James

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

CODY JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 4:24-cv-04125-JEH

GRANT JAMES, et al.,

Defendants.

Order

Plaintiff filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendants

violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by opening his legal mail on

February 4, 2022, July 14, 2023, and August 3, 2023, while he was a detainee at the

Hancock County Jail (“HCJ”). (Doc. 1). This matter is now before the Court on

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56 and Local Rule 7.1(D). (Doc. 55). For the reasons stated below,

Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED.

I

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322-23 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he court has one

task and one task only: to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there

is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp.,

24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). In making this determination, the court must

construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). “Inferences that are supported by only speculation or

conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion.” McDonald v. Vill. of

Winnetka, 371 F.3d 992, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004). In order to successfully oppose a

motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must do more than raise a

“‘metaphysical doubt’ as to the material facts, and instead must present definite,

competent evidence to rebut the motion.” Michael v. St. Joseph Cnty., 259 F.3d 842,

845 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal citation omitted).

II

The Court finds the following material facts. During the relevant period—

February 4, 2022 through August 3, 2023—Plaintiff was a detainee at the HCJ

awaiting trial. (Doc. 55-16). On January 23, 2025, Plaintiff was found guilty of

murder, home invasion, and aggravated discharge of a firearm in People v. Johnson,

No. 20-CF-125. Id.

Defendants Cole Cornwell, Grant James, Nicole Johnson, and Austin

Shuman were employed as civilian jailers at the HCJ. Id. at ¶ 4. Civilian jailers are

non-sworn law enforcement professionals responsible for maintaining the safety

and security of the detention facility, including the supervision and care of

inmates. Id.

Defendant Chris Becker was a civilian dispatcher. Id. Civilian dispatchers

handle 911 calls, communicate with deputies, and prepare civil process paperwork

for service. Id.

A

On February 4, 2022, Plaintiff received legal mail consisting of a letter from

his criminal defense attorney, Dennis Woodworth, dated January 17, 2022 and a

summary of two interviews that Illinois State Police (“ISP”) investigators

conducted of Plaintiff’s co-defendant, Michael Garcia, on December 23, 2020 and

January 27, 2021. (Doc. 55-3 at ¶ 3; Doc. 55-5 at 5:10–8:3; Doc. 57-1).

On February 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the opening of his

legal mail. Plaintiff stated Defendant Cornwell gave him the mail on February 4

and told him that Defendant Shuman had opened it. (Doc. 55-4 at 7:20-11:7, 10:21–

11:16, 20:20–21:15; Doc. 55-8). HCJ Administrator Kelly Twaddle responded to

Plaintiff’s grievance on February 7, 2022, denying the grievance and explaining

that, although Defendant Shuman inadvertently slit open the envelope, the mail

was not removed from its envelope or viewed. (Doc. 55-2 at ¶¶ 6-8; Doc. 55-8).

According to Defendant Shuman’s affidavit, Defendant Shuman

inadvertently opened the envelope, but he did not remove or read the mail because

he realized the sender identified on the envelope was Plaintiff’s criminal defense

attorney. (Doc. 55-9 at ¶ 3). Plaintiff testified that he does not know whether

Defendant Shuman read any of the contents of the opened legal mail on February

4, 2022. (Doc. 55-4 at 13:6-21).

According to Defendant Cornwell’s affidavit, Defendant Cornell did not

open or read Plaintiff’s legal mail, nor was he responsible for Defendant Shuman

opening the mail. (Doc. 55-10 at ¶¶ 4-7; Doc. 55-5 at 12:4-13). Defendants Shuman

and Cornwell did not disseminate any information contained in Plaintiff’s legal

mail to anyone. (Doc. 55-9 at ¶ 6; Doc. 55-10 at ¶ 7; Doc. 55-4 at 11:17-12:4, 13:16-

14:6; Doc. 55-5 at 14:24-16:15).

During discovery in Plaintiff’s criminal case, the Hancock County State’s

Attorney’s Office (“HCSAO”) received (1) Mr. Garcia’s recorded interviews from

December 23, 2020 and January 27, 2021 from the ISP, and (2) transcripts of the

interviews from Plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Woodworth. (Doc. 55-3 at ¶¶ 4-6; Doc. 55-

4 at 39:20–40:16; Doc. 55-7 at ¶ 2(a)–(b)).

B

On July 14, 2023, Plaintiff received legal mail containing a letter from Mr.

Woodworth dated July 10, 2023 and a copy of the transcript of Mr. Garcia’s

interview on January 27, 2021. (Doc. 55-5 at 17:15-19:9; Doc. 57-2). Plaintiff testified

that Defendant Johnson gave him the mail on July 14, 2023 and told him that

Defendant Becker mistakenly opened it when he was going through two days’

worth of incoming civil process mail. (Doc. 55-4 at 32:16-33:15).

According to Defendant Becker’s affidavit, Plaintiff’s mail was mistakenly

placed with incoming civil process mail from the court by whoever sorted the mail

that day. (Doc. 55-12 at ¶ 3). Defendant Becker inadvertently opened the envelope

containing Plaintiff’s legal mail on July 14, 2023, but he did not remove the mail

from the envelope or read it before realizing the sender was Plaintiff’s attorney. Id.

Defendant Becker then gave the envelope to Defendant Johnson, who immediately

delivered it to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 4. According to Defendant Johnson’s affidavit, she

did not open or read Plaintiff’s legal mail, nor was she responsible for Defendant

Becker opening the mail. (Doc. 55-13 at ¶¶ 3-4, 7).

According to an affidavit from Hancock County State’s Attorney Bobi James

(“SA James”), the ISP provided the HCSAO with a recording of Mr. Garcia’s

interview on January 27, 2021, and Mr. Woodworth later provided a copy of the

transcript during the discovery phase of Plaintiff’s criminal case. (Doc. 55-3 at ¶¶

4-6).

C

On August 3, 2023, Defendant James opened an envelope addressed to

Plaintiff from the Central District of Illinois Clerk. (Doc. 55-4 at 43:20-44:17; Doc.

55-14). The envelope contained a Civil Rights Complaint Packet with instructions

on how a prisoner can file a civil complaint in federal court. (Doc. 55-4 at 44:2-17;

Doc. 57-3).

III

A

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s Response does not

comply with this Court’s Local Rules. (Doc. 71). Local Rule 7.1(D)(2)(b) provides

that a response to a summary judgment motion must state, in separate subsections:

undisputed material facts, disputed material facts, disputed immaterial facts,

undisputed immaterial facts, and additional material facts. Local Rule

7.1(D)(2)(b)(6) cautions, “[a] failure to respond to any numbered fact will be

deemed an admission of the fact.” Likewise, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56(e)(2) provides that when a party fails to properly address another party’s

assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may “consider the fact

undisputed for the purposes of the motion.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2).

On January 6, 2026, the Clerk sent Plaintiff a Notice informing him that his

Response must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and Local Rule

7.1(D) and provided Plaintiff with a copy of both rules. (Doc. 58 at p. 1). The Notice

instructed Plaintiff that if he disagreed with a fact, he was required to “provide

affidavits, exhibits, or documents to support why [he] disagree[d] with it.” Id. The

Notice also warned Plaintiff if he failed to do so, the Court may “consider the facts

asserted in the summary judgment motion as undisputed.” Id.

In Plaintiff’s Response, he indicated whether Defendants’ material facts

were “true” or “false” by creating a chart and using a checkmark to indicate which

facts were “true” and a dash to indicate which facts were “false.” (Doc. 71 at p. 3).

Plaintiff did not explain why he believed certain material facts were “false” nor

did he provide any citations to the 207 pages of exhibits he attached to his

Response. Id. at pp. 3, 6-212.

“[I]t is not the role of the court to parse the parties’ exhibits to construct the

facts. . . . It simply is not the court’s job to sift through the record to determine

whether there is sufficient evidence to support a party’s claim.” Hoosier v.

Greenwood Hosp. Mgmt. LLC, 32 F. Supp. 3d 966, 972 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (citing Davis v.

Carter, 452 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff’s Response does not comply with

Rule 56(c) or Local Rule 7.1(D). Therefore, the Court deems Defendants’

undisputed material facts to be admitted. See McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs.,

LLC, 942 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2019) (approving district court’s strict compliance

of Rule 7.1(D) against a pro se litigant); see also White v. Felchner, SEM-19-3181, 2021

WL 3223067, at *2 (C.D. Ill. July 29, 2021) (facts deemed admitted).

