Kanayo Derhem v. Bay House Miami Condominium Association

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-13378

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

KANAYO DERHEM,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BAY HOUSE MIAMI CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,

CHARLES BRUMSTED, JR.,

SEAN ZAHNISER,

MIKE DESIMONE,

JAMES PINKERT, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-22318-KMW

____________________

Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM:

In June 2020, Kanayo Derhem sued ten defendants, alleging

claims of housing discrimination and hostile environment under

the Fair Housing Act and state law. The district court granted

summary judgment in the defendants’ favor. Derhem, pro se on

appeal, raises various arguments in support of reversal. None of

them have merit, so we affirm.

I.

In early 2019, Derhem and a co-purchaser, Mojtaba Koosej,

bought a three-bedroom condominium unit in Miami, Florida,

located within the Bay House Miami Condominium Association.

In doing so, Derhem and Koosej agreed to abide by all the

Association’s rules and regulations. But in the months after they

took title, the Association alleged that Derhem and Koosej

continuously broke the rules—namely, by hosting unregistered

visitors, leasing rooms within their unit to short-term renters

through Airbnb and other platforms, cloning key fobs for

unauthorized guests, leaving pet feces in common areas, covering

security cameras, and more. In response, the Association levied

fines against Derhem and Koosej for each of those violations and

suspended their right to use the building’s amenities until those

fines were paid.

The friction only escalated as time went on, and in June

2020, Derhem filed a complaint against ten defendants, including

the Association, the President of its Board of Directors, Charles

Brumsted, Jr., the other board members, the grievance committee

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24-13378 Opinion of the Court 3

members, and the building’s property manager. Derhem, a black

transgender woman, alleged that the defendants violated the Fair

Housing Act and state law by pursuing “meritless” rule violations

and imposing fines on a discriminatory basis. According to the

complaint, the defendants would not have taken those actions but

for Derhem’s race and sex.

After the defendants filed motions to dismiss, Derhem

amended the complaint, adding forty-eight additional paragraphs

of allegations. The defendants again moved to dismiss, and the

district court granted those motions in part. Derhem then filed the

second amended complaint, which added Koosej as a co-plaintiff

and included six counts. 1 The defendants filed yet another motion

to dismiss, this time objecting that Derhem improperly amended

certain counts.

Meanwhile, the discovery deadline came and went, and the

defendants filed a joint motion for summary judgment. In

September 2024, the district court entered an omnibus order

granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and motion for

summary judgment in full. See Derhem v. Bay House Miami Condo.

Ass’n, No. 20-22318-CV, 2024 WL 5516579, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 23,

2024). 2 The court entered final judgment for the defendants, and

Derhem timely appealed.

1 Koosej is not a party to this appeal.

2 The district court described this case’s “torturous procedural history.”

Derhem, 2024 WL 5516579, at *3. Derhem, the court said, “repeatedly failed

to adhere to Court practices, procedures, and deadlines,” and fluctuated

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II.

“We review a district court’s decision to use its inherent

power to strike a pleading for abuse of discretion.” United States ex

rel Sedona Partners LLC v. Able Moving & Storage Inc., 146 F.4th 1032,

1045 n.8 (11th Cir. 2025). We review a district court’s summary

judgment ruling de novo, viewing the evidence and drawing all

reasonable factual inferences in the nonmoving party’s favor. See

McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 2024).

III.

Derhem first contends that the district court abused its

discretion by striking certain factual allegations from the second

amended complaint. “We have explained that a district court has

the inherent power to strike a pleading so that it can enforce its

orders and ensure prompt disposition of legal actions.” Able Moving

& Storage, 146 F.4th at 1045 n.8 (quotation omitted). It also has

“extensive discretion” to disallow an amendment to the complaint

when it would cause undue prejudice to the opposing party.

Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 1999)

(quotation omitted).

between counsels and appearing pro se. Id. The result was a “nearly

unintelligible record,” which required “the Court to attempt to piece together

Plaintiffs’ arguments and evidence through various disparate filings.” Id.

Derhem’s appeal does not fare much better; in fact, the appellant’s brief

includes few citations to legal authorities. Still, we liberally construe pro se

filings. See Carmichael v. United States, 966 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020).

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When the district court partially dismissed the first amended

complaint, it gave Derhem leave to amend for a limited purpose:

to correct a name and to add Koosej as an indispensable party. Yet

the second amended complaint did more; it included new factual

allegations, which altered the theories of liability. Not only were

those allegations known to Derhem when the first complaint was

filed, but discovery had already closed. Because allowing Derhem

to proceed on new theories would unfairly prejudice the

defendants, the district court acted well within its discretion in

striking the new allegations and disallowing further amendments.

IV.

Next up is the district court’s summary judgment grant to

the defendants on Derhem’s intentional discrimination and hostile

living environment claims under the Fair Housing Act. 3 The Fair

Housing Act makes it unlawful to discriminate against any person

in the sale or rental of a dwelling “because of race, color, religion,

sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). When

interpreting that Act, we “look to cases interpreting Title VII,

which uses language virtually identical to the FHA’s.” Fox v.

Gaines, 4 F.4th 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2021).

3 Although the second amended complaint included six counts, Derhem

develops an argument only with respect to the Fair Housing Act claims on

appeal. Derhem has thus abandoned any arguments related to the other

counts. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we

read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro

se litigant are deemed abandoned.” (citation omitted)).

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To prevail on a disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff may

present “direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or both.” Tynes

v. Fla. Dep’t of Juv. Just., 88 F.4th 939, 944 (11th Cir. 2023). Evidence

is “direct” in this context if it “proves existence of the fact in issue

without inference or presumption.” Sailboat Bend Sober Living, LLC

v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 46 F.4th 1268, 1281 (11th Cir. 2022)

(alteration adopted and quotation omitted). For direct evidence,

Derhem alleges that after a grievance committee meeting,

Brumsted, the President of the Board, referred to Derhem as a

“monkey” in a conversation with some of the committee

members. 4 But “remarks by non-decisionmakers or remarks

unrelated to the decisionmaking process itself are not direct

evidence of discrimination.” Harris v. Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade

Cnty., 82 F.4th 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted).

Brumsted did not have the final say about whether to impose fines,

and the decisionmaking process was not actively ongoing at the

time the comment was made. So the one-off remark—while

undoubtedly repugnant, if true—does not qualify as direct

evidence of discrimination in this context.

4 Derhem presses other evidence, too, including Brumsted questioning

whether Derhem could have children while referring to the building as

“family-oriented.” Because that remark requires an inference that Brumsted

was referencing Derhem’s gender identity, it does not qualify as direct

evidence. See Harris v. Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 82 F.4th 1296, 1301

(11th Cir. 2023) (“We have held that only the most blatant remarks, whose

intent could be nothing other than to discriminate, constitute direct evidence

of discrimination.” (quotation omitted)).

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Moving on to circumstantial evidence, the district court—

drawing on both the McDonnell Douglas and “convincing mosaic”

frameworks—concluded that Derhem failed to present enough

evidence to get past summary judgment, and we agree. See Derhem,

2024 WL 5516579, at *8–9. Derhem suggests that the defendants’

discriminatory animus was the reason that they imposed fines and

suspended amenity access for purported rule violations.5 The

evidence primarily consists of comments that Derhem said

Brumsted made: calling Derhem a “monkey” and a “disgrace” to

the building, suggesting that Derhem file a discrimination

complaint for the elevators taking too long, asking whether a black

individual with Derhem was an illegal Airbnb renter, and asking

whether Derhem could have kids.

The defendants, however, presented ample evidence that

Derhem violated the Association’s rules “on a constant and

ongoing basis.” The Association’s governing documents clearly

allow for fines and suspensions to be imposed for those violations.

Plus, Derhem was not the only one who racked up fines; many

residents faced similar consequences when they broke the rules. So

the evidence reveals that Derhem’s rule violations were the real

5 Another claimed adverse action is that the Association took an unreasonable

amount of time to approve Derhem and Koosej’s application for occupancy,

but the record evidence shows that their application was approved within a

similar timeframe as all the others submitted that year. And despite

arguments to the contrary, Derhem also had an opportunity to run for a

position on the Association’s board.

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reason the Association took action, rather than discriminatory

animus.

Derhem responds that the Association allowed other

residents to have roommates, but again the record reveals the

whole story. Other residents entered into rental agreements with

the Association to split their unit; Derhem did not. Because

Derhem did not follow the rules, the defendants took the

reasonable step of imposing fines, and when those fines were not

paid, suspending amenity access. There is simply not enough

evidence to show that the real reason for the adverse actions was

illegal discrimination. See Tynes, 88 F.4th at 941.

Derhem’s claim that the defendants created a hostile

housing environment meets a similar fate. To prevail on that

claim, Derhem needed to show that race- or sex-based harassment

was “sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with or

deprive the plaintiff of her right to use or enjoy her home.” Fox, 4

F.4th at 1296 n.6 (alteration adopted and quotation omitted); see

also Smelter v. S. Home Care Servs. Inc., 904 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir.

2018). Derhem again emphasizes Brumsted’s alleged “monkey”

comment, but a single racial epithet, as abhorrent as it is, does not

suffice to establish a hostile environment claim. See Tonkyro v.

Sec’y, Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 995 F.3d 828, 837 (11th Cir. 2021).

Taking that comment together with the other evidence Derhem

presented, a reasonable jury would not find that the defendants

created a hostile housing environment. See Fox, 4 F.4th at 1296 n.6.

Accordingly, Derhem’s Fair Housing Act claims fail.

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V.

Derhem also contends that the district court failed to enter

a separate judgment as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

58(a). However, final judgment was entered in a separate

document following the district court’s omnibus order that

disposed of all remaining claims in the action. Although Derhem

appears to suggest that the separate document needed to note that

some claims were dismissed, rather than resolved on summary

judgment, nothing in the federal rules nor our caselaw requires as

much. Because the district court fully complied with Rule 58(a),

this claim is meritless.

VI.

Finally, Derhem raises a handful of arguments that were not

raised in the district court: that the district court’s order conflicted

with rulings from Florida’s Department of Business and

Professional Regulation, that Koosej was denied an opportunity to

conduct discovery, and that former counsel was responsible for any

errors in the summary judgment briefing. Derhem also claims, for

the first time in the reply brief, that the district court erred in

granting prevailing party fees to the defendants. These claims are

not properly before us, so we do not consider them. See Access Now,

Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004).

To the extent that Derhem argues that the district judge was

biased in the defendants’ favor, that claim fails, too. The only basis

for Derhem’s argument is that the district court rendered “a

disproportionate number of rulings” in the defendant’s favor, but

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under our case law, adverse rulings alone cannot establish

improper judicial bias. See Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents of Fla.,

708 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir. 1983). For that reason, reversal is not

warranted on this ground.

* * *

We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 6

6 We also DENY Derhem’s motion to strike the defendants’ brief as moot.