SATTERFIELD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

MARCUS A. SATTERFIELD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:23CV144

)

ROXBORO POLICE OFFICER T.J. )

KNAUB, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

When Roxboro Police Officer T.J. his body worn camera footage in

Knaub was speaking to Marcus A. support. See Def. T.J. Knaub’s Mot.

Satterfield as part of an investigation for Summ. J., Docket Entry 52; Br. in

into allegations of assault and Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.,

trespassing, Satterfield admitted that Docket Entry 54. Satterfield did not

he had a rock of crack cocaine that he provide any evidence in opposition to

was going to smoke and then opened the motion. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s

his hand and showed Knaub several Mot. for Summ. J., Docket Entry 56.

off-white rocks. Unsurprisingly,

Knaub arrested Satterfield for felony The undisputed evidence shows that

possession of cocaine, then found Knaub had probable cause to arrest

drug paraphernalia on his person Satterfield and the ensuing search

during a search incident to his arrest. incident to arrest was lawful.

Satterfield sued Knaub, in his official Accordingly, there is no genuine

and individual capacities, alleging dispute of material fact – Knaub did

violations of his Fourth Amendment not violate Satterfield’s Fourth

rights. Amendment rights, and he is entitled

to qualified immunity. For the

The Court previously dismissed the reasons explained herein, the Court

official capacity claim against Knaub. should grant Knaub’s motion for

In turn, Knaub moves for summary summary judgment and dismiss this

judgment on the remaining individual action.

capacity claim and supports the

motion with his declaration, a copy of

the investigative report, and a copy of

I. UNDISPUTED FACTS to smoke me a rock. . . . I got a

rock.

On January 28, 2022, while working

as a patrol officer with the City of Knaub: Where?

Roxboro Police Department, T.J.

Knaub was dispatched to a residence Satterfield: I’m fixing to smoke

in response to a domestic violence it.

call. See Decl. of Officer T.J. Knaub ¶ 3

Knaub: You have it now?

(Dec. 4, 2025), Docket Entry 52-1.

Satterfield’s mother had called to

Satterfield: Yeah.

report that he was fighting her

husband and was high on drugs. See (Knaub asked to see it)

id. ¶ 4. As Knaub approached the

home, he saw Satterfield lying in the Satterfield: I got it right here.

middle of the road; Satterfield stood

up when Knaub approached. See id. Satterfield then opened his left

¶ 6. hand to reveal several off-white

rocks.

Knaub knew Satterfield from previous

encounters where Satterfield had See BWC at 0:01:16–36.

acted erratically and violently and

seemed to be under the influence of From Knaub’s experience, the off-

alcohol or drugs. See id. ¶ 7. Knaub white rocks appeared to be crack

also knew that other officers had had cocaine. See Decl. ¶ 15. Based on

similar encounters with Satterfield. Satterfield’s statements and the

See id. appearance of the rocks, Knaub

determined that he had probable

Knaub asked “Marcus” to come talk cause to arrest Satterfield for felony

and tell him what was going on. See possession of cocaine. See id. ¶ 16.

Body Worn Camera Footage (“BWC”)

at 0:001:04–05, Ex. B to Decl. Satterfield began to wander away, but

(manually filed with the Clerk’s Knaub took hold of the fabric on the

Office). The following exchange took left sleeve of Satterfield’s jacket and

place: told Satterfield to “come here” and

put the drugs down on the patrol car.

Satterfield: I don’t know if you See BWC at 0:01:36–40. Satterfield

know, I’m Jesus Christ. I’m fixin’ asked, “Why?” and Knaub told him,

to smoke me a rock. . . . I’m fixing “You can’t have that.” Id. at 0:01:40–

41.

Knaub placed Satterfield in

handcuffs. See id. at 0:01:56–2:08.

Knaub asked Satterfield to show him

his right hand in which he held a pipe,

Brillo pad, and lighters. See id. at Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

0:02:18–20. From Knaub’s (1986). In analyzing a summary

experience, the glass pipe appeared to judgment motion, courts

be the kind used to smoke crack “must construe all facts and

cocaine, and he knew that the Brillo reasonable inferences in the light

pad is frequently used to filter the most favorable to the nonmoving

crack smoke. See Decl. ¶ 20. Knaub party.” Bandy v. City of Salem, 59

then had Satterfield open his left hand F.4th 705, 709 (4th Cir. 2023).

which held the small off-white rocks

he had shown Knaub earlier. See BWC The moving party bears the burden of

at 0:02:27–3:01. establishing the absence of a genuine

dispute of material fact by

Knaub conducted a pat-down search “identifying those portions of ‘the

of Satterfield before placing him in pleadings, depositions, answers to

the backseat of the patrol car. See id. interrogatories, and admissions on

at 0:03:07–4:19. He then spoke to the file, together with the affidavits, if any’

stepfather and caller, returned to his which it believes demonstrates the

car to place the contraband in the absence of a genuine issue of material

evidence bag, and transported fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

Satterfield to the Person County U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Rule

Sheriff’s Office in the Person County 56).

Law Enforcement Center. See id. at

0:04:20-12:37. During the transport, “Where, as here, the nonmoving party

Knaub did not ask Satterfield any bears the ultimate burden of proof at

questions. See id. at 0:12:38-17:25. trial, the moving party may discharge

The Magistrate found probable cause its initial burden at summary

for Satterfield’s arrest, placed him judgment by ‘showing – that is,

under a secured bond, and turned him pointing out to the . . . court – that

over to the custody of the Person there is an absence of evidence to

County Detention Center. See Decl. support the nonmoving party’s case.’”

¶ 32. Anderson v. Diamondback Inv. Grp.,

LLC, 117 F.4th 165, 174 (4th Cir. 2024)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

325). “If the moving party carries this

A court “shall grant summary initial burden, the burden then shifts

judgment if the movant shows that to the nonmoving party, who must ‘go

there is no genuine dispute as to any beyond the pleadings and by [his]

material fact and the movant is own affidavits, or by the depositions,

entitled to judgment as a matter of answers to interrogatories, and

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine admissions on file, designate specific

dispute of material fact exists “if the facts showing that there is a genuine

evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Anderson v.

issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Celotex secured to them by the Constitution

Corp., 477 U.S. at 324). and, in a more sharply limited way,

the statutory laws of the United

“An affidavit or declaration used to States” by persons acting under color

support [summary judgment] must of state law. Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l

be made on personal knowledge, set Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir.

out facts that would be admissible in 2009). A plaintiff bringing suit

evidence, and show that the affiant or pursuant to § 1983 must show that a

declarant is competent to testify on person acting under color of state law

the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. violated a constitutional or other

56(c)(4); see also Evans v. Techs. federal legal right. West v. Atkins, 487

Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

962 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Williams v.

Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 823 (4th Cir. Here, Satterfield contends that Knaub

1991)). violated his Fourth Amendment right

to be free from unreasonable search

A party cannot rely on statements in a and seizure.

brief to support a motion for

summary judgment, because they are A. Knaub had reasonable

not evidence. City of Greensboro v. suspicion to stop Satterfield.

Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Elections, No.

15-CV-559, 2017 WL 11488724, at *1 To the extent that Satterfield

n.4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2017) challenges Knaub’s interaction with

(collecting cases); see also Hill v. him in the first place, Knaub acted

Carvana, LLC, No. 22-CV-37, 2022 lawfully.

WL 1625020, at *3 (M.D.N.C. May 23,

2022). Officers may conduct a “brief

investigatory stop” as long as there is

There is no genuine dispute of “reasonable suspicion to believe that

material fact as to the criminal activity may be afoot.”

constitutionality of Knaub’s actions, District of Columbia v. R.W., 608 U.S.

and Satterfield, who has the burden at ___, 146 S. Ct. 1069, 1070 (2026) (per

trial, has failed to provide any curiam) (internal quotations

evidence to the contrary. omitted). “Reasonable suspicion ‘is a

Accordingly, the Court should grant less demanding standard than

Knaub’s motion for summary probable cause’ yet requires ‘at least a

judgment and find that he is entitled minimal level of objective justification

to qualified immunity. for making the stop.’” United States v.

Critchfield, 81 F.4th 390, 393 (4th

III. DISCUSSION Cir. 2023) (quoting Illinois v.

Wardlow, 528 U.SS. 119, 123 (2000)).

Title 42, United States Code, Section

An “‘officer must be able to articulate’

1983 “is a federal statutory remedy

objective reasons for his suspicion”

available to those deprived of rights

that “the particular person stopped is,

or is about to be, ‘engaged in a that Satterfield had just committed

particular crime.’” Id. (quoting assault and was trespassing. He then

Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 385 conducted a brief investigatory stop of

n.1 (2020)). Satterfield. Accordingly, because

Knaub had articulable, reasonable

“[R]easonable suspicion arises when, suspicion that criminal activity was

based on the totality of the afoot, this stop was lawful.

circumstances, the detaining officer

had a particularized and objective B. There was probable cause to

basis for suspecting criminal arrest Satterfield.