B

Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because there is

no evidence that opening Plaintiff’s legal mail frustrated his ability to pursue a

non-frivolous legal claim, and any right of access claim based on Plaintiff’s

criminal case is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Second,

Defendants argue there is no evidence that they acted recklessly or intentionally.

Third, Defendants argue that only three isolated incidents are insufficient to

constitute a violation of Plaintiff’s rights. Fourth, Defendants Cornwell and

Johnson, who delivered Plaintiff’s mail, argue they were not personally involved

in opening Plaintiff’s mail. Fifth, Defendant James argues the mail from the Clerk

on August 3, 2023 was not “legal mail.” Finally, Defendants argue they are entitled

to qualified immunity. (Doc. 55).

Instead of directly addressing Defendants’ arguments, Plaintiff argues his

claims have merit because Defendants’ insurance company is liable for any

judgment for compensatory damages under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, and

Defendants had a duty to comply with the “Employee Ethics Act” and the HCJ

Inmate Rules. (Doc. 71 at p. 4).

“While prisoners have First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as to their

mail, prison officials have the right to examine that mail to ensure that it does not

contain contraband.” Fogle v. Champaign Cnty. Sheriff's Off., No. 18-CV-2062-JBM,

2018 WL 3120016, at *1 (C.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (citing Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419

F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted)). “An inmate’s legal mail,

however, is entitled to greater protections because of the potential for interference

with his right of access to the courts.” Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 685-86 (citing Rowe v.

Shake, 196 F.3d 778, at 782 (7th Cir. 1999)). “[W]hen a prison receives a letter for an

inmate that is marked with an attorney’s name and a warning that the letter is

legal mail, officials potentially violate the inmate’s rights if they open the letter

outside the inmate’s presence.” Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 686 (citations omitted).

In the Seventh Circuit, there must be a “showing of hindrance” to a

“prisoner’s efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Guajardo-Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 805

(7th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Thus, “[a]n inmate has no constitutional claim

for interference with legal mail unless he can demonstrate that a non-frivolous

legal claim has been frustrated or impeded.” Lofquist v. Cecil, No. 20-169-RJD, 2020

WL 7074950, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2020) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352–53

(1996)). To satisfy this requirement, “actual prejudice to specific litigation must be

shown.” Lofquist, 2020 WL 7074950, at *5 (citing Kincaid v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 603

(7th Cir. 1992) (right of access claim “require[s] a showing of prejudice” to pending

or contemplated litigation)).

1

The Court can easily dispense of the claim related to the mail from the

Central District of Illinois Clerk, which Defendant James opened on August 3,

2023. (Doc. 57-3). “[P]rison employees can open official mail sent by a court clerk

to an inmate without infringing on any privacy right.” Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d

1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1996). “The Illinois Administrative Code 525.140(d) specifically

identifies mail from clerks of courts as ‘nonprivileged mail.’” Fogle, 2018 WL

3120016, at *2. The envelope Defendant James opened, which contained a blank

Civil Rights Complaint Packet, was not “legal mail.” See Fogle, 2018 WL 3120016,

at *2 (citing Martin v. Brewer, 830 F.2d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1987)). The Civil Rights

Complaint Packet is a public document and was available for download on the

Court’s online docket. See, e.g., Johnson v. Garcia, et al., Case No. 4:25-cv-04140-SLD,

Doc. 21. Therefore, Defendant James did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights

and is entitled to summary judgment.

2

Next, the Court will address the legal mail Plaintiff received on February 4,

2022 and July 14, 2023. On February 4, 2022, Defendant Shuman opened legal mail,

which contained a letter from Plaintiff’s criminal defense attorney and summaries

of two interviews that ISP investigators conducted of Plaintiff’s co-defendant, Mr.

Garcia, on December 23, 2020 and January 27, 2021. (Doc. 57-1). Defendant

Shuman argues he inadvertently slit open the envelope before realizing it was

from Plaintiff’s attorney. Defendant Cornwell delivered the mail to Plaintiff and

informed him Defendant Shuman accidentally opened it.

On July 14, 2023, Defendant Becker opened Plaintiff’s legal mail containing

a letter from Plaintiff’s attorney and a copy of the transcript of Mr. Garcia’s

interview on January 27, 2021. (Doc. 57-2). Defendant Becker argues he mistakenly

opened the legal mail as he was going through incoming civil process mail.

Defendant Johnson delivered the mail to Plaintiff and informed him Defendant

Becker accidentally opened it. Defendants Shuman, Cornwell, Becker, and

Johnson argue they did not remove the mail from the envelopes or read the mail.

Regardless of whether Defendants Shuman, Cornwell, Becker, and Johnson

intentionally opened or read Plaintiff’s legal mail, Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment because Plaintiff provided no evidence to demonstrate that

opening his legal mail on February 4, 2022 and July 14, 2023 frustrated or impeded

his criminal case or any other non-frivolous legal claim. Absent such evidence,

Plaintiff “has no constitutional claim for interference with legal mail.” Lofquist,

2020 WL 7074950, at *5 (dismissing interference with legal mail claim where

plaintiff did not allege that the destruction of his mail “caused any detriment to

his ability to litigate the matter”); see Sanders v. Salemi, No. 10 C 7203, 2012 WL

353844, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2012) (rejecting interference with legal mail claim

where plaintiff “has not suggested” that the denial of his legal mail “resulted in

actual frustration of a potentially meritorious legal claim”).

Moreover, SA James confirmed that the HCSAO received the recordings of

Mr. Garcia’s interviews and the transcripts during the discovery phase of

Plaintiff’s criminal case. (Doc. 55-3 at ¶¶ 4-6; Doc. 55-7 at ¶ 2(a)-(b)). There is no

evidence that Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings or trial was affected by the

Defendants’ actions or that Defendants hindered Plaintiff’s ability to pursue any

legal claim or defense. See Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 686 (affirming summary judgment

in interference with legal mail claim where plaintiff offered no evidence that

defendants’ actions affected his ability to litigate any matter).

Additionally, Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the doctrine established in Heck

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner

is barred from pursuing a § 1983 claim when “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Heck, 512

U.S. at 487. Here, Plaintiff has not shown that his conviction was invalidated,

through habeas proceedings or otherwise, and cannot pursue relief challenging

his conviction and seeking damages for the alleged denial of access to the courts.

See Hoard v. Reddy, 175 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 1999) (Heck bars a prisoner from

seeking damages for denial of access to the courts until conviction is overturned

or invalidated); see also Mason v. Gimber, No. 3:17-CV-01025, 2020 WL 3268654, at

*6–8 (S.D. Ill. June 17, 2020) (finding that plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth

Amendment denial of access to the courts claim was barred by Heck). Therefore,

the Court finds that Defendants Shuman, Cornwell, Becker, and Johnson are

entitled to summary judgment.

3

Having found that Defendants did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional

rights, the Court need not address whether Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity. See Johns v. Tinsley, No. 16-1106-JES, 2018 WL 10811472, at *5 (C.D. Ill.

Mar. 7, 2018) (citing Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 F.3d 778, 787 n. 9 (7th Cir. 2011)).

The Court also does not address whether opening Plaintiff’s legal mail on

February 4, 2022 and July 14, 2023 was too isolated and sporadic to support a right

of access to courts claim, if Defendants’ conduct was intentional or reckless, and if

Defendants Cornwell and Johnson were personally involved in opening Plaintiff’s

legal mail.

IV

For the reasons stated, supra:

(1) Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [55] is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s claims based on the First and Fourteenth Amendment as to his criminal

proceedings are dismissed without prejudice as barred by Heck v. Humphrey and

its progeny. As such, Defendants Grant James, Christopher Becker, Nicole

Johnson, Cole Cornwell, and Austin Shuman are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. Plaintiff takes nothing. Each side is to bear their own attorney's fees,

costs, and expenses. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this case.

(2) Should a party file a motion for reconsideration which is

subsequently denied by the Court, the party who filed the motion will be

responsible for the attorney's fees of the opposing party related to their response

to the motion for reconsideration.

(3) Plaintiff remains responsible for paying any remainder of the $350

filing fee. (d/e 7/16/2024).

(4) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of

appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P.

4(a)(4).

(5) To proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, Plaintiff must file a motion to

proceed on appeal in forma pauperis and identify the issues he will present on

appeal to assist the Court in determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith.

Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); Celske v. Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999) (An

appellant should be given an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for

appealing so that the district judge "can make a responsible assessment of the issue

of good faith."); Walker v. O'Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000) (providing that

a good faith appeal is an appeal that "a reasonable person could suppose . . . has

some merit" from a legal perspective). If Plaintiff chooses to appeal, he will be

liable for the $605 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal.

It is so ordered.

Entered: July 30, 2026

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. District Judge