McCaa

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

CEDRIQUEZ McCAA, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:26-CV-484-RAH

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the Court on Petitioner Cedriquez McCaa’s petition for

writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1. McCaa alleges he earned

credits under the First Step Act and the Second Chance Act while incarcerated and,

because the credits were greater than the amount of time remaining on his term of

imprisonment, the unused credits should be applied to reduce his term of supervised

release.1 Id.

A court has the power “to examine and dismiss frivolous habeas petitions prior

to any answer or other pleading by the state.” Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 328

(5th Cir. 1999); Daniel v. Gordy, No. 4:17-CV-0036-KOB-JEO, 2018 WL 1305464,

at *5 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 13, 2018) (citing Bundy v. Wainwright, 808 F.2d 1410, 1414–

15 (11th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases

authorizes courts to summarily dismiss a petition that is facially deficient without

requiring a response from the government). Under Rule 4, “[i]f it plainly appears

1 McCaa was sentenced by this court to 188 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised

release; he was released from federal custody on May 15, 2026. See United States of America v.

McCaa, Case No. 2:10-CR-191-RAH-CWB (M. D. Ala.) (Doc. 56 at 2, 4; Doc. 171 at 1).

from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief

in the district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify

the petitioner.” Paez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 947 F.3d 649, 654–55 (11th Cir.

2020) (quoting Rule 4 and finding no abuse of discretion when district court sua

sponte raised statute of limitations issue during screening of § 2254 petition).

It is well established that a federal prisoner who seeks habeas corpus relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “must exhaust his available administrative remedies before

he can obtain relief [from this court in a habeas action].” Davis v. Warden, FCC

Coleman-USP I, 661 F. App’x 561, 562 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Santiago-Lugo v.

Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 474–75 (11th Cir. 2015)). Although “the administrative-

exhaustion requirement was judge-made, rather than jurisdictional . . . [t]he

[administrative] exhaustion requirement is still a requirement; it’s just not a

jurisdictional one.” Id. at 562 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “In order to

properly exhaust administrative remedies, a petitioner must comply with an agency’s

deadlines and procedural rules.” Id. at 562 (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81,

90–91 (2006)). A court may sua sponte dismiss a habeas petition under Rule 4 if the

petitioner failed to exhaust. Brown v. United States, No. 23-60288-CIV, 2023 WL

2045583, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2023) (noting that “courts throughout our Circuit

have uniformly dismissed § 2241 petitions challenging the calculations of ETCs

under the First Step Act when the petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies”); Cannata v. United States, No. 4:21-CV-283-MW-HTC, 2021 WL

4254942, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No.

4:21-CV-283-MW/HTC, 2021 WL 4244283 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 17, 2021) (dismissing

§ 2241 petition sua sponte based on lack of exhaustion).

McCaa originally filed his petition as a motion for reconsideration in his

underlying criminal case in this court. See United States of America v. McCaa, Case

No. 2:10-CR-191-RAH-CWB (M. D. Ala.) (Doc. 168). However, because the proper

vehicle to challenge the execution of a sentence is a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, the

Court entered an order striking the motion and directing the Clerk to file the

document in a new civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Id. (Doc. 171). In the

petition, McCaa contends that “[a]ny administrative remedy procedure . . . will be

FUTILE at this point in release without creating a protected liberty interest.” Doc. 1

at 2. Thus, it is clear from the face of the petition that McCaa failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies before seeking relief from this Court. Further, his

conclusory statement that any administrative remedy would be futile is insufficient

to excuse the exhaustion requirement, and his petition is facially deficient. See

Morrison v. Neely, No. 7:25-CV-300-CLM-NAD, 2026 WL 1252094, at *4 (N.D.

Ala. Apr. 9, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 7:25-CV-300-CLM-

NAD, 2026 WL 1248562 (N.D. Ala. May 6, 2026) (rejecting petitioner’s conclusory

assertion that the administrative process was unavailable or futile) (citing Marquez

v. Washington, No. 2:24-CV-765-WKW, 2025 WL 2648247, at *7 (M.D. Ala. Sept.

15, 2025) (“Petitioner’s conclusory statements of his belief that exhaustion of

administrative remedies is futile are insufficient to excuse his failure to exhaust

before seeking habeas relief.”); Martin v. Neely, No. 7:24-cv-267-AMM-GMB,

2024 WL 4521942, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 19, 2024), report and recommendation

adopted, 2024 WL 4520939 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 17, 2024) (“Martin’s belief that

exhaustion would have been futile is entirely conclusory and thus is insufficient to

excuse her failure to exhaust.”); Penalosa v. Stone, No. CV-322-041, 2022 WL

11456512, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 22, 2022), report and recommendation adopted,

2022 WL 11429299 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 19, 2022) (“[C]ourts considering the issue of

calculation of time credits under the First Step Act have enforced exhaustion

requirements and rejected futility arguments.” (collecting cases)).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that McCaa’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition is

DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust available administrative

remedies.

The Clerk is DIRECTED to send McCaa a copy of this Order as notice of the

dismissal.

A final judgment will issue separately.

DONE and ORDERED on this 21st day of July 2026.

CHIEF ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE