BOYD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

NEW ALBANY DIVISION

SHELLEY B.,1 )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:25-cv-00142-TWP-KMB

)

FRANK BISIGNANO, )

)

Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON COMPLAINT FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

Plaintiff Shelley B. applied for disability benefits from the Social Security Administration

("SSA") on February 21, 2023, alleging an onset date of November 16, 2017. [Dkt. 7-5 at 5.]

Administrative Law Judge Douglas Gilmer (the "ALJ") issued a decision on August 15, 2024,

concluding that Shelley was not disabled and therefore not entitled to receive the requested benefits.

[Dkt. 7-2 at 19-28.] The Appeals Council denied her request for review on May 22, 2025. [Id. at

2-4.] On July 25, 2025, Shelley timely filed this civil action, asking the Court to review the denial

of benefits according to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1361. [Dkt. 1.]

This matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b) for a Report and Recommendation as to the appropriate disposition of the pending

motion. For the reasons detailed herein, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge

REVERSE and REMAND the Commissioner's decision.

1 To protect the privacy interests of claimants for Social Security benefits, and consistent with the

recommendation of the Court Administration and Case Management Committee of the

Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Southern District of Indiana has opted to

use only the first names and last initials of non-governmental parties in its Social Security judicial

review opinion.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The Social Security Administration (SSA) provides benefits to individuals who cannot

obtain work because of a physical or mental disability." Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1151

(2019). Disability is the inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months."

Stephens v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)).

When an applicant appeals an adverse benefits decision, this Court's role is limited to

ensuring that the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and that substantial evidence exists for

the ALJ's decision. Stephens, 888 F.3d at 327. "[S]ubstantial evidence" is "evidence that 'a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Zoch v. Saul, 981 F.3d 597,

601 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154). "Although this Court reviews the record

as a whole, it cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the SSA by reevaluating the facts, or

reweighing the evidence to decide whether a claimant is in fact disabled." Stephens, 888 F.3d

at 327. Reviewing courts also "do not decide questions of credibility, deferring instead to the

ALJ's conclusions unless 'patently wrong.'" Zoch, 981 F.3d at 601 (quoting Summers v. Berryhill,

864 F.3d 523, 528 (7th Cir. 2017)). "[E]ven under deferential standard of review for social

security disability cases, an [ALJ] must provide a logical bridge between the evidence and [the]

conclusions." Jarnutowski v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations

omitted).

The SSA applies a five-step evaluation to determine whether the claimant is disabled.

Stephens, 888 F.3d at 327 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)). The

ALJ must evaluate the following, in sequence:

(1) whether the claimant is currently [un]employed; (2) whether the claimant has

a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals one

of the impairments listed by the [Commissioner]; (4) whether the claimant can

perform her past work; and (5) whether the claimant is capable of performing

work in the national economy.

Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 868 (7th Cir. 2000), as amended (Dec. 13, 2000) (citations

omitted). "If a claimant satisfies steps one, two, and three, she will automatically be found

disabled. If a claimant satisfies steps one and two, but not three, then she must satisfy step four.

Once step four is satisfied, the burden shifts to the SSA to establish that the claimant is capable of

performing work in the national economy." Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).

After Step Three, but before Step Four, the ALJ must determine a claimant's residual

functional capacity ("RFC") by evaluating "all limitations that arise from medically determinable

impairments, even those that are not severe." Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2009).

In doing so, the ALJ "may not dismiss a line of evidence contrary to the ruling." Id. The ALJ uses

the RFC at Step Four to determine whether the claimant can perform her own past relevant work

and if not, at Step Five to determine whether the claimant can perform other work. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (v).

If the ALJ committed no legal error and substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's

decision, the Court must affirm the denial of benefits. Stephens, 888 F.3d at 327. When an ALJ's

decision does not apply the correct legal standard, a remand for further proceedings is usually the

appropriate remedy. Karr v. Saul, 989 F.3d 508, 513 (7th Cir. 2021). Typically, a remand is also

appropriate when the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v.

Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2005).

II. BACKGROUND2

Shelley was 60 years old when she applied for disability benefits. [Dkt. 7-2 at 27.]

The ALJ followed the five-step evaluation set forth by SSA in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) and

concluded that Shelley was not disabled. Specifically, the ALJ found as follows:

• At Step One, Shelley has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since during the period

from her alleged onset date of November 16, 2017, through her date last insured of December

31, 2022. [Dkt. 7-2 at 21.]

• At Step Two, Shelley has the following severe impairments: an immune system

disorder. [Id.]

• At Step Three, Shelley does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets

or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments. [Id. at 23-24.]

• After Step Three but before Step Four, Shelley has the RFC "to perform the full range of

medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c)." [Id. at 24-27.]

• At Step Four, Shelley has no past relevant work history. [Id. at 27.]

• At Step Five, relying on testimony from the vocational expert ("VE"), and considering

Shelley's age, education, and RFC, there were jobs that existed in the national economy

that Shelley could have performed through the date of the decision. [Id. at 27-28.]

III. DISCUSSION

Shelley raises four issues for the Court's review: (1) whether the ALJ erred in assessing her

and her husband's testimony; (2) whether the ALJ erred in assessing the medical opinions

regarding whether she can work on a regular and continuing basis; (3) whether the ALJ's Step

Three assessment was flawed; and (4) whether the mental limitations set forth in the RFC by the

ALJ were unsupported. [Dkt. 9.] The undersigned believes that the third issue raised is dispositive

and begins the analysis there.

2 The relevant evidence of record is set forth in the Parties' briefs and need not be repeated here.

Specific facts relevant to the disposition of this case are discussed below as necessary.

A. Whether the ALJ's Step Three Analysis was Flawed

The Court begins with the background necessary to understand Shelley's claim regarding

the ALJ's Step Three analysis before turning to the Parties' arguments and relevant legal standards.

At Step Two, the ALJ concluded that Shelley had one severe impairment—namely, an unspecified

"immune system disorder."3 [Dkt. 7-2 at 21.] The ALJ concluded that Shelley's other impairments

were not severe, including her anti-pneumococcal polysaccharide antibody deficiency (also known

as specific antibody deficiency ("SAD")), thyroid disorder, and sinusitis. [Id. at 22.]

At Step Three, the ALJ then considered whether Shelley's unspecified immune system

disorder met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments. [Id. at 23.] The entirety of the

ALJ's Step Three analysis is as follows:

There are no opinions in the record from medical experts or any other type of

medical or psychological consultants, who have been designated by the

Commissioner, which indicate that the claimant’s impairments alone or in

combination equal a listing.

The undersigned considered whether the claimant’s immune system disorder met

the requirements of any of the conditions under listing 14.00 during the period

under consideration. The claimant did not meet those listings because the medical

evidence does not document that the claimant’s immune system disorder presents

symptoms that satisfy the criteria for any of the aforementioned conditions.

[Id. at 24.]

The 14.00 Listings cover several "Immune System Disorders." 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt.

P, App. 1, § 14.00. This includes Listing 14.07, which covers "immune deficiency disorders." Id.

Listing 14.07 is satisfied by meeting the A, B, or C criteria. Id. As noted below, Shelley maintains

that she has evidence that she meets the C criteria, which requires the following:

3 Shelley correctly notes that "it is unclear what [immune system] disorder [the ALJ] was

considering [to be severe at Step Two]" given that he went on to describe her specific immune

system disorders as non-severe. [Dkt. 9 at 9.]

C. Repeated manifestations of an immune deficiency disorder, with at least two of

the constitutional symptoms or signs (severe fatigue, fever, malaise, or involuntary

weight loss) and one of the following at the marked level:

1. Limitation of activities of daily living.

2. Limitation in maintaining social function.

3. Limitation in completing tasks in a timely manner due to deficiencies in

concentration, persistence, or pace.

[Id. § 14.07.]

Shelley argues that the ALJ's Step Three analysis was flawed because the ALJ "failed to

properly assess [Shelley's] SAD and combined impairments under Listing 14.07." [Dkt. 9 at 22.]

Shelley notes that the ALJ's Step Three analysis was entirely perfunctory. [Id.] Specifically, she

notes that "[t]he ALJ's 'assessment' of Listing 14.07 was a one-sentence assertion that he generally

'considered' all of Listing 14.00 when evaluating her impairments at Step Three." [Id. (emphasis

in original).] This, says Shelley, is "exactly the kind of 'perfunctory,' boilerplate Step Three

analysis [the Seventh] Circuit has found 'inadequate.'" [Id. (citing Minnick v. Colvin, 775 F.3d

929, 935-36 (7th Cir. 2015)).] Shelley also asserts that "it is unclear whether any medical expert

or the ALJ assessed whether Plaintiff's combined medical impairments medically equal Listing

14.07C." [Id. (footnote omitted).] She notes that the two agency medical consultants only

"assessed Listing 14.06 for undifferentiated and mixed connective tissue disease." [Id. at 22 n.2

(citing dkts. 7-3 at 7; 17).] Shelley then details substantial evidence that she contends shows that

her combined impairments medically equal Listing 14.07(C) – Immune Deficiency Disorders. [Id.

at 22-25.]

In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not err at Step Three. First, the

Commissioner contends that Shelley "fails to cite any persuasive medical opinion" to support her

argument that she medically equals Listing 14.07, and the Seventh Circuit has "recognized that a

'finding of medical equivalence requires an expert's opinion on the issue.'" [Dkt. 11 at 7 (citing

Minnick, 775 F.3d at 935).] The Commissioner notes that the agency's reviewing physicians found

that Shelley did not meet or equal any Listing, and the ALJ was entitled to rely on that assessment.

[Id.] Second, the Commissioner argues that "[t]he ALJ needed only to minimally articulate his

analysis of th[e] evidence, and the [ALJ's] decision meets this standard." [Id. (citation omitted).]

In reply, Shelley argues that the Commissioner is wrong to suggest that it is Shelley's

burden to prove equivalence via a medical expert; instead, she argues that she must only produce

medical evidence to support her claim, which, as detailed in her opening brief, she contends that

she did. [Dkt. 12 at 11.] Shelley reiterates that the ALJ's analysis was inadequate in that he did

not consider a whole range of evidence supporting her contention that she meets or equal Listing

14.07(C) or otherwise explain why she fails to medically equal that Listing; thus, he did not build

a logical bridge between the evidence and his conclusion. [Id. at 11-13.]

"Under a theory of presumptive disability, a claimant is eligible for benefits if [she] has an

impairment that meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairments." Barnett v.

Barnhart, 381 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,

Subpt. P, App. 1). Each listing specifies criteria that, if met, mean that the claimant is

presumptively disabled. Id. (citing § 404.1525(a)). A claimant can also show that her symptoms

"are equal in severity to those described in a specific listing" and be found presumptively disabled.

Id. (citing § 404.1526(a)). "When evaluating whether an impairment is presumptively disabling

under a listing, the ALJ must discuss the listing by name and offer more than a perfunctory analysis

of the listing." Jeske v. Saul, 955 F.3d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

The Court agrees with Shelley that the ALJ's Step Three analysis was deficient. The ALJ

concluded that Shelley's severe—but unspecified—immune system disorder did not meet any of

the several 14.00 Listings without any explanation for why that was the case or what evidence he

considered in reaching that conclusion. At most, the ALJ offers the conclusory statement that none

of the 14.00 Listings are met because "the medical evidence does not document that the claimant’s

immune system disorder presents symptoms that satisfy the criteria for any of the aforementioned

conditions." [Dkt. 7-2 at 24.] The ALJ was required to "offer more than perfunctory analysis,"

Jeske, 955 F.3d at 588, and his analysis here was, at best, perfunctory. The Seventh Circuit has

"repeatedly" held that similar analyses by ALJs are insufficient. See Minnick, 775 F.3d at 935-36

(describing the ALJ's two-sentence analysis stating that the evidence does not establish that the

claimant meets or equals the requirements of the listing was "the very type of perfunctory analysis

we have repeatedly found inadequate" and collecting cases); Barnett, 381 F.3d at 670 (concluding

that the ALJ's "two-sentence consideration of the Listing of Impairments is inadequate and

warrants remand").

The Commissioner opposes this conclusion on two bases, neither of which is persuasive.4

First, the Commissioner defends the ALJ's Step Three analysis, arguing that the ALJ need only

minimally articulate his reasoning. But for the reasons stated above, the ALJ's Step Three analysis

here did not meet the minimal articulation requirement. The ALJ provided only the conclusory

assertion that the medical evidence did not meet the requirements of the Listings, even though he

4 The Court recognizes that there are cases in which the Seventh Circuit found an ALJ's Step Three

explanation deficient but still affirmed the ALJ's decision when the subsequent RFC analysis was

sufficient to explain why the claimant did not meet or equal a Listing at Step Three. See, e.g.,

Jeske, 995 F.3d at 589-90. But the Commissioner in Shelley's case did not argue that the ALJ's

RFC analysis—or any other part of his analysis—salvaged what was otherwise a clearly deficient

assessment at Step Three. The Court will not construct this argument for the Commissioner. See

Spath v. Hayes Wheels Int'l-Ind., Inc., 211 F.3d 392 397 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[I]t is not this court's

responsibility to research and construct the parties' arguments.") (citation and quotation marks

omitted).

was purporting to assess whether Shelley's immune system disorder met any of the 14.00 Listings.

[Dkt. 7-2 at 24.]

The Commissioner's second argument is equally unavailing. The Commissioner argues

that Shelley "fails to cite any persuasive medical opinion" to support her argument that she

medically equals Listing 14.07, and the Seventh Circuit has "recognized that a 'finding of medical

equivalence requires an expert's opinion on the issue.'" [Dkt. 11 at 7 (citing Minnick, 775 F.3d at

935).] As an initial matter, Shelley points to significant medical evidence that she says supports

her contention that she meets or equals List 14.07(C). [See dkt. 9 at 22-25 (citing record

evidence).] While the "burden is on the claimant at step three . . . the claimant's burden is merely

to produce evidence in support of the claim, not to prove equivalence." Hartley v. Berryhill, No.

1:17-cv-1043-TWP-TAB, 2018 WL 2173682, at *5 (S.D. Ind. May 10, 2018); see Terri C. v.

Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-2905-TAB-JPH, 2022 WL 278224, at *4 ("[I]t is a claimant's burden to

produce evidence in support of her claim [at Step Three] . . . but she need not prove equivalence.")

(citing Scott v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 734, 741 (7th Cir. 2011).

Moreover, it was the ALJ who failed to consider an expert's opinion on medical

equivalence. As Shelley points out, of the 14.00 Listings, the state agency consultants only

assessed whether Shelley met or equaled Listing 14.06. [Dkt. 9 at 22 n.2 (citing dkts. 7-3 at 7,

17).] Yet the ALJ concluded that Shelley's—again, unspecified—immune system disorder failed

to meet any of the 14.00 Listings, which includes Listing 14.07. The ALJ thus reached the

conclusion that Shelley did not meet or medically equal Listing 14.07 without considering an

expert's opinion on the issue. Contrary to the Commissioner's argument, it was the ALJ, not

Shelley, who needed to consult a medical expert before reaching the conclusion that he did. See

Dziki v. Bisignano, 2025 WL 2614501, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 10, 2025) (concluding that the ALJ's

decision was "not supported by substantial evidence or adequate explanation" because the ALJ

concluded that the claimant's impairment did not meet or medically equal three specific Listings

even though the state agency consultants on which the ALJ relied did not consider or evaluate the

claimant under those Listings).

In sum, the ALJ concluded at Step Three that Shelley's immune system disorder failed to

meet or medically equal any of the 14.00 Listings but offered only a conclusory explanation for

why that was so. The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that this is insufficient. See Minnick,

775 F.3d at 935-36; Barnett, 381 F.3d at 670. The Commissioner's arguments to the contrary are

unavailing. Accordingly, the undersigned believes that this case should be reversed and remanded

to the ALJ. The undersigned is not making any finding as to the merits of Shelley's positions that

she meets or medically equals Listing 14.07(C) or any other Listing.

B. Other Arguments

The Parties disagree about the other issues set forth above. Having found that it is

necessary to recommend remand for the reasons detailed above, the Court declines to substantively

address the Parties' remaining arguments. Either Party may raise those arguments on remand if

appropriate to do so.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons detailed herein, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge

REVERSE and REMAND the Commissioner's decision finding that Shelley was not disabled.

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b). The failure to file objections within 14 days of this Order will

constitute a waiver of subsequent review absent a showing of good cause for that failure. Counsel

should not anticipate any extension of this deadline or any other related briefing deadlines.

SO RECOMMENDED.

Date: 7/28/2026 Bobbie Pann

Kellie M. Barr

United States Magistrate Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

All ECF-registered counsel of record via email

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