Mankevich

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

V ASILII MANKEVICH CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-2040

VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

WARDEN WINN CORRECTIONAL MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC

CENTER, ET AL.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Before the Court is Petitioner Vasilii Mankevich’s (“Petitioner”) pro se Emergency

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Record Document 2). In the Motion, Petitioner

seeks immediate release from immigration detention. See id. at 2.

Petitioner is a native of Russia who is presently detained by Immigration and

Customs Enforcement ("ICE"). See Record Document 6-1 at 3. According to the Petition,

an Immigration Judge entered a final order of removal on January 8, 2026, and Petitioner

did not appeal that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See Record Document

6 at 2 & 6-1 at 3. Petitioner alleges that he has remained in ICE custody for more than six

months following the removal order and contends that his continued detention violates

Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Through the instant Motion, Petitioner seeks

immediate release from immigration detention pending resolution of his Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (Record Document 6).

An applicant for a Temporary Restraining Order or a Preliminary Injunction must

demonstrate each of the following: (1) a substantial likelihood her cause will succeed on

the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3)

the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to the

opposing party, and (4) granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest. See

Misquitta v. Warden Pine Prairie ICE Processing Center, 353 F. Supp.3d 518, 521 (W.D.

La. Nov. 16, 2018) (citing Piedmont Heights Civic Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430

(5th Cir. 1981)). The decision of whether to grant or deny an emergency injunction lies in

the district court’s discretion. See Moore v. Brown, 868 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 2017). And

courts should deny such motions more often than not. See Albright v. City of New Orleans,

46 F.Supp.2d 523, 532 (E.D. La. 1999) (explaining that temporary restraining orders are

“extraordinary relief and rarely issued.”); see also Suburban Propane, L.P. v. D & S GCTX

LLC, 2025 WL 2429087, at *2 (W.D. Tex. 2025) (holding that the extraordinary relief under

Rule 65 must be “unequivocally show[n].”); see also Anderson v. Jackson, 556 F.3d 351,

355–56 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Only under ‘extraordinary circumstances’ will this court reverse

the denial of a preliminary injunction.”).

In this case, Petitioner seeks injunctive relief that mirrors the relief requested in his

Habeas Petition, that is, immediate release. Another judge within this District decided a

similarly situated case, stating:

The Supreme Court, very recently, reminded lower courts that

preliminary injunctions are, as their name suggests, preliminary and should

“not conclusively resolve legal disputes.” Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192,

200 (2025). In other words, they should not be used to rule on the final,

merits question.

Rather, TROs and preliminary injunctions help “preserve the status

quo until a trial” or other final disposition is rendered. Id. at 193. That begs

the question: what does it mean to preserve the status quo? While the

words “status quo” do not appear within Rule 65 . . . , it is implicit in the

“irreparable harm” prong. . . . Irreparable harm must also take away “the

court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits.” Canal Auth. of

the State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1974); see also

Samuel L. Bray, The Purposes of the Preliminary Injunction, 78 Vand. L.

Rev. 809, 823–26 (2025) (concluding the same after probing Founding-era

sources). Put differently, “[t]here is always a status quo. There should not

be a preliminary injunction to protect it, however, unless the court’s ability to

render a meaningful decision on the merits would otherwise be in jeopardy.”

Callaway, 489 F.2d at 573.

Pema Sherpa v. Judith Almodovar, et al., No. 3:25-CV-01718 SEC P, 2026 WL 74401, at

*2 (W.D. La. Jan. 9, 2026). A ruling on the instant Motion should not resolve the legal

disputes in this case. Thus, to the extent Petitioner asks for an order of immediate release

from custody, the Court views this request as an effort to obtain a ruling on the merits of

his Habeas Petition through injunctive relief. Petitioner's motion for injunctive relief is

essentially a motion to decide the habeas petition now. See Garcia-Aleman v. Thompson,

No. SA-25-CV-00886-OLG-HJB, 2025 WL 3769302, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2025). The

issues raised in the motion are more appropriately addressed through the ordinary

adjudication of the habeas petition.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner's Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order (Record Document 2) is DENIED.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED, in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 17" day of July, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT