DENIED.

circumstances, arising from

objections to evidence referenced in IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

replies supporting motions for Williamson’s motion for issuance of a

summary judgment. If a moving party subpoena, Docket Entry 60, is

raises such an objection in its reply DENIED.

memorandum, the non-moving party

may file a surreply addressing only IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the

the evidentiary objection. See L.R. defendants’ motion to strike

7.6. Williamson’s surreply, Docket Entry

71, is GRANTED.

Here, the defendants did not raise

evidentiary objections in their reply

briefs, and yet Williamson has filed an

18-page surreply, repeating the same

factual allegations as his response in

opposition to the respective motions

for summary judgment. This violates

The clerk is directed to unseal all

sealed materials, Docket Entries 55,

55-1, and 55-2.

J it Gibson

United States Magistrate Judge

August 7, 2026

22