CLAY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

LUCRETIA CLAY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:25-cv-00018-JPH-TAB

)

ANDREW THORUP in his individual and )

official capacity, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Lucretia Clay is pursuing civil-rights claims arising out of an altercation

with City of Lawrence police officers and her subsequent arrest. The State of

Indiana, City of Indianapolis, and Axon Enterprise have filed motions to

dismiss the claims against them in Ms. Clay's third amended complaint. Dkt.

[132]; dkt. [138]; dkt. [140]. For the reasons below, those motions are

GRANTED.

I.

Facts and Background

Because Defendants have moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the

Court accepts and recites "the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true."

McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011).

In August 2022, Ms. Clay was driving with her three children when her

car got a flat tire. Dkt. 130 at 4 (third amended complaint). She first stopped

in a church parking lot, where Lawrence Police Officer Andrew Thorup checked

on her, and then left. Id. After attempting to air up the tire, Ms. Clay drove to

a nearby Jiffy Lube, where Officer Thorup pulled in behind her and started

yelling at her about her car. Id. at 4–5. Ms. Clay walked back toward her car

to be with her children. Id. at 5–6. Lawrence Police Officer Khalid Brooks then

pulled into the parking lot, "joining Officer Thorup in his aggressive approach

toward [Ms. Clay] and her vehicle." Id.

Officer Thorup yelled that Ms. Clay would be going to jail and then

jumped on her from behind while telling her to give him her hands. Id. at 6.

Ms. Clay could not move her hands because Officer Thorup was "forcing her

into a fetal position," and Officer Thorup started yelling that she was resisting

arrest. Id. Officer Thorup then tased her without warning. Id. Officer Brooks

lifted Ms. Clay enough that she could free her hands, and handcuffed her. Id.

After Ms. Clay was handcuffed, her mother arrived and took care of the

children. Id. at 7. Another officer transported Ms. Clay to the Marion County

processing center, where "she was forced to give the State of Indiana a DNA

swab against her will and religious beliefs" and was released on bond. Id. at 8.

Ms. Clay was charged with resisting arrest, neglect of dependents, attempting

to disarm an officer, and disorderly conduct. Id. at 7–8. Ms. Clay's court-

appointed public defender was biased against her, telling her "that he 'did not

like her kind.'" Id. at 9. The charges against her were later dropped. Id.

Ms. Clay brought this case in Indiana state court, and Defendants City of

Lawrence, Officer Brooks, and Officer Thorup removed the case to this Court.

Dkt. 1; see dkt. 52 (order denying Ms. Clay's motion to remand). In December

2025, Ms. Clay filed her third amended complaint against the City of Lawrence,

Lawrence Police Department, Officer Brooks, and Officer Thorup; unnamed

City of Lawrence EMTs and police officers; the City of Indianapolis and

Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD"); an unnamed IMPD

transport officer and unnamed jail employees; the State of Indiana; and Axon

Enterprise, which manufactures TASER weapons. Dkt. 130 at 2–4. She

alleges negligence; false imprisonment, false arrest, and/or criminal

confinement; intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"); unreasonable

search and seizure; assault and battery; excessive force; defamation;

obstruction of justice; violation of her religious beliefs; and a products liability

claim. Id. at 11–28.

Defendants Axon Enterprise, the State of Indiana, and the City of

Indianapolis and IMPD have filed motions to dismiss the claims against them.

Dkt. 132; dkt. 138; dkt. 140.

II.

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

Defendants may move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to

dismiss claims for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must "contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A facially plausible claim is

one that allows "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. In other words, a complaint "must

allege enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story

that holds together," Bilek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 8 F.4th 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2021),

"but it need not supply the specifics required at the summary judgment stage."

Graham v. Bd. of Educ., 8 F.4th 625, 627 (7th Cir. 2021).

When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "accept[s] the well-pleaded

facts in the complaint as true, but legal conclusions and conclusory allegations

merely reciting the elements of the claim are not entitled to this presumption of

truth." McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616. "It is enough to plead a plausible claim,

after which a plaintiff receives the benefit of imagination, so long as the

hypotheses are consistent with the complaint." Chapman v. Yellow Cab Coop.,

875 F.3d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 2017).

Indiana substantive law governs Ms. Clay's state-law claims. See Webber

v. Butner, 923 F.3d 479, 480–81 (7th Cir. 2019). Absent a controlling decision

from the Indiana Supreme Court, the Court does its best to predict how that

court would rule on the issues of law. Mashallah, Inc. v. West Bend Mut. Ins.

Co., 20 F.4th 311, 319 (7th Cir. 2021). In doing so, the Court may consider

decisions from the Indiana Court of Appeals. See id.

III.

Analysis

A. Axon's Motion to Dismiss

Ms. Clay brings claims against Axon—which manufactures TASER

weapons—for negligence, IIED, assault and battery, and failure to warn under

the Indiana Product Liability Act ("IPLA"). Dkt. 130 at 11–28.

1. Negligence and failure to warn

Ms. Clay's negligence and failure-to-warn claims allege that Axon failed

to provide warnings, including "integrated audible warnings, to mitigate the

risks associated with rapid or unannounced deployment of the TASER device."

Dkt. 130 at 15–16, 27–28.1 Axon argues that these claims must be dismissed

because Ms. Clay "does not allege a specific latent danger in the use of an

energy weapon necessitating a warning." Dkt. 141 at 7. Ms. Clay responds

that the TASER weapon's ability "to deliver high-voltage electricity into a

human spine" requires a warning "from the device itself" to allow her to comply

with orders or brace herself. Dkt. 178 at 1–2.

A manufacturer may be liable under Indiana law for failing "to warn of a

danger . . . as to which the average consumer would not be aware." Ford Motor

Co. v. Rushford, 868 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2007). But a TASER weapon's

capabilities are an obvious and inherent danger of the weapon, rather than a

"latent dangerous characteristic" that triggers a duty to warn. Kaiser v.

Johnson & Johnson, 947 F.3d 996, 1015 (7th Cir. 2020) (applying Nat. Gas

Odorizing, Inc. v. Downs, 685 N.E.2d 155, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)); First Nat'l

Bank & Tr. Corp. v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 378 F.3d 682, 690 (7th Cir. 2004)

1 The parties have not addressed whether Ms. Clay is a "user or consumer" of the

TASER weapon under Ind. Code § 34-20-1-1, which would require all her claims

against Axon to proceed under IPLA, see Robinson v. Davol Inc., 913 F.3d 690, 693

(7th Cir. 2019); Stegemoller v. ACandS, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 974, 975 (Ind. 2002)

(explaining that "consumer" includes "any bystander injured by the product who

would reasonably be expected to be in the vicinity of the product during its reasonably

expected use"). The Court does not address that question because these claims are

subject to dismissal regardless of whether they are within IPLA's scope. See Ford

Motor Co. v. Rushford, 868 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2007).

("There is no duty to warn that a knife or an ax will cut, a match will take fire,

dynamite will explode, or a hammer may mash a finger.").

Ms. Clay nevertheless contends that the danger was hidden from her

because the officers approached her from behind. Dkt. 178 at 1–2. But

whether a danger is latent depends on what would be hidden from "the

ordinary consumer," not from Ms. Clay in her own experience. Am. Eurocopter,

378 F.3d at 690. For example, the danger from a BB gun is not latent "under

the objective test that Indiana uses," even if the specific plaintiffs were not

aware of it. Moss v. Crosman Corp., 136 F.3d 1169, 1174–75 (7th Cir. 1998);

Ind. Code § 34-20-4-4 ("A product is not defective under the article if the

product is incapable of being made safe for its reasonably expected use, when

manufactured, sold, handled, and packaged properly."). Ms. Clay therefore has

not pleaded a plausible claim against Axon based on a duty to warn. See

Welch v. Scripto–Tokai Corp., 651 N.E.2d 810, 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) ("[T]he

risks posed by a disposable butane lighter are open and obvious to an ordinary

user of the lighter" so there was "no duty to warn.").

2. Assault and battery, and IIED

Axon argues that Ms. Clay's assault and battery and IIED claims must be

dismissed because they both require intent, which Ms. Clay has not plausibly

alleged. Dkt. 141 at 4–6. Ms. Clay responds that intent can be inferred from

Axon's decision "to distribute a weapon capable of delivering 50,000 volts into a

human spine." Dkt. 178 at 3.

To prevail on these claims, Ms. Clay must plausibly allege that Axon

intended to harm her. "[B]attery is an intentional tort and requires the intent

to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff." Price v. Kuchaes,

950 N.E.2d 1218, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); see Hellums v. Raber, 853 N.E.2d

143, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that an aiding and abetting theory

requires "intent to commit a tort, or [ ] negligence"). Assault similarly "is

effectuated when one acts intending to cause an imminent apprehension of a

harmful or offensive contact with another person." Raess v. Doescher, 883

N.E.2d 790, 794 (Ind. 2008). And IIED claims can proceed only "with the

requisite intent or recklessness to cause . . . severe emotional distress." Fox v.

Franciscan Alliance, Inc., 204 N.E.3d 320, 329–30 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

Here, intended or reckless harm to Ms. Clay cannot be inferred from

Axon's decision to make a product, even a weapon designed to contact another

person. See Price, 950 N.E.2d at 1231–32 (holding that a vaccine

manufacturer could not have intended to harm the plaintiff). So, Axon's

decision to make TASER weapons does not support the inference that it

intended harm to Ms. Clay in her interaction with Officers Thorup and Brooks.

See id. ("The vaccine manufacturers could not have intended to cause any

contact, let alone harmful contact, of the vaccine with Cathy." (emphasis

added)); cf. Baker v. Atlantic Richfield Co., No. 2:17-cv-429-JVB-JPK, 2021 WL

3726050 at *7 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 23, 2021) (holding that even if manufacturers of

lead-containing products concealed contamination, plaintiffs did not plead

intent to harm them). Ms. Clay therefore has not plausibly alleged that Axon

intended to harm her as required for her assault and battery and IIED claims.

Ms. Clay's claims against Axon are DISMISSED.

B. State of Indiana's Motion to Dismiss

Ms. Clay brings negligence, IIED, and defamation claims against the

State of Indiana. Dkt. 130 at 11–28. She alleges that Indiana appointed her a

biased public defender in her criminal case and published "public records"

related to her criminal case that said she "was a criminal" and "was violent and

a threat to police." Id.

1. Negligence and IIED

The State of Indiana argues that Ms. Clay's negligence and IIED claims

are barred by absolute immunity because they are based on her public

defender appointment, which is a judicial act. Dkt. 133 at 5–6; dkt. 182 at 1.

Ms. Clay responds, without supporting authority, that the public-defender

appointment was an administrative act rather than a judicial one. Dkt. 177 at

2.

Under Indiana law, "absolute judicial immunity" applies to judges and

non-judicial officers "who perform quasi-judicial functions." Marion Sup. Ct.

Prob. Dept. v. Trapuzzano, 223 N.E.3d 282, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). This

immunity "applies even if the action the defendant took was in error, was done

maliciously, or was in excess of his authority." Ind. Bd. of Pharm. v. Elmer, 207

N.E.3d 1237, 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

That immunity applies here because a public defender's appointment is a

judicial act. See Ind. Code § 35-33-7-6; Johnson v. State, 640 N.E.2d 747, 749

(Ind. Ct. App. 1994) ("It is a judicial function to determine whether counsel

shall be appointed at public expense."); see also Trapuzzano, 223 N.E.3d at 288

("Absolute judicial immunity . . . extends to persons performing tasks so

integral or intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are

considered an arm of the judicial officer."). Indeed, Ms. Clay admits that her

public defender was appointed "by a state judicial officer." Dkt. 130 at 9. So

even accepting Ms. Clay's allegations that her public defender was biased, his

appointment was a judicial act, making the State of Indiana immune2 from Ms.

Clay's negligence and IIED claims. See Dawson v. Newman, 845 N.E.2d 1076,

1081 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting the argument that sending certified copies

of a sentence as required by statute was a mere "administrative duty," and

therefore finding immunity from suit).

2. Defamation

For Ms. Clay's defamation claim, the State of Indiana argues that it is

protected by a qualified privilege because the records at issue are public under

Indiana law. Dkt. 133 at 7; dkt. 182 at 2. Ms. Clay responds that the State of

Indiana does not have a "license to lie" in its public records. Dkt. 177 at 3.

2 Judicial immunity applies even though Ms. Clay has named the State of Indiana as

the defendant, rather than the person who appointed her public defender. See

Mendenhall v. Indianapolis, 717 N.E.2d 1218, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining

that judicial immunity "look[s] to the nature of the function performed, not the identity

of the person who performed it" and holding that the City of Indianapolis was immune

for its officers' actions).

"Qualified privilege is a defense to a defamation action and applies to

communications made in good faith on any subject matter in which the party

making the communication . . . has a duty, either public or private, either

legal, moral, or social, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or

duty." Bals v. Verduzco, 600 N.E.2d 1353, 1356 (Ind. 1992). Here, the State of

Indiana had a duty to make public records available. See Ind. Code § 5-14-3-1

et seq. ("[A]ll persons are entitled to full and complete information regarding the

affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as

public officials and employees."). And the public has a "corresponding interest"

in accessing those records. Bals, 600 N.E.2d at 1356; see Taylor v. Antisdel,

185 N.E.3d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (explaining that criminal

prosecutions are "matter[s] of public concern"). Ms. Clay cites no legal

authority in support of her defamation claim based on the State of Indiana's

publication of public records. See dkt. 177 at 3–5. And while Ms. Clay briefly

argues that the State of Indiana acted with malice, id., providing public access

to public court records cannot support such a finding, see Taylor, 185 N.E.3d

at 875.

Ms. Clay's claims against the State of Indiana are therefore DISMISSED.3

3 Because the State of Indiana relies on defenses, it should have answered Ms. Clay's

complaint and filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). But

that does not affect the standard of review or this Court's ability to address the issue,

since the relevant facts have been presented with the complaint and motion to

dismiss. Walczak v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 739 F.3d 1013, 1016 n.2 (7th Cir. 2014);

see Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir. 2012).

Because those defenses are dispositive, the Court does not address the State of

Indiana's argument that Ms. Clay's claims against it are barred by law enforcement

immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. See dkt. 133 at 6–7.

C. Indianapolis Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Ms. Clay brings negligence; "false imprisonment, false arrest, and/or

criminal confinement"; unreasonable search and seizure; defamation; and First

Amendment religious expression claims against the City of Indianapolis and

the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department.4 Dkt. 130 at 11–28.

Because IMPD cannot be sued under Indiana law, City of Peru v. Lewis, 950

N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); Ind. Code § 34-6-2.1-155, and is not a

"person" who can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 independently of the City of

Indianapolis, Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 645 n.1 (7th Cir. 2007), it

is dismissed as a Defendant and the Court considers the claims against the

City of Indianapolis.

For defamation—Ms. Clay's only state-law claim against Indianapolis—

Indianapolis argues that Ms. Clay has not alleged enough detail to plausibly

plead this claim. Dkt. 139 at 6–7; see Webber, 923 F.3d at 480–81. Ms. Clay

responds that she has pleaded that Indianapolis published statements that she

was "a 'threat to police' and 'unfit parent'" on its website. Dkt. 176 at 2. Ms.

Clay has not alleged, however, what "documentation" Indianapolis may have

4 Ms. Clay also names as defendants in their "official capacities" a "John Doe

Transport Officer" who drove Ms. Clay to the Marion County Jail, and unnamed

Marion County Jail employees "responsible for processing" Ms. Clay. Dkt. 130 at 3.

Because these are official, rather than individual, capacity claims, they are against

Indianapolis under Monell. Sow v. Fortville Police Dept., 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir.

2011) (An official capacity suit "is another way of pleading an action against an entity

of which the officer is an agent."). These defendants are therefore dismissed as

duplicative. See Stanek v. St. Charles Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 303, 783 F.3d 634,

640 (7th Cir. 2015).

published, including whether it was public records; when any publication

occurred; or the context of any allegedly false statements. See dkt. 130 at 9,

24–26. She therefore has not plausibly pleaded a defamation claim against

Indianapolis. See McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616 (Legal conclusions and

conclusory allegations do not state a plausible claim.); Integrity Kokosing

Pipeline Servs., LLC v. Pipeliners Union 798, No. 1:20-cv-2321-RLM-MG, 2021

WL 4194435 at *9 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 15, 2021) ("While the pleading does not need

to incorporate the literal statement, a party asserting a defamation claim must

provide some context as to when and how the allegedly defamatory statement

was made to allow the defendant to form an appropriate response.").

Ms. Clay's remaining claims against Indianapolis are federal-law claims

brought through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See dkt. 130 at 11–28. Indianapolis

"cannot be held liable for the constitutional torts of its employees or agents."

First Midwest Bank Guardian v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir.

2021) (explaining Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. Of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658

(1978)). Instead, the violation must have been caused by Indianapolis's own

"policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or

acts may fairly be said to represent official policy." Id. So, to plausibly plead a

Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege that "(1) the [municipality] had an express

policy that, when enforced, causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) the

[municipality] had a widespread practice that, although not authorized by

written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to

constitute a custom or usage within the force of law; or (3) plaintiff's

constitutional injury was caused by a person with final policymaking

authority." McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 2000).

Indianapolis argues that Ms. Clay's Monell claims against it must be

dismissed because she alleges only individual employees' actions, not harm

from a municipal policy or custom. Dkt. 139 at 7–9. Ms. Clay responds that

she has pleaded "standardized, system-wide practices that no individual officer

could invent." Dkt. 176 at 2.

For her "false imprisonment, false arrest, and/or criminal confinement"

and unreasonable search and seizure claims, Ms. Clay has not identified an

express policy or widespread practice that led to her alleged constitutional

violations. See McCauley, 671 F.3d at 615. She instead relies on the actions of

the individual officer who transported her to the detention center after her

arrest, and the actions of detention center staff who held her after her arrest

and implemented her bond. See dkt. 130 at 16, 21.5 Because, under Monell,

"a plaintiff must challenge conduct that is properly attributable to the

municipality itself," her allegations about individual officers' actions do not

state a claim. First Midwest Bank, 988 F.3d at 986; see Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs.

of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 398 (1997) (Monell "require[s]

application of rigorous culpability and causation standards in order to ensure

that the municipality is not held liable solely for its employee's actions.").

5 Indianapolis disputes whether that officer was its employee, but because the

allegation does not support a Monell claim the Court does not address that dispute.

See dkt. 139 at 4–5.

While Ms. Clay briefly mentions a failure to train and a "'ransom' policy"

in having to pay a $500 bond, dkt. 176 at 2, generic allegations without factual

elaboration cannot support a Monell claim. See McCauley, 671 F.3d at 617,

619 (affirming dismissal of Monell claim that lacked "the factual heft required to

survive a motion to dismiss"); Latuszkin v. City of Chicago, 250 F.3d 502, 505

(7th Cir. 2001) ("Without a link between the City and the alleged policy, no

claim for municipal liability can survive."). Moreover, she does not allege that

the bond was a city policy, rather than ordered by a judicial officer of the State

of Indiana. See dkt. 130 at 16, 21.

That leaves Ms. Clay's First Amendment religious exercise claim, which

alleges that the Marion County Jail's policy of collecting DNA from arrestees

violated "her sincerely held religious beliefs and her right to religious

expression." Dkt. 130 at 10, 26–28. Indianapolis argues that this claim must

be dismissed because the Marion County Sheriff's Office, rather than

Indianapolis, runs the jail and sets its policies. Dkt. 139 at 4–5, 7–8. Ms. Clay

responds that under the consolidated city–county government, Indianapolis

"sets overarching policy" for the jail. Dkt. 176 at 2.

The consolidation of Indianapolis and Marion County is "only partial,"

and the Marion County Sheriff runs the Marion County Jail. Grieveson v.

Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2008) ("The Sheriff's Department has

always remained a separate entity from the City of Indianapolis."); Ind. Code §

36-3-1-5.1 ("Notwithstanding any other law, an ordinance adopted under this

section must provide that the county sheriff's department shall be responsible

for . . . [c]ounty jail operations and facilities."); see Homes v. Marion Cnty.

Sheriff, No. 1:23-cv-1307-TWP-MJD, 2024 WL 2133976 at *2 (S.D. Ind. May

13, 2024). Ms. Clay cites no contrary authority. See dkt. 176.

Ms. Clay also has not alleged that Indianapolis was responsible for

establishing or requiring a DNA-collection policy at the Marion County Jail,

which it did not operate. See dkt. 130 at 10, 27–28; First Midwest Bank, 988

F.3d at 986 ("[A] plaintiff must challenge conduct that is properly attributable

to the municipality itself."). And her bare argument in her response brief that

Indianapolis "sets overarching policy" at the Jail is too vague to support a

Monell claim. See id.; McCauley, 671 F.3d at 616 (Legal conclusions and

conclusory allegations do not state a plausible claim.).

Ms. Clay's claims against the City of Indianapolis and the Indianapolis

Metropolitan Police Department are therefore DISMISSED.

D. Unidentified Defendants

Ms. Clay has named as Defendants unidentified "emergency medical

technicians employed by or acting as agents of the City of Lawrence" and

additional "officers of the Lawrence Police Department who were present at the

scene." Dkt. 130 at 2–3.

Ms. Clay's claims against these unidentified defendants must be

dismissed. See Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[D]istrict

courts have the power to screen complaints filed by all litigants, prisoners and

nonprisoners alike, regardless of fee status."). The Seventh Circuit has

explained that it is generally "pointless to include [an] anonymous defendant"

because "this type of placeholder does not open the door to relation back under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, nor can it otherwise help the plaintiff.". Wudtke v. Davel, 128

F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 19977); see Herrera v. Cleveland, 8 F.4th 493, 497

(7th Cir. 2021). Claims against these defendants are dismissed without

prejudice, so Ms. Clay may seek to file a new complaint with her allegations

against these defendants if she learns their identities and believes it would not

be futile. See Troya v. Wilson, 807 Fed. App'x 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2020)

(unpublished).

IV.

Conclusion

Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. Dkt. [132]; dkt. [138];

dkt. [140]. The Clerk is directed to terminate as Defendants Axon

Enterprise, State of Indiana, City of Indianapolis, Indianapolis Metropolitan

Police Department, "City of Lawrence EMT," and "Indianapolis Metropolitan

Police Department Inmate Transport Officer."

SO ORDERED.

Date: 7/28/2026 :

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

LUCRETIA CLAY

10242 John Jay Drive

Indianapolis, IN 46235

All electronically registered counsel

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