Parra

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT July 17, 2026

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

GALVESTON DIVISION

SILVIA PARRA, §

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Plaintiff. §

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V. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00408

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GALVESTON COUNTY, TEXAS, §

et al., §

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Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

There are two motions pending before me: (1) a motion to compel filed by

Plaintiff Silvia Parra, and (2) a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Galveston

County, Texas (the “County”). Based on my review of the briefing, the record, and the

applicable law, I recommend that the County’s motion to dismiss be granted and that

Parra’s motion to compel be denied as moot.

BACKGROUND

Parra is Kayden Windham’s mother. On June 2, 2024,1 Windham died after

visiting the Crystal Palace Resort in Galveston County, Texas. On August 22, 2024, a

Galveston County grand jury indicted Parra for criminally negligent homicide in

connection with Windham’s death. Allegedly, Parra allowed Windham “to enter a pool

knowing that he could not swim, that he did not have any flotation device, that the

pool was dimly lit, and that he was not being supervised by [Parra] or by any other

adult.” Dkt. 28-1 at 2.2 Galveston County court records show that on December 8,

1 Parra alleges that her son died on June 2, 2023. See Dkt. 1 at 2. Windham’s obituary,

however, shows that his date of death was June 2, 2024. See Kayden Lee Windham,

Shelby County Today (June 6, 2024), https://scttx.com/obituaries/kayden-lee-

windham. I may take judicial notice of this obituary. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. W.

Feliciana Par. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, No. CV 16-449, 2016 WL 7007504, at *14 n.11

(M.D. La. Nov. 29, 2016) (collecting cases).

2 Because the Galveston County grand jury’s indictment is referenced in Parra’s complaint

and central to her claims, I may consider it without converting the pending motion to

dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean

2025, the Galveston County District Attorney’s Office (“GCDAO”) moved to dismiss

the charge against Parra, stating: “Probable Cause exists but insufficient evidence to

prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Motion to Dismiss, State v. Parra, No. 24-CR-3251

(405th Jud. Dist. Ct. Dec. 8, 2025).3 That same day, the presiding judge entered an

order of dismissal.

Parra instituted this lawsuit on December 12, 2025, against the County and the

GCDAO. Parra asserts four claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

(1) malicious prosecution; (2) deprivation of First Amendment rights; (3) deprivation

of substantive due process; and (4) civil rights conspiracy. Parra also asserts a Texas

state law abuse-of-process claim.

Parra did not serve the County until May 11, 2026. On June 5, 2026, the County

filed a motion to dismiss arguing that (1) Parra’s claims against the GCDAO are

redundant to her claims against the County; (2) Parra fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted; and (3) Parra’s state law claim fails because the Texas Tort

Claims Act does not waive sovereign immunity for intentional torts. Parra has not

responded to the motion to dismiss. Pursuant to the Local Rule 7.4, failure to respond

is taken as a representation of no opposition. Regardless of Parra’s failure to respond

to the motion to dismiss, however, I will independently consider the merits of the

County’s motion.

RULE 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails “to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion

to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). Moreover, “it is clearly proper in deciding a

12(b)(6) motion to take judicial notice of matters of public record,” and the indictment is

a public record. Norris v. Hearst Tr., 500 F.3d 454, 461 n.9 (5th Cir. 2007).

3 I may take judicial notice of matters of public record. See supra n.2.

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Conversely, “when the

allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to

relief, this basic deficiency should be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of

time and money by the parties and the court.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (cleaned up).

When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I accept “all well-pleaded facts as true

and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cummings v.

Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 948 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation

omitted). I “do not, however, accept as true legal conclusions, conclusory statements,

or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Benfield v. Magee, 945

F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678.

ANALYSIS

Because this is federal court, I will evaluate Parra’s federal claims before

determining whether this court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her

state law claim.

A. THE GCDAO IS NOT A SEPARATE JURIDICAL ENTITY

As Judge Jeffrey V. Brown has already noted in this case: “The Galveston

County District Attorney’s office is not an entity that is amenable to being sued.”

Dkt. 16 at 1 (citing Barrie v. Nueces Cnty. Dist. Att’y Off., 753 F. App’x 260, 264 (5th

Cir. 2018)). Because the GCDAO is not a separate juridical entity capable of being

sued, Parra’s claims against it should be dismissed.

B. PARRA DOES NOT STATE A CLAIM FOR ANY CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION

Parra asserts claims for malicious prosecution, deprivation of First

Amendment rights, deprivation of due process, and civil rights conspiracy against the

County under § 1983. See Dkt. 1 at 4–6. “Section 1983 provides a remedy against any

person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the

Constitution.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992) (quotation

omitted). “To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the

alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”

Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). Because

Parra does not plausibly allege a violation of any constitutional right, all of her § 1983

claims must be dismissed.

1. Malicious Prosecution

To state a constitutional malicious prosecution claim against the County, Parra

must allege:

(1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal

proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the present defendant against

plaintiff who was defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide

termination in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable

cause for such proceeding; (5) malice; and (6) damages.

Espinal v. City of Houston, 96 F.4th 741, 748 (5th Cir. 2024). Here, Parra fails to allege

the absence of probable cause. Instead, Parra merely asserts a string of non-specific,

conclusory allegations.

For example, Parra asserts that the County failed to “[p]reserve and properly

analyze physical evidence,” but she fails to specify what physical evidence the County

failed to preserve and analyze. Dkt. 1 at 3. She alleges that the County failed to

“[i]nterview all relevant witnesses,” but she never identifies the witnesses that the

County failed to interview. Id. Parra also alleges that the County failed to “[r]eview

and consider exculpatory evidence,” but she does not identify or describe the

exculpatory evidence. Id. She further alleges that the County failed to “[i]nvestigate

alternative theories and responsible parties,” but she does not articulate any

alternative theory or identify any other responsible parties. Id. She alleges that the

County failed to “[f]ollow standard investigative protocols and procedures,” yet she

identifies no protocols and procedures that were not followed. Id. These conclusory

allegations do not plausibly establish the absence of probable cause. Because Parra

has not plausibly pleaded the absence of probable cause, she also does not allege

malice, which requires the absence of probable cause. Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th

262, 278 (5th Cir. 2023) (explaining that “malice” is “often defined in this context as

without probable cause and for a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice”

(quotation omitted)). Accordingly, Parra’s malicious prosecution claim should be

dismissed.

2. First Amendment Claims

Parra asserts that the County prosecuted her to prevent her from pursuing a

civil wrongful death action against the Crystal Palace Resort on Windham’s behalf.

See Dkt. 1 at 5. These allegations appear to assert two distinct claims: First

Amendment retaliation and denial of access to the courts.

To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, Parra must show that (1) she

was “engaged in constitutionally protected activity”; (2) the County’s actions caused

her “to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing

to engage in that activity”; and (3) the County’s “adverse actions were substantially

motivated against [Parra’s] exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.” Keenan v.

Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 2002). Parra never identifies what constitutionally

protected activity she was engaged in. To the contrary, she claims that she was

deprived of her right to pursue civil legal remedies. See Dkt. 1 at 2. If Parra is basing

her retaliation claim on a threat to sue, she fails to articulate the who, what, and when

that is necessary to show that she was engaged in the constitutionally protected

activity of pursuing litigation. Moreover, the “absence of probable cause . . . must be

pleaded and proven” in a case asserting retaliatory prosecution based on the exercise

of protected speech under the First Amendment. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250,

265–66 (2006). As discussed above, Parra has not plausibly pleaded the absence of

probable cause. Thus, she necessarily has not stated a First Amendment retaliation

claim based on the County’s prosecution of her.

Parra’s denial-of-access claim is backward looking. A backward-looking denial-

of-access claim “covers claims not in aid of a class of suits yet to be litigated, but of

specific cases that cannot now be tried (or tried with all material evidence), no matter

what official action may be in the future.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413–

14 (2002). “The official acts claimed to have denied access may allegedly have caused

the loss or inadequate settlement of a meritorious case, the loss of an opportunity to

sue, or the loss of an opportunity to seek some particular order of relief.” Id. (cleaned

up). “The ultimate object of these sorts of [backward-looking] access claims, then, is

not the judgment in a further lawsuit, but simply the judgment in the access claim

itself, in providing relief obtainable in no other suit in the future.” Id. Here, Parra’s

denial-of-access claim fails because she never expounds upon how the County’s

prosecution of her “suppress[ed] her right to petition the courts through civil

litigation.” Dkt. 1 at 5.

