CASSEL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

MICHELLE CASSEL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:24-cv-00406-JPH-MKK

)

HUNTER GIVENS Officer, )

CARL WASSBERG Officer, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' UNOPPOSED

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Michelle Cassel alleges that police officers Hunter Givens and

Carl Wassberg violated her Fourth Amendment rights during a traffic stop and

vehicle search. The Defendants have filed motions for summary judgment.

Dkts. [60], [64]. For the reasons below, those unopposed motions are

GRANTED.

I.

Facts and Background

Because Defendants have moved for summary judgment under Rule

56(a), the Court views and recites the evidence "in the light most favorable to

the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in that party’s

favor." Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, Ms. Cassel

has not responded to the summary judgment motions, so the Court treats

Defendants' supported factual assertions as uncontested. See Hinterberger v.

City of Indianapolis, 966 F.3d 523, 527 (7th Cir. 2020); S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b),

(f).

In June 2023, Indiana State University Police Officer Hunter Givens

initiated a traffic stop after seeing that Ms. Cassel had a phone in her hand

while driving. Dkts. 61-2 at 00:40 (Givens body cam); 65-1 at 1 ¶¶ 4–5 (Givens

Aff.). Officer Givens approached the vehicle and told Ms. Cassel what he saw;

she responded that she "was just moving [the phone]." Dkt. 61-2 at 00:30–

00:45. She then told Officer Givens that she jointly owned her vehicle with her

fiancé, Derek. Id. at 1:00–2:45.

Officer Givens returned to his squad car and confirmed that the vehicle

was jointly registered to Ms. Cassel and Derek Chiado. Id. at 3:56–4:40. An

online search revealed that Mr. Chiado had a recent arrest for drug-related

activities. Id. at 4:42–5:00; dkt. 65-1 at 2–3 ¶¶ 17–18. Officer Givens then

asked dispatch to check Ms. Cassel's information and was told her license was

"clear and valid." Dkt. 61-2 at 5:06–5:54. Officer Givens next called West

Terre Haute Police Officer Carl Wassberg—a K9 handler—and inquired about

Mr. Chiado. Id. at 5:55–7:30; dkt. 65-1 at 3 ¶ 19. Officer Givens then asked if

Officer Wassberg was nearby, and Officer Wassberg said that he would head to

the scene. Dkt. 61-2 at 7:23–7:30. The call lasted about a minute and a half.

Id. at 5:55–7:30. Officer Givens continued to process the traffic stop by

entering information in his in-car system. Dkt. 61-2 at 7:30–13:32.

Officer Wassberg arrived six minutes later and approached Ms. Cassel's

vehicle. Id. at 13:32–13:55. He "observed that the interior of the vehicle

contained a significant amount of loose and miscellaneous items scattered

throughout the vehicle." Dkt. 61-1 at 4 ¶ 21 (Wassberg Aff.). "Based on [his]

training and experience, a cluttered vehicle interior presents officer-safety

concerns, including reduced visibility and possibility that weapons or other

dangerous items may be concealed or readily accessible by the driver." Id. at ¶

23. He therefore asked Ms. Cassel multiple times to exit the vehicle, but she

refused. Dkt. 61-3 (Cassel recording).

Officer Givens and Officer Wassberg then removed Ms. Cassel from the

vehicle. Id.; dkt. 61-2 at 15:42–16:08. Ms. Cassel physically resisted the

officers' attempts to place her hands behind her back. Id. Officer Givens

handcuffed Ms. Cassel and put her in his squad car. Id. at 16:20–16:30.

Officer Wassberg brought his K9 to conduct a free-air sniff of the exterior

of Ms. Cassel's vehicle. Id. at 17:12; dkt. 61-1 at 5 ¶ 33. During the sniff, the

K9 sat near the driver's side door, which Officer Wassberg recognized as an

alert to the odor of narcotics. Dkt. 61-1 at 5–6 ¶ 34. Officer Wassberg

rewarded the K9 with a tennis ball. Id. at 6 ¶ 35. Based on the alert, both

officers searched Ms. Cassel's vehicle, but they did not locate any narcotics.

Dkts. 61-2 at 18:10–28:00; 61-1 at 6 ¶¶ 36–37. Ms. Cassel was arrested for

resisting law enforcement and cited for distracted driving. Dkt. 61-1 at 6 ¶ 38.

Ms. Cassel filed this action alleging that Defendants violated her Fourth

Amendment rights. Dkt. 1. Defendants moved for summary judgment. Dkts.

60, 64.

II.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party must

inform the court "of the basis for its motion" and specify evidence

demonstrating "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party meets this

burden, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and identify

"specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the

evidence "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all

reasonable inferences in that party’s favor." Zerante, 555 F.3d at 584 (citation

omitted). A court only has to consider the materials cited by the parties, see

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); it need not "scour the record" for evidence that might be

relevant. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573–74 (7th Cir. 2017).

Ms. Cassel has not responded to the summary judgment motions, and

the deadline to do so has passed. When a summary judgment motion

is unopposed, facts alleged in the motion are "admitted without controversy" so

long as support for them exists in the record. S.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(f); see S.D.

Ind. L.R. 56-1(b) (party opposing judgment must file response brief and identify

disputed facts). "Even where a non-movant fails to respond to a motion

for summary judgment, the movant still ha[s] to show that summary judgment

[is] proper given the undisputed facts." Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480,

483 (7th Cir. 2021).

III.

Analysis

Under the Fourth Amendment, "[the] right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. Ms. Cassel did not

identify her Fourth Amendment theories of liability in her complaint, so

Defendants have moved for summary judgment on several theories. See dkts.

65 at 8–15 (addressing claims against Officer Givens based on the length of the

stop,1 ordering Ms. Cassel out of the vehicle, the vehicle search, and Ms.

Cassel's arrest); 60 at 8–15 (addressing claims against Officer Wassberg based

on ordering Ms. Cassel out of the vehicle, use of force, and the K9 sniff and

vehicle search). Because Ms. Cassel did not respond to Defendants' motions,

the Court also addresses those Fourth Amendment theories. See United States

v. Sineneng-Smith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020) ("In our adversarial system of

adjudication we follow the principle of party presentation.").

For each argument, Officers Givens and Wassberg contend that they did

not violate Ms. Cassel's Fourth Amendment rights and, regardless, are entitled

to qualified immunity. Dkts. 61 at 8–17; 65 at 9–17.

A. Qualified immunity standard

"Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from suit under § 1983

unless their conduct violates clearly established law." Zorn v. Linton, 146 S. Ct.

926, 930 (2026). In other words, "officers are entitled to qualified immunity . . .

1 Ms. Cassel's complaint did not dispute that Officer Givens had probable cause to

initiate a traffic stop. Dkt. 1 at 3.

unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the

unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time." District of

Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018); Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696,

701 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting that courts may address either prong first).

"A right is clearly established when it is sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that

right." Zorn, 146 S. Ct. at 930. In other words, existing precedent must place

the constitutional question "beyond debate." Id. "The relevant precedent must

define the right with a high degree of specificity, so that every reasonable

official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to

apply." Id. (A clearly established right generally requires "a case where an

officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have violated the

Constitution."). "In short, officers receive qualified immunity unless they could

have read the relevant precedent beforehand and know[n] that it proscribed

their specific conduct." Id.; see also Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 15 (2015).

Qualified immunity is analyzed defendant-by-defendant and claim-by-

claim. Mabes v. Thompson, 136 F.4th 697, 706 (7th Cir. 2025). The plaintiff

bears the burden of showing "clearly established law . . . particularized to the

facts of the case." Id. Meeting that burden "is a 'do or die' requirement for the

plaintiff's suit. If a plaintiff fails to identify analogous precedent clearly

establishing the law, the district court must grant summary judgment for the

defendant." Villalobos v. Picicco, 168 F.4th 1057, 1063 (7th Cir. 2026); accord

Thomas v. Carmichael, 164 F.4th 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2026).

B. Length of stop

"The Fourth Amendment may tolerate certain unrelated investigations

that do not lengthen the roadside detention, but a traffic stop become[s]

unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete

th[e] mission of issuing a . . . ticket." Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348,

349 (2015); Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) ("[Unrelated]

inquiries [may] not measurably extend the duration of the stop."). Officer

Givens argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on any claim that he

unconstitutionally prolonged the stop because "precedent would not have

placed [him] on notice that any of his conduct would be considered 'unrelated'

to the traffic stop or impermissibly prolonging the stop." Dkt. 65 at 13. The

Court exercises its discretion to begin with the "clearly established law" prong

of the qualified-immunity test. See Leiser, 933 F.3d at 701.

Here, the undisputed designated evidence is that Officer Givens ran a

brief search on Mr. Chiado and called Officer Wassberg for about a minute and

a half to ask about Mr. Chiado, then Officer Wassberg arrived on the scene six

minutes later. Dkt. 61-2 at 4:42–7:30, 13:32. The initial searches and calls

took less than three minutes, which overlapped with inquiries about Ms.

Cassel that were related to the purpose of the stop. Dkt. 61-2 at 4:42–7:30;

see Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. And the six minutes it took Officer Wassberg

to arrive didn't prolong the stop because Officer Givens continued to process

Ms. Cassel's citation during that time. Dkts. 61-2 at 7:30–13:32, 16:50–

17:25; 65 at 5 ¶ 24 (noting that it typically takes Officer Givens 5–10 minutes

traffic citation). Because Ms. Cassel did not respond to the summary judgment

motions, she has not identified precedent "squarely govern[ing]" the facts in the

uncontested designated evidence or shown that the stop length violated clearly

established law. See Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 15; see also Childs, 277 F.3d at

954.2 Officer Givens' motion for summary judgment is therefore GRANTED on

this claim.

C. Removing Ms. Cassel from the vehicle

"[O]fficers may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, exercise their

discretion to require a driver who commits a traffic violation to exit the vehicle

even though they lack any particularized reason for believing the driver

possesses a weapon." New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 115–16 (1986); see

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110–111 (1977) (holding that "legitimate

and weighty" concerns for officer safety outweighed the "de minimis" intrusion

of requiring a driver to exit a vehicle). Both officers argue that they are entitled

to qualified immunity on any claim about their removal of Ms. Cassel from her

vehicle. Dkts. 61 at 8–11, 16; 65 at 13–14, 16. The Court opts to begin with

the "clearly established law" prong of the qualified-immunity test. See Leiser,

933 F.3d at 701.

The uncontested designated evidence is that Officer Wassberg walked up

to Ms. Cassel's vehicle and noticed that "the interior . . . contained a significant

amount of loose and miscellaneous items scattered throughout the vehicle,"

2 Once Officer Wassberg's K9 alerted, that provided an independent basis to continue

the stop. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110–111 (1977).

which "presents officer-safety concerns." Dkt. 61-1 at 4 ¶¶ 21, 23. Officer

Wassberg repeatedly ordered Ms. Cassel to exit the vehicle, but she refused.

Dkt. 61-3. Officer Givens then returned from his squad car, Officer Wassberg

opened the car door, and the officers removed Ms. Cassel from the vehicle.

Dkt. 61-2 at 15:42–16:08.

Officer Wassberg therefore ordered Ms. Cassel to exit the vehicle due to

articulated safety concerns related to the state of her vehicle, while Officer

Givens was processing her citation. Dkt. 61-1 at 4 ¶¶ 21, 23 (Wassberg Aff.);

65-1 at 3 ¶ 26 (Givens Aff.). Ms. Cassel has not cited any clearly established

law demonstrating that it was unlawful for the officers to remove her from her

vehicle in this situation. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110–111; Smith v. Ball State

Univ., 295 F.3d 763, 770 (7th Cir. 2002) (When a driver refuses to exit their

vehicle, an officer is "justified in using force to remove [her]."); Villalobos, 168

F.4th at 1063 (stating that the plaintiff's burden to identify clearly established

law "is a 'do or die' requirement"). Defendants' motion for summary judgment

is therefore GRANTED as to this claim.

D. Restraining Ms. Cassel

Excessive force claims turn on "whether the officers' actions [were]

objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting

them." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Officer Wassberg argues

that he is entitled to qualified immunity on any excessive force claim. Dkt. 61

at 15–17. The Court elects to begin with the "clearly established law" prong of

qualified immunity. See Leiser, 933 F.3d at 701.

The undisputed designated evidence shows that Ms. Cassel physically

resisted having her hands placed behind her back, and the officers then forced

her hands behind her back to place her in restraints. Dkt. 61-2 at 15:42–

16:30. As explained above, an officer is "justified in using force to remove" a

driver who refuses to exit her vehicle. Smith, 295 F.3d at 770; accord Padula v.

Leimbach, 656 F.3d 595, 603 (7th Cir. 2011) (the officers "were entitled to

forcibly remove [the plaintiff] from his car when he did not comply with their

command to get out on his own"). Against that standard, Ms. Cassel has not

cited authority showing that Officer Wassberg's use of force to restrain her

violated clearly established law. See Padula, 656 F.3d at 603 (rejecting

excessive force argument when plaintiff "fell to the ground as dead weight" after

removal from the car); Smith, 295 F.3d at 770 ("When police officers face what

is essentially a fluid situation, they are entitled to graduate their response to

meet the demands of the circumstances confronting them."); dkt. 61-1 at 4–5

¶¶ 21–25, 30 (noting Ms. Cassel's physical resistance and potential for hidden

weapon). Officer Wassberg's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to

this claim.

E. K9 deployment & vehicle search

A dog sniff during a lawful stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment,

even without reasonable suspicion of drugs, unless the sniff prolongs the stop

beyond the time reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of the stop.

See United States v. Lewis, 920 F.3d 483, 491 (7th Cir. 2019). Officer

Wassberg argues that he's entitled to qualified immunity for the deployment of

his K9, and both officers argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity

regarding the subsequent search of Ms. Cassel's vehicle. Dkts. 61 at 15–17; 65

at 16–17. The Court addresses the "clearly established law" prong of qualified

immunity. See Leiser, 933 F.3d at 701.

The undisputed designated evidence is that Officer Wassberg brought his

K9 alongside Ms. Cassel's vehicle after she was apprehended, and the dog

promptly sat down next to the driver's side door. Dkts. 61-2 at 17:12; dkt. 61-

1 at 5 ¶ 33. Officer Wassberg recognized that behavior as an alert to the odor

of narcotics, and the officers proceeded to search Ms. Cassel's vehicle. Dkts.

61-1 at 5–6 ¶ 34; 61-2 at 18:10–28:00.

Ms. Cassel hasn't identified any precedent suggesting that Officer Givens

unreasonably prolonged the stop before Officer Wassberg arrived, or that a dog

sniff unreasonably prolongs a stop when the K9 alerts within seconds of

approaching the vehicle. Dkt. 61-2 at 17:12; see Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354–

57. Officer Wassberg is therefore entitled to qualified immunity on any claim

that he violated Ms. Cassel's Fourth Amendment rights by deploying the K9.

Once a properly trained dog alerts to the odor or presence of drugs,

officers have probable cause to search a vehicle. See United States v. Simon,

937 F.3d 820, 833 (7th Cir. 2019). Here, the designated evidence is that the

K9 was "trained and certified through an accredited canine training and

certification program," exhibited behavior consistent with a positive alert, and

was rewarded with a tennis ball. Dkts. 61-2 at 17:12; 61-1 at 2 ¶¶ 6, 34, 35.

Ms. Cassel identifies no precedent clearly establishing that, under those facts,

"every reasonable [officer] would have understood" that searching her vehicle

was unlawful.3 See Zorn, 146 S. Ct. at 930. Defendants are therefore entitled

to qualified immunity, and their motions for summary judgment are GRANTED

as to these claims.

F. Arrest

Officer Givens argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on any

claim about his arrest of Ms. Cassel for resisting law enforcement. Dkt. 65 at

14–17 (citing Ind. Code § 34-44.1-3-1(a)(1)). The Court begins with the "clearly

established law" prong of the qualified-immunity test. See Leiser, 933 F.3d at

701.

In Indiana, it is a crime to forcibly resist, obstruct, or interfere with a law

enforcement officer who is lawfully engaged in the execution of their duties.

See Ind. Code § 34-44.1-3-1(a)(1). For example, in New v. State, the plaintiff

was convicted of resisting law enforcement after attempting to return to her

vehicle multiple times against police orders and struggling with an officer when

he attempted to place her in handcuffs. See 135 N.E.3d 619, 621–22, 625 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2019) ("An overwhelming or extreme level of force is not required;

rather, forcible resistance may be satisfied with even a modest exertion of

strength, power, or violence."); accord Williams v. State, 959 N.E.2d 357, 358–

59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Against this precedent, Ms. Cassel has not shown that

3 Though Ms. Cassel suggests in her complaint that the officers "utilized the dog's

tennis ball in order to . . . feign a positive alert," dkt. 1 at 9, the undisputed designated

evidence shows that the K9 sat down next to the driver's side door before Officer

Wassberg took out the tennis ball. Dkt. 61-2 at 17:12–17:29.

it was "clearly established" that Officer Givens lacked probable cause to arrest

her for resisting law enforcement after she physically resisted being put in

handcuffs. Dkts. 61-2 at 15:42; 61-3 (Cassel recording). Officer Givens'

motion for summary judgment is therefore GRANTED as to this claim.

V.

Conclusion

Defendants' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED. Dkts. [60],

[64]. Final judgment shall issue by separate entry.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 7/28/2026 Sjamnu Patnaik Hanbore

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

MICHELLE CASSEL

3660 San Mateo Circle

Corona, CA 92882

All electronically registered counsel

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