wrongdoing.” R.W., 126 S. Ct. at 1071

(internal quotations and citations Satterfield also challenges his

omitted). Officers are permitted “to warrantless arrest, but the law

make commonsense judgments and permitted Knaub to arrest him under

inferences about human behavior” the circumstances.

because “[r]easonable suspicion

depends on the factual and practical An officer may arrest someone

considerations of everyday life on without a warrant “if the officer has

which reasonable and prudent men, probable cause to believe that the

not legal technicians, act.” Id. suspect committed a crime in the

(internal quotations and citations officer’s presence.” District of

omitted) (emphasis in R.W.). Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56

(2018). Probable cause does not

Here, the totality of circumstances require “‘an actual showing of’”

leaves no question that there was criminal activity; it only requires “‘a

reasonable suspicion to believe probability or substantial chance of

criminal activity was afoot when criminal activity.’” Id. at 57 (quoting

Knaub asked Satterfield to come talk Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232

to him. (1983)). It “‘deals with probabilities

and depends on the totality of the

Not only did Satterfield’s mother call circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Gates,

dispatch to report that Satterfield was 462 U.S. at 243-44 n.13). It “‘is not a

at her house fighting with her high bar.’” Id. (quoting Kaley v.

husband and would not leave the United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338

property – the same location where (2014)). To determine if there is

Knaub came upon Satterfield, but probable cause to arrest someone,

Knaub knew Satterfield. And he knew courts “‘examine the events leading

him to act erratically and violently, up to the arrest, and then decide

often when he was under the whether these historical facts, viewed

influence of alcohol or drugs. from the standpoint of an objectively

reasonable police officer, amount to

Knaub “drew the commonsense probable cause.’” Id. at 56-57 (quoting

inference,” R.W., 146 S. Ct. at 1073,

Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S.366, 762-63 (1969)); see also Virginia v.

371 (2003)) (cleaned up). Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008)

(“When officers have probable cause

The circumstances here far surpassed to believe that a person has

the standard for probable cause; there committed a crime in their presence,

is no need for probability. After all, the Fourth Amendment permits them

Satterfield actually admitted the to make an arrest, and to search the

crime to Knaub – “I’m fixing to smoke suspect in order to safeguard evidence

me a rock; I got a rock” – and Knaub and ensure their own safety.”).

actually saw Satterfield commit the

crime – Satterfield showed Knaub off- Because Knaub’s arrest of Satterfield

white rocks in his hand, which Knaub was lawful, his subsequent search of

identified, based on his experience in Satterfield incident to that arrest was

law enforcement, as crack cocaine. also lawful. See, e.g., Petrisor v.

Therefore, Knaub had probable cause Rodgers, No. 1:23CV552, 2025 WL

to arrest Satterfield – even without a 461631, at *12-13 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 11,

warrant – for possession of cocaine. 2025) (finding the defendant failed to

state a claim for an unreasonable

C. The search incident to arrest search where the search of his person

was lawful. was incident to his lawful arrest).

To the extent that Satterfield D. Knaub is entitled to qualified

challenges Knaub’s search of him immunity.

incident to his arrest, Knaub once

again acted lawfully. Knaub also argues that qualified

immunity protects him from suit in

Courts have long recognized that “a his individual capacity. He is correct.

search incident to a lawful arrest is a

traditional exception to the warrant “The doctrine of qualified immunity

requirement of the Fourth ‘balances two important interests,’

Amendment.” United States v. namely, the need to hold accountable

Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). public officials who exercise power

“When an arrest is made, it is irresponsibly, and the need to shield

reasonable for the arresting officer to officials who perform their duties

search the person arrested in order to responsibly from ‘harassment,

remove any weapons that the latter distraction, and liability.’” Byers v.

might seek to use in order to resist Painter, 173 F.4th 155, 160 (4th Cir.

arrest or effect his escape” and “to 2026) (quoting Peason v. Callahan,

search for and seize any evidence on 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). To

the arrestee’s person in order to determine if qualified immunity

prevent its concealment or protects an offer, the court asks two

destruction.’” Id. at 226 (quoting questions: “(1) whether a statutory or

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, constitutional violation occurred, and

(2) whether the right was clearly Thus, Knaub is entitled to qualified

established at the time of the immunity.

violation.” Harrold v. Hagen, 174

F.4th 393, 401-02 (4th Cir. 2026). “If IV. CONCLUSION

the answer on either question is ‘no,’

the officer being sued is entitled to IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

qualified immunity.” Id. at 402. that the Court GRANT T.J. Knaub’s

Motion for Summary Judgment and

Here, the analysis is straightforward. dismiss the case with prejudice.

There was no constitutional violation.

Vsona Gibson McFadden

United States Magistrate Judge

August 7, 2026