Hardemon

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 25-cv-22659-ALTMAN

NEIGHBORS AND NEIGHBORS

ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

KEON HARDEMON, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

ORDER

Our Plaintiff sought to extend its deadline to build affordable housing under a county-

sponsored program. But it alleges that a county commissioner refused to support an extension and

attempted instead to freeze its funding—all because the Plaintiff supported a political rival. We

previously dismissed this action, finding that the commissioner enjoys legislative immunity and that

the Plaintiff failed to state claims against the county. Now that our Plaintiff has amended its complaint,

the Defendants move again to dismiss its claims. After careful review, we GRANT in part and

DENY in part the Defendants’ motion.

THE FACTS

Our Plaintiff—Neighbors and Neighbors Association, Inc. (“NANA”)—is a “non-profit

organization focused on promoting small business development and affordable housing in historically

underserved and economically disadvantaged areas” in Miami-Dade County (the “County”). Amended

Complaint (the “AC”) [ECF No. 1] ¶ 21. It participates in the County’s Infill Housing Program (the

“Program”), which aims to “address the affordable housing crisis” by “transfer[ring] surplus County-

owned parcels to both for-profit and nonprofit developers at nominal costs, with the goal of

constructing single-family homes and multi-family rental units for low- and middle-income residents.”

Id. ¶¶ 15–16. In 2016, the Plaintiff received thirty-five properties through the Program. See id. ¶ 24.

But, under the Program, “deeds [are] granted subject to the standard . . . condition that construction

be completed within two years for . . . single-family and duplex lots or five years for . . . multifamily

projects.” Id. ¶ 28. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Plaintiff “encountered significant delays,”

including “labor shortages and supply chain disruptions.” Id. ¶ 31.

So, “beginning in August 2022,” the Plaintiff sought to “extend the development deadlines

for . . . thirty incomplete properties.” Id. ¶ 37. To do so, it “engaged in a series of communications”

with Keon Hardemon, the County Commissioner “representing County Commission District 3,”

which “encompasses Liberty City, Little Haiti, and Allapattah.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 37. “In 2022 and 2023,

Commissioner Hardemon introduced resolutions related to deed extensions and other matters

concerning the lots.” Id. ¶ 38. Once he did, the County Commission “unanimously approved the

proposed extensions,” ibid., which gave the Plaintiff until January 31, 2024, to complete construction,

see id. ¶ 39.

In November 2023, our Plaintiff sought another extension. According to the Plaintiff,

“Commissioner Hardemon . . . committed in writing to support” that latest extension. Id. ¶ 46. But

things changed during the “2024 District 3 Commission election,” when the Plaintiff supported

Audrey Edmonson—Hardemon’s “long-standing political rival[ ]”—in her bid to “retake the seat

from Commissioner Hardemon.” Id. ¶¶ 43, 45; see also id. ¶¶ 43, 45 (“NANA’s Executive Director,

Leroy Jones[,] . . . was an outspoken supporter of Edmonson during the campaign—publicly

endorsing her, participating in campaign events, speaking on her behalf at community meetings, and

routinely criticizing Commissioner Hardemon in various media appearances.”). Trying to “exact

political revenge,” our Plaintiff alleges, Hardemon took two steps to “crippl[e]” the Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 62.

First, he “unreasonably refused to submit the extension resolution to the County Commission.” Id.

¶ 69. Second, at a January 22, 2025 meeting of the County Commissioners, Hardemon “made a series

of disparaging remarks about NANA” and “then moved for the immediate suspension of all payments

to . . . NANA.” Id. ¶ 52; see also ibid. (“[Hardemon] liken[ed] the organization to a ‘gang’ and accus[ed]

it of engaging in behavior akin to ‘terrorism.’ He . . . further stated that he did not feel comfortable

allocating public funds to individuals who, in his view, were threatening him and his family.”). “On

Hardemon’s motion, the County Commission voted to suspend NANA’s county funding pending a

compliance audit.” Id. ¶ 86. “Ultimately, as a part of the Commission’s suspension of NANA’s

funding, a review conducted by the Mayor’s Office concluded that NANA was in compliance with all

applicable grant program requirements for eighteen of the nineteen grants it held with Miami-Dade

County.” Id. ¶ 61. “The sole exception to NANA’s compliance was the Infill Program”—with which

it was not in compliance, we’re told, “only because of Commissioner Hardemon’s unwillingness to

bring an extension resolution to the County Commission.” Ibid.; see also id. ¶ 58–59 (“While the freeze

ended up being temporary, it damaged NANA, as it required the diversion of staff resources to deal

with the looming crisis. NANA’s board had to hold up multiple meetings to develop plans and

strategies for what would happen if the freeze was made permanent, exploring loans and alternative

sources of funding to keep the organization afloat.”).

On February 25, 2025, our Plaintiff received notice that “NANA’s Program lots were in

default.” Id. ¶ 63. According to the Plaintiff, that notice warned that “unless the default was cured in

30 days . . . , the County could exercise its option to revert the thirty properties[.]” Ibid. “On October

21, 2025, the County Mayor presented a quarterly report on County property conveyances” in which

the “County administrative staff recommended that the County Commission should take final action

to revert all thirty of NANA’s program lots by voting on deed reversions.” Id. ¶ 64.1

1 The Defendants contend that the AC “is clear that the County has not reverted the deeds,”

Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 43] at 20 n.9, and the Plaintiff never argues otherwise.

In June 2025, the Plaintiff sued both Hardemon and the County (collectively, the

“Defendants”), alleging First Amendment retaliation, due-process violations, equal-protection

violations, and a breach of contract. See Complaint [ECF No. 1]. In November 2025, we granted the

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 17], finding that legislative immunity shielded Hardemon

from suit, that the Plaintiff failed to establish Monell liability, and that the Plaintiff failed to state a

procedural-due-process claim against the County. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss (the

“Order”) [ECF No. 39]. But we gave the Plaintiff leave to amend. See id. at 19.

In December 2025, the Plaintiff filed the operative AC, adding factual allegations to its

previous claims against the Defendants. That same month, the Defendants filed a renewed Motion to

Dismiss (the “MTD”) [ECF No. 43].2 This Order follows.

THE LAW

“To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Megladon, Inc. v.

Vill. of Pinecrest, 661 F. Supp. 3d 1214, 1221 (S.D. Fla. 2023) (Altman, J.) (cleaned up). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept all factual allegations in

a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, but legal conclusions without

adequate factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth.” Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832

F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).

2 That MTD is now ripe for adjudication. See Response in Opposition to the MTD (the

“Response”) [ECF No. 47]; Reply in Support of the MTD (the “Reply”) [ECF No. 50].

ANALYSIS

The Defendants again move to dismiss on two main grounds. First, they say that Hardemon

is entitled to legislative immunity. Second, they maintain that the Plaintiff fails to state claims against

the County. We address those arguments in turn.3

I. The Claims Against Hardemon

We previously found that “legislative immunity shields Hardemon from our Plaintiff’s claims.”

Order at 8; see also id. at 12 (“In declining to put forward an extension vote, and in moving to cut

funding, Hardemon engaged in discretionary choices related to the deliberative and communicative

processes by which legislators pass laws. Those choices may not have been undertaken in a strictly

rulemaking capacity. But they impact how the Program appropriates funds, distributes land, and

alleviates a housing crisis. And that means they concern public policy.” (cleaned up)).

Our Plaintiff now offers three new allegations to “clarif[y] why Hardemon’s role . . . was

administrative rather than policymaking.” Response at 3. First, it alleges that, “[i]f a lot is reverted to

County inventory, it is simply allocated to another Infill Program participant who desires to develop

it.” AC ¶ 19. Second, the Plaintiff claims that any reversion “will be insignificant” in relation to “public

policy and the ongoing housing crisis,” since NANA has only “29” of the “1438 parcels deeded under

the Infill Program”—“a mere 2% of the total program lots and 3.9% of the 737 lots located in District

3.” Id. ¶ 65. Third, it alleges that, “[u]pon reversion, these lots will be distributed to another developer

who will have at least two years under Program guidelines to develop the properties into affordable

housing,” and that “the identity of the developer is an administrative decision with no policy impact.”

Id. ¶ 66; see also id. ¶ 92 (“Hardemon’s actions were not legislative in nature in that they had no

3 Our Order opened by “confirming that our Plaintiff has Article III standing.” Order at 4.

The latest MTD doesn’t challenge that holding, and we see no reason to revisit this issue here. See id.

at 4–7.

appreciable impact on public policy or involve typical legislative priorities such as budgeting or policy

making. Nor did they, or will they, have a significant impact on a meaningful number of Hardemon’s

District 3 constituents.”).

Taken together, our Plaintiff believes that these allegations do two things. One, by

“highlight[ing] that, if NANA’s Program lots are reverted, the lots will remain part of the Infill

Housing Program inventory because they will remain earmarked for development of low-income

housing,” the Plaintiff says, the AC “establish[es] that the process is an administrative distribution of

resources that have already been allocated.” Response at 4; see also ibid. (“If reverted from NANA,

another Infill Program participant who desires to develop it will be allocated the lots to develop the

low-income housing on them.” (quotation marks omitted)). Two, by making “clearer by the numbers

that Hardemon’s and the County’s actions in forcing the reversion do not have broad-ranging policy

implications for affordable housing in Miami-Dade County,” the Plaintiff believes, the AC reveals that

Hardemon engaged in “a surgical strike designed to cripple NANA, as opposed to a shift in policy or

legislative goals with respect to low-income housing.” Id. at 3–4.

We remain unpersuaded. That the County may eventually redistribute NANA’s lots to another

developer doesn’t change the fact that “Hardemon’s actions will impact a large swath of Liberty City

residents and will shape the operation of a governmental program.” Order at 15. The AC in fact

concedes that a reversion will “affect[ ] the community at large,” ibid. (quoting Fowler-Nash v. Dem.

Caucus of Pa. House of Reps., 469 F.3d 328, 338 (3d Cir. 2006)), because, “as a matter of policy[,] those

low- and middle-income residents of District 3 who qualify for the Program will still be waiting for

those lots to be developed,” AC ¶ 66. And the mere fact that NANA’s properties represent only 3.9%

of District 3 lots doesn’t negate the reality that this action “concerns not one parcel of land, but thirty

lots designated for single-family, duplex development, and multifamily development.” Order at 13

(quotation marks omitted & emphasis added). Indeed, nothing in our Order imposed a numerical

threshold for measuring the impact of a “joint public-private venture through which [a]

City . . . expand[s] affordable housing options for its residents by contributing substantial municipal

resources.” NRP Holdings LLC v. City of Buffalo, 916 F.3d 177, 193 (2d Cir. 2019). We thus agree with

the Defendants that the AC “does not add any facts that materially alter the Court’s legislative

immunity ruling.” MTD at 7.

Our prior legislative-immunity finding focused on the fact that the Plaintiff “worked as an

extension of a governmental entity to resolve a city-wide problem,” that “the project at issue affects

large-scale municipal resources,” and that Hardemon took actions that “jeopardized the viability of

the project[ ].” Order at 12. Those factors remain true today, notwithstanding the new allegations

we’ve highlighted above. So, even if the Plaintiff’s lots comprise a fraction of the total Program

deeds—and even if those lots end up being built out by someone else—Hardemon’s actions, as the

AC acknowledges, still inflict a substantially similar “harm[ ]” on the “constituents in District 3.” AC

¶ 74. After all, another developer “will have at least two years . . . to develop the properties into

affordable housing,” all while “low- and middle-income residents . . . wait[ ] for those lots to be

developed.” Id. ¶ 66; see also id. ¶ 51 (quoting Jones’s speech to the Commission explaining that “this

is unfair . . . [to] people [whose] credit is on the line [and who] cannot move in their house because

we’re waiting on an extension so they can complete their houses”).

On the record before us, then, the animating principle of our prior Order applies with equal

force today: “Hardemon engaged in discretionary choices” that “impact[ed] how the Program

appropriates funds, distributes land, and alleviates a housing crisis.” Ibid. The new allegations fail to

change that reality. And the AC’s insistence that Hardemon played only an “administrative” role, AC

¶ 134, amounts to a legal conclusion we’re not bound to accept, see Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis,

297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or

legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.”). We therefore—once again—

dismiss all claims against Hardemon.

II. The Claims Against the County

That leaves only the Plaintiff’s claims against the County. Two such counts—Counts II and

V—assert Monell claims for First and Fourteenth Amendment violations. See AC ¶¶ 97–107, 124–130;

see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Another—Count III—advances a

procedural-due-process claim. See id. ¶¶ 108–115. And a fourth—Count VI—seeks “[i]njunctive

[r]elief” against both Defendants. See id. ¶¶ 131–144. Our prior Order found both that the Plaintiff had

failed to overcome the Monell hurdle and that it hadn’t sufficiently pled a procedural-due-process claim.

See Order at 16–20. Our Plaintiff now adds new allegations that (it believes) “cure” any such

“deficiencies.” Response at 5. We agree, except as to Count VI.

a. Liability

“Under the Monell line of cases, a municipality does not incur Section 1983 liability solely

because of its employer-employee relationship with an alleged wrongdoer.” Huggins v. Sch. Dist. of

Manatee Cnty., 151 F.4th 1268, 1285 (11th Cir. 2025). See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692–

94 (1978). Instead, “a municipality may be held liable only if such constitutional torts result from an

official government policy, the actions of an official fairly deemed to represent government policy, or

a custom or practice so pervasive and well-settled that it assumes the force of law.” Doe v. Sch. Bd. of

Broward Cnty., 604 F.3d 1248, 1263 (11th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). “A plaintiff can establish municipal

liability under Monell in three ways: (1) identifying an official policy; (2) identifying an unofficial custom

or widespread practice that is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom and usage with

the force of law; or (3) identifying a municipal official with final policymaking authority whose decision

violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Tundidor v. Hernandez, 2026 WL 1800959, at *4 (S.D. Fla.

June 23, 2026) (Altman, J.) (quotation marks omitted).

We previously rejected the Plaintiff’s final-policymaking approach, finding that “the

Complaint itself . . . acknowledges that Hardemon’s attempt to inflict an immediate suspension of all

payments was temporary and subject to administrative review,” and that “any extension of a lot’s

development timeline must be approved by a vote of the full Commission.” Order at 17 (quotation

marks omitted). In this latest iteration, our Plaintiff recycles that theory—along with the same

allegations. That final-policymaker argument thus falters for the same reasons we’ve already outlined.

See MTD at 17 (noting that the AC “still concedes that any extension of the lot’s development timeline

must be approved by a vote of the full Commission” (cleaned up)).

But that’s not the end of our inquiry. Our Plaintiff now offers a second theory of Monell

liability—one based on ratification. See AC ¶ 107 (“The County’s acquiescence to Hardemon’s

decision to not allow for the funding extension, and their actual implementation of his retaliatory

freeze and audit, constitute ratification of his position as the official policy and practice of the

County.”). The Defendants contest this new theory, arguing that the AC “fails to allege that the County

Commission itself—as the entity vested with the policymaking authority for the County—acted with

any unconstitutional motive[.]” MTD at 18. The Plaintiff counters that its new allegations “show that

the County acquiesced in Hardemon’s decision, and . . . allowed Hardemon to serve as the de facto

final policy maker on whether NANA should be given an extension.” Response at 6.

“[A] municipality can be held liable on the basis of ratification when a subordinate public

official makes an unconstitutional decision and when that decision is then adopted by someone who

does have final policymaking authority.” Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2016)

(quotation marks omitted). “When plaintiffs are relying not on a pattern of unconstitutional conduct,

but on a single incident, they must demonstrate that local government policymakers had an

opportunity to review the subordinate’s decision and agreed with both the decision and the decision’s

basis before a court can hold the government liable on a ratification theory.” Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d

1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up).

At this early stage of the case, the AC does just enough to clear this hurdle. It offers six

allegations to support its claim that the “County Commission and individual Commissioners were

aware of, and acquiesced in, Commissioner Hardemon’s unlawful conduct.” AC ¶ 83. First, it says that

“Hardemon has publicly expressed animus toward NANA.” Id. ¶ 84. Second, it alleges that “NANA

contacted the Chair’s office directly and submitted the draft resolution,” only for the “Chair’s office

[to] inform[ ] NANA that the resolution would not be added to the agenda unless it was transmitted

by Commissioner Hardemon himself.” Ibid. Third, it claims that “Jones addressed a quorum of the

Commission and specifically called out Hardemon’s refusal to present the extension resolution.” Id.

¶ 85. Fourth, it avers that the “County subsequently notified NANA in February 2025 that it was in

default, issued an October 2025 staff analysis recommending reversion of the properties, and assessed

tens of thousands of dollars in citations related to NANA’s unfinished construction sites.” Ibid. Fifth,

it contends that “a quorum of the County Commission also witnessed Hardemon’s extended

denunciation of NANA” at the “January 22, 2025 meeting”—and that, “[o]n Hardemon’s motion, the

County Commission voted to suspend NANA’s county funding pending a compliance audit.” Id. ¶ 86.

And sixth, it asserts that “NANA has met with the Commissioners of Districts 6, 12, 13, the staffs of

the Commissioners for Districts 1 and 5, and the County Mayor in an attempt to get them to place

the extension resolution for a vote,” only to “be[ ] told that if the matter is going to be placed on the

agenda, it has to come from Hardemon.” Id. ¶ 87.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, we think those allegations suffice

to sustain a claim of Monell liability. Taken together, the six allegations indicate that the County knew

about and approved of Hardemon’s refusal to platform the resolution for an extension vote—and

that it did so despite knowing about his (supposedly) animus-based rationale. It’s therefore plausible to

believe that, in declining to push the resolution to a vote, the County—through its Commissioners—

assumed responsibility for Hardemon’s actions by failing to intervene.

The Defendants contend that, “although Plaintiff[ ] allege[s] that the County Commission

heard Commissioner Hardemon’s comments at the January 25, 2025 meeting, there are no allegations

that Plaintiff[ ] made the County Commission aware of any improper motivations by Commissioner

Hardemon.” Reply at 10. That argument may carry the day later in this case. But our task today is to

draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff—not to engage in a hyper-literalistic reading of

the AC. And, applying that standard, we think the Plaintiff has done enough to suggest that the

Commission was indeed aware of Hardemon’s allegedly unlawful motive—especially given the

Plaintiff’s allegation that Hardemon “publicly expressed animus toward NANA,” that NANA

“contacted the Chair’s office directly” seeking to circumvent Hardemon, that “a quorum of the

County Commission also witnessed Hardemon’s extended denunciation of NANA,” and that Jones

“addressed a quorum of the Commission and specifically called out Hardemon’s refusal to present the

extension resolution.” AC ¶¶ 84–86.

Finally, the Defendants point out that “there are a plethora of reasons that could justify the

Commission’s vote, including Plaintiff’s noncompliance with the requirements of the Infill Program.”

MTD at 17. True enough. But, at this stage of the case, the Plaintiff need only identify one viable reason

for the Commission’s decision to freeze funding and order an audit. Since the AC plausibly alleges

that the Commission made that decision with animus against the Plaintiff, it’s done enough to plead

a ratification theory under Monell.4

4 The Defendants challenge Counts II and V only on Monell grounds. Because they never argue

in the alternative that those counts fail to state a claim, we’ve no need to examine the merits of those

counts.

b. Procedural Due Process

We turn next to Count III, which asserts a procedural-due-process claim. See AC ¶¶ 108–115.

We dismissed this claim the last time around because the Plaintiff conceded that the Program allows

the County “to reclaim the property and return it to its inventory if a developer fails to meet Program

requirements.” Order at 18–19 (quotation marks omitted). The Plaintiff now tries bolstering its

allegations by claiming that “NANA has commenced construction on eight Program lots which

include the addition of affixed structures such as footers, foundational slabs, and stem walls, the

installation of ‘rough in’ plumbing and electrical pathways, and the addition of fill and wire mesh.” AC

¶ 110. “These fixtures and material improvements,” the AC adds, “are property that belongs to NANA

which it caused to be added to the deeded lots for the purpose of developing them into low- and

middle-income housing under the Program.” Ibid. The AC further asserts that, “[b]ecause the property

exists in a state of limbo, with NANA still responsible as owners of the lots but unable to develop

them due to the imminent threat of reverter, NANA has suffered and continues to suffer financial

harm,” since “NANA must expend funds to maintain the lots and to protect them from trespassers

or other nuisances and has incurred tens of thousands of dollars in citations because the lots remain

undeveloped.” Id. ¶¶ 79–80.

The Defendants believe the AC “fares no better than the Initial Complaint because it still

maintains that the developers ‘receive surplus property from the County subject to several conditions

and deed restrictions’ and that the Infill Program allows for ‘the County to reclaim the property and

return it to its inventory’ if a ‘developer fails to meet Program requirements.’” MTD at 19 (citations

omitted). Any “additional description regarding Plaintiff’s construction progress,” they insist, “is

insufficient to overcome the property-interest obstacle previously highlighted by the Court” because,

“[u]nder Florida law, such improvements to real property . . . become part of the real property.” Ibid.

In any event, the Defendants continue, “the process Plaintiff challenges is a legislative act that serves

as a condition precedent to another purely legislative act (granting or denying an extension of time)

by the full Board,” so the Plaintiff “is not entitled to any additional due process beyond what the

legislative process itself affords because Plaintiff is effectively asking for a legislative outcome.” Id. at

20; see also id. at 20 n.9 (“[T]he County’s Notice of Default allowed Plaintiff 30 days to cure any default.

Yet, Plaintiff has not alleged that it has taken any remedial action since the Notice of Default was

issued.” (citation omitted)).

Our Plaintiff parries that the AC now makes clear that the “property right at issue” isn’t “just

the right to get an extension” but “NANA’s own money and the improvements made to the lots.”

Response at 19. It argues that, as “the unintended warden of a portfolio of semi-developed or

undeveloped properties,” it is “responsible for paying upkeep costs on the lots,” and yet it “can’t just

pack up the improvements and take them home” because “the improvements of the lots are part and

parcel now and will if reverted run with the land.” Ibid. And it contends that any process the

Defendants identify is “entirely illusory”: Because “Hardemon is the only one who can put the

extension resolution up for a vote,” our Plaintiff claims, it “does not have the ability to cure the[ ]

default, to seek an extension, or to challenge Hardemon’s decision to exercise his pocket veto powers.”

Id. at 20 (quotation marks omitted).

We needn’t consider whether “expend[ing] resources and improv[ing] the lots,” Response at

19, overcomes the fact that “the County never actually transferred full ownership of the property,”

Order at 19. And that’s because the AC adequately pleads a deprivation of property based solely on

the allegation that the Plaintiff “has incurred tens of thousands of dollars in citations because the lots

remain undeveloped.” AC ¶ 80; see also id. ¶ 85 (alleging that the Plaintiff was “assessed tens of

thousands of dollars in citations related to NANA’s unfinished construction sites”). The Eleventh

Circuit has explained that the “issuance of a citation and fine” suffices for a claim asserting “a

deprivation of property resulting from state action.” Kupke v. Orange Cnty., 293 F. App’x 695, 698 (11th

Cir. 2008); see also Zen Grp., Inc. v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 80 F.4th 1319, 1327 (11th Cir. 2023)

(“[O]ur precedents establish that a due-process right attaches to the imposition of civil or

administrative penalties.”). And the AC does enough to plead inadequate process by claiming that

Hardemon’s “pocket veto” left the Plaintiff “with no hearing, no ability to advocate on its own behalf

to the government officials that could grant it relief, and no ability to have the decision of Hardemon

to bar the doors to the Commission Chamber reviewed on any level.” Response at 20.

To withstand summary judgment, of course, our Plaintiff will need to produce viable evidence

establishing (among other things) that it paid—and lacks sufficient state-law avenues to challenge—

those fines. But not today. In plausibly alleging that it “incurred” those “assessments” and that the

process available to it under Florida law leaves it stuck within “a state of limbo,” AC ¶ 79–80, the

Plaintiff has done enough to survive the MTD.

c. Injunctive Relief

We turn finally to Count VI, which is titled “42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Injunctive Relief)” and is

brought against both Defendants. See AC ¶¶ 131–144. Count VI alleges that the “Plaintiff is entitled

to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against Defendants for violations of Plaintiff’s

constitutionally-guaranteed rights of free speech, assembly, and petition.” Id. ¶ 140. And it “specifically

seeks an injunction which enjoins Miami-Dade County from exercising any reversion rights with

respect to the Program lot deeds until the Commission has held a vote on the proposed resolution

extending the development timetable.” Id. ¶ 144. The Defendants argue that “Count VI must be

dismissed” because “[i]njunctive relief . . . is a remedy, not a separate cause of action.” MTD at 14

(quotation marks omitted). We agree.

“It goes without saying that an injunction is an equitable remedy.” Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,

456 U.S. 305, 311 (1982). The Eleventh Circuit has therefore explained that “[t]here is no such thing

as a suit for a traditional injunction in the abstract.” Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1097

(11th Cir. 2004). Based on its title and substance, however, Count VI appears to allege a cause of

action for injunctive relief. It thus fails to state a claim.

Resisting this conclusion, the Plaintiff argues that “Count VI plainly pleads a claim for First

Amendment Retaliation under § 1983[.]” Response at 15. But that argument, as the Defendants point

out, “is directly contradicted by the title of Count VI[.]” Reply at 8. In any event, to the extent the

Plaintiff is trying through Count VI to assert a claim of First Amendment retaliation, that count is

simply “duplicative” of Counts I and II, “which already request ‘injunctive relief.’” Ibid. We’ll therefore

dismiss Count VI.

III. Leave to Amend

Our prior Order noted that the Plaintiff had requested leave to amend only through “a single

sentence at the end of its Response—without any argument as to how an amended complaint would

overcome the problems we’ve identified[.]” Order at 19. We nevertheless gave our Plaintiff another

chance to plead additional facts. See ibid. Now, however, our Plaintiff commits that very same mistake

again, punctuating its Response with another cursory, one-sentence request for leave to amend. See

Response at 20 (“Should the Court determine that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim as to any of the

Amended Complaint’s counts, Plaintiff respectfully requests leave to file a Second Amended

Complaint.”). We decline to extend the same courtesy this time around.

The Eleventh Circuit has made clear that “filing a motion is the proper method to request

leave to amend a complaint”—and that a proper motion to amend “should either set forth the

substance of the proposed amendment or attach a copy of the proposed amendment.” Cita Tr. Co.

AG v. Fifth Third Bank, 879 F.3d 1151, 1157 (11th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). So, “where a request for

leave to file an amended complaint simply is imbedded within an opposition memorandum, the issue

has not been raised properly.” Newton v. Duke Energy Fla., LLC, 895 F.3d 1270, 1277 (11th Cir. 2018)

(cleaned up); see also Pop v. LuliFama.com LLC, 145 F.4th 1285, 1298 (11th Cir. 2025) (“The only place

that [Plaintiff] requested leave to amend was on the last page of his response in opposition to the

defendants’ motions to dismiss,” so “it had no legal effect.” (cleaned up)).

Our Plaintiff disregarded those requirements. And we’ve already warned it about shortcutting

the leave-to-amend process. We won’t be saving the Plaintiff from itself again. See Wagner v. Daewoo

Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A district court is not required to grant a

plaintiff leave to amend his complaint sua sponte[.]’”’).

CONCLUSION

After careful review, therefore, we ORDER and ADJUDGE as follows:

1. The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 43] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in

part.

a. Counts I, IV, VI, VU, and VIII are DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. The parties shall file an updated joint scheduling report, as required by S.D. FLA. L.R.

16.1(b)(2), by August 4, 2026.

DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of mee a on July 20,

ROY K. ALTMAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cc: counsel of record

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