Greer

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 3:25-cv-00142-MR-DCK

CHRISTOPHER SHANE GREER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) MEMORANDUM OF

KYLE MITCHELL, et al., ) DECISION AND ORDER

)

Defendants. )

___________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants Vernon Richards

and Kyle Mitchell’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 27].

I. BACKGROUND

The pro se Plaintiff, Christopher Shane Greer (“Greer” or simply, “the

Plaintiff”), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 addressing incidents

that allegedly occurred while he was incarcerated at the Gaston Correctional

Center.1 The unverified Amended Complaint2 passed initial review with

1 The Plaintiff’s present address of record is at the Granville Correctional Institution, but

the North Carolina Department of Adult Corrections website indicates that he is located

at the Scotland Correctional Institution. The Plaintiff is informed that it is his responsibility

to keep the Court apprised of his current address at all time. [See Standing Order of

Instructions]. The Court will instruct the Clerk to mail the Plaintiff this Order at both

addresses as a courtesy.

2 The original Complaint, which failed initial review, was also unverified. [See Docs. 1, 5].

regard to an incident that allegedly occurred on October 4, 2024. [Doc. 9:

Am. Compl.; Doc. 10: Order on Initial Review]. Presently pending are claims

that Defendant Kyle Mitchell violated the Eighth Amendment by instructing

other inmates to beat the Plaintiff when the Plaintiff refused to transport

tobacco at Mitchell’s request, and against Warden Vernon Richards on a

theory of supervisory liability.

The Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. [Doc. 27: MSJ;

see Doc. 28 Memo. and Exh.; Doc. 30: Medical Exh.]. Thereafter, the Court

entered an order in accordance with Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309

(4th Cir. 1975), advising the Plaintiff of the requirements for filing a response

to Defendant’s summary judgment motion and of the manner in which

evidence could be submitted to the Court. [Doc. 31: Roseboro Order]. The

Plaintiff has not responded and the time to do so has expired. This matter is

ripe for disposition.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is

genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). A fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under

governing law. Id.

The movant has the “initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)

(internal citations omitted).

Once this initial burden is met, the burden shifts to the nonmoving

party. The nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 322 n.3. The nonmoving party may not

rely upon mere allegations or denials of allegations in his pleadings to defeat

a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 324. Rather, the nonmoving party

must oppose a proper summary judgment motion with citation to

“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations …, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other

materials” in the record. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(a). Namely, the

nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence from which “a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248. To that end, only evidence admissible at trial may be considered by the

Court on summary judgment. Kennedy v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 269 F.

App’x 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

When ruling on a summary judgment motion, a court must view the

evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Facts, however, “must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a

‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127

S.Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). As the Supreme Court has emphasized,

“[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under

Rule 56(c), the opponent must do more than simply

show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts …. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”

Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986) (footnote

omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual

dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise

properly supported motion for summary judgment; the

requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material

fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

247-28, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). When opposing parties

tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury

could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of

the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary

judgment.

Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following is a summary of the relevant portions of the undisputed

forecast of evidence.3

The Plaintiff, who has been incarcerated in the NCDAC since 2023,

entered the Gaston CC on September 12, 2024. [Doc. 28-1: MSJ Ex at 10

(OPUS Info. Screen)].

On October 4, 2024, the Plaintiff sought emergency medical treatment,

stating that four or five inmates had dragged him into the bathroom and beat

him for having unwittingly moved a chair that was used to charge contraband

cell phones. [Doc. 28-3: Heinsius Decl. at ¶ 3; see Doc. 30: Med. Ex. at 1

(Octo 4, 2024 Clinical Encounter)]. The Plaintiff provided the names of four

of his attackers. [See Doc. 28-2: MSJ Ex at 3 (Harris stmt.); Doc. 30 at 1].

At no time during his treatment did the Plaintiff accuse a Gaston CC

staff member of threatening him or of orchestrating the attack. [Doc. 28-3:

Heinsius Decl. at ¶ 5]. Nor did the Plaintiff accuse any Gaston CC staff of

being involved in the attack during an investigation of the incident. [Doc. 28-

2: Kohnen4 Decl. at ¶ 4; Doc. 28-1: MSJ Ex at 13 (Plaintiff stmt.)].

3 As the Complaint and Amended Complaint are both unverified, they cannot be

considered on summary judgment as a forecast of evidence. See Goodman v. Diggs, 986

F.3d 493, 498-99 (4th Cir. 2021) (noting that a verified complaint is the equivalent of an

opposing affidavit for summary judgment purposes).

4 Sergeant Lance Kohnen, who investigated the incident, is not a defendant in this case.

Vernon Richards was the Warden at Gaston CC from August 2023 to

June 2024. [Doc. 28-4: Richards Decl. at ¶ 2]. Richards was placed on

Family Medical Leave in June 2024, and he retired in November 2025. [Id.

at ¶ 3]. Richards was not the acting warden of Gaston CC on October 4,

2024. [Id.]. During his tenure as warden at Gaston CC, Richards ensured

that there was at least one sergeant and one correctional officer monitoring

the dorms, and at least one officer monitoring the yard. [Id. at ¶ 7]. Richards

was unaware of any allegations or misconduct by Officer Mitchell concerning

contraband and/or ordering the assault of inmates while Richards was

warden. [Id. at ¶ 8].

Kyle Mitchell was a correctional officer at the Gaston CC, assigned to

the first shift mid-yard post, at the relevant time. [Doc. 28-5: Mitchell Decl. at

¶¶ 2-3]. He did not have any communication with the Plaintiff prior to October

4, 2024. [Id. at ¶ 4]. Officer Mitchell did not threaten Plaintiff or direct Plaintiff

to possess tobacco. [Id. at ¶ 5]. Officer Mitchell did not know the four inmates

who were implicated in the attack, and he did not direct any inmate to assault

the Plaintiff. [Id. at ¶¶ 6-7].

IV. DISCUSSION

“Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quotation marks omitted). The Eighth Amendment

prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments,” U.S. CONST.

amend. VIII, and protects prisoners from the “unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).

The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

imposes on prison officials a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the

hands of other prisoners and other prison officials. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at

833. Still, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another

. . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the

victim’s safety.” Id. at 834. To prevail on a claim against a prison official for

failure to protect, an inmate must show: (1) “serious or significant physical or

emotional injury,” and (2) that prison officials exhibited deliberate indifference

to inmate health or safety.” De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th

Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). To demonstrate deliberate

indifference, the inmate “must show both (1) ‘that the [prison] official in

question subjectively recognized a substantial risk of harm’ and (2) that the

official also ‘subjectively recognized’ that any actions he took in response

‘were inappropriate in light of that risk.’” Ford v. Hooks, 108 F.4th 224, 230

(Jul. 2, 2024) (quoting Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303

(4th Cir. 2004) (cleaned up)). It is not enough that the prison official should

have recognized the risk and the inadequacy of his response. Id. Instead,

the official “actually must have perceived” both. Parrish, 372 F.3d at 302-03

(“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard,” and “a showing of mere

negligence will not meet it”) (quoting Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695

(4th Cir. 1999)).

To establish liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff “must

affirmatively show that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation

of [his] rights.” Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171 (4th Cir. 2018)

(cleaned up); see Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)

(citation omitted). Mere knowledge of a deprivation is insufficient.

Williamson, 912 F.3d at 171. As such, the doctrine of respondeat superior

does not apply in actions brought under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). While personal involvement is required, it

need not be “hands-on.” Riddick v. Barber, 109 F.4th 649 (4th Cir. 2024).

“Instead, the ‘requisite causal connection’ between defendant and violation

can be established if the defendant ‘set[s] in motion a series of acts by others

which the actor[ ] know[s] or reasonably should know would cause others to

inflict the constitutional injury.’” Id. at 649-50 (citing Amisi v. Brooks, 93 F.4th

659, 670 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (establishing

liability for a person who “subjects, or causes to be subjected,” another

person to a deprivation of constitutional rights)).

Here, the undisputed forecast of evidence demonstrates that

Defendant Mitchell had never communicated with the Plaintiff prior to

October 4; he did not threaten Plaintiff; he never directed Plaintiff to possess

tobacco; he did not know the inmates who assaulted the Plaintiff; and he did

not direct any inmates to assault Plaintiff. As there is no forecast of evidence

that Defendant Mitchell violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights,

summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendant Mitchell.

The undisputed forecast of evidence further demonstrates that

Defendant Richards went on family leave before the Plaintiff arrived at the

Gaston CC in September 2024, and he was not the acting warden when

Plaintiff was attacked on October 4, 2024. The forecast of evidence

demonstrates that Defendant Richards had no involvement in the incident at

issue whatsoever such that there is no basis for a supervisory liability claim.

Summary judgment will, therefore, be granted in favor of Defendant

Richards.

“Qualified immunity protects officers who commit constitutional

violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could reasonably

believe that their actions were lawful.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531

(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). “To determine whether an officer is entitled to

qualified immunity, the court must examine (1) whether the plaintiff has

demonstrated that the officer violated a constitutional right and (2) whether

that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.” E.W.

ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The doctrine of qualified immunity “gives government

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments and

protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

As discussed supra, the Plaintiff has not presented a forecast of

evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the Defendants

violated his constitutional rights. As such, summary judgment for the

Defendants would also be proper on the basis of qualified immunity.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment is granted, and this action is dismissed with prejudice.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. 27] is GRANTED, and this action is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

The Clerk is respectfully instructed to enter a Clerk’s Judgment in favor

of the Defendants and to close this case.

Further, the Clerk is instructed to mail the Plaintiff a copy of this Order

at his address of record and to him as follows: Christopher Shane Greer,

Offender No. 0620836, Scotland Correctional Institution, 22385 McGirts

Bridge Road, Laurinburg, NC 28353.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: August 6, 2026

Martifi Reidinger ey

Chief United States District Judge AS

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