Texas has a two-year statute of limitations on wrongful death actions. See Tex.

Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003 (“A person must bring suit not later than two

years after the day the cause of action accrues in an action for injury resulting in death.

The cause of action accrues on the death of the injured person.”). Windham died on

June 2, 2024. Thus, Parra had until June 2, 2026, to bring a wrongful death claim.

Even if I assume that the County’s prosecution of Parra hampered her ability to sue

the Crystal Palace Resort while her criminally negligent homicide charge was pending,

that charge was dismissed on December 8, 2025. Parra therefore had nearly six

months remaining in the limitations period to bring suit and alleges no facts

explaining why she could not file during that interval. In fact, Parra filed this lawsuit

against the County only four days after the criminally negligent homicide charge was

dismissed, undermining any inference that the County’s prosecution of her prevented

her from accessing the courts. This is fatal to Parra’s denial-of-access claim. See

Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1264 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Before filing an

‘access to courts’ claim, a plaintiff must make some attempt to gain access to the

courts; otherwise, how is this court to assess whether such access was in fact ‘effective’

and ‘meaningful’?”).

3. Substantive Due Process

Parra also asserts a substantive due process claim. See Dkt. 1 at 5 (“Defendants,

by prosecuting Plaintiff without probable cause and for improper purposes, violated

Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights.”). Parra’s due process claim, however, is

duplicative of her malicious prosecution claim and should be dismissed for the same

reasons as the malicious prosecution claim. See supra § B.1.

C. CIVIL RIGHTS CONSPIRACY

Parra asserts that “Defendants entered into a conspiracy to deprive [her] of her

constitutional rights under color of state law.” Dkt. 1 at 6. Parra identifies only two

alleged conspirators: the County and the GCDAO. But as mentioned above, the

GCDAO is not a separate juridical entity; it is merely an office through which

governmental officials perform their duties. Thus, as pleaded, the alleged conspiracy

consists of the County conspiring with itself. A governmental entity cannot conspire

with itself. See Chambliss v. Foote, 421 F. Supp. 12, 15 (E.D. La. 1976) (finding no civil

rights conspiracy where “the university and its officials are considered as constituting

a single legal entity which cannot conspire with itself”), aff’d, 562 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir.

1977). Moreover, for all the reasons discussed above, Parra fails to state a

constitutional claim, which bars her conspiracy claim. “[A] conspiracy claim is not

actionable without an actual violation of section 1983.” Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914,

920 (5th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted).

Even if the complaint could be construed as alleging constitutional violations

and distinct conspirators, it alleges only repeated assertions that they “agree[d]” and

“acted in concert,” without identifying any communication, participant, time, or overt

act demonstrating an agreement. Dkt. 1 at 2, 6. That is independently insufficient to

plausibly allege a conspiracy. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678. Accordingly, the court should dismiss Parra’s civil rights conspiracy claim.

D. STATE LAW CLAIM

Having established that Parra fails to state any claim under federal law, I

recommend that this court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Parra’s

state law claim for abuse of process. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Duncan v. City of

Freeport, No. 3:23-cv-255, 2024 WL 2819118, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 23,

2024) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims

after dismissing all federal claims).

E. PARRA’S MOTION TO COMPEL IS MOOT

Having determined that Parra fails to state a federal claim and having

recommended that this court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Parra’s state law claim, I further recommend that Parra’s pending motion to compel

be denied as moot.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, I recommend that the County’s motion to

dismiss (Dkt. 28) be granted and that Parra’s motion to compel (Dkt. 15) be denied as

moot. Because Parra has never amended her pleadings, however, and because I

recently allowed Parra’s counsel of record to withdraw, see Dkt. 33, I will give Parra

45 days from the date that this memorandum and recommendation is adopted to file

an amended complaint.

Usually, parties have 14 days from service of a memorandum and

recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ.

P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of factual

findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error. In recognition of the fact that

Parra needs time to either secure new counsel or file objections pro se, the deadline

for filing objections to the memorandum and recommendation is extended to

Monday, August 17, 2026.

SIGNED this day of July 2026.

______________________________

ANDREW M. EDISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE