Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

JENARIUS BROWN CIVIL CASE NO. 25-1146

VERSUS JUDGE EDWARDS

DEDRICK MIRE, ET AL. MAG. JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES

MEMORANDUM RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court are two motions. The first is a Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings (R. Doc. 23) filed by Dedrick Mire (“Major Mire”), Ernest Charrier

(“Sergeant Charrier”), Justin Corley (“Sergeant Corley”),1 Dustin Dauzat (“Dauzat”)

and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Public Safety and Corrections

(“DPSC”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Jenarius Brown (“Plaintiff”) opposes the

motion (R. Doc. 25). The time for filing a reply has run, see R. Doc. 24, and accordingly,

the motion is ripe. The second motion is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R.

Doc. 26) filed by Plaintiff. Defendants oppose the motion (R. Doc. 28). Plaintiff replied

(R. Doc. 29).

After careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda and the applicable law,

Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED.

1 Initially filed suit against Sergeant Quintell Woods. See R. Doc. 1. However, Plaintiff’s Motion to

Amend the Complaint states that Sergeant Woods changed his name to Justin Corley. See R. Doc. 9

at 1. Accordingly, the Court will refer to the defendant as “Sergeant Corley.”

I. BACKGROUND

This case stems from Plaintiff’s allegations that several correctional officers

physically assaulted him while he was an inmate at Raymond Laborde Correction

Center (“RLCC”). According to Plaintiff, on September 2, 2024, Major Mire, Sergeant

Charrier, and Sergeant Corley attacked Plaintiff while he was fully restrained. See

R. Doc. 11 at 4. Plaintiff also alleges that he was maced by Dauzat. See id. Because

of this alleged incident, Plaintiff asserts that he “submitted multiple timely” internal,

written grievances—referred to as “ARPs”—in accordance with Louisiana’s

Administrative Remedy Procedure. See R. Doc. 26-3 at 1. And on October 10, 2024,

Sergeant Charrier threatened him, Plaintiff says, for submitting these grievances.

See R. Doc. 11 at 4. Plaintiff then claims to have submitted ARPs relating to that

incident as well.

However, Plaintiff claims that his ARPs were never processed. See R. Doc. 26-

3 at 1. Plaintiff asserts that his ARPs “were either returned to [him], destroyed[,] or

ignored.” See id. On the other hand, Defendants—through the affidavit of Diane

Williams (“Williams”), the Classification Manager at RLCC—assert that Plaintiff

never filed any ARPs pertaining to these incidents. See R. Doc. 28-2.

Before filing suit, Plaintiff wrote to Williams inquiring into the status of his

ARPs related to the September 2, 2024, incident. See R. Doc. 26-3 at 41–42. Williams

responded that he had withdrawn the ARPs, numbered “RLCC-2024-447” and

“RLCC-2024-509.” See id. at 42. But, according to Plaintiff, neither of those ARPs

relate to the incident on September 2, 2024. See id. at 41–42. Because RLCC did not

process his ARPs, Plaintiff attempted to appeal directly to the DPSC headquarters,

but “the ARP/letter was intercepted by RLCC staff.” See id. at 1.

On June 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants in the 12th Judicial

District Court of Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana. See R. Doc. 1 at 1. The DPSC

subsequently removed the case to this Court on August 9, 2025. See id. On August

29, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants alleging claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Major Mire, Sergeant Charrier, Sergeant Corley, and

Dauzat for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights and negligence. See R. Doc. 11.

He also alleges that the DPSC is liable for his injuries under the theory of respondeat

superior. See id.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

a. Judgment on the Pleadings

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), any party may move for judgment

on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay

trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “A motion brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) is

designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a

judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings

and any judicially noticed facts.” Hebert Abstract Co., Inc. v. Touchstone Props., Ltd.,

914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990). Motions for judgment on the pleadings are “subject to

the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Ackerson v. Bean

Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 209 (5th Cir.2009). Thus, usually, the inquiry on a 12(c)

motion “focuses on the allegations in the pleadings and not on whether the plaintiff

actually has sufficient evidence to succeed on the merits.” Id. (quotations omitted).

When ruling on a 12(c) motion requires a court to look outside the pleadings,

the motion is converted to one for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Because

all parties have submitted matters outside of the pleadings and Defendants’

affirmative defense requires the Court to consider facts outside the pleadings,

Defendants’ Motion must be treated as a motion for summary judgment. Dillon v.

Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 272 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We ... conclude that when courts rule on

exhaustion on the basis of evidence beyond the pleadings, the nonmoving party

should be granted the protections of Rule 56. Consequently, we find that the district

court did not err in converting Appellees' motion into a motion for summary judgment

under Rule 12(d).”).

b. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows “that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of

summary judgment.” Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 177 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “A dispute is genuine if

the summary judgment evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the [non-movant].” Id. (internal quotations omitted). In evaluating a motion for

summary judgment, the Court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh

the evidence” and “must resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible inferences

in favor of the non-moving party.” Total E&P USA Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas

Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 434 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted).

“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility

of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those

portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)

(cleaned up). “The moving party may meet its burden to demonstrate the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact by pointing out that the record contains no support

for the non-moving party's claim.” Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 263

(5th Cir. 2002). Thereafter, if the non-movant is unable to identify anything in the

record to support its claim, summary judgment is appropriate. Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”): “No action shall be brought

with respect to prison ... by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006). “Proper exhaustion demands

compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford,

548 U.S. at 90. The petitioner must have “pursue[d] the grievance remedy to

conclusion”—substantial compliance with administrative procedures is not enough.

Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir. 2001). Because exhaustion of

remedies is an affirmative defense, defendants bear the ultimate burden of proof. See

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Further, “[s]ince exhaustion [of

administrative remedies] is a threshold issue that courts must address to determine

whether litigation is being conducted in the right forum at the right time, … judges

may resolve factual disputes concerning exhaustion without the participation of a

jury.” Dillon, 596 F.3d at 272 (citation and footnote omitted).

Louisiana's Administrative Remedy Procedure has two steps, and a prisoner

has not exhausted his remedies until he has completed both. See id. at 265–66. At

step one, a prisoner submits a request to the warden briefly setting out the basis for

the claim and the relief sought. See La. Admin. Code tit. 22, pt. I, § 325(G)(1). The

grievances are screened by an ARP screening officer prior to assignment to the first

step. See id. at § 325(I)(1). The ARP screening officer must provide notice to the

offender that his ARP is either being accepted and will be processed, or being rejected

and will not be processed until any noted deficiency is corrected. See id. §

325(I)(1)(a)(i)-(ii). The grievance letter should be written within 90 days of the alleged

event that is the subject of the complaint. See id. at § 325(G)(1). The Warden has 40

days from the day the grievance is received to respond to the request. See id. at §

325(J)(1)(a)(ii).

The inmate may proceed to the second step of the ARP by appealing to the

Secretary of the DPSC if he or she is dissatisfied with the Warden’s response. See id.

at § 325(J)(1)(b)(i). If the inmate never receives a response to a first step grievance,

then he or she is entitled to proceed to the second step of the process upon the

expiration of the first-step response time limit. See id. at § 325(J)(1)(c). If the inmate

is not satisfied with the second-step response, he or she may then file suit in district

court. See id. at § 325(J)(1)(b)(iv).

Here, Defendants have put forth Williams’ affidavit as evidence that Plaintiff

has not exhausted his administrative remedies. See generally R. Doc. 28-2. In the

affidavit, Williams states that she has reviewed all existing ARP records for Plaintiff,

and “[n]o ARPs were filed by [Plaintiff] pertaining to the incident he alleges occurred

on September 2, 2024….” See id. at 1. And Plaintiff’s own evidence shows that he was

aware of the administrative grievance process and pursued it on other occasions.

Here, Plaintiff has provided as evidence numerous ARPs he claims that he

submitted. See generally R. Doc. 26-3. Also included in those documents attached by

Plaintiff, is a notice from the screening officer showing that an ARP submitted by

Plaintiff had been accepted, and the Warden’s Office would issue a response within

40 days. See id. at 7 & 40. However, by Plaintiff’s own admission, that ARP—RLCC-

2024-509—"had nothing to do with the incident[s]” on September 2, 2024, and

October 10, 2024. See id. at 41. Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s own evidence shows that he

did have access to the administrative remedy process and was able to successfully

submit other ARPs, and the Williams declaration shows that RLCC has no record of

Plaintiff doing so for the complained of incident. Accordingly, Defendants met their

burden of showing that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies before

filing suit.

However, Plaintiff can avoid the exhaustion requirement if he can show that

the remedy was “unavailable.” Even where such an administrative remedy process

theoretically exists and applies, however, the Supreme Court has recognized three

situations in which an administrative remedy is de facto unavailable and, thus,

exhaustion is not required: (1) where the process “operates as a simple dead end –

with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved

inmates”; (2) where the process is “so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking,

incapable of use”; and (3) “when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking

advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or

intimidation.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643–44 (2016). But the Fifth Circuit has

explained that “[e]xceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply only in

‘extraordinary circumstances,’ and [the plaintiff] bears the burden of demonstrating

the futility of administrative review.” Schipke v. Van Buren, 239 F. App'x 85, 86 (5th

Cir. 2007) (citing Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994)); see Amos v. Cain, No.

20-7, 2021 WL 1080518, at *7 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 19, 2021) (explaining that the

“defendants have shown that [plaintiff] failed to exhaust a generally available

remedy” through a declaration stating that none of the plaintiffs “submitted a

grievance related to any claim at issue here, much less pursued such a claim to

conclusion,” and that, thereafter, “the burden shifts to the plaintiffs to show that the

generally available remedy was, in fact, unavailable”).

Plaintiff contends that the second step was not available to him until the prison

responded to his first-step grievance. See R. Doc. 29 at 3–4. According to Plaintiff, by

“refusing to process the ARP, [RLCC] blocked [Plaintiff] from advancing to Step Two.”

See id. at 3. That is incorrect. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “a prisoner who does

not receive a timely response to his initial ARP is not prevented from filing a second-

step ARP.” See Bargher v. White, 928 F.3d 439, 447 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Dillon, 596

F.3d at 266 and La. Admin. Code tit. 22, pt. I, § 325(J)(1)(c) (“expiration of response

time limits shall entitle the offender to move on to the next step in the process.”)); see

also Wilson v. Epps, 776 F.3d 296, 301 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he prison’s failure to timely

respond simply entitles the prisoner to move on to the next step in the grievance

process.”).

Plaintiff seemed to be aware of this because his Amended Complaint states

that he “has appealed to the [DPSC] headquarters in Baton Rouge to attempt to have

his ARP processed to the second step.” See R. Doc. 11 at 2. However, in his declaration,

Plaintiff claims that “the ARP/letter was intercepted by RLCC staff.” See R. Doc. 26-

3 at 1. But Plaintiff’s claim that the letter was intercepted by RLCC staff is not

substantiated by the record. Plaintiff cites to pages 78 and 79 of his attached exhibit

as evidence that RLCC staff, specifically Williams, prevented Plaintiff from

submitting his appeal to DPSC headquarters. See R. Doc. 26-4 at 2. However,

Plaintiff’s attached exhibit is only 61 pages long. See R. Doc. 26-3. And Rule 56 “does

not impose on the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence

to support” a party’s motion for, or opposition to, summary judgment. Skotak v.

Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992). Instead, parties should

“identify specific evidence in the record, and ... articulate the ‘precise manner’ in

which that evidence support[s] their claim.” Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th

Cir. 1994) (citing Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir. 1992) (other

citation omitted)). Plaintiff failed to do so here.

Further, to the extent that Plaintiff did attempt to proceed to the second step,

he makes no claim that he did so in a timely manner. The record includes a letter

from Plaintiff’s counsel that indicates counsel received copies of seven ARPs from

Plaintiff on October 18, 2024. See R. Doc. 26-3 at 2. Of those ARPs, the most recent

one is dated October 13, 2024. See id. at 55. Based on Louisiana’s Administrative

Remedy Procedure, no more than 90 days from the initiation (submitting the ARP) to

completion shall elapse. See La. Admin. Code Tit. 22, Pt. I, § 325(J)(1)(c) (“No more

than 90 days from the initiation to completion of the process shall elapse, unless an

extension has been granted.”). So, giving Plaintiff the full benefit of the doubt, he had

at most 90 days from October 13, 2024, to submit his appeal to the DPSC, or until

January 12, 2025. But Plaintiff’s attached exhibits are devoid of facts indicating that

he sent—or attempted to send—his appeal to the DPSC by that date. In fact, the only

date on the letter he sent to his counsel claiming that RLCC staff intercepted his

appeal to the DPSC is the date that the letter was received by his counsel’s office on

July 3, 2025, well after the 90-day period limit. See R. Doc. 26-3 at 57. Thus, Plaintiff

is unable to show that he proceeded to the second step of Louisiana’s Administrative

Remedy Process in a timely manner.

Because Plaintiff has not shown through competent summary judgment

evidence that RLCC staff prevented him from submitting his appeal to DPSC

headquarters or that his appeal was made in a timely manner, he has not met his

burden of showing that the administrative remedy was unavailable to him. As such,

he failed to exhaust the required administrative remedies before bringing this suit

while incarcerated. Accordingly, Plaintiffs suit is dismissed without prejudice.

Bargher, 928 F.3d at 447 (“Failure to exhaust ... warrants dismissal without

prejudice ....”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R.

Doc. 26) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings (R. Doc. 23) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 17th day of July, 2026.

Topics

EDWARDS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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